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THE
GOOD



Rear-admiral Karel Doorman

THE
BAD



Captain K.N.I.L. Raymond Westerling

AND THE
Virtuous



Captain flyer Erik Hazelhoff Roelfzema

‘The good, the bad and the virtuous’

The virtue-ethical theory of Alasdair MacIntyre applied to military practice

Een wetenschappelijke proeve op het gebied van de managementwetenschappen

Proefschrift

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Preface

It was sometime in the eighties of the last century that I - by sheer coincidence - saw Stanley Kubrick's film: '2001: a space odyssey'. I found it a fascinating film, especially because of the unusual combination of an intriguing story with classical music - which at that time I did not particularly like - and science fiction images - which I did not like particularly as well. Years later I found out that the score of the opening scenes was Richard Strauss' musical poem 'Also sprach Zarathustra'. I bought the compact disc and enjoined listening to it. A few years later it occurred to me that Zarathustra also referred to a book; which I then bought and read. This was the first book of Wilhelm Friedrich Nietzsche I read and than another and another. Next I started with Schopenhauer and before long I was seriously interested in philosophy. The question what to do after my retirement - after serving for 35 years as a cavalry officer - was therefore easily answered: I would study philosophy.

I entered the Utrecht University in 2003 as a part-time student and after two years I felt confident enough to become a full time student. I graduated as a bachelor in December 2007 and the next year entered a master course in applied ethics which I accomplished in 2009. During these years I was impressed and motivated by my teachers. I am especially grateful to dr. Jan Vorstenbosch in the way he taught and inspired me. Also dr. Marcel Verweij of the ethics institute proved an inspiring tutor and companion.

When I finished my bachelor and master studies the question arose: 'What next'? After some serious deliberation I decided to try and achieve a PhD degree. My aim was to combine my philosophical ambitions and my involvement in the military profession of which I had been a proud and committed member. I found professor dr. Desiree Verwey - a tutor in philosophy and ethics at the Netherlands Defence Academy - willing to support my plans. She proved not only a supporter, but also a highly stimulant tutor. I owe her much! Furthermore I am very grateful to the Ministry of Defence, especially the then commander in chief of the armed forces, general Peter van Uhm: without his support and the help from many others in the armed forces of all services and ranks, I would not have been able to achieve my goals. There is one other party that deserves special praise and that is the library of the Netherlands Defence Academy and the librarians, under the direction of Mirjam Kruize. They never failed me in their highly professional support. Last but not least I would like to thank my friend André Hartslief, originally from South Africa, who took it on to oversee and when necessary to correct my use of the English language.

Finally I would like to thank my wife Anneke, our children and all our friends who never tired - at least pretended so - when I again started talking of my schemes, ideas, plans and ambitions! At times I must have been a very tiring companion. I thank you all for your patience and support.

Amersfoort, 2013

Abstract

Nowadays democratic constitutional states seldom go to war because survival of the nation state is at stake. They mostly participate in 'new wars' in order to maintain the international rule of law. This means that they must fight these wars in accordance with the tenets of the *Jus in Bello* traditions. If they do not they will lose their moral high ground. However, 'new wars' are far more complex than old wars. New wars are fought by often isolated small units against a foe who is not always recognizable as such. These circumstances make it difficult for the soldiers involved in the fighting to uphold the tenets of the *Jus in Bello* traditions. The question then is how to fortify the moral attitude of the soldiers who have to fight these wars? In my opinion virtues rather than rules could provide the required moral strengthening.

The classic Aristotelian concept of virtue ethics is based on the idea of an overarching goal in life living a good life. Living such a 'good life' requires virtues. These virtues enable a man to flourish in life and thus live the 'good life' in which he realizes his capabilities and talents. Alasdair MacIntyre states that in modern times the shared notion of an overarching goal in life is lost. Nowadays there are just too many opinions and convictions about what is the aim of human life. These convictions are based on religion, nationality, other elements of cultural background and individual personality.

However, mankind participates in activities, many of which are shared and many of which are enjoyable. Men enjoy these activities when done well. They enjoy them even more when they go better and most of all when they are done best. Men enjoy excelling in what they like to do. The more complex the task, the more challenging it is to achieve it and the more enjoyment one experiences at its successful accomplishment of the task at hand. To excel in all kind of activities is a goal that anyone can recognize and accept. MacIntyre states that the aspiration to excellence in activities one enjoys results in the development of dispositions tailored to the practice, which enhance the excellence of the activities conducted in the practice. These dispositions are the modern virtues. This means that those virtues can be identified by analyzing the practice and why it is enjoyed and which dispositions enhance the enjoyment by setting standards of excellence. MacIntyre's theory promises a clear understanding of specific practices and the relevant virtues. It explains the role of institutional structures and the difference between these with their practice. The theory relates how narrative provides a method to imbue virtues and it entails the necessity of a close link with the wider moral tradition in which the virtues specific to a practice are embedded.

The central aim of my thesis is to develop the outline of a policy on how to apply virtue ethics in military practice in order to ensure that individual soldiers will uphold adequate moral standards in their actions in 'new wars'. The question is how to achieve this aim. My hypothesis by which I aim to answer the central question is that the theory of virtue ethics as elaborated by Alasdair MacIntyre in his book 'After Virtue' provides a suitable instrument to identify, develop, instil and uphold the required moral standards in the military. In my thesis I attempt to prove my hypothesis by developing a model for application of the virtue ethical theory of MacIntyre on military practice.

Application of this assumption to the military lead to the following findings. The military practice is characterized by the following constitutive elements: task, arms, cooperation, enemies, danger, an undetermined time and place, and rules that govern the practice. In

relation to these constitutive elements, I identified the reasons why soldiers enjoy military activities. These are: satisfaction in accomplishing tasks, pride in wearing an uniform and bearing arms, a feeling of belonging as a result of close cooperation in a primary group, contentment in overcoming the enemy, excitement and thrill in facing danger, the challenge and adventure of strange places, and the structure and stability provided by clear rules. Based on the findings so far, I then proceeded to identify 7 virtues of military character and 1 virtue of military intellect. The virtues of military character are: sense of responsibility, military competence, comradeship, respect - for fellow soldiers, civilians and even the enemy - , courage, resilience, and discipline. These virtues of military character are a prerequisite to establish what needs to be done, both practically and morally. How to achieve what needs to be done, is a matter of deliberation which requires the virtue of intellect: practical wisdom. This virtue-ethical framework is tangible; the virtues accommodate the pursuit of excellence and provide clear goals - and also yardsticks - for military education and training and personal development. The acquisition of these dispositions allows a soldier to be truly virtuous.

MacIntyre also argues that these virtues can be developed and in this process of becoming a virtuous person narrative plays an important role. It provides the necessary context in practices, supports the development of the virtues and creates a unified identity. Stories provide practical clues about what to expect and what is appropriate to do in a specific context. Over time - by instruction, training, exercising, education, the examples set by role models and experience, all activities involving stories - being a member of the military will evolve into a typical military bearing. Eventually this bearing becomes part of one's identity. Narrative also creates flexibility for interpretations which suit specific 'tribes' within the military: services, corps, regiments, units etc. However, building such a military character will require a strong and continuous effort, based on a clear policy.

After having identified the constitutive elements of the military practice, the reasons why soldiers enjoy serving, I established which dispositions enhance the enjoyment of serving and support the aspirations to excellence. Then I investigated the role of narrative in the development of a military identity. Next I conducted a reality check by interviewing a number of soldiers with proven operational combat experience. To further validate my findings I also interviewed healthcare workers and civil servants. The outcomes of these interviews corroborated my findings.

Furthermore, MacIntyre explains that a practice needs an institution to support it. The institution provides the practice with a context, means and secures continuity. The armed forces serve as the institution that sustains military practice. The armed forces embody the purpose of military practice. The institution also provides benefits for those who serve in them. These generic benefits are money, status and power. The benefits gained by means of working in the institution are not the same as the enjoyment gained in participating in the practice. Modern activities often show a combination of these factors. However this distinction can grow into a gap: the institutional objectives become separated from the needs of the practice. Managerial ethos and institutional instrumentality gain in weight at the expense of the excellence of the practice. This development can be noticed in several branches of Dutch society, for example in education, healthcare and also in the military. In this instrumental approach rules are the means which are used to try to direct activities; not only in a practical sense but also pertaining to morals. A code of conduct is such a rule based institutional instrument

aiming at securing morality. Comparing the actual Dutch military code of conduct with the virtue-ethical framework I developed shows that the framework finds more support in the field and is better suited to the military practice than the present code. An international comparison adds weight to this conclusion.

The last issue which MacIntyre addresses is that the virtues of a practice need to be founded in the wider moral traditions. The lasting characteristics of Dutch moral traditions are: freedom and equality, political and religious tolerance, cooperativeness and solidarity, (the latter also in international orientation). These characteristics are in line with the virtue-ethical framework I developed for the military. However, the perspective from tradition also allows for another question: how to reconcile the needs of the nation on the one hand with the liability of the soldier to get wounded or killed over issues in which he has no direct personal interest on the one hand with on the other. This kind of bond cannot be captured in a modern contract, but requires a covenant. A covenant binds the community and the individuals over time and implies a strong moral obligation even in difficult times and in the face of danger. A covenant is a 'fiduciary relationship' which rests on lasting mutual trust and confidence. This means that the parties to the covenant must be aware of the responsibilities this involves. It seems that currently this awareness is lacking in the Netherlands. This awareness could be improved by reaffirming the character of a practice of the military.

All in all there are good reasons which support the conclusion that the virtue-ethical theory as developed by Alasdair MacIntyre in his book *After Virtue* provides a suitable instrument to develop a virtue-ethical framework which is suited to the military practice. Application of this framework in the Dutch armed forces would solve a number of the present problems and could contribute to a better understanding of the military in wider Dutch society.

Samenvatting

Democratische rechtstaten raken heden ten dag niet verwickeld in nieuwe oorlogen, omdat het voortbestaan van de natiestaat in gevaar is. Meestal nemen zij deel aan nieuwe oorlogen teneinde de internationale rechtsorde te handhaven. Dit betekent onder meer dat de oorlogvoering moet plaatsvinden in overeenstemming met de waarden van de traditie van het *Jus in Bello*. Als zij zich daar niet aan houden verliezen ze de morele grondslag waarvoor ze deelnamen aan een gewapende interventie. Tegelijkertijd moeten we constateren dat deze nieuwe oorlogen veel complexer zijn dan oude oorlogen. De nieuwe oorlogen worden vooral gevoerd door kleine - veelal geïsoleerd optredende - eenheden, tegen een tegenstander die vaak niet als zodanig is te herkennen. Deze omstandigheden maken het erg ingewikkeld voor de soldaten om de waarden van het *Jus in Bello* hoog te houden. De vraag is dan ook hoe onder deze omstandigheden morele ontsporingen zijn te voorkomen en het morele bewustzijn te versterken van de soldaten die deze oorlogen moeten uitvechten. Naar mijn mening is dit morele bewustzijn beter te bewerkstelligen met behulp van deugden dan met reglementen.

De klassieke Aristotelische opvatting met betrekking tot deugdethiek is gebaseerd op één uiteindelijk doel in het leven, te weten een goed leven te leiden. Een goed leven leiden vereist deugden. Deugden stellen de mens in staat een goed leven te leiden waarin hij zijn vermogens en talenten tot bloei brengt. De kardinale deugden zijn rechtvaardigheid, moed, matigheid en wijsheid. Alasdair MacIntyre stelt dat in de moderne tijd er niet langer sprake is van eenheid van opvatting over het uiteindelijke doel van het leven. Met betrekking tot deze kwestie bestaan vandaag de dag vele en uiteenlopende opvattingen. Deze overtuigingen zijn gebaseerd op religie, nationaliteit andere vormen van culturele achtergrond en ook de persoonlijke identiteit. Dit betekent dat er geen eenheid van opvatting bestaat met betrekking tot de noodzaak van deugden en welke dat zouden moeten zijn.

Tegelijkertijd nemen mensen allemaal deel aan verschillende activiteiten, vaak samen met anderen en vaak ook met plezier. Mensen vinden het leuk dingen goed te doen, en het wordt veelal nog leuker als het beter gaat en het grootste plezier is gelegen in de dingen op hun best te doen. Alle mensen vinden het leuk te excelleren in dingen die ze graag doen. Dit plezier in een succesvolle prestatie neemt toe naarmate de activiteit complexer en veeleisender is. Het willen uitblinken in allerlei activiteiten is een doel dat door iedereen kan worden herkend en aanvaard. MacIntyre stelt dat het streven te willen slagen in activiteiten die men leuk vindt, leidt tot de ontwikkeling van op de praktijk afgestemde houdingen die het prestatieniveau bevorderen. Deze houdingen vormen de moderne deugden. Dit houdt onder meer in dat deze deugden kunnen worden geïdentificeerd door de praktijk te analyseren, na te gaan welke aantrekkingskracht ervan uitgaat, waarom die praktijk leuk wordt gevonden en welke houdingen die vreugde vergroten doordat daarmee een kwaliteitseis wordt neergezet.

De theorie van MacIntyre MacIntyre's belooft een inzicht te bieden in de verschillende praktijken en de daarbij behorende relevante deugden. De theorie verklaart voorts de rol van instituties en in welk opzicht deze verschilt van die van de praktijken. De theorie beschrijft verder de rol van narrativiteit bij het internaliseren van deugden en geeft voorts aan hoe belangrijk het is dat de deugden van specifiek praktijken passen binnen

de morele tradities van de samenleving. Het centrale doel van mijn dissertatie is aan te geven op welke wijze deugdethiek kan worden toegepast in de militaire praktijk teneinde de morele weerbaarheid te verhogen van soldaten die in deze nieuwe oorlogen moeten optreden. Ik wil deze centrale doelstelling realiseren op basis van de hypothese dat voor het hooghouden van de morele standaarden van de militaire praktijk een geschikt instrument wordt gevonden in de deugdethische theorie van Alasdair MacIntyre, zoals hij deze heeft uiteengezet in zijn boek *'After Virtue'* en waarin hij aangeeft hoe deugden kunnen worden geïdentificeerd, gevormd en eigen gemaakt. In mijn dissertatie wil ik deze hypothese staven door een raamwerk te ontwikkelen voor de toepassing van de theorie van Alasdair MacIntyre op de militaire praktijk.

De toepassing van deze theorie op de militaire praktijk heeft geleid tot de volgende bevindingen. De militaire praktijk heeft de navolgende samenstellende kenmerken: een taak, een wapenuitrusting, samenwerking, een vijand, gevaar, een onbestemde plaats en tijd en er gelden regels. Als een van deze elementen ontbreekt is er geen sprake van een militaire praktijk. In samenhang met deze samenstellende delen heb ik een aantal verlangens geïdentificeerd die een rol spelen in de aantrekkingskracht van de militaire praktijk. Dit betreft: tevredenheid over het volbrengen van taken; trots op het dragen van een uniform en bewapening; je thuis voelen als onderdeel van een nauwe samenwerking in een primaire groep; voldoening over het verslaan van een vijand; de spanning en sensatie van een dreigend gevaar; de uitdaging en het avontuur van vreemde plaatsen; de structuur en duidelijkheid die worden geboden door heldere regels. Vervolgens heb ik op basis van het vorenstaande zeven militaire karakterdeugden en een militaire intellectuele deugd vastgesteld. De militaire karakterdeugden zijn: verantwoordelijkheidsbesef, militair vakmanschap, kameraadschap, respect - voor mede militairen, burgers en zelfs de vijand - moed, veerkracht en discipline. Deze militaire karakterdeugden stellen militairen in staat vast te stellen wat vereist is, wat moet worden gedaan, zowel in praktisch als in moreel opzicht. Hoe daaraan inhoud moet worden gegeven vereist de militaire deugd van het intellect: praktische wijsheid. Dit deugdethische raamwerk is tastbaar, de deugden ondersteunen het streven naar voortreffelijkheid en vormen duidelijke doelen - en maatstaven - voor militaire opleidingen, training en vorming. De verwerving van deze deugden stellen de militair in staat werkelijk deugdzzaam te zijn.

MacIntyre stelt ook dat deze houdingen kunnen worden aangeleerd en ontwikkeld en dat in dit proces narrativiteit een grote rol speelt. Het schept de context waarin een praktijk plaatsvindt, het ondersteunt de vorming van deugden en draagt bij aan de ontwikkeling van een identiteit. Verhalen geven praktische aanknopingspunten voor wat men mag verwachten en wat in een bepaalde situatie het juiste is om te doen. Na verloop van tijd - door opleiding, training, oefening, vorming, de voorbeelden van rolmodellen en ervaring, allemaal zaken die verhalen vormen - zal het deel uitmaken van een militaire organisatie - een militaire familie - leiden tot de ontwikkeling van een typisch militaire houding die deel wordt van de identiteit. Narrativiteit schept ook flexibiliteit, doordat de interpretatie kan worden aangepast aan de tradities van specifieke verbanden in de krijgsmacht, te weten: krijgsmachtdelen, korpsen, regimenten en eenheden. We moeten ons daarbij wel realiseren dat het vormen van een militair karakter een voortdurende inspanning vergt die moet zijn gebaseerd op krachtig leiderschap gesteund door een helder en krachtig beleid.

Na te hebben vastgesteld wat de samenstellende delen van de militaire praktijk zijn, welke elementen de aantrekkingskracht van die praktijk vormen en welke deugden het plezier in de praktijk verhogen en bijdragen aan het nastreven van voortreffelijkheid, heb ik door middel van interviews getoetst in hoeverre mijn bevindingen in de praktijk worden gesteund. Om de betrouwbaarheid van mijn toetsing te vergroten heb ik behalve militairen ook personen geïnterviewd die werkzaam waren in de gezondheidszorg en als gemeente ambtenaar. De uitkomsten van deze interviews gaven aan dat mijn bevindingen door het veld worden onderschreven.

Voorts stelt MacIntyre dat een praktijk niet kan voortbestaan zonder de steun van een institutie. De institutie voorziet de praktijk van een context, verschaft benodigde middelen en stelt de continuïteit veilig. Voor de ontplooiing van militaire activiteiten vormt de krijgsmacht de geëigende institutie. De krijgsmacht geeft inhoud en vorm aan het doel van militaire activiteiten. De institutie verschaft haar leden ook beloning. In algemene termen gaat het hierbij om geld, macht en status. Dit geldt ook voor de militaire institutie. De beloning die wordt verkregen door voor een institutie te werken, is niet dezelfde als het plezier dat wordt verworven door deel te nemen in een praktijk. Dit onderscheid kan uitgroeien tot een kloof; de institutionele doeleinden raken los van de behoeften van de praktijk. Het instrumentele gedachtegoed van managers en institutionele belangen krijgen de overhand, veelal ten koste van de praktijk en het daarin verankerde streven naar kwaliteit. Deze ontwikkeling kan in een aantal branches in de Nederlandse samenleving worden opgemerkt, bijvoorbeeld in het onderwijs, de gezondheidszorg en ook in de krijgsmacht. In een instrumentele benadering vormen regels het favoriete middel activiteiten te sturen; niet alleen in praktische zin, maar ook in moreel opzicht. Een gedragscode is zo'n instrument waarmee de institutie tracht moreel correct gedrag te bevorderen. Vergelijking van de huidige militaire gedragscode met het door mij ontwikkelde deugdethische raamwerk laat zien dat het raamwerk meer wordt gedragen door het veld en beter is afgestemd op de militaire praktijk dan de huidige gedragscode. Een internationale vergelijking (met F, de BRD, het VK en de US) verleent deze conclusie extra gewicht.

Het laatste punt dat MacIntyre aan de orde stelt, betreft de noodzaak dat de deugden van een praktijk zijn verankerd in de bredere morele tradities. De duurzame kenmerken van de Nederlandse traditie zijn: vrijheid en gelijkheid; politieke en religieuze verdraagzaamheid; gemeenschapzin en solidariteit, zowel in intern gerichte als in internationale zin. Het militaire deugdethische raamwerk dat ik heb ontwikkeld past goed in deze tradities. Maar het perspectief vanuit de traditie vestigt de aandacht op nog een zaak die in dit verband aan de orde moet worden gesteld en dat is de wijze waarop vorm en inhoud wordt gegeven aan de band tussen de maatschappij en haar militairen. Hoe verzoenen we de belangen van de staat met het risico dat militairen lopen om gewond te raken of zelfs te sneuvelen in conflicten waarin ze zelf geen enkel direct belang hebben? Deze band kan niet worden vastgelegd in een arbeidscontract, maar vergt een verbond. Een verbond bindt de gemeenschap en de individuele leden daarvan over een lange periode, zelfs eeuwen, en impliceert een sterke morele verplichting zelfs in moeilijke tijden en ten opzichte van een dreigend gevaar. Een verbond vormt een duurzame relatie die is gebaseerd op wederzijds vertrouwen. Dit houdt in dat de partijen van het verbond zich bewust moeten zijn van de verantwoordelijkheid die het verbond met zich meebrengt. Het heeft er alle schijn van dat dit bewustzijn in Nederland

ontbreekt. Erkenning van de krijgsmacht als praktijk zou dat bewustzijn kunnen verbeteren.

Al met al zijn er goede argumenten die de conclusie rechtvaardigen dat de deugdethische theorie zoals deze door Alasdair MacIntyre is ontvouwd in zijn boek *'After Virtue'* zich uitstekend leent om een deugdethisch raamwerk te ontwikkelen dat is afgestemd op de (militaire) praktijk die het beoogt te steunen. Toepassing van dit raamwerk zou een aantal actuele problemen binnen de Nederlandse krijgsmacht kunnen wegnemen en zou ook kunnen bijdragen in een bredere verankering van de krijgsmacht in de maatschappij.

Chapter1 : introduction.

Preface.

1.1. War is a phenomenon as old as the human race and there is no real prospect that the phenomenon of war will become obsolete.¹ Conflicts go with being human and war is the ultimate conflict, as it involves the wilful killing of fellow humans.² War and violence have many causes and manifestations.³ As a result it is the subject of a vast quantity of explanations, analysis and controversy. The concept of war as a phenomenon can for example be explained in strategic, economic, sociological, legal and many other terms. It is my purpose to investigate war from an ethical point of view: the ethics of war as a social practice; the ethics of those that wage war.⁴ In the last decades however, the face of war has changed considerable. These changes do not only pertain to strategy, tactics and implements of war, but also to its moral aspects. There are many developments that have an impact on the moral aspect of war. For the sake of brevity I will limit a discussion of these developments to three main features which have direct moral consequences: just war, new war and the density and intensity of war.

Just war.

1.2.1. For good reasons war is considered an anomaly, a disruption of the normal peaceful cooperation between nations and peoples. War involves violence, destruction and killing and is rightly considered a means of last resort. Therefore **the decision to go to war** is a profound one, a decision that is not taken lightly and needs careful justification; both to the international community and the own nation. The need for justification of war gave rise to the development of the tradition of just war. This tradition aims also to limit the occurrence of war and to lighten the consequences of war. This long tradition resulted in a collection of modern laws. However, war is a complex and dynamic phenomenon and the law is always slow to catch up with actual developments. Furthermore the law covers only those issues that are incorporated in the law itself and these are never complete. Therefore the moral tradition of just war is still a powerful argument in discussions about morality and war.⁵

This is especially the case in western democratic and constitutional states. Nowadays these states are not involved in wars in which the survival of the own nation state is at

¹ Arendt, H. (1970). On violence. San Diego, Harcourt, Brace & Company. P5 'The chief reason warfare is still with us is neither a secret death wish of the human species nor an irrepressible instinct of aggression...but the simple fact that no substitute for this final arbiter in international (*and intra-national*) affairs has yet appeared on the political scene.'*(Italics added by the author)*.

² See also Hobbes, T. (1996). Leviathan. Oxford, University Press. P 59 '...men are continually in competition for honour and dignity ... and consequently amongst men there arises on that ground envy, hatred and finally war...' and P 85-86 '...during time that men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war...'.

³ The Dutch philosopher Hans Achterhuis identifies six possible causes of violent conflicts: violence as a rational option to solve problems; mimetically desire, emulation; tension between morals and politics which results in the legitimisation of violence; lack of recognition as an equal partner; an aggressive human nature as the result of a evolutionary and genetically development; the 'we' and 'they' antithesis. See Achterhuis, H. (2008). Met alle geweld. Rotterdam, Lemniscaat.

⁴ Walzer, M. (1977). Just and unjust wars. New York, Basic books. P 30 'Hence the peculiar horror of war: it is a social practice in which force is used by and against men as loyal or constrained members of states and not as individuals who choose their own enterprises and activities.'

⁵ Ibid, P 288: 'Moral argument is especially important in wartime because the laws of war are radically incomplete.'

stake. Presently these states participate in war in order to: restore the international rule of law, to stop the horror of extreme internal strife and lately even to achieve a regime change.⁶ The governments of these states that want to participate in war have to convince the international community and their citizens that they made a right decision, even when there is no direct danger to the own state. They have to convince their constituency of the necessity to go to war, or face the danger of being ousted in the next elections. And they have to convince the people that will have to pay the price in reduced prosperity, increased taxes and relatives killed or maimed. However, as the survival of the nation state is not at stake, there remain in fact only a few arguments to go to war. Although these arguments may fit well in the standard 'state criterion', they do not necessarily have any public credibility or support. Often there is only one credible public justification and that is morality. In this claim on a moral obligation to go to war, the tradition of just war plays a significant role, both in the moral justification of the cause for which we go to war, and - also as a consequence thereof - in the justification of the morally responsible way in which we will conduct the war. What this implies requires a short introduction of the main tenets of the tradition of just war.

1.2.2. Morality and war, as embedded in **the tradition of just war**, is based on two aspects: the legitimacy of war as such and the actual conduct of the war: the first kind of judgement is adjectival in character: we say that a war is just or unjust. 'The second is adverbial: we say that a war is being fought justly or unjustly. Medieval writers made the difference a matter of prepositions, distinguishing *jus ad bellum*, the justice of war, from *jus in bello*, justice in war. *Jus ad bellum* requires us to make judgements about aggression and self-defence; *jus in bello* about the observation or violation of the customary and positive rules of engagement. The two sorts of judgement are logically independent.'⁷ But although there is no logical relation between *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*, there is still a political relation. When a state claims the moral high ground in its justification to go to war, it cannot at the same time allow an immoral conduct of the war, as this would undermine its moral presumptions; even - if not especially - in the face of an enemy that does not endorse the tradition of just war.

1.2.3. The political relation between the just cause of the war and the just conduct of the war is also a matter of the **perception of war**; both in the international and national political community and by the wider public. In this respect media play an important role. Even when the public support of a war is already weak, and there are serious misgivings on the morality and legitimacy of participating in an armed conflict, media can - and often do - make the difference. Nowadays war is covered by all kind of media, even including video footage by those who actually participate in the fighting or by accidental bystanders.⁸ Events on the battlefield may reach the wider public in a matter

⁶ There is still some controversy about the claim that regime change is a legitimate cause for war. See the introduction to the 2006 4th edition of Walzer, M. (1977). *Just and unjust wars*. New York, Basic books. P x: "It isn't only aggressiveness, then but also the murderousness that makes a political regime a legitimate candidate for forcible transformation. Still, the primary aim of the intervention is to stop the killing: regime change follows from that purpose."

⁷ Ibid, P 21.

⁸ On November 19th 2005 US marines killed 15 civilians. The tragedy of Haditha may have been left at that - just another statistic of "war-torn" Iraq - a place too dangerous to be reported properly by journalists. The US command at that time reported an incident at Haditha, but did not refer to any civilian casualties. The following day a self-styled local journalist and human-rights activist, Taher Thabet al-Hadithi, got his video camera out and filmed scenes in which were shown the bodies of women and children, still in their

of days, even hours. For this reason a cover up of war crimes is seldom effective, although the incentive to try to do so is high. Media coverage of 'bloody events' or even war crimes committed, may well trigger public outrage. This public outrage could undermine public and political support for the war and even lead to an early end of the commitment.

1.2.4. In short, the concept of Just War - both *Ad Bellum* and *In Bello* - has become an even more important issue than it already used to be. And because of this increased interest in the appropriate conduct of war - by the political community and public opinion - an extra moral weight is put on the shoulders of those who wage war. This weight is added to the personal moral misgivings a soldier may have about the conduct of the war and is further increased by the direct visibility in the media coverage of the conduct of the war.

New war.

1.3.1. War as a human activity, a social practice, is characterized by the repetitious use of coherent patterns, methods and rules. But as human social patterns are not static, war is also subject to the internal dynamics of social behaviour: patterns change, other methods are introduced and new rules develop. Each era has its own kind of war and in the present time we have to deal with modern types of warfare. The overall feature of these modern wars is **asymmetry**. After the fall of the Soviet bloc and faced with the overwhelming military force of western nations, especially the United States, a new type of warfare has started to develop. Some characteristics of this new kind of asymmetric warfare are: focus on the rear of the opponent instead of on the front, including psychological warfare exploiting the openness of western societies as a vulnerability; using a non-national or transnational base like ethnicity or religion instead of a geographical powerbase; direct attack of the cultural base of a nation, e.g. by drugs trafficking, radicalizing malcontents, infiltrating institutions and conducting cyber attacks on the financial systems, etc.⁹ But apart from this very broad characterization of this new kind of warfare, we still lack a proper theory that covers all aspects of this type of warfare and how to cope with it. Several attempts have been made to develop a common theoretical framework of these new wars, but no consensus is reached yet.¹⁰

nightclothes, apparently shot in their own homes; interior walls and ceilings peppered with bullet holes; bloodstains on the floor. Some time later, Mr Hadithi's tape was passed to the US newsmagazine Time, which published an account based on the footage. Source: Asser, M. (2008). "What happened at Haditha?" BBC news. London. Another example is the documentary 'Fokking Hell' by the Dutch journalist Peter ter Velden, which is largely based on video footage shot by Dutch soldiers serving in the province of Uruzgan in central Afghanistan. Velden, ter, P. (2010). *Fokking Hell*. The Netherlands, Nederlandse Omroep Stichting.

⁹ See Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui (2002). Unrestricted Warfare. Los Angeles, Pan American Publishing Company. The authors, both colonels in the Chinese peoples liberation Army, sketch an extensive if rather dismal picture of these kind of 'asymmetric' attacks.

¹⁰ See i.e. Smith, R. (2008). The utility of force. New York, Vintage Books, in which general Rupert Smith introduces the concept of 'war amongst the people'. Another author is Robb, J. (2007). Brave new war. Hoboken, New Jersey, John Wiley & sons, who claims a role for globalization and coined the term 'open source war'. Yet another term is 'hybrid warfare' to indicate the blurring distinction between military and police action and regular and irregular warfare; see Wilkie, R. (2009). "Hybrid warfare." Air and Space Power journal 23(4): P 13-18 and Hoffman, F. G. (2007). Conflict in 21st century: the rise of hybrid wars. Arlington, Potomac institute for policy studies.

However these 'new' wars¹¹ share one common factor which is that the 'new' belligerents : '...deliberately violate all the conventions of 'old' war, as well as the new body of human rights legislation that has been built up since World War II.'¹² These new wars share a total disregard of the tradition of just war and the international and humanitarian laws.¹³

1.3.2. And these 'new' wars are no small affairs. Despite the fact that these 'new' wars are sometimes labelled as 'limited' conflicts, the amount of casualties in such conflicts can be appalling. The intrastate ethnic conflict in 1994 in Rwanda cost the lives of approximately 800.000 people¹⁴. Estimates as to the number of people killed in the armed conflicts endemic to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the last 20 years vary from 900.000 to 5.500.000. A 'safe' guess is that this Congolese intrastate and trans-national conflict cost 3 million victims of which 1 million were killed by violence and 2 million succumbed to malnutrition and disease.¹⁵ But also in Europe in the Balkan trans-national wars raged from 1991 to 1996 and despite extensive UN commitment a sordid number of approximately 110.000 people were killed. The 2003 war in Iraq cost an estimated 35.000 coalition casualties and some 200.000 Iraqi civilian casualties, after President Bush on May 1st 2003 made his 'Mission Accomplished' speech in which he declared that major combat operations in Iraq had ended.¹⁶ The Afghan war resulted - from its start in 2001 until the end of 2010 - in approximately 15.000 casualties suffered by the coalition forces, an estimated 30.000 insurgents killed or captured and some 25.000 civilian casualties. The after-effects in territories laid to waste by herbicides, poisonous gas, landmines and unexploded ordnances still cause casualties long after the hostilities ended.¹⁷ The violent activities of international terrorist networks, pirates and plain criminally inspired narcotics entrepreneurs add further complications to this already extremely complex picture of violence and war in which the only rule seems to be: 'no rules'.

1.3.3. So, while constitutional states aim at waging war in accordance within the tradition of just war, they are mostly faced with opponents who do not even pay lip service to the rule of law. This fact, this asymmetry, of course creates an extra moral pressure on the soldiers who face these totally ruthless fighters. They often experience this unbalance as fighting an enemy with one hand (or sometimes even two hands) tied behind their back.¹⁸ This unbalance is sometimes enhanced by the complications that result from being part of an international military involvement.

¹¹ This term 'new war' is coined by Kaldor, M. (2005). "Old wars, cold wars, new wars and the war on terror." *International politics* **42**(4): 491-493.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ignatieff, M. (1997). *The warrior's honor: ethnic war and the modern conscience*. New York, Henry Holt and Co. P6: 'War used to be fought by soldiers; it is now fought by irregulars. This may be one reason why postmodern war is so savage, why war crimes and atrocities are now integral to the very prosecution of war.'

¹⁴ van der Veen, R. (2004). *Afrika. Van de koude oorlog naar de 21e eeuw*. Amsterdam, KIT Publisher. P 201-203

¹⁵ Ibid, P 232

¹⁶ Burnham G., L. R., Doocy S., Roberts L., (2006). "Mortality before and after the 2003 invasion of Iraq: a cross-sectional cluster sample survey." *The Lancet* **368** (9545): 8.

¹⁷ Tyner, J. A. (2010). *Military legacies: a world made by war*. New York, Routledge.

¹⁸ This characterization pertains most strongly to land warfare, but not exclusively. Dutch Naval commanders during the 1991 Gulf war were required to call the Minister of Defence in person before

1.3.4. The UN is authorized by **the international community** and by international law to apply military force.¹⁹ Under chapter VII of the charter the UN are authorized to conduct peace-enforcement operations and under chapter VI peace-keeping operations can be mounted.²⁰ However, the UN depend on the member states to provide the military means necessary. The deployment of UN forces has created a new complication to the already complex character of war. UN peace-keeping troops are supposed to be impartial and even-handed. This is not always an easy task for the troops involved; a difficulty that is enhanced by unappreciative belligerents. Nevertheless the UN succeeded in creating an international touchstone for the legitimacy of the (inter)national use of violence. The UN Security Council has the power to condemn or to condone the use of violence. And although the UN lack the means to enforce the resolutions promulgated by the Security Council, these carry authority. As a result nations seek approval of the council in case of international use of violence. However, this development has only limited value as also non-state parties have made their violent appearance on the international stage and the UN Security Council holds no (formal nor material) jurisdiction over these non-state actors. Consequently UN military operations suffer from a number of shortcomings. Many of these shortcomings have a direct impact on the military capabilities and feasibilities. Which nations are prepared to contribute a contingent to the international force? And although the UN can state what is necessary in order to be able to conduct a successful campaign, ultimately the campaign has to be conducted with the assets which are contributed by the nations and within the nations' political constraints that are imposed. The assets pertain to the number of troops and equipment as well as to the international composition of the force. The constraints depend on the chapter under which the operation is mounted and the exact political mandate. The mandate and the ensuing Rules Of Engagement (ROE)²¹ can seriously limit military options. More limitations can occur because of caveats by nations that contribute to the force. Furthermore, the limitations involved and the operational options that are open to the UN force are well known to their opponents and they can orchestrate their resistance accordingly. These facts and circumstances create a problematic context for UN, or UN condoned international, military operations.

1.3.5. In short, because of the asymmetric attitude of the belligerent parties regarding the applications of rules, 'new' wars create a morally very difficult context for waging war. This problematic context could be further enhanced by the shortcomings that are often the case in an international intervention, such as: an inadequate force, an insufficient mandate, and a lacking unity of command and effort.

The density of war.

1.4.1. Apart from the very different opponents who face each other in 'new' wars there are other features that characterize this type of war. Fighting in 'new' wars is not as dense as in old wars. In old wars the armed forces involved conducted military

taking operational decisions. See: de Wijk, R. (1998). Vechten met een hand op de rug? Vredesondersteuning in escalerende conflicten. Clingendael notities. Den Haag: 61. P 33.

¹⁹ Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice (1985), United Nations, Department of Public Information. P 80.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ For every mission a set of Rules Of Engagement is established which reflects the mandate under which a mission is executed and addresses the limitations to the violence that is allowed in a number of specified 'standard' cases. See: Army, R. N. (1996). Military doctrine. The Hague, Army staff. P 97.

operations in defined combat zones with large units and formations that fought their campaigns and battles in close coordination, which resulted in a dense kind of warfare. 'New' wars, which are mainly land wars, do not involve set battles of armed hosts; basically this type of war is fought in a large number of small fights often spread over a large territory. Consequently these wars are fought in a large number of relatively small engagements. The majority of these armed contacts take place at the level of **small units**: platoons and groups (sometimes even on a smaller scale). The relatively small number of troops involved in the operation, the often large size of the area of operations and the 'modus operandi' by the opponents prohibit large scale combat operations. In 'old' wars military units were deployed and manoeuvred in relatively compact formations. Units were visibly and often even physically in touch with each other and there were always officers present to lead units at all levels. Although an operation may be conducted at battalion level, in 'new' wars soldiers will not see a battalion, mostly not even a company; at the most they will see their own platoon.²² This means that small unit leaders and even mere individual members of small units carry responsibilities that are substantial larger than they used to be in 'old' wars. This responsibility is not limited to their capability to execute their mission skilfully, independently and self-reliant, but also to independently upholding their moral standards. In 'new' wars small units are dispersed over relatively large areas with no direct physical, visual or other contact with other units or the higher echelon. As a result supervision by senior officers is often missing and relatively large responsibilities are delegated to junior leaders.

1.4.2. Another feature of the reduced density of new war is the **variety in the kind of armed confrontation**. It can be a well set ambush, involving a large number of fighters. But it can also be a relatively small affair of a pot-shot by a hidden gunman.²³ It can be a herdsman waving in the field who can pick up a rifle and shoot at the soldier once he turns his back. Sometimes 'child soldiers' are employed. Is the pedlar just trying to make a living, or is it a suicide bomber on the prowl? It is often impossible to distinguish a fighter from a peaceful member of the local society. Furthermore the fighting is not continuous. Heavy fighting alternates with relatively peaceful periods. These circumstances can create anxiety, uncertainty and stress for the soldiers involved in these operations. This anxiety is often enhanced by the fact that these 'new' wars are fought far away from their homes in rough terrain, an exhausting climate and amidst foreign strange peoples whose language they do not speak. In short, soldiers deployed in 'new' wars with low density and varying intensity face new challenges. They must rely on themselves, or at best the small unit of which they are a member, to cope with the problems and anxieties of fighting. A kind of fighting in large areas that is unpredictable

²² A Dutch armoured infantry battalion had in the 'old' war on average an area of responsibility (AOR) with a front of approximately 5 kilometres and a depth of 8 kilometres (= 40 square kilometres). The strength of the battalion counted on average 900 PAX and some 110 armoured vehicles. See: Koninklijke Landmacht, Ed. (1986). Voorschrift 2-1386: Gevechtshandleiding. Den Haag, Koninklijke Landmacht and Commando Opleidingen Koninklijke Landmacht, Ed. (1990). VS 2-217: het manoeuvre bataljon. Den Haag, Koninklijke Landmacht, par. 3126. Nowadays a similar unit, the Battle Group of the Dutch Task Force Uruzgan, numbers approximately 700 PAX and 40 armoured vehicles (as well as an array of soft top vehicles) and has an effective AOR of approximately 800 square kilometres.

²³ There are lots of books, newspaper articles, etc. that describe the nature of 'new' war fighting. Some of the more extreme stories are published in Filkins, D. (2008). The forever war. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, P128, 129 and Junger, S. (2010). War. London, Fourth Estate, P63, 254-260. See also, Barnes, C. and Leavitt, K. (September 2010). "Moral disengagements. When will good soldiers do bad things?" Military Review 2010 (special edition: ethics reader): P 46-51. Another example is the Iraq, U. N. A. M. I. (2006). Human rights Report, 1 May - 30 June 2006. Baghdad, United Nations Organization: P 22.

in intensity, frequency and location. Fighting against an enemy who is unpredictable in its manifestation and not constrained by any rules. These characteristics create additional moral pressures and vulnerabilities.

Inferred effects.

1.5.1. When soldiers from western democratic states get involved in these kinds of 'new' wars, pressures are apt to arise. First of all their expeditionary deployment is - at least partially - based on the notion of a just war and the moral superiority this entails: 'We participate in this operation for the sake of restoring the (international) rule of law and make the world a better place to live in.' This argument is not only valid at the political and institutional level but is also relevant as a moral justification for the individual soldiers and the support they receive from their relatives and friends at home.²⁴ But in a warzone it is sometimes very difficult to keep track of this ideal.²⁵ This difficulty could be enhanced by doubts as to the relevance of the moral arguments for participating in a war, and if the fighting is not merely about economic interests and plain power broking.

1.5.2. Secondly, the pressure this fact entails could be added to because their conduct in war is often under strict scrutiny. Supervision, not only by the Ministry of Defence in order to ensure that moral standards are strictly upheld, but also by other stakeholders, is perfectly legitimate. Some 'opens source' scrutiny however is often based on commercial (public or private) considerations and easily overlooks the sometimes very difficult circumstances under which the soldiers have to operate.²⁶ This kind of extensive media coverage may well add to the pressures. Soldiers could feel misunderstood and not properly supported; sentiments that could affect their motivation and eventually their moral standards.

1.5.3. Participating in 'new' wars adds to these pressures and this creates a third source of tension. For many soldiers it is certainly a 'clash of civilisations' ²⁷, as these soldiers come from a background in which the rule of law is not an anomaly but a cornerstone of society, in which men and women are basically equal and in which people generally are literate. They come from a society in which violence is not only illegal but also morally rejected unless within the bounds of police or military use. On the battlefields of 'new' war these soldiers are confronted with almost every form of brutality and horror and sometimes on a scale which does not in anyway fit into their frame of reference. The harsh circumstances, the brutal fighting and the often lacking local support, may well increase the risk of 'retaliating in kind' and a slipping of moral standards. ²⁸

²⁴ Holmes, R. (1985). Acts of war. London, Wellington house, P 270-290.

²⁵ Rielly, R. (2010). "The inclination for war crimes." Military Review **2010** (special edition: ethics reader): 52-58.

²⁶ On January 12th 2008 two Dutch soldiers were killed and one soldier seriously wounded by friendly fire. This incident was investigated by the military judicial. They concluded that the incident was the result of an unhappy conjunction of circumstances; there was no question of reproachable negligence.

Nevertheless the parents of the deceased soldiers filed a complaint against two fellow soldiers (a NCO and an officer). The complaint was eventually rejected by the court. See: Ed. (2008). Onderzoek naar dood militairen door eigen vuur. NRC. Rotterdam; Ed. (2010). "Onderzoek doden door eigen vuur." NRC and Ed. (2010). Strafvervolging in "eigen vuur"- incident afgewezen. Rechtennieuws.nl, Gerechtshof Arnhem.

Retrieved December 4, 2010, from <http://rechtennieuws.nl/30757/strafvervolging.html>.

²⁷ Huntington, S. P. (1996). The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. New York, Simon & Schuster.

²⁸ One of the incidents that attracted widespread attention, was the Haditha massacre in which 24 Iraqi men, women and children were killed by a group of United States Marines on November 19, 2006. It has

1.5.4. Isolation may well be a fourth factor that adds to the already increased pressure. The absence of their habitual cultural and moral background in their everyday operations could erode - albeit slowly - their values and normative framework. The variety in the nature and intensity of armed confrontations add further to anxiety and stress. The vulnerability for this process is enhanced by deployment in small groups and in isolated places. In these small and isolated units supervision, moral support and when necessary correction by superior officers are often lacking. Large responsibilities are shared by few and mutual moral support could be failing and a lowering of moral standards could be the result.²⁹

1.5.5. So while soldiers are confronted with circumstances in which morality could well be undermined, there is also a strong necessity to uphold moral standards. Most of all in order to maintain the moral sanity of the soldiers involved. In order to cope with the cruelties on the battlefield it is a first prerequisite not to retaliate in kind and to participate in committing similar cruelties. These kind of retaliatory actions do not only constitute a criminal breach of military law, but also create a burden to which eventually morality - if not the soldier in person - will succumb.³⁰ But also will the intervening force lose its moral high ground if it is known that its members indulge in savagery and cruelties. If the intervening force would allow the rule of law to be ignored, it would place itself outside the community of civilized nations.³¹ The intervening force would also lose much of its credibility and public support, both in the warzone and in the international and national context. Therefore maintaining a high moral standard is important, both from an institutional and from an individual point of view. How to secure these moral standards on both the individual and the institutional level is the subject of this thesis.

Definitions and delimitations

1.6.1. Within the context of this thesis I will focus on the moral aspects of the actions of those who wage war, both on an individual as on an institutional level. I will aim my investigation on soldiers (combatants) who participate in war as members of an

been alleged that the killings were retribution for the attack on a convoy of Marines with an improvised explosive device that killed Lance Corporal Miguel Terrazas. On December 21, 2006, eight Marines from 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines were charged in connection with the incident. As of June, 2008, charges against seven of the eight Marines had been dropped. On October 3, 2007, the Article 32 hearing investigating officer recommended that Staff Sgt Frank Wuterich be tried for negligent homicide in deaths of two women and five children, and that charges of murder be dropped. See, Knickmeyer, E. (2006). In Haditha, memories of a massacre. The Washington Post. Washington, The Washington Post Company and Wikipedia, t. f. e. (2008) Haditha killings retrieved November 28, 2010 from <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haditha>.

²⁹ Another telling example of slipping of moral norms is the so called Somalia Affair. In 1993 a Somali teenager was brutally beaten to death by two Canadian soldiers participating in humanitarian efforts in Somalia. The soldiers in question were posted at a relatively isolated outpost and the Canadian troops in Somalia had until then not suffered any casualties or extreme stress. The only provocation that the Canadians on that base faced, was petty theft from their compound. See: Winslow, D. J. (2002). The parliamentary inquiry into the Canadian peace mission in Somalia. Strengthening Parliamentary Oversight of International Military Cooperation and Institutions. Brussels, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF): P 3-5.

³⁰ French, S. E. (2003). The code of the warrior: exploring warrior values past and present. Oxford, Rowman and Littlefield. P 4-7 and P 232-241.

³¹ Bellamy, A. J. (2004). "Motives, outcomes, intent and the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention." Journal of military ethics 3(3): P 216-232.

international intervention force.³² I reserve the term ‘soldier’ for combatants, members of an international intervention force that come from constitutional democratic nation states. When I use this term soldier I mean all kind of military personnel, male or female, officers and other ranks and of all services. ‘Soldiers’ are lawful combatants.

1.6.2. In the context of this thesis I use the term war as a generic concept that includes any type of armed conflict: intra-national, transnational and international, including peacekeeping operations, non combatant evacuation operations, humanitarian interventions, etc. This implies that I will focus my investigations on these primarily operational tasks for the military.

1.6.3. I will not delve into the legal definitions of combatant, unlawful combatant and non-combatant or privileged belligerent and unprivileged belligerent and all its ramifications.³³ I will reserve the generic term of ‘fighter’ for all those who oppose ‘soldiers’ by violent means.

1.6.4. For practical reasons my primary frame of reference are the Dutch armed forces and their wider context in Dutch society. However, I will refer to the situation in other western constitutional democratic nations whenever this seems appropriate to provide a clearer view on the issues I address.

1.6.5. I will base my investigation on virtue ethics. I will justify my choice, but I will not elaborate on other ethical theories. I will use elements of these other theories, only to clarify and explain positions in my virtue ethical approach.

Maintaining moral standards.

1.7. My assumption is that virtue ethics can provide a strong foundation for military moral standards and will add to the possibility to secure these standards even in the face of serious challenges. First of all because virtues are attainable for all soldiers and can be further developed and maintained by education, training and living up to exemplary fellow humans. A virtuous attitude is relevant for all members of the armed forces, not only officers. Furthermore, such virtues can be personalized to fit an individual’s personality and character. A person’s character involves more than reason, but entails background, emotional make up, ideas and intuitions and forms a relatively stable part of the psychology of a person as a whole. Virtues embedded in character share that stability and therefore are less liable to erosion. In the second place virtue ethics is closely connected to the concept of a practice in which to acquire and demonstrate the relevant virtues. This provides a context to develop a morality that is especially suited to the military practice and the demands this practice entails. A set of morals that is easily recognized as being relevant to military practice is more readily accepted and

³² Formally only the members of armed forces have the legal status of combatant as far as they are not part of the medical corps or chaplain. All other are non-combatants. Combatants have the legal right to participate directly into the fighting if and only if they distinguish themselves from the civilian population by carrying their weapons openly and wear a uniform. Furthermore combatants must be organized, lead and subjected to a internal system of disciplinary law. See: Landmacht, (2003). Landmacht Doctrine Publicatie II deel C. gevechtsoperaties tegen een irregulier optredende tegenstander. Den Haag, Landmachtstaf. P 461,462.

³³ For an extensive discussion on the definition of unlawful combatant, etc. see Otto, R. (2011). Targeted killings and international law. Heidelberg, Springer. P 234-243.

internalized, than an external set of rules. A third consideration is that virtue ethics aims at attaining excellence in participating in a practice while abiding by the rules of the practice in order to attain a goal. This goal is always also related to the others that participate in a practice. In this way virtue ethics is also well suited to military practice as excellence in handling the implements of war, abiding by the rules and close cooperation between soldiers are essential parts of the military practice. A conduct based on virtues enhances the overall quality of the practice and thus improves the life expectancy of soldiers on the battlefield. In short there are strong indications that virtue ethics is indeed especially suitable to develop, impose, support and maintain a military body of ethics.

Research question

1.8.1. The **central aim** of this thesis is to develop the outline of a policy on how to apply virtue ethics in military practice in order to ensure that individual soldiers will uphold adequate moral standards in their actions in 'new' wars? The question is how to achieve this aim that provides both a sound theoretical foundation and practical relevance. My **secondary aim** is thereby to contribute to the body of theory on virtue-ethics and its practical application. My frame of reference will be the Dutch armed forces. The Netherlands are a traditional democratic constitutional state which frequently deploys its armed forces in expeditionary operations and as such the Dutch armed forces are well suited to serve as a vehicle for my research. My **third aim** consequently is to assist the Royal Netherlands Armed Forces - in which I served for 35 years - in upholding the moral character of their military personnel.

1.8.2. **My hypothesis** by which I aim to answer the central question is that **the theory of virtue ethics as elaborated by Alasdair MacIntyre in his book 'After Virtue' provides a suitable instrument to identify, develop, instil and uphold the required moral standards in the military.**³⁴ This theory is based on an interconnectedness of practice, narrative and wider moral traditions and claims to provide an objective method to establish which virtues are relevant for a practice. The theory promises a clear understanding of a specific practice and those virtues that are relevant to that practice. It explains the role of institutional structures and the difference of these with the practice as such. The theory relates how narrative provides a method to imbue virtues and it entails the necessity of a close link with the wider moral tradition in which the virtues specific to a practice are embedded. I will attempt to prove my hypothesis by developing a model for application of the virtue ethical theory of MacIntyre on military practice. However, in my attempt I will limit myself to the application of his theoretical framework only; I will not elaborate on his introductory considerations and arguments. The overall aim of my delving in applied ethics is to come forward with a model that provides tangible means to address practical issues in military ethics. As Aristotle in his endeavours, I want 'to work within and to defend a method that is thoroughly committed to the data of human experience and accepts these as its limits.'³⁵

1.8.3. As for my research I will critically analyze MacIntyre's theory and add to that when deemed necessary. Then I will apply MacIntyre's theory on Dutch military practice and identify relevant military virtues and how to imbibe these in the military .

³⁴ MacIntyre, A. (2007). *After Virtue*. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co.

³⁵ Nussbaum, M. (1986). *The fragility of goodness*. Cambridge, University Press. P 245.

In order to have a reality check on the concepts I develop, I will interview a number of veterans who have been in action and have suffered serious wounds and/or have been awarded honours for valour. In order to validate my findings I will also interview members of two other professions: one with clear characteristics of a practice (medical care) and one with a less apparent resemblance to a practice (municipal civil servants). Furthermore I will investigate what policies on military morality are presently developed in the Netherlands and a number of other democratic constitutional states in order to establish similarities and differences and whether these countries use virtue ethics for a theoretical background of their military morality. These other states will include the German Federal Republic, the United Kingdom, the United States and France. Finally I will investigate how a concept of specific military ethics could be part of the wider notion on ethics within Dutch society.

Key issues and outline of the thesis

1.9.1. I will realize my ambition in the following steps. After this introduction (chapter 1), I will elaborate on virtue ethics in general in chapter 2.³⁶ I will also point out what are the main differences with an approach based on utilitarianism or deontology. I will state the relevant differences and explain why these theories are less well suited as a foundation of military morality. Next I will critically analyze the theory of Alasdair MacIntyre. Criticisms will be discussed and if necessary elements of the theory of MacIntyre will be adapted.

1.9.2. In chapter 3, I will investigate war as a (military) practice. How can we define the practice of waging war and which are the constitutive elements of this practice? Then I will identify which are the internal goods related to this military practice. Hereafter - in chapter 4 - based on these constitutive elements I will apply the theory of MacIntyre and identify which virtues are relevant to soldiers in war as a practice. I will elaborate on these military virtues and how they can be substantiated.

1.9.3. Next, in chapter 5, I will explore the role of narrative and its potential as a means to implement a firm moral posture in the military. I will discuss the role of narrative in developing and sustaining one's personality and which are the implications for the development of a policy on moral education. In this discussion I will also look into the possible contribution of tradition to this effect.

1.9.4. I will also present and discuss - in chapter 6 - the results of the interviews with Dutch soldiers (and others) with operational experience. I will compare these findings with the results of interviews with employees from other professional organizations and backgrounds. Based on these comparisons I will evaluate the virtues I identified in the preceding chapter.

1.9.5. In chapter 7, I will investigate the role of the military institution. I will elaborate on the nature of the institution with regard to the practice, and the benefits the

³⁶ Aristoteles (2005). *Ethica Nicomachea*. Budel, Damon and van Tongeren, P. (2003). *Deugdelijk leven*. Amsterdam and Sun and Nussbaum, M. (1999). "Virtue Ethics: a misleading category." *The journal of Ethics* 3(3): 163-201.

institution provides for those who participate in the practice. How does the institution safeguard the moral standards of the practice. I will discuss the Dutch moral policy at the level of the Ministry of Defence. I will elaborate on the main product of this policy, the code of conduct. Next I will compare this Dutch code with other relevant international codes on military morality. As stated I will focus on the policies of the armed forces of the German Federal Republic, the United Kingdom, the United States and France. I will identify and discuss differences and similarities.

1.9.6. Chapter 8 will start with a review the role of the armed forces as an institution in society in general ; what exactly is the moral responsibility of the institution from the perspective of the morality of society as a whole. How can we define the moral responsibility of the armed forces on a institutional level ? In addition, how does the general morality relate to the specific morality of the military institution. I will continue by exploring the relationship between on the one hand the morality of the practice of war and the moral responsibilities of the armed forces as an institution and on the other hand the wider civil morality. I will explore similarities and differences and seek ways as how these differences can be explained and tension overcome.

1.9.7. Finally, in chapter 9, I will discuss the overall results of the research and provide an outline of a policy for the moral education in the military. Furthermore, some suggestions will be made on the implementation of such a policy and the necessary further research.

Chapter 2 : virtue ethics

Introduction.

2.1. Soldiers of constitutional states are deployed to defend the values of life, property and peaceful social interactions of the people who sponsor them. The moral cord between the people and their military implies that the military upholds the same set of core values, which reflects the people they serve. Violation of these values will strain this moral cord. This is one of the main reasons why the military has to conduct operations within the bounds of moral constraints.¹ The other main reason why moral constraints are necessary is to protect the soldiers as moral agents. Throughout the course of their duty, they will face fundamental moral choices. They must be able to bear that responsibility and to justify their actions, in order to reinforce themselves morally when engaged in their mission, which may well involve killing other people.² There are other reasons as well, but the aforementioned already underpin the need for a specific military morality. However what kind of morality is required? Should this morality merely have a functional goal and aim at producing good soldiers who do their job efficiently and within the formal bounds of the rules that apply? On the other hand, should it aspire at creating self relying, morally responsible soldiers whose actions are governed by the rule of law and the ethical considerations these imply?

Function and utilitarianism.

2.2. Wolfendale argues that there are two kinds of approaches to military ethics: a functional and an aspirational approach.³ The functional approach, - which is in many aspects similar to the alleged Sword approach⁴ - sees ethics as a means to secure an efficient military force that fights by the book, and does not violate the laws of war. In this approach the outcome, the results, the consequences count. How these results are realized is of less importance. Developing self-reliant moral agents is not required. However, the laws of war and other rules are static and reality - especially the reality of war - is dynamic. Therefore laws and rules can never cover all possible situations. Thus, rules require interpretation and this necessarily involves moral considerations. To deliberate on moral considerations requires moral agents who are able to determine whether a rule applies unequivocally or whether there is some leeway. This kind of ethical deliberation requires an approach of ethics and ethical training that goes beyond mere efficiency.⁵ In short, a strictly functional approach to military ethics has some serious drawbacks, as ethical deliberation boils down to a matter of efficiency. From the perspective of the functional approach in which the result counts, this approach could well be linked with a utilitarian or consequential theory of ethics, as in this ethical

¹ Mosely, A. (2008). The ethical warrior: a classical liberal approach. Ethics education in the military. D. L. P. Robinson, N., Carrick, Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing Limited: P 178, 179.

² French, S. E. (2003). The code of the warrior: exploring warrior values past and present. Oxford, Rowman and Littlefield. P 242: "Come back with your shield or on it. "The (*Spartan*) mothers who spoke this line were not heartless monsters. They wanted their children to return with their sense of self-respect still with them...To come back with their shields was to come back still feeling like warriors, not like cowards or murderers."

³ Wolfendale, J. (2008). What is the point of teaching ethics in the military? Ethics education in the military. Robinson, D.L.P. ; De Lee, N. and Carrick, D. Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing Limited: P 161-173

⁴ Toner, C. (2006). "Military Service as a Practice: Integrating the Sword and Shield Approaches to Military Ethics." Journal of Military Ethics 5(3): 183-200. P 184.

⁵ French, S. E. (2003). The code of the warrior: exploring warrior values past and present. Oxford, Rowman and Littlefield. P 9.

theory the consequences of an act determine whether the act in itself is morally right or wrong. In classical utilitarian thought, a morally right act promotes happiness for the greatest number of people.⁶ The common good is the leading factor. Hitherto a lot has been said and written about the feasibility of utilitarianism and consequentialism. Criticisms are voiced about the (im)possibility to provide a simple unitary notion of what happiness entails. Questions are raised on how to foresee - let alone predict - the consequences of an act a priori. Other criticisms pertain to the absence of any consideration regarding the intention of individual actors and how to justify the sacrifice of the individual's interest to the common good and how to define this common good. More criticism is aimed at how to apply a calculus solely based on reason, where other motives may play an important role as well. These criticisms gain extra weight when applied in war. War is unpredictable in its exact course and consequences, and decisions in war are seldom based on rational and careful considerations only. Therefore, it is no surprise for the comment of Berntsen that: '...there seems to be a general agreement that utilitarian ethics do not work well in the military setting.'⁷

Aspiration and duty ethics.

2.3. The aspirational approach aims at creating independent moral agents who are responsible for their behaviour and effective fighters as well.⁸ The similar Shield approach argues that a sound ethical background is necessary to protect the soldier against the moral after-effects of his, in some respects brutal, handwork.⁹ The emphasis on soldiers, who are also independent moral agents, seems to allow for a theory based on duty ethics (deontology), as in these theories the intention and autonomy of the agent play an important role. Kant is the founder and an important representative of duty ethics. In his theory, the morality of an act is determined by the intention of the autonomous individual to abide by the moral law under all circumstances and whose decisions are shaped by this categorical imperative.¹⁰ This categorical imperative is founded in reason and in reason only. This results in a very strict conception of duty and how one ought to act; no matter what the circumstances are. This rational strictness creates a very clear and strict conception of duty. However, it is precisely this unequivocal strictness that is the source of the main criticisms that are passed on duty ethics. This theory leaves little room for the role of emotions in our decisions how to act, as for the situational context in which we make our decisions. As stated before, war is a complex affair in which situational pressure can be extreme and can create an emotional 'roller coaster'. In war, soldiers will often be faced with a number of options, often all of them bad, and the difficulty arises out of the fact that it is seldom obvious which of these options is the ethically responsible correct one to follow.¹¹ In other situations, a soldier

⁶ Mill, J. S. (1998). On liberty. Oxford, University Press. P 137,142.

⁷ Berntsen, A. R., R. (2008). Ethics training in the Norwegian Defence forces. Ethics education in the military. Robinson P., De Lee, N., Carrick, D. Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing Limited: P 100. See also Norman, R. (1995). Ethics, Killing and War. Cambridge, University Press: P 11 and Nathanson, S. (2010). Terrorism and the ethics of war. Cambridge, University Press: P 162-165.

⁸ Wolfendale, J. (2008). What is the point of teaching ethics in the military? Ethics education in the military. Robinson, P., De Lee, N., Carrick, D. Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing Limited: P 171.

⁹ French, S. E. (2003). The code of the warrior: exploring warrior values past and present. Oxford, Rowman and Littlefield. P 242: See also: Toner, C. (2006). "Military Service as a Practice: Integrating the Sword and Shield Approaches to Military Ethics." Journal of Military Ethics 5(3): 183 – 200. P 184.

¹⁰ Kant, I. (1996). Practical philosophy (Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals). Cambridge, University Press. P 82 and Ibid (Critique of practical reason) P 166-167 and P 69.

¹¹ Nussbaum, M. (1986). The fragility of goodness. Cambridge, University Press. P 14-47.

could be faced with a decision where he knows which is the ethically responsible option to choose, but where there is considerable (situational) pressure on him to choose another - not necessarily the ethically responsible - option.¹² In these kind of circumstances it is hard - if not impossible - to apply the categorical rules of duty ethics. Not only because of the strictness of the rules, but also as there is often hardly any time for careful and rational deliberation that is exempt from emotions. However, apart from these practical considerations, there is also a theoretical problem. Duty ethics is categorical. The categorical rules of duty ethics apply always under any circumstance.¹³ It is hard to see how these categorical rules (which imply that thou shall not kill) can be adapted to apply in war (where killing often is inevitable). The question is how to reconcile theoretically the categorical nature of duty ethics with the exceptional situation of war? Such reconciliation is still lacking. In addition, there is another, practical, consideration as well. As I stated before, war is dynamic and the challenges of war can be extreme. Rules are static and do not always provide guidance on extreme situations. So also with duty ethics, the question remains whether a rule-based theory provides the kind of guidance that is required in the extremes of war. There is also another issue: doing ones duty suffices. In this respect one could argue that duty ethics aims at nothing more than an ethical minimum.¹⁴ In other words, it seems that an aspirational approach based on duty ethics has serious drawbacks as well.¹⁵ On the other hand, it is obvious that all soldiers need ethical education and training, as all soldiers on all levels will be faced with ethical problematic situations in which they have to make their own decisions. The question is how to achieve this goal?

Function and aspiration in virtue ethics.

2.4. In virtue ethics the central question is not 'what ought I to do', but 'how should I live'. In this conception, one aims at 'living a good life', which means striving after excellence in the practice of living. Striving for excellence makes the difference between man-as -he-happens -to-be, and man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realizes-his-potentiality, his natural goal (*Telos*).¹⁶ To make the best of your life is considered an inherent goal of living, of human nature.¹⁷ From this perspective virtue ethics could be described as a

¹² Cullens, J. (2008). What ought one to do? Ethics education in the military. Robinson, P., De Lee, N., Carrick, D. Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing Limited: P 83.

¹³ Kant, I. (1996). Practical philosophy. Cambridge, University Press. In his 'Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals'. Kant introduced three formulations his categorical imperative: 1, (P 73) 'Act as if the Maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature'; 2, (P 80) 'So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.'; 3, (P 84) 'To act only so that the will could regard itself as at the same time giving universal law through its maxim.'

¹⁴ Olthoorn, P. (2011). Military Ethics and Virtues. Abingdon, Routledge. P 5.

¹⁵ Marlantes, K. (2011). What it is like to go to war. New York, Atlantic Monthly Press. P 60; 'There is no foolproof formula for choosing the right side; there are only guidelines. The warrior operates in extreme zones. The more removed a situation like combat gets away from everyday life, the less applicable the guidelines get. This is why we must rely so much on character rather than rules when discussing and experiencing extreme conditions like war.'

¹⁶ MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 53 and P 148.

¹⁷ Even Kant - who is critical of the notion of the virtues - supports this idea; albeit from a different perspective, see Kant, I. (1996). Practical philosophy. Cambridge, University Press. P 518 (The metaphysics of morals). 'When it is said that it is in itself a duty for human beings to make his end the perfection belonging to a human being as such, this perfection must be put in what can result from his deeds, not in mere gifts for which he must be indebted to nature; for otherwise it would not be a duty. This duty can therefore consist only in cultivating one's faculties (or natural predispositions), the highest of which is understanding, the faculty of concepts and so too of those concepts that will have to do with duty.'

'Bildung Moral'.¹⁸ Living a good life also implies living in a society. So living excellently includes all others that participate in the practice of living together. Moreover, to excel in living a good life, requires abiding by the rules and intent of the social practice of living and acting together (*Dikē*). The quality, which enables one to participate in a practice in an excellent way, is called virtue (*Arete*).¹⁹ This means that the concept of what it is to live a good life (*Agathos*) must precede the identification of the virtues. The same goes for the standards of excellence by which the virtues are defined. The virtues and the standards they imply, define the moral values of the practice.²⁰ Morally responsible conduct confirms the goal of living the good life, immoral conduct (*Kakos*) opposes this inherent goal. Living virtuously is a matter of attitude rather than obeying to a rational set of imperatives or an inventory of consequences.²¹ This virtuous attitude can be acquired by education and contemplation; learning from role models (heroes) and imitating their behaviour; and exercise in participating in the practice: experience.²² Eventually virtuous conduct thus becomes a habit.²³ Acquiring this virtuous attitude thus requires active involvement in a practice. It is this involvement that leads the way to a morally responsible conduct, which is in accordance with the conception of the good, which is defined in a tradition of which the practice is a part. This morally appropriate conduct is not just based on reason, but also on emotion, intuition, experience and tradition. In this respect, virtue ethics is definitely different from the aforementioned rule based moral theories. Martha Nussbaum refutes this.²⁴ She argues that virtue ethics do not deserve a separate theoretical status, as both deontology and utilitarianism see virtue, as well as the role of the agent as important elements in their theories. In her article, she furthermore argues that both deontology and utilitarianism aim at a universalizing theory, while virtue ethics do not. However, the latter argument determines the attractiveness of virtue ethics. In this concept, there is more room for different evaluations of the context in which the agent acts: what is the actual situation and what are the agent's beliefs regarding the good life? Charles Taylor characterized

All the same this duty includes the cultivation of one's will (moral cast of mind), so to satisfy all the requirements of duty. A human being has a duty to raise himself from the crude state of his nature, from his animality, more and more towards humanity by which he alone is capable of setting himself ends; he has a duty to diminish his ignorance by instruction and to correct his errors.'

¹⁸ Dohmen, J. (2010). *Brief aan een middelmatige man*. Amsterdam, Ambo. P 140, 141.

¹⁹ Van Tongeren, P. (2003). *Deugdelijk leven*. Amsterdam, Sun. P 21-33. See also Aristoteles (2005). *Ethica Nicomachea*. Budel, Damon. Par. 1094b11-1095a11; 1106b23-28 and MacIntyre, A. (2007). *After Virtue*. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P149.

²⁰ MacIntyre, A. (2007). *After Virtue*. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 187-189.

²¹ Aristoteles (2005). *Ethica Nicomachea*. Budel, Damon. Par. 1105b19-1106b34, as well as MacIntyre, A. (2007). *After Virtue*. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 150. For a modern articulation see: Sloterdijk, P. (2009). *Du musst dein Leben ändern*. Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp. P 290: 'Tatsächlich ist es möglich, schon die klassische *Habitus* Lehre als Trainingstheorie zu lesen. Wer richtig geübt hat, überwindet die Unwahrscheinlichkeit des Guten und lässt die Tugend wie eine zweite Natur erscheinen. Zweite Naturen sind Könnensdispositionen, dank deren sich der Mensch als Artist der *Virtus* auf der Höhe zu halten vermag. Er tut das fast Unmögliche, das Beste, als sei es das Leichte, Spontane, Natürliche, das sich nahezu von selbst einstellt.'

²² Ibid, book II (1.1-3) and also Sloterdijk, P. (2009). *Du musst dein Leben ändern*. Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp. P 231: '...um einem Üben den klarzumachen, es komme darauf an die Übung auszuführen und nicht über sie zu räsonieren. Einen Diskuswurf bringt man nur zustande, indem man den Diskus wirft - und keine Gerede über Diskusse und über die richtige Art sie zu werfen, kann den Wurf ersetzen.' See also Aristoteles (2005). *Ethica Nicomachea*. Budel, Damon. Par. 1099b9-10 and 1103a31-1103b21.

²³ Aristoteles (2005). *Ethica Nicomachea*. Budel, Damon. Par. 1103a14-25.

²⁴ Martha Nussbaum however, argues that classical virtue ethics is overtaken by enlightenment theories and deserves no longer a separate status. Nussbaum, M. (1999). "Virtue Ethics: a misleading category." *The journal of Ethics* 3(3): 163-201.

the difference between virtue ethics and enlightenment ethical theories as between substantive and procedural moral theories.²⁵ The characteristics of virtue ethics allow accommodating both a functional and an aspirational approach. The idea of striving for excellence in a practice could as well apply on military practice, which would serve the former. The overarching idea of living a good life and acquiring the virtuous attitude that enables such a life provides the moral attitude, which is aimed for in the latter. Virtue ethics is not merely about what to do, about choice: it takes the agent into account as well.²⁶ The notion of an agent includes his personal mental make-up, as well as his origin, the community and the tradition he belongs to. Furthermore, virtue ethics explicitly take as well the situational context into account: which actions are feasible, which actions are within my grasp.²⁷ This does not mean though that in virtue ethics there is no deliberation, on the contrary.²⁸ However, this deliberation is primarily aimed at finding practical solutions that are morally justified.²⁹ Another feature is that virtue ethics provide a perspective for personal growth: one can learn to be virtuous. Specific education and training, augmented by relevant experience can result in a virtuous disposition. The practical orientation of virtue ethics, the perspective of personal development as well as its foundation in a community and its tradition fit well with the general characteristics of military practice. Therefore, virtue ethics seem the most promising theory for founding a moral groundwork for the military.³⁰ The question is how?

Virtue ethics according to Alasdair MacIntyre.

2.5.1 The theory on virtue ethics as developed by MacIntyre is based primarily on Aristotle. As I explained in the preceding paragraph 2.4., Aristotle argues that everything in nature has an inherent goal (*Telos*). For human beings this involves being part of a community and a very special community at that namely the polis, the Greek city-state.³¹ Moreover, being a free citizen of the polis implies the obligation to be a good member of the polis, to live a good, a flourishing life. Living a good life requires excellence, and a

²⁵ Taylor, C. (1994). *Justice after virtue*. After MacIntyre. Horton, J and Mendus, S. Cambridge, Polity Press. P 27. See also Taylor, C. (2007). *Bronnen van het zelf*. (*Sources of the self*) Rotterdam, Lemniscaat. P129.

²⁶ Toner, J. H. (2000). *Morals under the gun*. Lexington, University Press of Kentucky. P 149: 'There are three classic focus point for morality: the outcome (teleological ethics: a good result), the act (deontological ethics: a dutiful deed) and the agent (an actor of good character).'

²⁷ Aristoteles (2005). *Ethica Nicomachea*. Budel, Damon. Par. 1113a9-12.

²⁸ Wortel and Bosch argue that deliberation and a critical attitude are among the prerequisites of being a professional soldier. Wortel, E., Bosch, J. (2011). "Strengthening moral competence: a 'train the trainer' course on military ethics." *Journal of military ethics* 10(1): 17-35. Bieri argues that every action as expression of the will of an actor requires deliberation, as well as a decision on which realistic course of action an actor embarks. Bieri, P. (2011). *Het handwerk van de vrijheid*. (*Das Handwerk der Freiheit*) Amsterdam, Wereld bibliotheek. P153-169.

²⁹ Aristoteles (2005). *Ethica Nicomachea*. Budel, Damon. Par. 1142b28-33

³⁰ Kem, J. D. (2006). "The use of the ethical triangle in military ethical decision making." *Public administration and management* 11(1): 22-43. See also Toner, J. H. (2000). *Morals under the gun*. Lexington, University Press of Kentucky. P 150: 'Armies exist to win battles and wars. Military ethics is thus teleological, for is necessarily utilitarian and consequentialist. But military ethics is also deontological, for soldier can and must be taught principles and learn duties. The very nature of the profession of arms - which entails killing or preparing to kill, destruction or preparation for wreaking destruction - involves soldiers in the ethical anguish of what I have called duelling duties. Decision 'logic trees', moral checklists, ethical flow charts - none of these things can help soldiers resolve some of the most pressing problems they confront (often without benefit of much time for reflection and analysis). We can now see why virtue ethics is indispensable to the profession of arms.'

³¹ Aristotle (1995). *Politics*. Oxford, University Press. Par. 1253a18-29.

virtuous disposition enables achieving excellence. Aristotle discerns two types of virtue. These are the virtues of character, and the virtue of practical wisdom, prudence. The former pertain to dispositions that direct actions, and the latter enables a person to deliberate on his choices.³² The overall result is that an agent will act rightly in affect and conduct.³³ The ancient Greek virtues of character are courage, temperance and justice. Aristotle identifies several more virtues of character: generosity, greatness, truthfulness, modesty and friendship.³⁴ However, the virtues of courage, justice and temperance, together with practical wisdom (prudence) are the four cardinal (*cardo* means pivot) virtues. All these virtues are connected to the overall concept of the good life. MacIntyre on the other hand, makes another connection. He argues that the good life is not a holistic notion, but is made up of all kinds of practices (family, school, work, leisure, etc.) He then argues that the notion of a virtue does not only pertain to the holistic concept of the good life, but to these specific practices as well. Furthermore, in his view, it is possible to identify the specific virtues that are relevant to the different practices!³⁵ It is this powerful interpretation by MacIntyre, which - in my opinion - provides a solid foundation for a specific application of virtue ethics for the military. I will develop this idea further in the following pages of my thesis, but first I will give a short description of the main content of MacIntyre's theory, after which I will elaborate on - and sometimes criticize and complement - the concepts he uses.

2.5.2. MacIntyre derives the notion of virtue from the concept of a practice. A practice is valued for internal reasons, inherent to the practice. MacIntyre calls these internal reasons internal goods.³⁶ Virtues are required to participate in a practice in an excellent way. Acquiring the relevant virtues enhances the pleasure, the internal goods, someone gain in a practice. Aspiration for excellence is a feature of humanity and of living a good life. He then states that the specific virtues of the different practices one participates in, need to be a consistent entity. This notion cannot come as a surprise, as all virtues aim at achieving excellence and therefore, there is little chance virtues could be mutually counterproductive. Only by adhering to one consistent overall set of virtues, man can achieve wholeness, constancy of character, integrity: permanent traits which will explain why someone acts in a particular way. Thus, character gives a special sort of accountability and pattern to action. This wholeness requires (or shapes) of course a unique and unified identity.³⁷ It is hard to conceive a person who internalizes a consistent entity of virtues who at the same time lacks identity. A virtuous person, therefore, is necessarily a person with a well-established identity. This identity also

³² All in all Aristotle discerns 12 virtues of character and five virtues of intellect. Aristoteles (2005). Ethica Nicomachea. Budel, Damon. Par:1107a31-1108b10, 1139b15-17.

³³ Sherman, N. (1989). The Fabric of Character: Aristotle's Theory of Virtue. Oxford, Clarendon Press. P2.

³⁴ Aristoteles (2005). Ethica Nicomachea. Budel, Damon. Par: 1107b8-15, 1107b21-1108a4, 1108a19-24, 1108a30-35, 1108a25-29.

³⁵ MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 186-187.

³⁶ MacIntyre in later writings also uses the term 'goods of excellence'. MacIntyre, A. (2003). Whose justice? Which rationality? Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 30-36.

³⁷ Ibid, P 201. MacIntyre does not elaborate on the concept of identity, which is a subject of a discussion in which widely divergent positions are argued for. In this thesis I will use the term 'identity' in a practical meaning as mentioned in Parfit, D. (1986). Reasons and persons. Oxford, University Press. P 203-209.

"Identity has two criterions. First there is a physical criterion: a continued existence of a whole body. Second there is a psychological criterion: the continued existence of a mental entity, which has strong and overlapping psychological connections that involve 'the doings of our deeds, the thinking of our thoughts and the occurrence of certain other physical and mental events'. A person's identity requires that these criteria coincide."

implies membership, and this is not necessarily a chosen membership. We are thrown into a family, a community, and there our identity is primarily shaped. Narrative plays an important role in this process. Our identity is shaped by narrative: stories by others in which we figure, as well as stories by one self in which others figure. These stories - result in a human identity, which encompasses a past, a present and a future and therewith constitutes the concept of a life. That life is lived with others, which means that one is a subject of narrative as well as an object. Even so, this also means that participating in practices add to the narrative. These mutual stories do not only create an individual identity, but they create solidarity and thereby define a practice, a community as well. Moreover, in order to form and sustain a practice and a community, there must be some shared concept of the good, a moral tradition. These moral traditions in their turn provide a substance and a context for the identification of the good life, the 'telos' of man. In MacIntyre's words: '...man is in his actions and practice, as well as in his fictions a story-telling animal. He is not essentially, but becomes through his history, a teller of stories that aspire to truth. But the key question for men is not about their authorship; I can only answer the question "What am I to do?" if I can answer the prior question "Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?"'³⁸

2.5.3. Another issue MacIntyre addresses is the difference between a practice and an institution. Institutions are necessary to support practices and to guarantee their continuity. Institutions provide organisation, procedures and officials to realize a practice. They provide so-called external goods for those who are employed in an institution. These are money, power and status. An individual can own these external goods, while internal goods that pertain to a practice cannot be owned. Institutions are also part of the wider social fabric, and this means that institutions too, are part of a wider tradition.

2.5.4. MacIntyre then starts his criticism of modernity, by stating that in modern societies there is no consensus on a conception of the good life and neither is there a coherent moral tradition. The individual, therefore, lacks a context in which he can develop a unified character; an enterprise that is altogether hardly feasible, because of the fragmented concept of modern selfhood and individuality. His implicit conclusion is that under the present circumstances we will not be able to reinvent an Aristotelian society based on the virtues. We must bear in mind that MacIntyre wrote the above in 1981, at the height of the cold war and a worldwide financial crisis: an era, which left little room for optimism. After the demise of the Soviet empire in 1990 there was more room for optimism. However, this initial optimism has since then evaporated under the influence of other developments in the world.³⁹ So, one might argue that MacIntyre's criticism is still valid. The question is whether this appreciation of the state of affairs in the world, disqualifies the practical value of his theory. In my opinion, the opposite is true. Where are we to find a collective moral foothold if there is no shared comprehensive conception of the good? If society as a whole no longer legitimates and sustains a collective frame of moral reference, people will look elsewhere, in smaller entities, families, clubs, work, etc.⁴⁰ It is from this perspective that MacIntyre's theory

³⁸ MacIntyre, A. (2007). *After Virtue*. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 216.

³⁹ Verhaeghe, P. (2012). *Identiteit*. Amsterdam, Bezige Bij. P 111-212. Dohmen, J. (2010). *Brief aan een middelmatige man*. Amsterdam, Ambo. P 15,16.

⁴⁰ See also Schneewind, J. B. (1982). "Virtue, narrative and community: MacIntyre and morality." *Journal of Philosophy* 79(11): 653-663.

has actually gained relevance, as it provides a means to identify the virtues, which can assist in meeting standards of excellence and create flourishing practices! Experiencing the benefits of being a virtuous member of a flourishing practice, could well lead to the virtuous disposition in other practices as well. In such a way, the virtues of the practices could contribute to the quality of larger social entities. Therefore, there are ample reasons why MacIntyre's theory - in spite of his social criticism - still provides a worthwhile method to identify the virtues relevant to a practice.

2.5.5. His idea of narrative as an instrument in shaping an individual's character, could provide a relevant and tangible link between educational means and methods and long existing military traditions. His other notion that the morality of the individual must fit in a wider moral tradition of society seems more than interesting too, especially for the military, as I explained in the first paragraph of this chapter. A necessary moral cord exists between the people and the military that defends the interests of the people. This moral cord between the people and their military implies that the military upholds the same set of core values, which reflects the people they serve. Therefore, it is worthwhile to investigate the nature of this cord. In short, in spite of the social criticisms, MacIntyre connects to his theory: it provides ample starting points for my further research and investigation. In this chapter, I will be further elaborate on MacIntyre's concepts of a practice, internal goods and the virtues. The issues of identity and narrative and the relation of these with a moral tradition will be discussed in chapter four and five respectively.

Concepts in MacIntyre's theory on practice and virtues.

2.6.1. As I have explained above, virtue ethics is centred around the conceptions of practice, inherent goals and virtues. However, Aristotle, the founder of virtue ethics, does not use explicitly the notion of a practice.⁴¹ Van Tongeren explains why and provides a broad definition of the concept of a **practice**. First, he states that the term practice refers to the object of ethics, human conduct.⁴² Then he explains this conception further by using the Greek term of 'poiesis' and 'praxis'. 'Poiesis' refers to manufacturing, an activity in which the goal of the activity lies beyond the activity in itself. The activity serves as a means towards other ends. It is an activity that results in a product, an object that is external to the actual activity. 'Praxis' refers to practicing an activity in which the ultimate goal lies in participating in the activity itself. Only by participating in the practice and abiding by the rules that govern the activity will one attain the pleasure the activity entails.⁴³ The goal of the practice is internal to the activity.⁴⁴ Alasdair MacIntyre - in the first part of his theory - defines the notion of a practice in a more elaborate way, as: *'any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, an partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence and human conceptions of the ends and goods*

⁴¹ Aristoteles (2005). *Ethica Nicomachea*. Budel, Damon.

⁴² Tongeren van, P. (2003). *Deugdelijk leven*. Amsterdam, Sun. P21. See also: Achterhuis, H. (2008). *Met alle geweld*. Rotterdam, Lemniscaat. P 134-136.

⁴³ Nussbaum, M. (1986). *The fragility of goodness*. Cambridge, University Press. P 125.

⁴⁴ A similar distinction between the *homo faber* and the *homo ludens* is used by Huizinga in Huizinga, J. (1938). *Homo ludens, proeve eener bepaling van het spel-element der cultuur*. Amsterdam, Universiteit Pers. P 10.

*involved are systematically extended.'*⁴⁵ This definition is long and complex, but nevertheless there are some similarities with the elements Van Tongeren addresses. Both Van Tongeren and MacIntyre speak of participating in a practice with others, and for reasons that lie within the activity itself. Both address the necessity of rules and the opportunity to enhance the pleasure one finds in participating. However, a further explanation and interpretation of some of the notions MacIntyre uses, is desirable as any inconclusiveness could hamper my further proceedings.

2.6.2. According to MacIntyre, a practice is a human activity that people engage in together. This implies that human life consists of many practices. During their life people participate in many different practices, like: family life, school, playing, work, etc.⁴⁶ The definition MacIntyre provides, states further that a practice is a complex activity, it is socially established and requires cooperation. The practice is part of an existing social fabric and tradition, and participants must adapt to those traditions.⁴⁷ The notion that a practice must be socially established is 'translated' by Van Tongeren in the explicit notion that rules constitute the very practice: without rules that are internal to the practice, there would not be any practice.⁴⁸ Taylor goes even further and argues that practices articulate patterns of what the participants ought and ought not to do.⁴⁹ The terms of the definitions further imply that neither individual activities that do not require cooperation, nor very simple activities that do not require any special expertise are considered as a practice. People participate in a practice, because they like it, and they benefit from it. These benefits MacIntyre refers to as internal goods. When one can speak of a practice in which individuals are engaged together, the quality of the engagement is measured by standards of excellence. By aspiring towards a better performance, one can increase the amount of benefits, internal goods, gained. This again means that not just any activity can be qualified as a practice. The idea of cooperation and rules require a longstanding status: a past in which rules developed, a present with a specific form and a future in which the practice will further develop to meet the needs of the community. However, in spite of MacIntyre's extensive definition, it is not a simple affair to determine exactly which activities qualify as a practice and which not. In this respect, MacIntyre himself is rather vague, and he even goes so far as to state that the question as to the precise range of practices is not of the first importance. He states that a further explanation of the notions he uses in his definition will provide the appropriate insight into the defining qualities of a practice.⁵⁰ He then elaborates on internal and external goods and the notion of virtue. In this thesis, I will use the definition as given by MacIntyre and the criteria that arise from this definition. After having elaborated on the notion of a practice, I will next address the notions of internal goods.

2.6.3. As to the conception of **internal goods**, MacIntyre states that a practice is self-contained: it is autotelic. This means that the activities central to the practice are primarily exercised for the sake of acquiring the internal goods that are specific for the

⁴⁵ MacIntyre, A. (2007). *After Virtue*. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 187.

⁴⁶ MacIntyre, A. (1990). *Three rival versions of moral inquiry*. Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P64

⁴⁷ Ibid, p 194. However, this does not mean that practices are static per se; they can and will develop and change over time.

⁴⁸ Tongeren van, P. (2003). *Deugdelijk leven*. Amsterdam, Sun. P21-22.

⁴⁹ Taylor, C. (2007). *Bronnen van het zelf*. (Sources of the self) Rotterdam, Lemniscaat. P 285.

⁵⁰ MacIntyre, A. (2007). *After Virtue*. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 187,188.

particular practice.⁵¹ The aim of a practice seems to be the participation in the activity as such, rather than to achieve a goal at which the activity aims.⁵² The internal goods to be gained pertain to the pleasure one finds in a good performance, to the stimulation of imagination that is needed to grasp the possibilities of the practice and to the pleasure one experiences in acting as a skilled practitioner together with others. In order to enjoy fully these internal goods we must excel in the activity, which is central to the practice. John Rawls articulated this notion as the Aristotelian principle, which he defines as follows: ‘...other things equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realised capacities (their innate or trained abilities), and this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realised, or the greater its complexity.’⁵³ Sloterdijk articulates a similar notion.⁵⁴ According to MacIntyre, internal goods can only be acquired and experienced by participating in the practice itself, but are also only to be specified in terms of the practice. It is participating in e.g. a game of rugby that counts and not necessarily winning the game. In participating as such, one finds the pleasure and fulfilment that are inherent to the game. The game can only be explained in terms that are specific for that game, like ‘scrum’, ‘knock on’, ‘line out’, ‘off side’, etc. Rules are another feature of a practice. These rules are designed to allow each participant a fair opportunity to exhibit his excellence.⁵⁵ Not abiding by the rules of the game - e.g. in rugby throwing the ball forward and not paying any attention to the dimensions of the playing ground - would ruin the game (*Agon*) and annul the possibility of gaining internal goods and eventually even destroy the practice as such. Another internal good MacIntyre identifies, pertains to the benefits gained from experiencing to be an excellent practitioner. By participating in a practice, one joins a specific community and thus becomes a member of that community. This specific community in its turn is part of a larger social fabric and indirectly one becomes a member of this larger community as well.

2.6.4. However, MacIntyre does not provide any clue on the **meaning of an internal good**. How are we to interpret that concept? MacIntyre states that it is a good that cannot be acquired in any other way than by participating in the practice.⁵⁶ However, why would we want those goods? Why do people want to participate in a practice? Some people are able to answer this question quite easily. They want to be a medical practitioner because it is a family tradition or because they want to help and cure people. The former is a matter of family tradition (or pressure); the latter indicates some attraction to the medical practice, an aspiring to the internal goods of that practice. Especially in socially accepted practices, a justification for participating in a practice is easily found and accepted. Others find it hard - or even impossible - to answer the question: “Why?” Some of them are not able to come up with anything more than “I just want to do it.” Especially with practices that are not readily socially accepted, people find it sometimes hard to explain (and justify) their attraction and choice. However, what is an internal good, how

⁵¹ Ibid, p 188-191. MacIntyre also uses the term ‘goods of excellence’. See MacIntyre, A. (2003). Whose justice? Which rationality? Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P32-35.

⁵² Aristoteles (2005). Ethica Nicomachea. Budel, Damon. Par.1099a27-28.

⁵³ Rawls, J. (2006). Een theorie van rechtvaardigheid. (*A theory of justice*) Rotterdam, Lemniscaat. P 432. See also MacIntyre, A. (2003). Whose justice? Which rationality? Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 31

⁵⁴ Sloterdijk, P. (2009). Du musst dein Leben ändern. Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp. P 502: ‘Alle Erweiterungen der Könnenskreise, alle Steigerungen bis zum den letzten Höhen der Artistiek vollziehen sich auf der Basis von Selbstformung durch Übung.’

⁵⁵ MacIntyre, A. (2003). Whose justice? Which rationality? Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 27.

⁵⁶ MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 188-189.

to define this notion? MacIntyre does not provide any further theoretical interpretation of internal goods and until now neither did other philosophers address this specific notion. Therefore, an interpretation has to be looked for elsewhere. As this notion is closely related to action, it is a subject of practical reasoning.⁵⁷ An internal good is a reason for action, and the action aims at satisfying a desire: the internal goods. This is inherent to MacIntyre's definition of a practice: '*activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized*'. Bieri points out that desires are dependent on what the world has to offer - the external circumstances - and on how we think and feel as persons with a specific history and character - the internal circumstances.⁵⁸ An internal good therefore can be described as characteristics of a specific practice which cause persons to develop a desire - a specific mental state - to participate in that practice. According to Searle⁵⁹, actions aimed at satisfying desires require a mental state that has a direction of fit from the world to the mind. This means that by acting on the intention of this mental state, the state of affairs in the world is changed in order to meet the conditions of satisfaction of this intentional mental state. In other words: the intention to participate in a practice requires action and by doing so, we meet the appropriate condition of satisfaction of the mental state in question. Therefore, internal goods seem to be desires.⁶⁰ Desires are fulfilled or frustrated; they are not true or false. Beliefs are true or false. Beliefs are a part of theoretical reasoning, which is aimed at investigating states of affairs in the world. Their direction of fit is from the mind to the world: in order for beliefs to be true there must be a state of affairs in the world that corresponds with these beliefs. A desire, on the other hand, can already be satisfied when the behaviour of the agent comes to match his intention.⁶¹ However, intentionality as such requires some kind of deliberation prior to the intention.⁶² Nancy Sherman articulates a similar idea in her interpretation of the Aristotelian notion of desire. According to her Aristotle's account of desire suggests that it is because something seems good to us that we desire it and that it is good because we desire it. She hereby implies some kind of *ex ante* deliberations.⁶³ As to the nature of this kind of prior deliberation, Charles Taylor introduces some concepts that might clarify the notion of prior intentional deliberation. He identifies weak and strong evaluations of desires.⁶⁴ Weakly evaluated desires pertain primarily to the outcome of our actions, while strongly evaluated desires also refer to the quality of our motives to act in order to satisfy these desires. In this perspective, some internal goods could be labelled as weakly evaluated desires. The desire is largely contingent: I just want it. Often, there are no further reasons. Other internal goods could be labelled as strongly evaluated desires. These require deliberations, which often involves reflections on values, personal as well as social. This kind of deliberation

⁵⁷ The notion of practical reason is also a subject of much philosophical controversy and I do not intend to participate in this discussion. My sole purpose is to provide a reasonable explanation of the concept of desire, which can be useful in this thesis. By doing so, I do not intend to take a stand in the ongoing dispute on rationality, action and identity.

⁵⁸ Bieri, P. (2011). *Het handwerk van de vrijheid. (Das Handwerk der Freiheit)* Amsterdam, Wereld bibliotheek. P 220-221.

⁵⁹ Searle, J. R. (2001). *Rationality in action*. Cambridge (Massachusetts), MIT Press.

⁶⁰ Ibid, P 7.

⁶¹ Ibid, P 34-37.

⁶² Ibid, P 47-49.

⁶³ Sherman, N. (1989). *The Fabric of Character: Aristotle's Theory of Virtue*. Oxford, Clarendon Press. P 63-65 and 87.

⁶⁴ Taylor, C. (1985). *Philosophical papers 1: human agency and language*. Cambridge, University Press. P 1- 44 (chapter one: what is human agency). See also Taylor, C. (2007). *Bronnen van het zelf. (Sources of the self)* Rotterdam, Lemniscaat. P 60, 67.

appeals to the identity of the agent. Taylor's argument leads to a more or less similar conclusion as Searle's in his explanation of desire-independent-reasons-for-action. According to Searle it is possible to impose conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction. For example, in joining the military, I satisfy my conditions of satisfaction of wanting to be a member of the armed forces. However, when I state that I do so, because I want to help humanity, this evaluative statement imposes further conditions of satisfaction on the already satisfied condition of satisfaction of joining the military. Also by doing so, a desire-independent-reason-for-action is created.⁶⁵ The agent thereby takes responsibility for satisfying this imposed condition of satisfaction (helping humanity). In this way evaluative notions are imposed on desires. However, whether the desires are weakly or strongly evaluated, or constructed as desire independent, they are all satisfied by participating in the practice at which the intentionality is directed. The choice to act on a desire does not necessarily require any moral evaluation, as the direction of fit is from the world to the mind. From this perspective, internal goods, as an element in MacIntyre's theory, can be labelled as desires.

2.6.5. However, still another question remains that MacIntyre does not address, which is **how to identify the internal goods** of a practice. He seems to claim that internal goods can only be identified by participating in a practice. Only then will we know what the characteristics of a practice have to offer. In my opinion, this is not enough. Some theoretical underpinning is necessary in order to establish whether all relevant internal goods of a practice are properly identified. Such an investigation requires, first of all, an analysis of the practice involved: what elements constitute a practice? In particular, which elements necessarily constitute a practice, which means that if one of them would be missing there would not be a practice? A proper investigation should therefore start by analyzing a practice in order to establish the constitutive elements. Analysis of these constitutive elements could provide an insight in the kind and number of internal goods to be gained in a practice. As the appeal of a practice is also a matter of personal appreciation this side of the matter also has to be investigated. Personal experience in the practice, or accounts of such experiences, could provide additional evidence on the relevance of the internal goods thus identified. In this way, we could add weight to the significance of internal goods related to a practice, instead of merely referring to individual experience and intuition. This is important, as according to MacIntyre, the virtues supervene on internal goods, which means that there can be no virtues without the appropriate internal goods.

2.6.6. Central to the notion of virtue ethics is of course **the concept of virtue**. Aristotle defines a virtue as a state that enables us to do what is best pertaining to pleasure and pain. The opposite of what is doing the best is a moral vice.⁶⁶ Virtues are neither emotions nor capacities, so they must be defined as dispositions, attitudes.⁶⁷ They are desirable characteristics of individuals and are not to be understood as values which notion refers to ideals that are cherished by a community.⁶⁸ With Aristotle, these notions refer to the goal of living a good life and the character needed to achieve that goal.

⁶⁵ Searle, J. R. (2001). *Rationality in action*. Cambridge (Massachusetts), MIT Press. P 172-175.

⁶⁶ Aristoteles (2005). *Ethica Nicomachea*. Budel, Damon. Par. 1104b27-29. See also: Horton, J. and Mendus, S. (1994). After virtue and after. *After MacIntyre*. Cambridge, Polity Press. P 6.

⁶⁷ Aristoteles (2005). *Ethica Nicomachea*. Budel, Damon. Par. 1107a1-3.

⁶⁸ Olthoorn, P. (2011). *Military Ethics and Virtues*. Abingdon, Routledge. P 6.

Modern philosophers, like Sloterdijk, confirm this idea.⁶⁹ Sloterdijk even goes as far as to state that we have a duty to improve the way in which we live our life.⁷⁰ Foot adds that: '... virtues are in some general way, beneficial. Human beings do not get on well without them.'⁷¹ Van Tongeren defines a virtue as 'the quality which is required to perform excellently in a practice.'⁷² He limits the notion of a virtue to the practice and does not include any specification of living a good life. MacIntyre, in his definition of a virtue, also ties virtues to practices, but he also introduces a link with internal goods to be gained in a practice. He defines virtue as '*an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods that are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods.*'⁷³ In this definition, virtues are the qualities that enable us to achieve the internal goods of the practice by participating in a most excellent way in the activities that are central to the practice. By improving our effort we increase our gain in the internal goods of that practice. MacIntyre implicitly claims that by identifying the internal goods of a practice one can also identify the virtues needed to reap the benefits of these internal goods. This is an important conclusion. Because once we have established what kind of internal goods can be gained in a practice, we also could analyse and argue which virtues are necessary to excel in that particular practice. By this method, we would not have to depend on mere intuition.

2.6.7. In his definition MacIntyre seems to have in mind a singular idea of a virtue, whereas Aristotle distinguishes two **types of virtue**: the virtues of character and the virtue of intellect.⁷⁴ Both are indispensable for becoming a virtuous person. However, MacIntyre does acknowledge both types, but he considers their common properties as a virtue more important than their differences.⁷⁵ In short, both Aristotle and MacIntyre start from the principle of two types of virtue. The virtues of character refer to the dispositions of a moral nature. According to Aristotle, this kind of virtue is largely a matter of conditioning in and by the (extended) family and the community, resulting in a disposition that enables an agent to perceive a situation and its moral implications. This perceiving the moral implications of a situation requires an emotional disposition as well as cognitive faculties.⁷⁶ Emotions enhance moral perceptions.⁷⁷ Without emotions we would not fully register the situational facts and context.⁷⁸ On the other hand,

⁶⁹ Sloterdijk, P. (2009). Du musst dein Leben ändern. Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp. P 290: 'Tatsächlich ist es möglich, schon die klassische *Habitus* Lehre als Trainingstheorie zu lesen. Wer richtig geübt hat, überwindet die Unwahrscheinlichkeit des Guten und lässt die Tugend wie eine zweite Natur erscheinen. Zweite Naturen sind Könnensdispositionen, dank deren sich der Mensch als Artist der *Virtus* auf der Höhe zu halten vermag. Er tut das fast Unmögliche, das Beste, als sei es das Leichte, Spontane, Natürliche, das sich nahezu von selbst einstellt.'

⁷⁰ Ibid, P 47: 'Du musst dein Leben ändern! - so lautet der Imperativ, der die Alternative von hypothetische und kategorisch übersteigt. ... Er gibt das Stichwort zur Revolution in der zweite Person Singular. Er bestimmt das Leben als ein Gefälle zwischen seinen höheren und niedrigeren Formen. Ich lebe zwar schon, aber etwas sagt mir mit unwidersprechlicher Autorität: 'Du lebst noch nicht richtig'.'

⁷¹ Foot, P. (1985). Virtues and vices and other essays in moral philosophy. Oxford, Basil Blackwell. P 2,3.

⁷² Tongeren van, P. (2003). Deugdelijk leven. Amsterdam, Sun. P22.

⁷³ MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 191.

⁷⁴ Aristoteles (2005). Ethica Nicomachea. Budel, Damon. Par. 1103a2-10.

⁷⁵ MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P153-155.

⁷⁶ Sherman, N. (1989). The Fabric of Character: Aristotle's Theory of Virtue. Oxford, Clarendon Press. P 45.

⁷⁷ Aristoteles (2005). Ethica Nicomachea. Budel, Damon. Par. 1105b19-1106a11.

⁷⁸ Sherman, N. (1989). The Fabric of Character: Aristotle's Theory of Virtue. Oxford, Clarendon Press. P 47.

emotional impressions do require critical deliberation as well in order to assert the impact of the emotions at hand.⁷⁹ Virtues require right action as well as right feeling.⁸⁰ The virtues of character allow us to identify the appropriate mean between two kinds of moral anomaly, two kinds of vice. For each virtue therefore there are two corresponding vices: the vice of excess and the vice of defect.⁸¹ A virtuous attitude manifests itself in morally responsible choices resulting in a sensible course of action, which avoids the extremes. However, as I have explained circumstances play an important role in establishing what kind of conduct could be considered virtuous. Also the agent is a factor: what is good for one agent might not be good enough for another.⁸² This practical directedness of the virtues, which manifests itself in a practice, means that virtues cannot be defined in absolute terms.⁸³ However, it is possible to describe virtuous conduct in general terms. It is clear that a certain kind of conduct is preceded by the decision to act in a certain way, and that the decision in its turn is preceded by deliberation. It is logical to assume that consistently virtuous conduct can only be the result of decisions that are preceded by deliberation in which moral considerations are taken into account. Eventually the overall conduct is a matter of having a virtuous disposition.⁸⁴ Therefore, Aristotle distinguishes besides the virtues of character also virtue of the intellect (*Phronēsis*), practical wisdom. This virtue is described as 'an acquired disposition to know what is virtuous in a given situation and act accordingly'.⁸⁵ This practical wisdom is indispensable, as a virtuous attitude requires deciding what to do and as deciding requires moral deliberation, a virtuous person cannot dispense without this practical wisdom.⁸⁶ *Phronēsis* is essential: not only in order to know what to do - to meet the moral standards of excellence of the *praxis* -, but also how to act accordingly - to choose the appropriate practical means of effectiveness, *poiesis*, to achieve the required end.⁸⁷ Practical wisdom is therefore the prerequisite for all other virtues (of character).⁸⁸ Thus, practical wisdom also provides a check on uncritically following customary (and supposedly virtuous) habits. According to Aristotle: 'it is not possible to be fully good without having practical wisdom, nor practically wise without having excellence of character.'⁸⁹ The virtue of character enables the agent to determine the goal he sets for himself and practical wisdom directs his actions to attain that goal.⁹⁰ The virtue of practical wisdom is a disposition that allows us to choose the appropriate mean between two kinds of moral anomaly, two kinds of vice. Consequently, by its

⁷⁹ Nussbaum, M. (2007). *Wat liefde weet (Love's knowledge)*. Amsterdam, Boom. P108-113.

⁸⁰ Sherman, N. (1989). *The Fabric of Character: Aristotle's Theory of Virtue*. Oxford, Clarendon Press. P 192.

⁸¹ Aristoteles (2005). *Ethica Nicomachea*. Budel, Damon. Par. 1106b37-1107a2.

⁸² Ibid, Par.1106a36-1106b4.

⁸³ Johnson, P. (1994). Reclaiming the Aristotelian ruler. *After MacIntyre*. J. Horton. Cambridge, Polity Press. P 47. 'Morality is a realm of indeterminacy and irregularity and so cannot be formulated precisely in terms of rules or precepts. It is the nature of practice that its rules cannot encompass all its particulars, so the skill in judging particulars is to a significant degree a matter of perception and comes into play only with the possession of the virtues.' See also Nussbaum, M. (1986). *The fragility of goodness*. Cambridge, University Press. P 300, 301 and Aristoteles (2005). *Ethica Nicomachea*. Budel, Damon. Par. 1103b34-1104a10.

⁸⁴ Aristoteles (2005). *Ethica Nicomachea*. Budel, Damon. Par. 1105b19-1107a27.

⁸⁵ Ibid, par. 1140b4-7 and 1144b31-32.

⁸⁶ MacIntyre, A. (1990). *Three rival versions of moral inquiry*. Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 111.

⁸⁷ Taylor, C. (2010). *Een seculiere tijd (A secular age)*. Rotterdam, Lemniscaat. P659.

⁸⁸ MacIntyre, A. (2003). *Whose justice? Which rationality?* Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 110.

⁸⁹ Aristoteles (2005). *Ethica Nicomachea*. Budel, Damon. Par. 1144a16-17 ; 1144b31-32.

⁹⁰ Ibid. Par. 1145a1-5.

essence, virtue occupies the middle, but as to the result, the virtues lead to the best possible course of action.⁹¹

2.6.8. Another issue that is not addressed by MacIntyre is the **number of virtues**. How many virtues are there? Is it possible to count or calculate the exact number of virtues? Aristotle distinguishes quite a number of virtues of character.⁹² However this does not mean that there are no more. Aristotle explicitly states that the foundation of virtues of character lays in growing accustomed to what is right and what is wrong in and by the family and the community. This process of habituation should start early in life.⁹³ However, every community, every society, every practice has its own standards of excellence to aspire at and as a result the virtues that enable realizing these aspirations may vary as well. Besides these standards develop and change over time.⁹⁴ And there is another complicating factor as well. According to Van Tongeren, a virtue is an attitude that manifests itself in all kind of circumstances. Therefore, in order to cope with all these different circumstances, a virtuous person has to have several virtues that can manifest themselves in these many and different contexts.⁹⁵ These contexts include the practices a person participates in. Also in these different practices different standards of excellence are provided and is established which different virtues are relevant in order to achieve excellence in a specific practice. It would be hard, if not impossible, to establish a generic list of virtues that would accommodate all practices. Sherman states that virtue ethics: 'As a theory it remains inexact, awaiting the more determinate operations of practical reason in its perceptual and decision-making roles.'⁹⁶ However, according to MacIntyre it is possible to establish which virtues are relevant in a specific practice. Each practice has specific standards of excellence which require equally specific virtuous dispositions to achieve the pleasure inherent to meeting these specific standards. These standards must be tangible in order to present attainable goals and provide a focus for developing the required virtuous disposition. In short for every practice it is possible to establish which virtues are relevant to that particular practice. These virtues must provide focus within the wider context of the practice. This means that the virtues must meet the requirements of the practice: specific enough to enable focus and wide enough to fit within the context of the overall practice.⁹⁷ Bieri supports this approach: he states that these kind of notions are invented for practical use. And in his opinion this means that the outlines of this notions are as sharp as required by their practical use. And because of this relation with a practical use, there will always be a domain of blur and twilight.⁹⁸ In the rugby analogy: technical skill is important, but must be brought to bear in a play with team spirit.

2.6.9. The problem of an - in principle - indeterminate set of virtues has given rise to the notion that there is only **one virtue** and that is being virtuous. In this respect there

⁹¹ Ibid, par. 1107a5-7.

⁹² Courage, temperance, justness, friendship, craftsmanship, generosity, greatness, veracity and gentleness. Ibid, book 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9.

⁹³ Ibid, par. 1103b22-25.

⁹⁴ For example the virtues of the medieval knight are no longer a yardstick for appreciating other people nowadays, nor are those of the feudal lords, the colonialist or the pre-war capitalist, etc.

⁹⁵ Tongeren van, P. (2003). *Deugdelijk leven*. Amsterdam, Sun. P 56.

⁹⁶ Sherman, N. (1989). *The Fabric of Character: Aristotle's Theory of Virtue*. Oxford, Clarendon Press. P 11.

⁹⁷ Aristoteles (2005). *Ethica Nicomachea*. Budel, Damon. Par. 1094a22-24.

⁹⁸ Bieri, P. (2011). *Het handwerk van de vrijheid. (Das Handwerk der Freiheit)* Amsterdam, Wereldbibliotheek. P 145.

seem to be two interpretations of the virtues. I will use the terms narrow and broad to distinguish the different perspectives. A narrow interpretation links virtues primarily to a specific practice. The development of these specific virtues of character could be considered as a first stage in the development of an overall virtuous lifestyle. This second stage in which this overall virtuous lifestyle is developed, could be seen as a broad interpretation of the role of the virtues in life in general.⁹⁹ MacIntyre seems to use both conceptions.¹⁰⁰ He uses the narrow conception in order to establish which virtues are relevant for a practice. He then makes a connection by stating that these virtues must be internalized by means of narrative which in itself must fit in the wider moral tradition. The notion of a moral tradition assumes a broad interpretation of what is virtuous.¹⁰¹ It assumes a connection between the virtues and a shared 'comprehensive conception of the good'.¹⁰² These conceptions may be valuable at a theoretical level, but on a practical level there are several arguments that oppose the notion of one single virtue. In order to become a virtuous practitioner an individual must get acquainted with the standards of excellence of the practice he participates in. This requires a clear understanding of the content of these standards. These standards therefore should be - and mostly are - tangible. Furthermore standards differ for each practice. It would be hard, if not impossible to imbue a - necessarily - abstract knowledge of standards that suffices for a successful participation in different practices. Also on a conceptual level the idea of a single virtue is problematic. Knowledge of and the skill to apply rules and standards is a prerequisite to reap the internal goods inherent to the practice. These internal goods too differ by practice and the individual participants. It is hard to see how a single virtue could enhance the delight in different internal goods related to participating in different practices in which different individuals participate. For example playing a game of chess would not produce the appropriate internal goods for a rugby player, which would inspire him to aspire at excellence and thus to develop the appropriate virtues. On the other hand it is hard to imagine that a player of chess could find pleasure in physical prowess and team spirit - internal goods typical of playing rugby - while playing chess. As virtues are closely related to a practice, an overall singular abstract notion of virtue would not be very helpful in acquiring the disposition appropriate to excel in a specific practice.

2.6.10. However accepting the idea of several virtues for each and every practice, leads to the next question: how to establish what is **virtuous conduct**? How could a virtue - like temperance - be interpreted in such a way that it is clear what is meant by it instead of it being used as a kind of portfolio concept that can hold any kind of conduct. This is a hard question to answer, as virtue ethics is a substantive theory rather than a procedural theory.¹⁰³ In procedural theories it is relatively easy to establish what kind of conduct is morally appropriate in a given situation. It is matter of choosing starting points, adapting or developing an axiology and going through the prescribed theoretical procedure. This will result in a moral verdict on the motives of an act (deontology) or

⁹⁹ Milton, J. (2000). *Paradise lost*. London, Penguin books. P 103 (Book v, Line 71): '...since good, the more communicated, more abundant grows.'

¹⁰⁰ MacIntyre, A. (2007). *After Virtue*. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 203.

¹⁰¹ MacIntyre, A. (2003). *Whose justice? Which rationality?* Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 44-45.

¹⁰² A description John Rawls introduced in his book "Political Liberalism". Rawls, J. (1996) *Political Liberalism*, New York, Columbia University Press.

¹⁰³ Taylor, C. (1994). Justice after virtue. *After MacIntyre*. Horton, J. and Mendus, S. Cambridge, Polity Press. P 27.

on the moral nature of consequences of an act (utilitarianism). Virtue ethics lacks a fixed procedure that can be applied in any situation. Sherman articulates the inexact character of virtue ethics as follows: 'The choices the virtuous agent makes require refinements of more vaguely grasped ends, as well as their assessment in terms of overall fit within a coherent conception of good living.'¹⁰⁴ Virtue ethics does have a method though. To start with, a virtuous agent must perceive a situation and realize the moral issue(s) at hand. This kind of situational perception is by definition personal and therefore subjective. At first it will be difficult to perceive a situation clearly and to decide on an appropriate course of action. However, experience will enable the practitioner to build a capacity which will assist him to correct his perception for bias and other distortions. This capacity to appraise a situation critically requires deliberation. Thus, in order to determine what is virtuous, the agent must first realize to what he is attracted in order to realize pleasure and to avoid pain. Then he must force himself to disengage his thoughts from this attraction and deliberate on the extreme opposite position.¹⁰⁵ Aristotle uses antonyms, pairs of contrasting notions. By distancing himself from the extremes of vicious conduct, the agent will find the right mean, the virtuous position.¹⁰⁶ However, this mean is not the arithmetic average; it is the appropriate balance in a particular context.¹⁰⁷ The virtuous person establishes what is virtuous by choosing the mean between the vice of excess (too much) and the vice of defect (too little). He does so by first establishing what would be his first choice of action. Then he must imagine what would be the opposite course of action. By doing so, he will be able to discern the antonyms. Next, he will establish what would be the mean: the best possible course of action, which is within his power.¹⁰⁸ It is important that in this deliberation real opposing positions are established from which to choose.¹⁰⁹ The choice between killing and torturing a prisoner of war will necessarily result in bad conduct, as both options are bad in themselves. In this case, a correct opposition of choices would be either killing the prisoner or setting him free. A correct mean would then be to detain the prisoner in accordance with the rule of international law. The virtuous person deliberates on the basis of his knowledge, and the conclusion of this deliberations must direct his actions. The action must be in accordance with the conclusion of the deliberation.¹¹⁰ And as to the right way to act, we should only consider those options that are within our power.¹¹¹ Aristotle emphasizes that apart from our choice being well considered and limited to feasible options that are within our power, it must also be a voluntarily choice.¹¹² An indication for the correctness of our choice of the virtuous position is found in the support or criticism by others (*endoxa*) and the arguments they put forward.¹¹³ Actions that are in accordance with the virtues will be applauded and those that divert from the virtues will be criticised. In short the content

¹⁰⁴ Sherman, N. (1989). The Fabric of Character: Aristotle's Theory of Virtue. Oxford, Clarendon Press. P 9.

¹⁰⁵ MacIntyre, A. (1990). Three rival versions of moral inquiry. Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 127.

¹⁰⁶ Aristoteles (2005). Ethica Nicomachea. Budel, Damon. Par. 1109a35-1109b7.

¹⁰⁷ Schwartz, B., Sharpe, K. (2010). Practical wisdom. New York, Riverhead. P 29.

¹⁰⁸ Aristoteles (2005). Ethica Nicomachea. Budel, Damon. Par. 1109a35-1109b7. A view that is supported by Bieri as a prerequisite for a truly free choice of an agent. Bieri, P. (2011). Het handwerk van de vrijheid. (Das Handwerk der Freiheit) Amsterdam, Wereld bibliotheek. P 153-169.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, par. 1107a8-27.

¹¹⁰ Ibid, par. 1113a9-13.

¹¹¹ Ibid, par. 1111b26-29.

¹¹² Ibid, par. 1111b7-10 and 1111b19.

¹¹³ Ibid, par. 1106b23-27.

of an abstract notion - like temperance - is limited by the situation in a specific practice in which the term is used. The rules and the standards of excellence that apply in the practice further limit the content. The fact that the action must be feasible and within the power of the agent further constraints what is within the limits of temperance as a virtue. Virtue ethics: 'As theory, it remains inexact, awaiting the more determinate operations of practical reason in its perceptual and decision-making roles.'¹¹⁴ However, knowledge of the virtues will have great influence on our lives. 'And like archers who have some target to aim at, with this knowledge we shall be more likely to hit upon what is right.'¹¹⁵

2.6.11. A question that is closely connected with the preceding issue of what determines the virtuous nature of an action, is: **which virtue is relevant in a specific situation?** The rugby player who attempts a drop goal when the game is almost finished and practically lost, can do so from divergent dispositions. It could be a courageous act. He made the attempt in spite of the odds involved, and the reproaches of his teammates in case of failure. It could also be a matter of resilience. In the face of defeat he got a grip on himself and made a last attempt to change defeat into victory. It could also be interpreted as the paramount of team spirit. For the love of his team he made a desperate attempt in order to prevent a bitter defeat that would bring disappointment to the whole team. Which of these virtues made the player do what he did? It is doubtful that even the player himself knows the right answer. This does not necessarily mean that it is impossible to discern virtues. On a theoretical level this is feasible as I intend to demonstrate. Also in a practice it is possible to discern different virtues. Otherwise the notion of virtues would have lost its meaning long ago. What is problematic though, is to establish which virtue settles the action. In the example it is feasible that all virtues are involved in his action: resilience, courage and comradeship. It is even possible that the virtues were mutually supportive in bringing about the action. A virtue is a disposition to aspire to meeting the standard of excellence inherent to a practice and a practice requires several skills and dispositions, the combination of which leads to an overall successful performance in the practice. The question then is whether it matters which virtue was the ultimate determinant. As the overall excellence in the practice is the accepted goal of any practice it seems irrelevant which virtue was ultimately determining in achieving this success; more virtues could - even simultaneously - contribute to meeting the standards of excellence. This does not mean that - on second thoughts - a practice could do with a single virtue after all. All virtues that are relevant to a practice are important, the amount in which they contribute to the overall success may vary though. The different virtues derive their relevance by providing tangible standards of excellence inherent to the practice. The virtue of practical wisdom serves to mediate among all such virtues, telling the agent which of them should primarily govern his action in a particular situation and what that requires of him.¹¹⁶

2.6.12. The question which virtue is relevant also presumes that we are able to make a clear **distinction between the relevant virtues**. From this perspective virtues should have a singular denotation. A denotation that enables to distinguish specific virtues without

¹¹⁴ Sherman, N. (1989). *The Fabric of Character: Aristotle's Theory of Virtue*. Oxford, Clarendon Press. P11.

¹¹⁵ Aristoteles (2005). *Ethica Nicomachea*. Budel, Damon. Par. 1094a22-24.

¹¹⁶ Zagzebski, L. T. (1998). *Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge*. Cambridge, University Press. P 222-224.

any overlap with other virtues. This is a problematic presumption. As I explained in paragraph 2.6.10 above, virtuous conduct is not the result of following a moral procedural theory, it is the result of a substantive method.¹¹⁷ This method is applied by different individuals in different circumstances resulting in conduct which may vary greatly in direction. From this perspective it seems very hard to discern the boundaries of the specific virtues that are relevant in a specific situation. It would be equally hard to establish when a specific virtue dominant in shaping an individual's conduct is taken over by another dominant virtue, etc.¹¹⁸ For example consider a soldier helping his wounded comrade to return to their own lines. Surely this would be considered a fine example of comradeship. Now imagine that it takes hours and hours to reach the own lines and the soldiers have nothing to compensate for their dwindling forces: no food nor water. Nevertheless the able bodied soldier continues his struggle to bring his wounded comrade into safety. Of course comradeship is still a driving disposition but also resilience seems to become of some importance. Without the virtue of resilience the soldier would perhaps have given up on his attempts to save his comrade. Has comradeship become irrelevant? Has resilience become more relevant? Or is resilience underpinning comradeship, and/or vice versa? After a while the enemy spots the two soldiers and sets up an ambush. The soldiers are not aware of these proceedings and continue their combined struggle; still a matter of comradeship and resilience only. Then the enemy opens fire and the soldiers do not give up but continue their struggle. Is this still a matter of comradeship and resilience only, or do other virtues become important too, like courage? How do comradeship, resilience and courage relate to each other in this example? It seems possible to discern these virtues. But is it possible to define these virtues in such a way that they can be discerned as separate entities? Is it possible to discern where these virtues overlap? These are hard questions to answer, if such an answer is possible at all, especially as with virtues there is always a perceptual component.¹¹⁹ However some conclusions can be drawn. In a specific situation several virtuous dispositions can be active to effect an individual's conduct. It is also possible to identify these virtues. This is a matter of identifying the appropriate standards of excellence and establishing to what extent these are realized. Furthermore, it is plausible that these dispositions can be mutually invigorating. However, to ascertain to what extent the one or the other virtue is dominant in directing the agent's conduct, or to establish to what extent virtues overlap in bringing about specific conduct, seems virtually impossible. Even the agent himself might be unaware of any mutual influence or overlap. Any attempt to define specific virtues in strict terms would unacceptably narrow down the complexities involved in expressing virtuous conduct in a wide range of circumstances.

2.6.13. The last issue that needs to be addressed is how to become virtuous. According to MacIntyre's definition, **virtues are acquired**, and this means that they are at first taught, then put into practice together with others and eventually - by experience - embedded in the individual's character.¹²⁰ However, this process of habituation must not be mindless or uncritical. It should be an earnest process, in which the agent

¹¹⁷ See paragraph 2.6.10 above.

¹¹⁸ Sherman, N. (1989). The Fabric of Character: Aristotle's Theory of Virtue. Oxford, University Press. P166.

¹¹⁹ Ibid, P 29 and 35.

¹²⁰ MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 194.

seriously tries to improve his performance.¹²¹ When learning a new skill, uncritical repetition of rote steps would never allow one to learn from one's errors or to improve upon prior attempts. Every conscientious student is always monitoring himself and his performance.¹²² The notion of virtue as an acquired disposition is shared with Aristotle, Rawls and Sloterdijk too.¹²³ According to Aristotle acquiring virtues requires a willingness to listen to arguments, the presence of a certain kind of intellect which will enable proper education. The foundation for this kind of intellect and willingness is laid in the family. Appropriate parental guidance will result in the prerequisites for a successful education.¹²⁴ Next living together with friends and sharing arguments and thoughts is required to further develop moral consciousness.¹²⁵ Nancy Sherman interprets this as follows: 'In Aristotle's view we become moral agents in response to and through the help of others whom we deeply care about and whose lives intertwine with ours. Through the early attachments and affections of *philia* we are made ready for the sorts of friendships and associations which will sustain the good life.'¹²⁶ When, in this process, arguments fail a certain - moderate - amount of parental coercion is permissible. Furthermore, all education should be governed by rules which aim at creating the appropriate circumstances for acquiring knowledge and skills: 'learning by doing'.¹²⁷ Training and learning skills aim at creating familiarity to act in a certain way in a wide range of circumstances. But this kind of training in itself is not enough, also a disciplined desire is required, as well as the appropriate motive: the values instilled in prior education.¹²⁸ Improved skills do result in increasing the pleasures gained in performing well.¹²⁹ The desire to participate in the activities of the practice together with other participants whom we appreciate - if not admire - creates a stimulating environment in which aspiring at excellence comes naturally. Copying the conduct of admired fellow practitioners - role models - is an important feature of acquiring a virtuous disposition.¹³⁰ Giving and receiving esteem plays an important role in this

¹²¹ Sherman, N. (1989). The Fabric of Character: Aristotle's Theory of Virtue. Oxford, University Press. P 30-31.

¹²² Osiel, M. J. (1999). Obeying orders: atrocity, military discipline and the law of war. London, Transaction Publishers. P 276.

¹²³ Aristoteles (2005). Ethica Nicomachea. Budel, Damon. Par. 1103a15-29 and 1105b1-5. Rawls, J. (2006). Een theorie van rechtvaardigheid. (A theory of justice) Rotterdam, Lemniscaat. P474- 480. Sloterdijk, P. (2009). Du musst dein Leben ändern. Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp. P 290.

¹²⁴ Ibid, par. 1103b23-25.

¹²⁵ Aristoteles (2005). Ethica Nicomachea. Budel, Damon. Par. 1170b11-12.

¹²⁶ Sherman, N. (1982). Aristotle's theory of moral education. Philosophy. Cambridge (Massachusetts), Harvard. **PhD**: 237. P 53. She also explains that the Greek family entails more than the modern notion of a family. The ancient notion of a family included beside the parents, nurses, tutors and trainers as well as other 'elders.' Ibid P 57. See also Sherman, N. (1989). The Fabric of Character: Aristotle's Theory of Virtue. Oxford, Clarendon Press. P 151-155.

¹²⁷ Aristoteles (2004). Ethica Nicomachea. Budel, Damon. Par. 1103a31-1103b2; 1103b22-1103b25.

¹²⁸ Hardie, W. F. R. (1981). Aristotle's ethical theory. Oxford, Oxford University Press. P 103-105. This notion is also noticeable in the funeral oration of Pericles: 'There is a difference too in our educational systems. The Spartans from their earliest boyhood, are submitted to the most laborious training in courage; we pass our lives without all these restrictions, and yet are just as ready to face the same dangers as they are...There are certain advantages, I think, in our way of meeting danger voluntarily with an easy mind instead with laborious training, with natural rather than state-induced courage.' Thucydides (1954). The Peloponnesian war. Harmondsworth, Penguin. P 118.

¹²⁹ The Aristotelian principle as articulated by Rawls, J. (2006). Een theorie van rechtvaardigheid (A theory of justice). Rotterdam, Lemniscaat. P 432.

¹³⁰ Sherman, N. (2011). The untold war: inside the hearts, minds and souls of our soldiers. New York, W.W. Norton & company. P 28. See: also van Tongeren, P. (2012). Leven is een kunst. Zoetermeer, Klement. P 107.

process.¹³¹ Experience adds to this kind of education.¹³² An important aspect of learning by experience is how to cope with disappointments. Disappointments are important elements in educating the young and inexperienced as they will knock them out of their naïve trust in others and overconfidence in their abilities.¹³³ This also induces modesty as a feature of virtue ethics.¹³⁴ In this Aristotelian perspective practices provide a pre-eminently appropriate environment for developing virtues. Even then, acquiring the appropriate virtues will take time.¹³⁵ When I return to the example of playing a game of rugby, it means that playing rugby requires preparation, training! Playing well enhances the pleasure one experiences in the game and in being a rugby player. Playing rugby better will increase this pleasure. Technical ability to handle the ball and team spirit are some of the virtues that enable the rugby-player to increase the pleasure he experiences in participating in the game. By improving his realization of these virtues, the participant will achieve greater joy in the practice. To strive for excellence is an essential feature of virtuous conduct. This strives for excellence, is shared by those who participate in the practice and as a result there is a certain kind of relationship between the participants.¹³⁶ It is within the bounds (and bonds) of this relationship, they characterize themselves and others as virtuous. In this relationship, mere skills needed in a practice are enriched and transformed as extensions of human powers needed for the achievement of the internal goods of the practice.

2.6.14. An aspect that requires some elaboration, is the relation between **values and virtues**. Values are abstract notions used in theoretical reasoning. Values refer to goals or duties that people aspire at, founded on their ideas of good and evil.¹³⁷ Values also often articulate a maximum.¹³⁸ Values are a part of morality and pertains to ideals worthwhile to strive after.¹³⁹ Morality is an integrated part of the culture of a society in a certain time and space. Values are a part of a tradition and as such can be sources of inspiration for the developing of virtues.¹⁴⁰ The direction of fit of values is from the mind to the world: in order for an ideal, a value - or believes in general - to be true, there must be a state of affairs in the world that corresponds with these believes.¹⁴¹ Virtues on the other hand pertain to a disposition to act in a morally appropriate way. Virtues play an important part in practical reasoning. Virtues are dispositions that inspire an agent to aspire at excellence: the best what is within his power. The virtues of character enable an agent to identify the moral issue(s) at stake in a specific situation and establish the requirement to act: what to do. The virtue of intellect, practical wisdom, enables the agent to deliberate and choose an appropriate course of action: how to do it. The direction of fit is from the world to the mind. Action is required in order to meet the conditions of satisfaction of the agent's mental state. Wisdom is not the same as

¹³¹ Ibid. P 433: 'the companion effect'.

¹³² Aristoteles (2004). *Ethica Nicomachea*. Budel, Damon. Par. 1107a1, 1179a33-1181b24.

¹³³ Aristotle (1991). *The art of rhetoric*. London, Penguin Books. Par. 1389a16-1389a31.

¹³⁴ van Tongeren, P. (2012). *Leven is een kunst*. Zoetermeer, Klement. P 107.

¹³⁵ Aristoteles (2004). *Ethica Nicomachea*. Budel, Damon. Par. 1103a16.

¹³⁶ MacIntyre, A. (2007). *After Virtue*. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 191.

¹³⁷ van Baarda, T. A., van Iersel, A.H.M. (2002). *Militaire ethiek, morele dilemma's van militairen in theorie en praktijk*. Budel, Damon. P 190.

¹³⁸ Tongeren van, P. (2003). *Deugdelijk leven*. Amsterdam, Sun. P 29.

¹³⁹ Verweij, D. E. M. (2007). Morele professionaliteit in de militaire praktijk. *Werkzame idealen*. Kole, J., Ruyter, de, D. Ed. Assen, van Gorcum: P 5 and 126-138.

¹⁴⁰ MacIntyre, A. (2007). *After Virtue*. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 219.

¹⁴¹ Searle, J. R. (2001). *Rationality in action*. Cambridge (Massachusetts), MIT Press.

cleverness. Cleverness is the ability to take the right steps to any end, whereas wisdom is related only to good ends.¹⁴² One might say that a man who lacks wisdom has 'false values'.¹⁴³

Conclusions.

2.7. According to MacIntyre, it is possible to identify the virtues that are related to a specific practice. Virtues are those dispositions that enable the practitioner to gain the internal goods related to the (specific) practice. Therefore, by first identifying the internal goods of a practice we can next establish which virtues enhance the pleasure participants experience in a specific practice. MacIntyre does not touch on the meaning of virtues, but these can be established by using the method Aristotle used. The virtuous course of action can be identified by finding the mean between two related opposing notions of vice; the vice of excess and the vice of falling short. This - narrow - interpretation of the virtues requires intellectual deliberation, practical wisdom, and the development of virtues of character. These virtues of practical wisdom and character can be acquired by education, exercise and experience. How to interpret the nature of the virtues, in relation to developing a virtuous identity, which is embedded in a moral tradition, requires another - broad - interpretation of the virtues, not directly linked with a specific practice. This pertains to the connection between virtue and identity, and the link with society and its wider moral tradition, which I will cover in chapter 7 and 8. In the next chapter 3, 4 and 5, I will apply MacIntyre's theoretical framework on military practice.

¹⁴² Aristoteles (2004). *Ethica Nicomachea*. Budel, Damon. Par. 1143b23-28.

¹⁴³ Foot, P. (1985). *Virtues and vices and other essays in moral philosophy*. Oxford, Basil Blackwell. P 7.

Chapter 3: military practice.

Introduction.

3.1. In this chapter I will apply the theoretical framework I discussed in the preceding chapter on military practice. Although this application is of a generic nature, I will use the Dutch military practice as a primary frame of reference. In order to answer the central question of this thesis, whether the theory of virtue ethics as elaborated by Alasdair MacIntyre in his book 'After Virtue' provides a suitable instrument to identify, develop, instil and uphold the required moral standards in the military. In this chapter I will attempt to establish how his theory fits the military practice.¹ I will do so by first arguing why military operational activities qualify as a practice. Next I will address the constitutive elements of that practice. Based on these, I will try to identify relevant internal goods served by the practice. These internal goods should provide the key to establish which military virtues are related to the military practice, which will be addressed in the next chapter.

Military Practice

3.2.1. MacIntyre defines a practice as: *'any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved are systematically extended.'*² However, in spite of this extensive definition he is rather vague as to what kind of activities qualify as a practice.³ The question is whether practice (*praxis*)- as opposed to mere production (*poièsis*)- really exists. To what extent is this classical distinction still valid in modern society? As noted before there is a difference between practises (*praxis*) and production (*poièsis*). On the one hand there are practices in which the aim of the activities is to participate in the practice and satisfaction is primarily found in participating in the activities of the practice. On the other hand there is production (*poièsis*) in which satisfaction is found in the indirect results of the activities; the practice serves as a means to attain other goals.⁴ Although our present society is much more complex than that of ancient Greece, this distinction still can be made. My assumption is that almost all modern activities share aspects of both *praxis* and *poièsis*. We can visualize this by using the figure of the double wedge which shows that in some activities the criteria of a practice are dominant and at in other that of production, while between these extremes the dominance of the practice former gradually makes way for that of the latter.⁵ In less abstractive terms, the activities of a member of an amateur rugby team would be found at the practice end of the scale, while the activities of an unskilled employee on an industrial assembly line - whose primary aim is to provide for the sustenance of his family - would be found on the production end of the scale. In a practice satisfaction is primarily found in the activities of the practice as such, while in more production like activities the satisfaction is primarily found in the indirect results of the activities, such as an income, power or status. The question is whether the military qualifies as a practice and if this is the case

¹ See paragraph 1.8.2 above.

² MacIntyre, A. (2007). *After Virtue*. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 187.

³ As I noted in paragraph 2.6.2. above.

⁴ As I noted in paragraph 2.6.1. above.

⁵ See appendix A.

what the implications are. Does military practice meet the criteria of the definition and to what extent is satisfaction primarily found in participating in the activities of that practice, or are other - indirect results or purposes - also or even more important?

3.2.2 In the definition of MacIntyre military activities form without a doubt a '*coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity*.' Military activities are conducted within an institutional setting that is part of the larger state institution. As such the military is socially established. Military activities are complex because of the many aspects that are involved in the activity: mission, men, materiel, time, space and doctrine. Coherence is required in order to produce the overall result aspired at. Because of the complexity of the activities, cooperation between the members of the military is a '*conditio sine qua non*'. From these perspectives, military activities do qualify as a practice.

3.2.3. Whether '*goods internal to that form of activity are realized*' is less obvious. However, there are some strong indications that this is indeed the case. When young men and women voluntarily join the military, they often refer to their expectations on with regard to the challenging, adventurous and thrilling nature of working within the armed forces. The comfort and support of comradeship and teamwork are mostly mentioned as well.⁶ These characteristics that are attributed to the military and which are positively appreciated by those who consider joining the military can be interpreted as internal goods. Goods that can only be realized by participating in the practice. These findings underpin the notion of the military as a practice. Education and career opportunities - typical of an external orientation to a military job - are often mentioned as well, but mostly not in the first place and often with a lower priority.⁷ Which internal goods could be involved in military practice will be investigated later in this chapter, in relation to my further analysis of military practice.

3.2.3. The element of MacIntyre's definition of the virtues as '*trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, an partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved are systematically extended*.' is part and parcel of military education, training and exercise. Achieving standards of military skill is definitively appropriate, if not definitive of military practice. If these standards are not met, there is hardly a question of a military practice as such. Soldiers willingly submit themselves to the regimen of intensive education and sometimes harsh training and exercise in order to achieve these standards. The value of the skills and drills taught, relate directly to qualities that are needed on the battlefield in order to act like a close-knit team in fulfilling the mission and survive.⁸ The last element, survival, implies the danger of bodily harm, even death. The very real danger of being hurt, strongly underpins the need for meeting standards and achieving excellence. Soldiers realize this need for excellence in all aspects of military practice. This awareness is enhanced once they actually experienced the challenges of real battle and find out that excellence is

⁶ Gelooven, R. M. W. v. (2009). Basisstudie Imago en Belangstelling. Afdeling Gedragwetenschappen. Den Haag, Ministerie van Defensie: 41. P 31.

⁷ Ibid, P 29. See also van Rees Vellinga, N (2006). Belangstellingsonderzoek 2005-2006, Een baan als militair. Afdeling Gedragwetenschappen. Den Haag, Ministerie van Defensie: 22. P 10-14 and C.D.P.O. (2000). Een baan als militair. Afdeling Gedragwetenschappen. Den Haag, Ministerie van Defensie: 66. P 21. See also chapter 6.

⁸ Mullaney, G. M. (2009). The unforgiving minute: a soldier's education. London, Penguin books. P 88-121.

indeed a force multiplier and improves their chance of surviving this experience unscathed.⁹

3.2.4. According to Van Tongeren the notion of a practice not only refers to the kind of activities that are part of a practice, but also to how the activities are executed and how the participants experience the practice.¹⁰ Also from this perspective does the military qualify as a practice. Not only are the activities of the practice typical for the military, the way to do things and the standards of excellence involved, are part of the practice as such, as is experience.¹¹ The idea of military activity as a practice is also supported by Huizinga.¹² He argues that military activities when practised within the constraints of rules do qualify as a kind of game - and thus as a practice - albeit of a very intense and energetic nature. According to Huizinga the nature of a military confrontation as a sort of match (*agon*) is introduced from the very moment the competitors consider each other as opponents who compete for a cause they both consider just or entitled to. He states further that within this nature of a match it is required that the contenders respect each others as equals. In the case this respect is lacking, contenders can still act within the rules of a game by voluntarily (and even one-sidedly) abiding to restrictions in order to maintain their honour.¹³ And although this notion is put under pressure in new wars, the idea of a military confrontation as a match still has important moral implications with regard to the standards and constraints the contestants (voluntarily) impose on their activities in trying to achieve their goals. All in all, there are good arguments to qualify the military as a practice in the meaning MacIntyre attaches to this concept.

Analyzing military practice

3.3.1. To establish which internal goods and virtues are connected to the military practice - according to MacIntyre's theory - further analysis is required. I will continue this analysis by dissecting military practice in its constitutive parts. When we first look at the present military as a practice and try to dissect it, we can discern several elements that are typical of that practice. Without these elements there would be no military practice as such. First of all, the practitioners are aiming at something, a goal that is inherent to participating in the practice: they have a task to accomplish. The general task of the military in any democratic and constitutional state is articulated in the constitution.¹⁴ The task refers to the vital interests of the state and the international community and implies the threat with or the actual use of (lethal) force. This task requires not only an appropriate armament for the soldiers, but also the skills to use this armament in adverse conditions involving bodily danger. These capabilities enable soldiers to perform other, sometimes secondary, tasks as well, such as disaster relief, development missions, etc. This notion is often captured in the expression: 'It's not a

⁹ This notion is supported by the results of the interviews that were conducted, the contents of which will be discussed in chapter 6.

¹⁰ Tongeren van, P. (2003). Deugdelijk leven. Amsterdam, Sun. P20-22.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Huizinga, J. (1938). Homo ludens. proeve eener bepaling van het spel-element der cultuur. Amsterdam, Universiteits Pers. P130-150

¹³ Ibid, P 130-131.

¹⁴ Bovend'eert, P. P. T., Ed. (2009). Grondwet voor het koninkrijk der Nederlanden Deventer, Kluwer. Article 97-1

soldier's job, but only soldiers can do it.'¹⁵ The issue of the actual (changing) content of present military tasks and the influence on the mental outlook of soldiers will be addressed in chapter 7. But no matter what the actual task is, whether it involves attacking an enemy stronghold or assisting civilians in overcoming the effects of a tropical storm, it still is a task which is executed in a military context by soldiers who wear a uniform and bear arms. To fulfil these primary and secondary tasks the military is deployed by the government - which has the legitimate authority to do so. This governmental decision to deploy the military will result in more specific operational tasks for the military. These specific operational tasks will be disseminated into many minor tasks that underlie military practice. The notion of a **task** involving the possible use of force is definitely a constitutive part of military practice. In general there would be no military practice without an (authorized) task to perform.

3.3.2. Next the military practice implies the use of weapons. It is not for nothing that the military is denoted as the nation's 'power of the sword'. We cannot picture a modern armed force without arms. It would be a conceptual inconsistency. These arms involve a vast array of weapon systems and related special equipment, including a uniform to be worn. It also involves the organization and shops to maintain weapon-systems, the vehicles to transport spare-parts, fuel and ammunition, as well as clothes, food and water for those who operate the weapon-systems. All these elements are necessary to bring to bear the capacity for violence. So we can conclude that the wielding of **arms**, of specialized equipment, is an integral part of military practice.

3.3.3. Another aspect of military practice is the involvement of a large number of people in executing complex activities, which necessitate close cooperation. Without this cooperation the military could not function in any coherent way. This cooperation takes place at all levels: between services, formations and units and most direct and intense on the individual level. It is hard, if not impossible to conceive military practice as a random collection of individual activities. Therefore **cooperation** between those who participate in military practice is most certainly a constitutive part of this practice.

3.3.4. There are still other elements that determine military practice. The military is used to secure the vital interests of the state through the threat or actual use of violence. This means by definition that there is some kind of opposing force as well. This opposing force, the **enemy**, will equally defend its vital interests and is often willing to use violence as well. The potential mutual use of violence could ultimately result in (mortal) **danger** for those who participate in the military practice. Military practice is unequivocally connected with operations against an enemy. And as the enemy has lethal weapons as well, there can be no military practice without danger.

3.3.5. A practice is always related to a specific time and place. This time and place is often strictly confined: a medical operating theatre during working hours or a sports playing ground in leisure time. The confined time and place in which military practice is realized, is called a theatre of operations. This is a certain space at sea, on land and in the air where the military practice of threatening with, or actually wielding violence is realized. Of course, there are training areas where the military prepares for their tasks,

¹⁵ Moskos, C. C. (1967). Peace soldiers : the sociology of a United Nations military force. Chicago, University Press.

but these are not the places where military practice finds its ultimate realization, its 'raison d'être'. A theatre of operations, a battlefield, used to be - and sometimes still is - determined in time and space. It is that space in which the battle would take place (like the Northern German Plain of the cold war) or has taken place (like the air battle over The Hague). Its duration used to be predictable as well (like the Dutch Republic's Navy's raid at Chatham), or is determined post hoc (like the Dutch eighty year war of liberation). It is typical of modern military practice that the space (a theatre), and the time (a period of conflict) could be anywhere and anytime. This feature of relatively confined battle space in an **undetermined time and place** in which the practice takes place, is very much a constitutive feature of modern military practice.

3.3.6. If a specific practice is to be recognized as such, it must be similar in appearance, even at different time and places. There must be some internal structure that enables the recognition of a practice as an activity we have experienced before. These repeating features are captured in some kind of basic rules. Rules are often also the determining factor in setting the goal that is central to the practice. Without some kind of rules it would be hard, if not impossible to recognize a practice as such. And there are certainly rules that are inherent to military practice. These rules are meant to safeguard the moral conduct of the war and are based on the 'jus in bello'. The rules include (inter)national laws and (inter)national military regimen. One of its main tenets refers to the absolute prohibition on killing innocent (non combatant) civilians. This is one of the touchstones on the moral worth by which the war is conducted. At the same time, it is clear that it is impossible to wage war without killing any innocent bystanders. This fact is internationally recognized, and in order to reconcile the absolute prohibition on attacking non-combatants with the legitimate conduct of military activities; the concept of double effect was introduced.¹⁶ Other rules are meant to control large numbers of people who live and fight together under sometimes extreme circumstances. These rules constitute the military regimen, the formal embedding of military discipline. Therefore **rules** are a constitutive part of all practices - the military included - and specific rules determine military practice. Many of these rules are set by either the international institutions or the highest authority of the realm: the national government.¹⁷ This means that the military is not autonomous in setting the rules that govern the practice. The military has only a limited autonomy to establish rules that are necessary to enable

¹⁶ The concept of double effect is part of the tradition of just war. Its argument runs as follows. It is permitted to commit an act that is likely to have evil consequences (the killing of non combatants) provided the following four conditions hold: (1) the act is good in itself or at least indifferent, which means it is a legitimate act of war; (2) the direct effect is morally acceptable - the destruction of military supplies, for example the killing of enemy soldiers; (3) the intention of the actor is good, that is, he aims only at the acceptable effect, the evil effect is not one of his ends nor is it a means to his ends (*in his effort to minimize evil he even should accept increased risk for himself. Civilians have a right that due care is taken*); (4) the good effect is sufficiently good to compensate for allowing the evil effect, it must be justifiable under the proportionality rule. And proportionality in the tradition of just war means, that in the conduct of hostilities it is not permissible to do: 'any mischief which does not tend materially to the end (of victory), nor any mischief of which the conduciveness to the end is slight in comparison with the amount of mischief.' See: Walzer, M. (1977) Just and unjust wars. New York, Basic books. P 129 and 158. *Italics* added by the author.

¹⁷ Nowadays parts of the sovereign power of nations is transferred to international institutions. E.g. many of the members of the EU transferred their authority to distribute a national currency to the EU which issues the Euro; European laws are of a higher judicial level than national laws; European agricultural rules and regulations dominate national policies; etc. Also according to Dutch laws the obligations under international treaties have preference over the national constitution.

practicing the practice in an orderly way. One thing is abundantly clear however: rules too define military practice.

3.3.7. Are the aforementioned constitutive parts really characteristic of the military as a practice? Of course there are other practices that require special equipment and necessitate cooperation with others and in some way are dangerous as a result primarily of the opponent's conduct: for example in ice-hockey. But this is a practice which does not involve the intention of deliberately harming the opponent. Also the police practice is different, although many features of that practice seem similar to the military. The police also have a task that may involve the use of violence and has to abide by rules. The use of lethal violence by the police is however only admissible as a means of self-defence in response to a clear and present danger. Cooperation is also a feature of police practice, albeit on a smaller scale. The purpose is however totally different; the purpose of the police practice is aimed at maintaining law and order in the realm. The use of violence to enforce law and order is a means of last resort and the danger that ensues from policing is an exception rather than a defining characteristic. In consequence there are no enemies, only fellow citizens, some of which break the law and need correction. This correction sometimes requires a 'strong arm' especially in the face of serious - even armed - criminal activities. Furthermore, the citizens are (including those committing misdemeanours and crimes) often living in the same area the police officer lives in as well. This means that the area of responsibility of participants in the police practice is often also the area they live in. However, the main difference between police practice and military practice is the feature of the potential use of violence. For the military the threat with or use of violence is the primary task and as such a 'means of first resort' that aims at inflicting harm - or worse death. This is typical for the military, and is lacking in any other practice. But violence alone does not typecast military practice in full: the other elements (task, arms and cooperation as well as rules) are also constitutive. Without all these characteristics, military practice could well refer to an activity of individual psychopaths or banditry instead. The former has no conscientious barrier against killing and are not known for their willingness and capacity to cooperate while the latter lack legitimacy as to the rules they are subject to and in the goals they aspire at.

3.3.8. Thus the constitutive elements of military practice I identified, define that practice. These elements can be summarized as follows: the military has a task to perform that involves the wielding of arms and other special equipment and requires close cooperation between soldiers on a battlefield in an undetermined time and space, while abiding by rules in facing an enemy and danger. Together these elements make up the characteristic features of military practice. They are all part of a whole and if one part is missing the entity of military practice as such will be lost. From this perspective, of connectivity of the constitutive elements, it also follows that is virtually impossible to establish a priority or hierarchy between these elements and the further elaboration in the following paragraphs does not suggest one.

Internal goods

3.4.1. Related to these constitutive parts, I will try to discern the internal goods which are related to military practice. This is not an easy task, as internal goods - as I explained in the preceding chapter - are a combination of the characteristics of a practice and personal desires, expectations, mental states. I will try to discern the internal goods by interpreting the constitutive parts of the practice as its main characteristics. The

influence of mental states is by definition a very personal affair and therefore hard to fathom. On the other hand, specific practices do attract people with similar mental dispositions. So there seems to be a shared notion of the internal goods related to a specific practice. Insight in these shared notions can be gained from military (auto) biographies and research on motivations for young people to voluntarily join the military. I will try to discern the internal goods by combining the interpretation of the constitutive elements of the military with the expectations of those who join. Thus, I aim at giving a plausible argument on the internal goods of military practice. However, by aiming at the expectations of people considering joining the military, I run the risk of introducing idealistic notions that are not corroborated in the reality of the practice. Internal goods experienced could be appreciated higher or lower than the expectations beforehand. I will address this issue in chapter 6 in which I will investigate to what extent my findings are supported by soldiers whom I interviewed.

3.4.2. To start with, having a task to accomplish implies the actual realization of the task involved. The accomplishment might be relatively easy or very difficult because of adverse, even sheer impossible circumstances, let alone obstruction by others, e.g. an enemy. It is plausible however, that the accomplishment of a task results in a sense of fulfilment and achievement over a responsibility shouldered and living up to one's self-esteem.¹⁸ There is evidence that the nature of the task could also be relevant. The deployment of the military in missions for operations other than war also seems to have an inherent attraction.¹⁹ Also the complexity of the task is of influence on the amount of satisfaction gained.²⁰ Satisfaction over tasks accomplished - especially as complex as in the military - could be therefore identified as an internal good related to the constitutive element of a task as a defining part of military practice.

3.4.3. Carrying arms, wearing a uniform and wielding other specialized equipment is often accompanied by a feeling of excitement²¹ and pride²² as well as a sense of power and deep felt satisfaction over the skilful and professional mastery of these powerful systems that can wreak havoc and death. This feature and the notion of being a member of a special group that is authorized to use this power - if necessary - may well result in an added sense of pride.²³ I, therefore consider excitement, pride and satisfaction to be internal goods related to the notion of arms as a constitutive part of military practice.²⁴

¹⁸ Marlantes, K. (2010). Matterhorn. London, Corvus. P 476: 'His only choice being whether or not too play his part with heart and courage. He ran because fate had placed him in a position of responsibility and he had accepted the burden. He ran because his self-respect required it.'

¹⁹ C.D.P.O. (2000). Een baan als militair. Afdeling Gedragwetenschappen. Den Haag, Ministerie van Defensie: 66. P 21, figure 4.1 Some 23% of potential soldiers refer to 'helping people' and doing 'something useful' as reasons to join the military.

²⁰ Rawls, J. (2006). Een theorie van rechtvaardigheid (A theory of justice). Rotterdam, Lemniscaat. P432,433.

²¹ Mullaney, G. M. (2009). The unforgiving minute: a soldier's education. London, Penguin books. P 239: 'I was uneasy with the excitement I felt about shooting. Shouldn't I have felt remorse at aiming live rounds at other people?'

²² Marlantes, K. (2010). Matterhorn. London, Corvus. P401: 'Nice shot Mellas said. You gonna try for another one? Beats humping, was the answer.'

²³ For one of the many stories on the care soldiers put in their weapons see Herr, M. (1978). Dispatches. London, Pan Books. P 117: 'The M-79 had been cut down and fitted with a special stock. It was obviously a well loved object; you could see the kind of work that had gone into it by the amount of light caught from the flares that glistened on the stock.'

²⁴ An average of 58% of young people considering joining the armed forces state that their expectations are primarily based on the assumed content of their job as a soldier. The other main incentives are:

3.4.4. The enemy is a necessary element of military practice. This could be a real enemy who aims at killing soldiers, it could be a merely hostile population or even it could include non-human threats like an immediate natural danger (floods, volcano's, disease) that a population needs protection from. The aim of military operations, of military practice, is to overcome the enemy - no matter the nature in which it manifests itself. Succeeding in this can or will result in deeply felt contentment and tranquillity, as well as pride and satisfaction when the enemy is indeed overcome and over the way the enemy fighter is treated after he has been overcome, without brutality and without contempt and brazen superiority.²⁵ In addition to pride and satisfaction, contentment over an enemy overcome could well be considered an internal good of military practice too.

3.4.5. The wielding of lethal arms, the undetermined nature of the battlefield and the presence of an enemy all result in danger as part of the military practice. Facing danger, real physical, even mortal danger, brings excitement, elation and joy over being alive and completing a successful action in the face of sometimes heavy odds.²⁶ This feature gives an extra dimension to the agonal nature of the practice. The excitement and thrill this involves may qualify also being among the internal goods of military practice.

3.4.6. Cooperation with others in the military results in the comfortable feeling to belong and the warmth of a very special human relationship as a result of shared hardship and (mortal) danger. Also there is the warmth and comfort in being valued, esteemed and admired as a member of a very special group, as well as in expressing admiration and esteem for others.²⁷ This notion is often found in military (auto) biographies and novels.²⁸ A sense of belonging and the comfort this brings is plausibly an internal good of the practice.²⁹

personal development (39%); purpose (25%); conditions of employment and atmosphere (11%). The most important notions pertaining to the content include: 'variation' (20%); 'excitement' (15%); 'challenging' (15%) and 'sportsmanship' (11%). C.D.P.O. (2000). Een baan als militair. Afdeling Gedragswetenschappen. Den Haag, Ministerie van Defensie: 66. Figure 4.1 P 21. See also Gelooven, R. M. W. v. (2009). Basisstudie Imago en Belangstelling. Afdeling Gedragswetenschappen. Den Haag, Ministerie van Defensie: 41. P28.

²⁵ Holmes, R. (1985). Acts of war. London, Wellington house. P 373; 'No personal hostility whatever. Indeed an enemy position had been taken, one tended to take the same attitude of care and welfare to their dead and wounded as if they belonged to our own side. There was an abhorrence of any maltreatment of prisoners... especially when they had put up a good fight.'

²⁶ Jünger, E. (2003). Storm of steel (*In Stahlgewittern*). London, Penguin books. P 88: '...when I was lying on my pallet (*after the first day of the Somme offensive*) in my dug out, teeth chattering and quite unable to sleep. Rather I had the sensation of a supreme awokeness – as if I had a little electricity bell going off somewhere in my body.' (italics added).

²⁷ Marlantes, K. (2010). Matterhorn. London, Corvus. P 476: 'He ran because his self-respect required it. He ran because he loved his friends...'

²⁸ An early mentioning of these feelings can be found in Curling, H. (1970). The recollections of rifleman Harris. London, Portland House. P 112. (a biography of a British soldier in the Peninsular war in the early eighteenth century. Originally published in 1816) and Crane, S. (1994). The red badge of courage. Ware, Wordsworth Editions. P 11 and 66 (An autobiography of a soldier of the American civil war. Originally published in 1895). An example of a recent account is found in Junger, S. (2010). War. London, Fourth Estate. P 79. (A story of an American outpost in the Afghan war in the early twenty-first century).

²⁹ C.D.P.O. (2000). Een baan als militair. Afdeling Gedragswetenschappen. Den Haag, Ministerie van Defensie: 66. P 21, Figure 4.1. An average of 14% of those considering joining the armed forces state that the notion of an atmosphere of 'good fellowship' is one of the attractive features of the military.

3.4.7. The requirement to act in a theatre of operations undetermined in a time and space produces the thrill of participating in an adventure the outcome of which is unsure and where the stakes are high.³⁰ This experience and the tension it involves adds to feeling of being alive.³¹ This feeling is enhanced by a sense of relieve and satisfaction of having accomplished what you were expected to, especially after being brought to exhaustion. This exhaustion is the result of sheer physical effort, lack of rest and sleep and stress created by uncertainty and danger. The notion of adventure - both in a physical and a mental sense - captures these features and adventure appears to be an obvious internal good of military practice.

3.4.8. Rules create stability and certainty in a for the rest chaotic environment. Adhering to the rules, discipline, helps to overcome the sometimes bewildering experiences of the battlefield. They provide comfort in difficult situations and result in contentment having lived up to them.³² Abiding by rules and the stability these provide and the resulting structure of responsibilities and military regimen are part of the expectations juveniles have of the military.³³ Structure and stability seem therefore part of the internal goods of the practice as well.³⁴

3.4.9. Looking at the nature of the internal goods, I have discerned in the preceding paragraphs the following remarks can be made. Some of the internal goods seem to be connected to more than one constitutive part, a characteristic of the military practice, and vice versa. The challenge of adventure could be related to the experience of wielding arms, joining a fraternity, going to unexpected and strange places and facing danger as well. Pride could also refer to tasks accomplished, wearing a uniform, being a member of a special group and facing danger successfully, etc. Moreover, as internal goods are also a matter of individual expectations and desires it is not easy - if not virtually impossible - to discern exactly what is one kind of volition and what is another. But this many-sidedness of the different internal goods also creates an interconnectedness that enhances the overall coherence and inherent value of the internal goods. This kind of coherence mirrors the interconnectedness of the constitutive parts and adds to the overall identity of military practice. A second deduction that can be made, is that it is hard to ascertain to what extent these internal goods are appreciated in a similar way. I refer to the distinction between weakly and strongly evaluated desires which I introduced in the preceding chapter. The notions like satisfaction, contentment, excitement, etc. can preponderant be identified as weakly evaluated desires, as they - for the most part - do not imply moral deliberation. Some people have (some of) these

³⁰ Ibid, 30% of those potentially enlisting mention adventure and challenge as a reason for joining the military. Another 5% refers to physical challenges and personal development.

³¹ Holmes, R. (1985). *Acts of war*. London, Wellington house. P 272: 'Basically I enjoined Vietnam, recalled one veteran. It was the most vivid part of my life... You were so aware of time you could taste it.'

³² Keegan, J. (1978). *The face of battle*. Harmondsworth, Penguin books. P 175: 'For a crowd is the antithesis of an army, a human assembly animated not by discipline but by mood, by the play of inconstant and potentially infectious emotion which, if it spreads, is fatal to the army's subordination.'

³³ Junger, S. (2010). *War*. London, Fourth Estate. P 123: 'They were both highly trained and entirely in control of their own fate, and that allowed them to ignore the statistically reality that they had only a fifty-fifty change of surviving their tour.'

³⁴ C.D.P.O. (2000). *Een baan als militair*. Afdeling Gedragwetenschappen. Den Haag, Ministerie van Defensie: 66. P 21, Figure 4.1. An average of 21% of potential members of the armed forces state that the notion of a discipline is one of the attractive features of the military. An additional 14% mention further education as well.

desires, while others have not.³⁵ Other notions, like 'wanting to do something for other people' and 'making the world a safer and better place to live in' can be considered as strongly valuated desires, as they imply moral deliberation. However, there is evidence that many of these notions, the internal goods to be gained in a practice - either weakly or strongly evaluated - are shared by those who are interested in joining the military.³⁶ Applicants for a job in the military also refer to other incentives for joining. However, these pertain to extrinsic characteristics like a steady job, a regular income, education opportunities or 'to get away from it all'.³⁷ These considerations do not qualify as internal goods as with these the military is seen as a means to obtain other benefits. On balance my claim seems justified that I identified the relevant internal goods related to military practice.

Conclusions

3.5.1. Based on the notion of internal goods as forwarded by MacIntyre, I have in the preceding paragraphs made clear why the military activities qualify as a practice. I proceeded by analyzing the practice and identifying the constitutive elements of military practice: task, arms, cooperation, enemies, danger and an undetermined time and place. Next I made a first attempt to identify which internal goods are inherent to the military practice. The goods I identified are based on the constitutive elements - which I described as the characteristics - of military practice and the expectations of those who join the military. There is evidence that the internal goods I discerned are indeed those that attract people to participating in military practice.³⁸ Almost always it is a combination of some internal goods that appeal to those who want to join the military. Corroborations can be found in military (auto) biographies and other military non-fiction publications, including research papers.³⁹ And lastly, it is founded on my personal experience as a (former) participant in the practice. However, there still remains one problematic issue and that is the relation MacIntyre assumes between internal goods and virtues. This assumption could not be explicitly corroborated, as I did not find conclusive evidence of a one to one relation between a specific

³⁵ Taylor, C. (1985). Philosophical papers 1: human agency and language. Cambridge, University Press. P 1- 44 (chapter one: what is human agency).

³⁶ Rees Vellinga, N. van (2006). Belangstellingsonderzoek 2005-2006. Een baan als militair. Afdeling Gedragwetenschappen. Den Haag, Ministerie van Defensie. P10: The reasons for considering a job in the armed forces in the survey were: interesting in general 17%; adventurous 15%; challenging 15%; physical demanding 12%; diversity 9%; action 6%; see the world 3%. All in all 77% of the responses were internally job oriented.

³⁷ Ibid, Externally oriented responses totalled 23%: salary 4%; education 6% and 13% miscellaneous.

³⁸ Rees Vellinga, N. van (2006). Belangstellingsonderzoek 2005-2006. Een baan als militair. Afdeling Gedragwetenschappen. Den Haag, Ministerie van Defensie and ³⁸ C.D.P.O. (2000). Een baan als militair. Afdeling Gedragwetenschappen. Den Haag, Ministerie van Defensie: 66.

³⁹ Some examples of these are: Gelooven, R. M. W. v. (2009). Basisstudie Imago en Belangstelling. Afd. Gedragwetenschappen. Den Haag, Ministerie van Defensie: 41; Blaschke, P. H., Gramm, R., Sixt, W., Ed. (1986). De officio: zu den Herausforderungen des Offiziersberuf. Hannover, Lutherisches Verlagshaus; Broesder, W. A. (2011). Soldiers wielding Swords and Ploughshares. Psychology. Leuven, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. **PhD**: 114; Cook, M. L. (2008). Ethics education, ethics training and character development in the US air force academy. Ethics education in the military. Robinson, P., De Lee, N., Carrick, D. Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing Limited: 57 – 66; Dixon, N. F. (1984). On the psychology of military incompetence. London, Jonathan Cape; Crane, S. (1994). The red badge of courage. Ware, Wordsworth Editions; Curling, H. (1970). The recollections of rifleman Harris. London, Portland House; du Gard, R. M. (1999). Lieutenant-Colonel de Maumort. New York, Knopf; Graves, R. (1976). Goodbye to all that. London, Penguin books; Jünger, E. (2003). Storm of steel (In Stahlgewittern). London, Penguin books; Marlantes, K. (2011). What it is like to go to war. New York, Atlantic Monthly Press.


characteristic of military practice and a particular internal good; these connections are more complex. In the next chapter I will continue my elaborations on military practice by identifying and discuss military virtues.

Appendix A to chapter 3: praxis and poièsis

Activity A: preponderant characteristics of a practice

Activity B: characteristics a balance of both practice and poièsis

Activity C: preponderant characteristics of poièsis



Chapter 4: military virtues.

Introduction.

4.1. In the preceding chapter I identified the constitutive elements of military practice and the internal goods of that practice. Based on these findings, I can now argue what is required to excel in the military practice. A collection of real examples of excellent practitioners may be one way of completing this picture. Every practice has its plethora of heroes and villains, of 'the good' and 'the bad', and it will be no trouble to form an opinion on who are 'the virtuous'. The cogency of this approach often depends on whether the results reflect personal presuppositions or coincide with well established intuitions. The advantage of MacIntyre's interpretation of Aristotelian virtue ethics is that his theory aims at establishing analytical standards to identify which virtues are relevant to a practice. Therefore I will proceed by trying to forgo all preconceived ideas and attempt to follow the logic of his theory, in which MacIntyre defines a virtue as: '*an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods that are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods.*'

Virtues and the military

4.2.1. Before arguing which virtues can be identified as '**military**', I first want to address the meaning of this adjective. Clemenceau famously observed that military justice is to justice what military music is to music.¹ He obviously meant to say that the adjective military infers to a limited practical purpose with instruments of limited scope and nuances. Military virtues aim at 'bolstering the wavering man'.² I will elaborate on this by means of the following three examples. The first example pertains to a soldier. During an attack, a group of soldiers takes cover in a kind of earthwork they captured. Suddenly a hand grenade is lobbed into their temporary hideout. The soldier who spots the grenade can do several things. He can jump out of the hole and take cover, thus saving his life. The other soldiers who have not seen the grenade land and remain in the hideout are seriously wounded. The soldier in question could also have done another thing: that is, grab the grenade and throw it out of the hideout. In the former action he saved his own life and could continue the fight; that the other soldiers did not take evasive action is their misfortune for which some of them paid dearly. In the latter action he took a serious risk that the grenade would explode before he had a chance to throw it away, causing serious injury to him or even worse, but he would have saved his comrades. There is no doubt that we would consider the second course of action an almost perfect example of the military virtue of courage. In the second example a civilian paramedic is the main actor. On his way home he witnesses a serious traffic accident. Of course he immediately offers assistance. One man is seriously wounded and is choking. No matter what the paramedic does, the victim does not get any air and loses consciousness. The paramedic knows that an extended lack of oxygen will cause damage to the victim's brain, if not worse. Although he is not licensed to do so, he performs an improvised tracheotomy, consequently saving the victim's life. The paramedic did not risk his own life in this action, but he ran the risk of serious problems for performing an unlicensed intervention. However, there is little doubt that we would consider this intervention a courageous act. In the third example, there is a female civil servant

¹ Clemenceau apparently offered the comment orally, but is universally attributed to him.

² Wintle, J., Ed. (1989). The dictionary of war quotations. London, Hodder and Stoughton. Homer, The Iliad.

working in the town social welfare department. One day a notoriously aggressive client is at one of the counters. On former occasions he abused a fellow (male) civil servant who served him, and he had even tried to hit him. As it is his client, he is the one who has to deal with him, but it is obvious he is terrified. Without saying another word the female civil servant goes to the counter and says: 'My colleague is indisposed, can I help you?' She only runs the risk of being abused or an attempt at assaulting her. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the terrified colleague considers her a woman of courage. I have described three courageous acts, but only one of them can be labelled as military courage as it was displayed by a soldier in a specific context. A military virtue applies to the disposition of soldiers to act in an excellent way in a military context only. The adjective 'military' does not mean that virtues - like courage - are only found in the military, or that there are virtues that can only be found in soldiers.³

4.2.2. MacIntyre's defines the **virtues** as acquired qualities that enable the participant to achieve the internal goods that are inherent to participating in the practice. The fact that it is an acquired quality means that virtuous conduct is at first taught and then put into practice. Further education will help to internalize the appropriate disposition.⁴ Eventually - by experience - being virtuous becomes a habit.⁵ This does not mean that a virtue is a mere rote. As I explained in chapter 2, a virtue, an Aristotelian habit, requires deliberation as well. The frequent deliberation adds quality to the habit and as such the disposition to act virtuous becomes embedded in the individual's character.⁶ A virtue than is a disposition, an attitude of understanding what ought to be done, and to act accordingly. The content of the 'ought' is the result of practical wisdom: what is appropriate and feasible in the situation and context given. From this perspective soldiers could do with only one virtue: practical wisdom. However, according to Aristotle, practical wisdom is essential in deliberating on the appropriate course of action. According to him, practical wisdom is the virtue of the intellect. The disposition to act in moral matters is a matter of the virtues of character.⁷ The spheres in which these moral actions are displayed are of a different nature and refer to the complexities, the different 'spheres' of life, the different practices and the different aspects of a practice.⁸ As I explained in chapter 2, we therefore need both virtues of character as well as the virtue of practical wisdom.⁹

4.2.3. The question then is which spheres are determinant in military practice and which specific virtues of character are needed. MacIntyre refers to the internal goods to be achieved. This provides a first hint as to appropriate military virtues. The internal goods of military practice are a combination of the characteristics of the practice and the attraction these characteristics have for those who - want to - join the military. In the preceding chapter I tried to identify these internal goods. The characteristics of military

³ 'But the military virtues are not a class apart: they are virtues which are virtues in every walk of life... nonetheless military virtues being jewels set in iron and blood.' Hackett, J. (1983). The profession of arms. London, Sidgwick and Jackson. P 141.

⁴ Baarda, T. A. van, Verweij, D.E.M., Ed. (2006). Military ethics, the Dutch approach. Leiden, Koninklijke Brill N.V. P 11.

⁵ Aristoteles (2005). Ethica Nicomachea. Budel, Damon. Par. 1103a23-24

⁶ Verweij, D. E. M. (2010). Geweten onder schot. Amsterdam Boom. P 99. See also van Tongeren, P., Becker, M., Hoekstra, A., Karssing, E., Niessen, R. (2010). Deugdethiek en integriteit Assen, van Gorcum. P 22- 25.

⁷ Aristoteles (2005). Ethica Nicomachea. Budel, Damon. Par.1103a1-10.

⁸ See par.2.6.3. above.

⁹ See par 2.6.9. above.

practice were established clearly. The expectations and desires involved - as the other aspects of the internal goods - were less clear. Similar desires and expectations could refer to different characteristics. This has to do with the inherent subjective character of these desires and expectations. Due to the subjective nature of desires and expectations, it seems problematic to ascertain which desires and expectations result in which specific choices and actions by an agent. Virtues suffer from a similar indeterminateness - as I explained in chapter 2.¹⁰ It seems problematic to define virtues in such a definite way as to establish a distinct objective notion that is completely separate from other closely related notions.¹¹ However, it is possible to identify the characteristics of a practice and which standards of excellence pertain to these characteristics. In practice, it would then still be possible to establish to what extent conduct meets these standards of excellence and deserves to be qualified as virtuous. Hackett puts it thus: 'Thus while you may indeed hope to meet these virtues in every walk of life, and a good deal of educational effort is spent on developing them as being generally desirable, in the profession of arms they are functionally indispensable.'¹² However, even then it is hard to ascertain which virtue is dominant in a virtuous course of action.¹³ On the other hand, this indeterminateness could also allow for a certain degree of flexibility. Given the development of a situation the dominance of one virtue could be superseded by another, adding to the overall virtuous character of the conduct in question. This flexibility between virtues could be seen as an asset of the concept of military practice as it adds to the internal coherence of the standards of excellence that define the practice. So I will proceed by trying to establish which standards of excellence are relevant in military practice. Aspiring at these standards should result in acquired human dispositions that will enhance the experience of the internal goods of military practice I identified in the preceding chapter. As I aim at establishing practical applicable concepts, the virtues I identify must be tangible in order to appeal to soldiers as relevant and worthwhile to aspire at. The concept of the virtues as such - a disposition and not a set of rules - should provide the flexibility required by the very dynamic circumstances in which the virtues are to be displayed. Thus, by identifying tangible military virtues I aim at establishing practical and morally relevant notions, which will enhance the overall excellence of the practitioners. The moral notions aim primarily at enhancing the excellence of the moral components of the practice: what is required, what is to be done. This is a matter of the virtues of character. The practical notions aim at enhancing the excellence of the primarily technical aspects of the practice: how to do what is required. This is a matter of practical wisdom.

4.2.4. After having established what is a relevant virtue in a military sense, the question that also needs to be addressed is how to describe these virtues in a way that provides tangible clues for soldiers which kind of conduct is appropriate. As explained before this is not an easy task.¹⁴ However, some kind of defining argument is required, in order to provide tangible standards of excellence that can be aspired at. However, we must acknowledge that although a virtue is indicated by a generic term, this does not imply a generic meaning. The first limitation of its meaning is found in the context, the specific

¹⁰ See paragraph 2.6.10. - 2.6.12. above.

¹¹ Sherman, N. (1989). *The Fabric of Character: Aristotle's Theory of Virtue*. Oxford, Clarendon Press. P 11: 'As a theory it remains inexact, awaiting the more determinate operations of practical reason in its perceptual and decision-making roles.'

¹² Hackett, J. (1983). *The profession of arms*. London, Sidgwick and Jackson. P 141.

¹³ As I explained in paragraph 2.6.12 above.

¹⁴ See paragraph 2.6.10. - 2.6.12. above.

practice in which the virtue is expressed. For example, resilience has a different meaning in rugby than in chess. In the former, it is primarily a matter of physical endurance, while in the latter it is first of all a matter of staying mentally alert. A second limitation is found in the practical orientation and value of a virtue. Resilience is not merely an abstract notion used in the deliberations of theoretical wisdom. It is a notion used in practical wisdom that finds its meaning in its application in actions in the context of a practice. The third limitation is that the meaning of a virtue is also a matter of the situational circumstances.¹⁵ How to come to a decision on what is an appropriate action in a specific situation? Different agents could easily come to different conclusions. The method of Aristotle, using antonyms (choosing between the vice of deficiency and the vice of excess) already implies some kind of indeterminateness. Therefore, it is hardly possible to articulate an exact prescription on how to appreciate and interpret the virtuous character of human conduct. A further exploration will result in establishing which virtues are relevant in military practice and in providing a broad description that aims at providing insight into the meaning of the respective military virtues. Based on the characteristics of military practice and the internal goods involved I will successively address responsibility, competence, comradeship, respect, courage, resilience and discipline.¹⁶

Responsibility

4.3.1. When I look at the notion of a task involving the threat or use of violence as one of the constitutive parts of military practice, I have identified as the connected internal good: a sense of a sense of fulfilment and achievement over a responsibility shouldered and living up to one's self-respect. Now we must have a closer look on what this entails. The execution of a military task is, first of all, a matter of duty. Soldiers have sworn an oath to stand by their duty. Dutch soldiers swear loyalty to the king, as the institutional head of state, obedience to the law and submission to the military regimen.¹⁷ Most of the time military tasks come in the form of orders to be executed. As long as these orders are within the bounds of the law and given by a lawful authority, the soldier has the obligation to adhere by his oath and to obey. However, I have argued that duty alone is not a very practical moral yardstick in military practice.¹⁸ Duties and the rules they imply are static whereas the situations in which these rules must be applied are very dynamic and situations may occur in which it is hard to establish which rules apply, if any.¹⁹ On the other hand, the pressure duty exerts should not be underestimated. Duty has a strong obligatory value: to neglect one's duty is not a matter of indifference. Especially holding a public office requires discharging the duties of that office. The wider public expects this and often it is required by law. Furthermore, holding a public office

¹⁵ Aristotle (2004). The Nicomachean ethics. London, Penguin books. Par.1106b1-5. The middle should not be interpreted as a matter of arithmetic, because: 'Supposing that 10 pounds of food is a large and 2 pounds a small allowance for an athlete, it will not follow that a trainer will prescribe 6 pounds; for even this is perhaps too much or too little for the person to receive it – too little, but too much for one who is only beginning to train.'

¹⁶ A schematic representation of the relationship between the characteristics of military practice, the internal goods involved and the ensuing virtues is found in annex A to this chapter.

¹⁷ Huntington, S. P. (1957). The soldier and the state. Cambridge (Massachusetts), Harvard University Press. P8-18.

¹⁸ See par. 2.3. before.

¹⁹ Toner, J. H. (2002). A letter to Garcia: leading soldiers in moral mayhem. The future of the army profession. L. J. Matthews (ed.). Boston, McGraw – Hill. P 333.

and the discharge of public duties this office requires, is open to public scrutiny.²⁰ Holding a public office therefore requires a firm commitment to just institutions and laws. But there is more; in not doing what one is supposed to do the self esteem of the agent is under pressure. Especially In the case of holding a public office, as the soldier does.²¹ Johnson states that: 'self estimation is a crucial element in establishing a moral balance between goodness and harm.' He continues with: 'the moral character of office holders is necessary for a moral limit to be placed on their actions.'²² Johnson argues that moral character is required, which suggests that the notion of duty alone does not suffice. This sounds plausible as duty is imposed. Duty has an external source and it is not an internal disposition. Besides, duty is minimalistic: it suffices to do one's duty and to adhere merely by the rules that duty prescribes. In a case in which the dynamics of a situation creates a state of affairs beyond the call of duty, supererogative actions are not required. This latter argument could be countered by appealing to a wider sense of duty that will compel one to continue and complete the task at hand and thus fulfil the wider obligation one is under.²³ However, this argument does not address the problem that the notion of duty involves when compared with a virtue: duty has an external origin while a virtue refers to an internal disposition.

4.3.2. So there still lacks a notion that covers this internal disposition to act appropriately in the accomplishment of a military task. Bieri forwards a powerful idea which seems to fit MacIntyre's theory.²⁴ According to him, an action first requires a desire, which is then deliberated upon. Next the agent reaches a decision as to the realization of this desire. Only then the notion of the personal will is added, which results in an action by the agent. The agent is willing to act. The agent has a free choice on how to act, which makes him accountable for his action: he has to bear the responsibility of his action.²⁵ This does not mean that the agent is completely free in his choices and his actions. First of all, his desire must be feasible to satisfy.²⁶ Other, internal and external, factors can play a role as well. Self-esteem, peer pressure and duty too can constitute compelling reasons for an agent, especially a soldier, to act.²⁷ Taking all these considerations into account the overarching notion with regard to the completion of allotted tasks seems to be responsibility: for the agents' personal well being, like self-esteem; for his fellow soldiers for the sake of both comradeship and even peer pressure; and because of his being a soldier and the obligations this role implies. Responsibility is

²⁰ Johnson, P. (1994). Reclaiming the Aristotelian ruler. After MacIntyre. J. Horton (ed.). Cambridge, Polity Press. P 45.

²¹ Hume, D. (1975). Enquiries concerning human understanding and concerning the principles of morals. Oxford University Press. Section IX, conclusion: 'By the pursuit of a name, a reputation in the world we bring our own deportment and conduct frequently in review and consider how they appear in the eyes of those who approach and regard us... a habit that is the surest guardian of any virtue.'

²² Johnson, P. (1994). Reclaiming the Aristotelian ruler. After MacIntyre. J. Horton (ed.). Cambridge, Polity Press. P 49.

²³ Snider, D. J. (2003). "The professional practice." Military review 83(1): 3-8. P 7: '... duty is not confined to explicit orders or tasks; it involves allegiance to their commissioning oath.'

²⁴ Bieri, P. (2011). Het handwerk van de vrijheid. (*Das Handwerk der Freiheit*) Amsterdam, Wereldbibliotheek.

²⁵ Ibid. P 160 – 168.

²⁶ Ibid. P 257 – 266. Feasible action is also an Aristotelian notion, see Aristoteles (2005). Ethica Nicomachea. Budel, Damon. Par.1113a9-1113a12.

²⁷ Marshall, S. L. A. (1978). Men against fire: the problem of battle command in future war. Gloucester Massachusetts, Peter Smith. P 149 and Wong, L., Kolditz, T.A., Millen, R.A., Potter, T.M. (2003). Why they fight: combat motivation in the Iraq war. U.S. Army War College. Carlisle, Strategic Studies Institute: 35.

not only an issue in the soldier's deliberation and decision to act; it also implies accountability for his actions and the consequences.²⁸ Responsibility thus encompasses the reasons why a soldier acts and in doing so, the soldier accepts being responsible for his actions and the consequences; he accepts to be held accountable.²⁹ Responsibility reconciles the external reasons of duty, the internal the disposition to act and accountability for the consequences: all major issues in military ethics.³⁰ Responsibility, or rather a **sense of responsibility**, the disposition to act because of the commitments a soldier has to realize the task at hand - as well as to himself, his peers and others. To act in an appropriate way, even in the face of adverse circumstances - seems to be the virtue that provides the opportunity to enhance the pleasure and satisfaction one finds in completing military tasks. Walzer expresses a similar idea.³¹

4.3.3. However, responsibility is a notion with a wide variation in meaning. It could refer to a cause, a liability, a capacity or a duty. Neither of these meanings covers the meaning of responsibility as a virtue; the dispositions to take tasks seriously and to perform these in a well-considered way, while taking into account the consequences for others.³² One could act in a more or less responsible way. In this respect, one could speak of an analogous notion rather than a digital. According to Bovens, it is hard to establish whether a certain kind of conduct can be considered responsible as the context and characteristics of the agent may vary substantially. However, he identifies several notions that are often applied in order to come to an opinion on the virtuous character of specific responsible conduct.³³ First of all, the agent must take his task - and the duties this implies - seriously. Secondly, he must be able to identify whether a moral issue is at stake. In the third place, he must take the consequences of his action into account, especially where others are concerned. Autonomy is a fourth notion which means that - although the agent should listen to others and their advice - the agent must act on his own strength and convictions. The last point is that the actions should be based on some kind of code, which is verifiable and will bear examination. However, he states that these 'criteria' are not solid nor have all of them to be taken into account. In the end, responsible conduct in the virtuous sense is a kind of conduct that is well received in moral terms.³⁴

4.3.4. In approximating the content of this virtue I will look first at the vice of deficiency. Shortcoming in the sense of responsibility could result in a neglect of the self, falling short in accomplishing the allotted tasks, ignoring the interests of other

²⁸ Baarda, T. A. v., Verweij, D.E.M., Ed. (2006). Military ethics, the Dutch approach. Leiden, Koninklijke Brill N.V. P 39-43.

²⁹ Verweij, D. E. M. (2010). Geweten onder schot. Amsterdam Boom. P 137-141.

³⁰ Bonadonna, R. R. (1994). "Above and beyond: marines and virtue ethics." Marine Corps Gazette 78 (Jan.): 3. P19.

³¹ Walzer, M. (2004). Arguing about war. New Haven, Yale University Press. P 23-27: 'A field commander has a twofold responsibility... First he is responsible *upward* - to his military commanders and through the highest of them, the commander in chief, to the sovereign people, whose officer he properly is and to whose collective safety and protection he is pledged... He also has a responsibility *downward*, to each and every one of his fellow soldiers, who are in one sense the instruments with which he is supposed to win victories, but they are also men and women whose lives, because they are his to use, are also in his care... He is bound to minimize the risks his soldiers must face... As a moral agent he is also responsible *outward* - to all those people whose lives his activities affect.'

³² Bovens, M. A. P. (1990). Verantwoordelijkheid en organisatie. Zwolle, Tjeenk Willink. P 33.

³³ Ibid, P 42-49.

³⁴ Ibid, P 182.

stakeholders and a failure to accept the consequences. The shirking of responsibility to the self can take many forms. The burden of responsibility may frighten the agent into inertness. Other reasons may play a role as well in shirking responsibilities. Accountability is often shirked as well. A well-known strategy in exonerating is to claim that the agent had no other possibility and that the agent was not really free in his decision on how to act: the circumstances, other persons, lack of knowledge or means, or whatever other reasons are to blame. All arguments leading to the conclusion that the agent himself cannot be held accountable. This attitude has two important aspects. First, it testifies to a lack of critical distance in reviewing one's own actions. Without some kind of 'soul searching', it will be very hard to redeem self-esteem. Thus the agent runs a serious risk of further loss of self-esteem. In a further response the sense and meaningfulness of allotted tasks could be questioned, which could lead to a further withdrawal and even alienation.³⁵ Secondly however, this will not refrain others from holding the agent accountable. This may well result in further denying of any responsibility by the agent, resulting in further loss of self-esteem and/or resentment against those who hold him accountable. Shirking responsibility will corrode the status of an agent, to himself and to others.³⁶ As to falling short in accomplishing the allotted task, this is a somewhat risky course of action for a soldier. In the military a soldier is obliged to execute a lawfully given order. However, there are ways to circumvent a direct confrontation: slow moving might go unnoticed and eventually nullify the task. Another strategy is blaming circumstances that prevented a proper execution. Especially on the battlefield this excuse sounds plausible, and countervailing facts are hard to check. Outright refusing to execute an order may do the trick as well, but involves a higher risk as it is punishable under military law. Risk avoiding, indifference and laziness are attitudes that play a role in a defective sense of responsibility. As to the consequences it is relatively easy to deny that unwelcome consequence could be foreseen. In short, irresponsibility, failing to accept responsibility, could affect the moral status of the agent, the accomplishment of the task at hand and the amount and nature of unwanted negative consequences.

4.3.5. But there is a flip side: the vice of too much. Overestimating one self and an excess of self-esteem may well lead to vanity and overrating one's capabilities. As to the task at hand there is just too much involvement in completing the allotted task.³⁷ This could even result in the fanatical attitude that puts orders before everything else: 'Befehl ist Befehl'. This kind of zeal may well result in taking risks that could easily have been avoided and puts soldiers and materiel to unnecessary hardship and danger. Changing circumstances are disregarded. This kind of behaviour too seldom leads to the required result. It provokes annoyance and leads to passive or active resistance by those who have to bear the brunt of this relentless ambition. Unwelcome consequences of exaggerated zeal are played down or simply denied. Another symptom of an exaggerated sense of responsibility could be an expansion of assumed responsibilities well beyond the actual responsibilities of the agent. This exaggerated sense of responsibility could lead to interference in the responsibilities of others and

³⁵ Richardson, R., Verweij, D., Vogelaar, A., Kuipers, H., Ed. (2002). Mens en organisatie: de krijgsmacht in verandering. Alphen aan den Rijn, Haasbeek. P 227.

³⁶ Bieri, P. (2011). Het handwerk van de vrijheid. (*Das Handwerk der Freiheit*) Amsterdam, Wereldbibliotheek. P 293-333 and Sloterdijk, P. (2009). Du musst dein Leben ändern. Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp. P 512-515 and 642-646.

³⁷ Richardson, R., Verweij, D., Vogelaar, A., Kuipers, H., Ed. (2002). Mens en organisatie: de krijgsmacht in verandering. Alphen aan den Rijn, Haasbeek. P 226, 227.

meddlesomeness. A proper sense of responsibility will find the morally responsible mean between the irresponsible love of the easy and blind zeal. A preliminary definition could describe responsibility as the appropriate mean between, on the one hand, an attitude of shirking and scraping through and on the other hand an attitude of meddlesomeness or blind zeal and fanatically pursuing a mission while circumstances have changed.

4.3.6. A proper sense of responsibility can be developed. It is first a matter of educating soldiers and explaining the importance of a proper sense of responsibility. Training provides ample opportunities to have soldiers experience what responsibility entails. This involves confronting soldiers with the consequences of irresponsible behaviour and show how an appropriate way of bearing responsibilities mostly leads to success. Leadership based on trust - as in mission command - will further create a culture in which bearing responsibility is a normal feature of executing orders.³⁸ Mission command is based on the notion that it is impossible to provide binding rules that apply in all circumstances, as situations in the area of operations change constantly, sometimes unimaginably. In mission command initiative and responsibility as well as trust are the key elements.³⁹ Applying mission command requires that a clear goal is set; the limits in time and space in which the mission must be accomplished are established; the appropriate means are allocated. How the soldier or the unit aims to meet the set standards is his or their own responsibility. This style of command is based on mutual trust and will spark creativity and enhance the sense of responsibility of all involved in accomplishing the mission. This also implies the willingness to be held accountable for one's actions. A consequent application of mission command and the appropriate leadership style could well instil a proper sense of responsibility in soldiers of all ranks. Experience will add to the recognition and internalization of an appropriate sense of responsibility.

Competence

4.4.1. As to the internal goods related to the wielding of arms and other specialized equipment with an enormous, even lethal power, I have identified pride and satisfaction over skill and proficiency in handling these systems as the connected internal goods. To acquire these skills and proficiency one must have a professional attitude: the will to master the weapon systems one is entrusted with.⁴⁰ One could argue that acquiring the knowledge and skills to master a weapon system is a matter of preparing for tasks ahead. From this perspective, responsibility could be the appropriate virtue. However, as I explained in chapter 2, the distinction between separate virtues is primarily a matter of the appropriate standards of excellence that pertain to the characteristics of the practice. Besides, we need separate virtues that cover these spheres of military practice in order to create practical goals and appropriate standards.⁴¹ Furthermore it is clear that this kind of preparing for tasks ahead is an activity in its self. Proper

³⁸ Uhle-Wettler, F. (1984). Höhe- und Wendepunkte Deutscher Militärgeschichte. Mainz, Hase & Koehler Verlag. P255-304. See also Vries, de, P.H. " 'Auftragstaktik': ontstaan, ontsporing en (her)ontdekking." Militaire Spectator **161**(6): P 283-289.

³⁹ The concept was first developed by the Prussian general staff under Helmuth Graf von Moltke (the elder) in the second half of the 19th century. Blaschke, P. H., Gramm, R., Sixt, W., Ed. (1986). De officio: zu den Herausforderungen des Offiziersberuf. Hannover, Lutherisches Verlaghaus. P 132.

⁴⁰ Huntington, S. P. (1957). The soldier and the state. Cambridge (Massachusetts), Harvard University Press. P8-18.

⁴¹ See paragraph 2.6.8. - 2.6.11. and 4.2.2. and 4.2.3. above.

preparation is a longstanding military dictum, the importance of which cannot be underestimated.⁴² Therefore a separate virtue seems to be appropriate to provide a tangible goal to aspire at with regard to acquiring the skills and proficiency in order to master the use of weapon systems, as well as the disposition to use these systems well. **Military competence** can be identified as that virtue, because it is a necessary condition for achieving proficiency and skill in handling arms and other special equipment and meeting the related standards of excellence.⁴³ It is more than likely that realizing this proficiency will ensue in a feeling of pride over the accomplishment.⁴⁴ This will be a stimulus in further developing the disposition to master and show military competence in an excellent way.

4.4.2. However, competence is also a notion with a wide variation in meaning.⁴⁵ Especially in the field of business strategy and –administration, as well as in human resources management, the term competence acquired specific meanings. Therefore, it is worthwhile to have a closer look at the term. Some use the term "core competences" to indicate the characteristics organizations have developed over time. These core competences are specific to an organization and provided they are used effectively, they ensure a continued lead over competitors. The core competence of an organization is a unique combination of business specialism and human skills that give expression to the organization's typical character.⁴⁶ Others have a more limited view of competence as: "basic personal characteristics that are determining factors for acting successfully in a job or a situation".⁴⁷ Some use a more generic approach and define competence as clusters of knowledge, skills and attitudes necessary to accomplish specific tasks.⁴⁸ Spencer and Spencer combine both notions in a system of four levels of competence.⁴⁹ According to them, the first level of the competence structure is concerned with the observable (instrumental) knowledge and skills that relate to carrying out work or holding a position and that are necessary to enable the occupation, job or task to be performed properly. The second level is referred to as "widely applicable vocational skills" or "starting qualifications" and include things like social and communicative skills, general technical and vocational insights, organizational qualities and basic approaches to work and situations. The third level in the competence structure consists of the values, standards, ethics and morals of the person concerned as well as those of the organization and the (professional) group to which he/she belongs or to which

⁴² Sun Tzu, (1983). The art of war. New York, Delacorte Press. P 17: 'He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared.'

⁴³ MacIntyre also uses the notion of craft and craftsmanship. See MacIntyre, A. (1990). Three rival versions of moral inquiry. Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 64-66.

⁴⁴ Snider, D. J. (2003). "The professional practice." Military review **83**(1): 3-8. P 7: 'Expert knowledge of the profession is the foundation... of expertise and professional practice, and it enables the daily exercise of discretionary judgment to make decisions and to take actions that fulfil moral and legal responsibilities.'

⁴⁵ Nordhaug, O. and Gronhaug, K. (1994). "Competencies as resources in firms", *The International Journal of Human Resource Management*, **5** (1): 89-106. "The concept of competence has different meanings, and it remains one of the most diffuse terms in the organizational and occupational literature."

⁴⁶ Bergenhenegouwen, G. J. (1996). "Competence development- a challenge for HRM professionals: core competences of organizations as guidelines for the development of employees." European Journal of Training and Development **20**(9): 29-35.

⁴⁷ MacClelland, D.C. (1993). "The concept of competence", in Spencer, L.M. and Spencer, S.M. (Ed.), *Competence at Work*, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1993.

⁴⁸ Kuiper, H., de Beer, M. (2009). *Competentiegericht opleiden*. TNO, Soesterberg: 27. P 8-11.

⁴⁹ Spencer, L.M. and Spencer, S.M., Ed. *Competence at Work*, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1993.

he/she reports. These values and standards are internalized by the person on the basis of his or her own insights, experiences and education. The fourth and deepest level of the human competence structure consists of deeper-lying personal characteristics, such as image of self, actual motives and the source of the enthusiasm and effort that goes into (professional) actions. A less elaborate system is provided by Jurse and Tominc, who claim that competences and skills are to be understood as a combination of: knowing and understanding (theoretical knowledge, the capacity to know and understand); knowing how to act (applications of knowledge to certain situations); knowing how to be (values, living and working with others, etc.).⁵⁰ When next we look at the virtue of competence, as a disposition to aspire at achieving the standards of excellence pertaining to a proper use of the implements of war, we can see that the idea of competence as a virtue is captured by both Spencer's first three levels and by Jurse's and Tominc's simpler three-tiered system. Competence as a virtue encompasses the instrumental knowledge and skill to perform the allotted task in an excellent way, the capability to aspire to the standards of excellence together with others in the context of a practice, and to internalize these aspirations in a disposition to act accordingly.

4.4.3. Another point is that skills and proficiency are generic terms. By adding the adjective military, I want to emphasize the stamp of quality that goes beyond general skill and proficiency.⁵¹ Military competence entails more than skills: it entails care and keeping the arms and other equipment in a perfect working order; it entails the ability to repair and improvise if regular functioning proves impossible; it entails a thorough understanding of the possibilities and limitations of mechanical systems both in serving these (weapon) systems and in the effects they are able to produce.⁵² A soldier must know what effect his weapon produces: is the weapon system reliable to produce the same effects even after heavy firing; what are the exact effects against different kind of targets; does it allow for precision fires and to what extent will accuracy be impaired by extensive use; is it prone to cause collateral damage; etc. He must be wary of the moral hazards of his lethal skills.⁵³ It are these qualities that enable soldiers also to make adequate moral appreciations when and how to use his weapons.⁵⁴ Similar considerations are appropriate with regard to the use of non-lethal systems, machinery and other military equipment: what are the effects they could produce, which risks are involved in improper handling, etc. This moral appreciation will add to the willingness and preparedness to display the appropriate competence. According to Sherman, the Aristotelian notion of acquiring an art is not a matter of internalizing procedural principles only. Acquiring a virtue is about having reliable motives, expressed in chosen actions which come to have intrinsic value. The virtuous action will not be chosen

⁵⁰ Jurse, M., Tominc, P. (2008). "Professional competences of graduates as a labour market mechanism." *Journal of Contemporary Management Issues* **13**(1): 17-36.

⁵¹ Mullaney, G. M. (2009). *The unforgiving minute: a soldier's education*. London, Penguin books. P 107: 'The next day we did our drills blindfolded. At First our platoon bumbled around like kids striking a piñata. After two days of practice, we could set a platoon of forty rangers in a midnight patrol base in under thirty minutes.'

⁵² Ibid. P 286: 'Markam was a master – timing the length of his bursts to balance firepower and accuracy.'

⁵³ Sherman, N. (2011). *The untold war: inside the hearts, minds and souls of our soldiers*. New York, W.W. Norton & company. P 144.

⁵⁴ A rather chilling example of a lack of moral appreciation of military skills is found in Herr, M. (1978). *Dispatches*. London, Pan Books. P 35: 'some reporters asked a door gunner, 'How can you shoot women and children?' and he'd answered, 'It's easy, you just don't lead 'em as much.' The soldier in question answered a moral question with a technical response on the technique of using a different angle to lead his machinegun shooting on - slower moving - women and children.'

merely by procedure, nor will what is brought about be valued apart from the actions which realize it.⁵⁵ Military competence can be taught and trained and by experience it eventually could well become a habit, a true virtue of the soldier as a member of the military: a notion that is corroborated by both Rawls and Sloterdijk.⁵⁶

4.4.4. The virtue of military competence pertains to the skills and attitude of the soldier in applying these skills. A soldier's deficient attitude towards his equipment can be a matter of light heartedness.⁵⁷ He thinks that he will be able to use his equipments after a few instructions and experience will do the rest. He will be negligent in study, training and in the maintenance of his equipment. This could be a matter of indifference or the idea that there is little chance he will come into a position in which he will depend on the proper functioning of his tools. On the battlefield he will pay dearly for this attitude. On the other hand, it is possible that the soldier takes an exaggerated care of his equipment. This care may result in reluctance to use his equipment in order to avoid wear. As to the use of his tools, this kind of soldier is also very precise indeed: everything must be done by the book, no matter how long this may take. This attitude too can cost him dearly. Proper military competence means that the soldier wants to know how to use his equipment and the range within which it can be used properly. He will want to know what the possibilities are and its limits in using it and what are the effects of its use. The many exercises and training will give him a proper idea within which constraints he can use his equipment and how to keep it in an optimal working order. But military competence is not limited to the personal individual skills. Meeting the standards of excellence is also the result of following exemplary other practitioners: role models. This implies sharing training and discussions with those who serve as examples. Being partners in a practice involves cooperation; not only in the activities of the practice but also in meeting the required standards of excellence. Being a competent soldier and participating in a practice together with others, also includes attention for the proficiency of others as well. This means the willingness to assist others in acquiring the proper knowledge and skills. It also means the willingness to address others who fail to live up to professional standards. But there is another incentive as well, because as the performance of military missions is teamwork, it is important that every member of the team knows his job!⁵⁸ Appropriate military competence does not allow for members of the practice whose conduct is lacking in competence.⁵⁹ Therefore a preliminary definition of military competence could be read as the right mean between an attitude of thinking that a rough general knowledge of weapon systems and other equipment will do and that this won't come to serious problems and an attitude of exaggerated care for material and equipment and handling these strictly according to regulations and wanting to do everything by the book and disregarding situational necessity.

⁵⁵ Sherman, N. (1989). The Fabric of Character: Aristotle's Theory of Virtue. Oxford, University Press. P 188-189.

⁵⁶ Rawls, J. (2006). Een theorie van rechtvaardigheid. (A theory of justice) Rotterdam, Lemniscaat. § 65 'The Aristotelian principle', P 431-438 and Sloterdijk, P. (2009). Du musst dein Leben ändern. Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp. P 458-459.

⁵⁷ Blaschke, P. H., Gramm, R., Sixt, W., Ed. (1986). De officio: zu den Herausforderungen des Offiziersberuf. Hannover, Lutherisches Verlagshaus. P 187.

⁵⁸ Eddy, P., Linklater, M., Gillman, P. (1982). The Falklands War. London, Sphere Books. P 93-94.

⁵⁹ Blaschke, P. H., Gramm, R., Sixt, W., Ed. (1986). De officio: zu den Herausforderungen des Offiziersberuf. Hannover, Lutherisches Verlagshaus. P 235.

4.4.5. Military competence can be acquired as is shown almost daily in most militaries. It requires clear standards of excellence, and dedicated and competent instructors who portray as role models as well. Challenging training as close to reality as feasible will stimulate absorbing lessons learned. Presentations by experienced colleagues of all ranks will help to bring home the practical relevance of the skills and drills taught. Competition may further enhance the zeal of trainees.⁶⁰ Meeting the appropriate standards could be accompanied by some ceremony in order to stimulate pride and promote eagerness to get to the next step of proficiency. In short, there are many ways and means to instil in soldiers a disposition of military competence.

Comradeship

4.5.1. As already mentioned in chapter 2 and the preceding paragraphs, a practice always involves the company of others: mostly in cooperation, often others are merely bystanders and sometimes the others are confronted as opponents.⁶¹ The successful cooperation with others in accomplishing a task together results in the internal goods of a sense of belonging and warmth. The notion of being a successful member of a primary group creates a feeling of belonging, contentment, security and peace of mind. **Comradeship** seems the virtue that enhances the establishment of a strong social fabric within a group. Comradeship can be given substance by an active care for the wellbeing of fellow soldiers and enjoying and appreciating their friendship in return. However, comradeship and friendship are different concepts. Friendship is something which can start spontaneously and develop in all kind of settings and circumstances. Basically, it is a special kind of voluntary benign relation between two individuals based on reciprocity.⁶² Aristotle discerns three kinds of friendship: based on benefit, on pleasure and on mutual sharing of a notion of the good.⁶³ Only the latter is considered to be true friendship: 'Only the friendship of those who are good, and similar in their goodness, is perfect'.⁶⁴ Aristotle considers friends as 'the greatest of external goods.'⁶⁵ Comradeship is of a different nature, as it is connected with a specific context. Comradeship is not a matter of individual choice; it is a matter of being brought together (by chance) and being thrown on each other's company. Comradeship is forged under duress, shared hardship, and under circumstances of mutual dependency and trust.⁶⁶ Comradeship entails giving and taking, giving and getting assistance, to support and be supported, to correct and to accept criticism, all in spite of personal differences.⁶⁷ Above all

⁶⁰ See also: Kuiper, H., de Beer, M. (2009). *Competentiegericht opleiden*. TNO, Soesterberg: 27. P 15, 16.

⁶¹ Huntington, S. P. (1957). *The soldier and the state*. Cambridge (Massachusetts), Harvard University Press. P8-18.

⁶² Aristoteles (2005). *Ethica Nicomachea*. Budel, Damon. Par. 1155b27-30.

⁶³ Ibid. par 1156a6-1156b32

⁶⁴ Aristotle (2004). *The Nicomachean ethics*. London, Penguin books. Par. 1156b6-7

⁶⁵ Ibid. par. 1169b10.

⁶⁶ Junger, S. (2010). *War*. London, Fourth Estate. P 240: '...tightly bonded men mainly worried about living up to the standards of the group.'

⁶⁷ Verweij, D. E. M. (2010). *Geweten onder schot*. Amsterdam Boom. P 110-153. See also: Sassoon, S. (2007). *The war poems*. London, Bibliobazaar. P 75: 'Love drove me to rebel. Love drives me back to grope with them through hell; and in their tortured eyes I stand forgiven.'

comradeship entails trust.⁶⁸ Comradeship enables a group to work together in harmony and - also as a result of this - more effectively.⁶⁹

4.5.2. The enhanced effectiveness of close-knit groups is a well known fact and this is the main reason why military education aims at creating and strengthening group cohesion.⁷⁰ Peer pressure and self-esteem are powerful incentives for living up to formal as well as informal standards. Manning systems are often organized to allow for group training and deployment. Teambuilding is a constant factor in military education, training and exercise. Applying pressure is one of the most common used techniques to enforce cohesion: pressure in set standards, time allotted and circumstances aggravated. Under these pressures the inadequacy of the individual soldier is demonstrated whereas the accomplishments of team work are accentuated. Soldiers experience the power and comfort of their primary group. Often soldiers are assigned a fellow soldier as a special buddy for whom they carry a specific responsibility. All these efforts are aimed at imbuing the importance of cooperation and establishing cohesive groups and almost always these efforts are successful. Having experienced the value of comradeship it will be relatively easy to acquire the disposition to build and foster comradeship as the key to successful and emotional gratifying cooperation. Especially in the face of discomfort and danger, comradeship is an indispensable virtue.⁷¹ This notion is strongly exemplified by John Keegan, who states: 'What battles have in common is human: the behaviour of men struggling to reconcile their instinct for self-preservation, their sense of honour and the achievement of some aim over which other men are ready to kill them. The study of battle is therefore always a study of fear and usually of courage; always of leadership, usually of obedience; always of compulsion, sometimes of insubordination; always of anxiety, sometimes of elation or catharsis; always of uncertainty and doubt, misinformation and misapprehension, usually also of faith and sometimes of vision; always of violence, sometimes also of cruelty, self-sacrifice, compassion; above all it is always a study of solidarity and usually also of disintegration - for it is towards the disintegration of human groups that battle is directed.'⁷² However, disintegration can also be the result of a derailing of internal cohesion as a result of which the group withdraws in itself and is no longer open to deliberation and criticism, both from within and from external sources.

4.5.3. Sometimes cohesion and comradeship can have a dark side. Kohlberg defines three levels of moral development: the pre-conventional level in which individuals have a predominantly egocentric perspective; the conventional level in which people have a more group- oriented outlook and understand values and norms; the post-conventional level in which individuals understand and accept universal principles and try to act

⁶⁸ The importance of trust in friendship, love and similar relations is discussed in a more comprehensive way in Nussbaum, M. (1986). The fragility of goodness. Cambridge, University Press. P354-361.

⁶⁹ According to Aristotle shared activities will improve the overall effort and standard of excellence.

Aristoteles (2005). Ethica Nicomachea. Budel, Damon. Par. 1170a5-7 and 1172a8-14. See also Nussbaum, M. (1986). The fragility of goodness. Cambridge, University Press. P 362, 364.

⁷⁰ Stouffer, S. A. (1949). The American soldier: combat and its aftermath. Princeton (New Jersey), University Press.; Marshall, S. L. A. (1978). Men against fire: the problem of battle command in future war. Gloucester (Massachusetts), Peter Smith; Wong, L., Kolditz, T.A., Millen, R.A., Potter, T.M. (2003). Why they fight: combat motivation in the Iraq war. U.S. Army War College. Carlisle, Strategic Studies Institute: 35.

⁷¹ Marlantes, K. (2010). Matterhorn. London, Corvus. P 370: 'But the attack went on – not because of any conscious decision, but because of friendship.'

⁷² Keegan, J. (1978). The face of battle. Harmondsworth, Penguin books. P301.

accordingly, even in spite of societal ordering.⁷³ Soldiers will on average exceed the pre-conventional level as cohesion is strongly promoted. For the same reason conventional moral thinking will be strong. This could put a brake on further development into the post-conventional level of moral thinking. Bradley argues that merely abiding by the conventional moral frame of reference could lead to de-individuation of group members by which anonymity is enhanced. This could lead to moral disengagement, which includes avoiding responsibility, misrepresenting consequences and dehumanizing victims. Emotionally charged situations and weak leadership could well lead to an ethical derailing of group cohesion and comradeship. A notion that is also found with Verweij, Oltshoorn and other authors.⁷⁴ To avoid such derailing soldiers at all levels - and not just officers - have to be trained in moral reasoning.⁷⁵

4.5.4. All together, the much extolled virtue of comradeship pre-eminently defines military practice as it is based on the fact that on the battlefield soldiers live and act together in close cooperation. The hardships they endure together and their mutual dependence creates a very special bond indeed.⁷⁶ Comradeship depends on the specific context of a primary group in danger.⁷⁷ The primary military group is a micro cosmos, like a family, a 'band of brothers'. However, even within a family one can nevertheless withdraw from the obligations that are entailed by family ties. A deficiency in comradeship, individual egotism and indifference can be very demanding for a group. The result will be that the group withdraws its support as well and will leave the strayed member to its own. But this will inevitably create tension within the primary group, and this may afflict the internal cohesion and eventually may even destroy the social fabric of the primary group. On the other hand there are those who put their group, their 'family', before everything else. Everything the members do, is done well. No criticism is accepted: not within and not from the outside. This attitude too will create tension and will impede the ability to create well balanced relations within the group. Proper comradeship is based on the awareness that cooperation and mutual trust are necessary and that this entails more than just working together. Living together promotes the founding of special bonds. Sharing hardship and danger further strengthens these ties and comradeship supports and actively maintains these ties. Proper comradeship further fosters mutual trust and support. This true trust and support entail constructive criticism as well. Comradeship exists for the benefit of all who share in this phenomenon. A preliminary definition of the virtue of comradeship could read as the right mean between an attitude of egotism, without any concern for others and an

⁷³ Kohlberg, L. (1976). Moral stages and moralization: the cognitive developmental approach. Moral development and behaviour: theory, research and social issues. T. Lickona. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston. P 32-35.

⁷⁴ Siver, C. L. (2009). The dark side of the band of brothers: explaining unit participation in war crimes. Political Science. Washington, University of Washington. **PhD**. P 201-204. See also Verweij, D. E. M. (2010). Geweten onder schot. Amsterdam Boom. P 117 and Oltshoorn, P. (2011). Military Ethics and Virtues. Abingdon, Routledge. P 55-56.

⁷⁵ Osiel, M. J. (1999). Obeying orders: atrocity, military discipline and the law of war. London, Transaction Publishers. P363: 'The internalist approach should be implemented by increased reflective habituation, through realistic training simulations in which soldiers apply rules of engagement (*and other regulations*) to different kind of military operations.' Italics added by the author.

⁷⁶ du Gard, R. M. (1999). Lieutenant-Colonel de Maumort New York, Knopf. P 688: 'Comradeship in arms exists only when you have endured danger together.'

⁷⁷ Ibid, P 688: 'As soon as the moment of danger is there, all these controversies (*irritation, hatred even, dirty tricks, revenge*) disappear. Everything that is not a part of comradeship, melts away.'

attitude of an exaggerate attention for group opinions and uncritical support of group actions.

Respect.

4.6.1. Cohesion in the military has both a horizontal dimension - with fellow soldiers with whom the bond is fostered by comradeship - and a vertical dimension - with others. These others form a miscellaneous group. First of all, there are soldiers from other units who are not a member of the inner circle of the primary group, but with whom there is still a special bond as members of the same military 'tribe'. Then there are others who are outsiders, who is not a member of the own armed forces and who are beyond the bond of cohesion. These outsiders include innocent bystanders, civilians, and also not so innocent others; the enemy. With all these others there is some kind of relation, the basis of which is the fact that they are all fellow human beings: the same race the soldier belongs to as well. The internal good of belonging is thus extended. This means accepting other people as they are and treating them fairly and refraining from harassment, humiliation and discrimination. Recognizing these others - even the enemy - as fellow human beings entitle them to respect.⁷⁸ 'At the heart of moral conduct, whether in peace or in war, is a sense of that our actions are constrained by respect and reverence for others.'⁷⁹ In the following paragraphs I will elaborate on the virtue of respect and to what extent the different others require a different kind of respect. First of all, respect can be a matter of deference for a person based on his position, role or quality. This refers to the stoic notion of decorum, dignity and decency.⁸⁰ But there is also a wider notion of respect based on recognition of our fellow human beings who are therefore all eligible to our respect. Considering the nature of the military organisation and its characteristics as a practice, as well as the challenges of new wars, the virtue of **respect** is the key to successful cooperation in a wider perspective.

4.6.2. The respect soldiers have for **fellow soldiers** who is not a member of the exclusive entity of their primary group is clearly a matter of deference. This kind of respect is due to soldiers from other units, subordinated personnel as well as superiors.⁸¹ Deference involves esteem for a fellow soldier as a member of the same 'tribe' who underwent the same kind of education and training and faced the same kind of challenges and as such is eligible to the same support as one would expect oneself of other soldiers. Successful cooperation with these others requires respect.⁸² It is often out of respect that we assist and obey colleagues who are relative strangers. Without the virtue of respect, wider cooperation with others would hardly get going and would be of little quality.

4.6.3. However, there is still another kind of respect, which is self-respect. In Rawls' view self-respect is the most important internal good. He links self-respect with the Aristotelian principle according to which people aspire for achieving excellence in the

⁷⁸ Ibid. P 170-172. See also Kant, I. (1996). Practical philosophy. Cambridge, University Press. (*Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals*) Par 4:433.

⁷⁹ Sherman, N. (2011). The untold war: inside the hearts, minds and souls of our soldiers. New York, W.W. Norton & company. P 85.

⁸⁰ Sherman, N. (2005). Stoic warriors: the ancient philosophy behind the military mind. Oxford, University Press. P 51-56 and Oltshoorn, P. (2011). Military Ethics and Virtues. Abingdon, Routledge. P 111-115.

⁸¹ As such the notion of respect is included in the Netherlands' military code of conduct. Berlijn, D. L. (2007). *introduction voorlopige gedragscode Defensie*. Ministerie van Defensie. Den Haag, Defensiestaf.

⁸² Holmes, R. (1985). Acts of war. London, Wellington house. P 43: 'We are passing through a village where another regiment has its headquarters and its quarter guard 'pays the proper compliments' by turning out and presenting arms...this is our display of pride and respect.'

things they do just for their own sake: the internal goods. Self respect pertains to the trust a person has that he is able to realize his intentions. The realisation of these intentions requires virtues - among other aspects. A person desires to own these dispositions and to manifest these in his actions: a healthy self-respect encourages practicing of virtues.⁸³ He does so both for the sake of self-esteem as for the sake of the opinion of others.⁸⁴ Respect is a two-way street: respect paid is often a prerequisite for being paid respect. On the other hand, if fellow soldiers do not live up to the standards of their common calling one cannot stand by and do nothing about it. Self-respect as well as respect for his fellow soldiers requires an intervention. In short, respect has both an internal and an external source. Both sources are important because they are the fountainheads of mutual respect, especially within the social fabric of the armed forces: a notion that is confirmed by Olthoorn.⁸⁵

4.6.4. There is yet another more limited notion of respect as well. This kind of respect is a matter of appraisal; a valuation of others based on conduct or character.⁸⁶ This esteem is often paid to soldiers who demonstrate special characteristics or competences.⁸⁷ These outstanding soldiers often serve as role models. Role models are important in imbuing virtues. They provide extra stimuli to aspire at excellence. The experience of the pleasure entailed in paying proper respect and receiving it, is probably the most important incentive to develop the disposition of respect.⁸⁸

4.6.5. The virtue of respect can hardly be defined in isolation as this virtue is closely connected to the preceding virtue of military character: comradeship. However, as stated before, respect does not only pertain to the members of the primary group, but also to others the soldier has to cooperate with.⁸⁹ The military is a hierarchical organisation which implies there are military superiors as well as military subordinates. Both superiors and subordinates, as well as other fellow soldiers can be the object of a lack of respect: contempt. This contempt sometimes is based on no other ground than the relative position of the other. Contempt can also be the result of peer pressure: we all have contempt for this person and so will you. Contempt can also be the result of perceived or real grievances, apparent incompetence or a perceived flawed character. Contempt towards subordinates can result in an authoritarian and even insolent conduct. However, this kind of superior's contempt can result in a reluctance to comply with orders or even outright sabotage, or worse - like 'fragging'.⁹⁰ Contempt impedes forwarding appropriate criticism. On the other hand, superiors and subordinates can be the object of too much respect, infatuation or exaggerated admiration. In this situation there is no room for criticism either, just for approval and flattery. This too can have negative effects. The object of admiration may well be induced to think he really is very gifted if not infallible. Also it can undermine discipline as the necessary distance will disappear between the idol and his fans. This can affect performances as leadership -

⁸³ Ibid, P 15.

⁸⁴ Rawls, J. (2006). *Een theorie van rechtvaardigheid. (A theory of justice)* Rotterdam, Lemniscaat § 67.

⁸⁵ Olthoorn, P. (2011). *Military Ethics and Virtues*. Abingdon, Routledge. P 113-130.

⁸⁶ Aristoteles (2005). *Ethica Nicomachea*. Budel, Damon. Par. 1172a8-14.

⁸⁷ Olthoorn, P. (2011). *Military Ethics and Virtues*. Abingdon, Routledge. P 112.

⁸⁸ Ibid, P 114.

⁸⁹ The willingness to cooperate in and loyalty to a larger entity is often expressed in 'esprit de corps' which has a strong bonding effect as well.

⁹⁰ Gabriel, R. A., Savage, P.L. (1978). *Crisis in command: mismanagement in the army*. New York, Hill and Wang. P 43.

even of primary groups - still requires distance. Distance is necessary when one has to act with authority. Especially when orders are issued that involve danger and hardship. A lack of distance, to close a relationship, may also interfere with necessity. Orders are not given in order not to imperil to close associates. The right mean of respect among soldiers lays between contempt and uncritical admiration. This respect is, first of all, based on the functional position of the other(s). This kind of respect is inherent to being a member of a military, hierarchical, organisation. In the second place, this respect could - or rather should - be based on the appreciation of the exemplary way the superior, subordinate or fellow soldier conducts himself. Lastly, the disposition to respect others should be based on a proper respect for the self. Respect thus also entails the duty to criticize and question those functionaries - and the self - with the aim to broaden the personal appreciation and insight as well as that of the other. All members of a unit, as well as the unit as such, will profit from a respectful conduct by all. The preliminary definition of respect could be defined as the right mean between an attitude of contempt and authoritarian behaviour toward others and the blind infatuation and approving of anything the other does. Respect does not only pertain to the members of the same group but also to other fellow soldiers, including subordinates and superiors. Respect also entails self-respect: appropriate respect is founded in proper self-respect.

4.6.6. Still, as indicated above, there are more 'others' who also are entitled to a respectful treatment.⁹¹ The expeditionary battlefield can be anywhere and as such it is seldom empty; especially on land. The very concept of asymmetrical warfare entails that war is waged amongst the peoples, **civilians**.⁹² These civilians and their property present in the area of operations are an inevitable feature of modern military operations. Civilians are fellow human beings which become involved in military activities against their will; most of the times they just happen to be there. However, in spite of their sometimes unwelcome presence, the mere fact that they are indeed fellow human beings entitles them to a correct and respectful treatment. Furthermore, the tradition of 'jus in bello' and the international law pertaining to this tradition set clear rules for the protection of non-combatants. Thus, they are entitled to respect under the rule of law. Abandoning those rules could seriously undermine the public and moral support for the armed forces and would also cause serious damage to the self-respect of the soldiers involved with possibly long-lasting effects.⁹³ However, by the same rule of law, military necessity is recognized which allows for 'inevitable' civilian casualties. Albeit that under the principle of 'double effect' civilians have a right that due care is taken regarding their presence on the battlefield. Under this principle, a military commander has the obligation to minimize the risks for non-combatants even to the extent that he should accept increased risk for himself. ⁹⁴ Respect can play a role in assessing the risks involved as it is a virtue that requires reflection on what to do, not only on what is legitimate, but also on the morally appropriate course of action. Respect helps in finding a balance between the entitlements that are at stake, in establishing what is fair.⁹⁵ However, reality spells a somewhat different account. The war on terror of

⁹¹ Osiel, M. J. (1999). Obeying orders: atrocity, military discipline and the law of war. London, Transaction Publisher. P 14.

⁹² Smith, R. (2008). The utility of force. New York, Vintage Books.

⁹³ French, S. E. (2003). The code of the warrior: exploring warrior values past and present. Oxford, Rowman and Littlefield. P 242.

⁹⁴ Walzer, M. (1977) Just and unjust wars. New York, Basic books. P 129 and 158.

⁹⁵ Sandel, M. J. (2010). Justice. London, Penguin books. P160-166.

the last few decade cost more civilian lives than all terrorist attacks together.⁹⁶ This seemingly neglect of civilian rights may be due to the element of 'nearness'. Hume formulated this as follows: 'a man naturally loves his children better than his nephews, his nephews better than his cousins, his cousins than strangers, where everything else is equal.'⁹⁷ One of the consequences of this kind of thinking is an increasing emphasis on the safety of own troops, resulting in a heavier reliance on stand-off weapon systems targeted at areas instead of on clearly identified enemy elements.⁹⁸ At the same time new wars are almost all fought amongst the peoples and winning their hearts and minds is an established aim of armed operations.⁹⁹ It is especially from this perspective that the virtue of respect for civilians in the area of operations should therefore be extended beyond present practice. Not only because the rule of law requires this, but also from the perspective of the overall aim of modern armed interventions. The latter argument should be based on the conviction that civilians are entitled to a respectful treatment as they are fellow human beings.

4.6.7. What entails a respectful treatment of civilians? Their presence can be seen as an impediment for combating the enemy. In that case their interests will be easily considered to be irrelevant. In such a situation, the military is at best not interested in their fate. This may be due to the emphasis on the safety of own troops. At worst the civilians are seen as accomplices of the enemy or even as the enemy itself. On the other hand, the presence of civilians on the battlefield cannot be considered to be merely a matter of their bad luck. In asymmetrical warfare the civilian population is part of the equation. To ignore them is counterproductive. Not to make a distinction between the enemy and the civil population in general, will at best undermine the willingness of civilians to cooperate and at worst will sow hatred and resentment amongst them. Especially when operating in an area in which the population has a strong notion of honour and respect, a lack of respect will be experienced as a humiliation.¹⁰⁰ However, from a military point of view, it would be counterproductive if not impossible to keep civilian entitlements in absolute awe. The appropriate respect towards civilians in the area of operations is based on the recognition of the other as a fellow human being. The right mean between indifference if not hostility and exaggerated veneration is respect. The proper attitude is one of empathy for people who are involved in a conflict against their will; an attitude which recognizes their interests, property and cultural heritage.¹⁰¹

⁹⁶ Oltshoorn, P. (2011). Military Ethics and Virtues. Abingdon, Routledge. P 76, 78-81.

⁹⁷ Hume, D. (2011). A treatise of human nature. Seattle, CreateSpace. P 267.

⁹⁸ According to information released in January 2008 by the Dutch Ministry of Defence there have been a total of 157 instances of troops in contact (TIC) in Uruzgan since march 2006 . These 157 TIC resulted in 128 jetfighter sorties in which 50 laser guided bombs were dropped, 98 Apache combat helicopter sorties in which 53 attacks were made and 20 artillery barrages; a total of 246 instances of committing stand-off capabilities.

⁹⁹ (2009). Land doctrine publicatie: militaire doctrine voor het landoptreden. Utrecht, Commando Landstrijdkrachten: 147. P 63-65

¹⁰⁰ Oltshoorn, P. (2011). Military Ethics and Virtues. Abingdon, Routledge. P 121-126.

¹⁰¹ On the morning of April 3, 2003, the 2nd battalion 101st Airborne Division stood outside the holiest Shia mosque in all Iraq, watching hundreds of Iraqis suddenly turn on U.S. troops. Battalion commander lieutenant-colonel Hughes had led them into the city to liberate it, but agitators had spread the lie that the Americans were going to seize the mosque and arrest the cleric. Hughes could have muscled his way in, but he took another approach."Everybody smile!" he ordered his troops, "Don't point your weapons at them. Take a knee, relax!"For his tense soldiers, "taking a knee" first meant taking a deep breath. They did, and the crowd's mood eased. Hughes then ordered his men to withdraw. See: Black, E. (2010). Banking on Baghdad. Washington, John Wiley and sons.

Proper respect based on this recognition will result in a conscientious weighing of military necessity and civil desirability, if not rights.

4.6.8. Last but not least there is the ultimate other: the **enemy**. The enemy too is among the others in the area of operations, but the enemy also is a conceptual necessity. Without an enemy, there is no military, so eventually the soldier will always have to confront an enemy who is out to thwart his aim by using violence and if necessary by killing him. A successful confrontation with the enemy will result in internal goods of satisfaction, of moral righteousness. However, these internal goods can only be acquired by a proper treatment of an enemy, after he has been overcome - either wounded or captured - and is at our mercy. This requires first of all respect. Respect is a powerful disposition to remain on the moral high ground and refrain from abuse or worse.¹⁰² This respect is primarily a matter of deference for the enemy in his role as a fighter who is prepared to take up arms and fight and is willing to risk his life.¹⁰³ Another issue is that under the rule of law, the enemy is entitled to certain rights once he has fallen into our hands: even when dead.¹⁰⁴ This means that a respectful treatment in accordance with the rule of law is also an aspect of the respect due to the enemy. As I explained above in paragraph 4.7.2., respect is also a matter of self-respect which in its turn has a close relation with the esteem by others.¹⁰⁵ Abuse should lead to disapproval and condemnation by peers resulting in a damaged self-respect. This too could be a strong incentive to refrain from maltreating a fallen enemy. Thus showing proper respect is also a matter of maintaining the respect by peers and the self. Respect for the enemy is from many perspectives an appropriate military virtue. The soldier owes moral duties to both enemy troops and non-combatants as they are - like himself - free and equal moral agents.¹⁰⁶ But there is another reason as well to respect the enemy and even to feel empathy for him. 'Recognizing the key aspects of his humanity is necessary to anticipate the enemy's likely actions and reactions. To dehumanize the enemy in one's mind may reduce one's moral qualms about killing him. But it also greatly impedes one's ability to outwit him and so to prevail against him.'¹⁰⁷

4.6.9. However, what entails proper respect for the enemy. A lack of respect could be a result of anger and even revulsion or hatred for the enemy. This may result in bloodthirstiness and cruelty: killing becomes the first aim of combat and the enemy that falls into our hands alive awaits a dreadful fate. On the other hand, one cannot expect a

¹⁰² Iersel van, F. (2002). De moed van de militair. Over moed : De deugd van grenservaring en grensoverschrijding. H. Beck & Merks, K. Budel, Damon. P 213-214

¹⁰³ Jünger, E. (2003). Storm of steel (In Stahlgewittern). London, Penguin books. P xiii: 'Of all the troops who were opposed to the Germans on the great battlefields the English were not only the most formidable but the manliest and the most chivalrous. I rejoice therefore, to have an opportunity of expressing in time of peace the sincere admiration which I never failed to make clear during the war whenever I came across a wounded man or a prisoner belonging to the British forces.'

¹⁰⁴ Even when dead, enemy fighters are entitled to a respectful treatment. Disrespect - as shown on a YouTube clip of US soldiers urinating on some dead Taliban fighters, put on the internet in January 2012 - caused serious resentment, both in the area of operations and in the U.S. YouTube, (2012). American Soldiers urinating on Taliban corpses. Retrieved on March 26, 2012 from <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MxTUmMkvr2I>.

¹⁰⁵ Sherman, N. (2011). The untold war: inside the hearts, minds and souls of our soldiers. New York, W.W. Norton & company. P 134.

¹⁰⁶ Osiel, M. J. (1999). Obeying orders: atrocity, military discipline and the law of war. London, Transaction Publishers. P 14.

¹⁰⁷ Keegan, J. (1978). The face of battle. Harmondsworth, Penguin books. P 314.

soldier to regard the enemy as a tragically misled victim of an ill-informed nation: an enemy that deserves our concern and can be convinced of his erring by peaceful means and should be set free. A too lenient approach could easily imperil the soldiers' own safety as the enemy is willing to kill as well. Therefore, the proper mean between hatred and brutality on the one side and concern and leniency on the other hand, lays in respect as well. This means that the enemy is confronted with an unyielding effort to overcome him, using all the legitimate means at our disposition: if necessary the enemy will be killed. But as soon the enemy has yielded, either freely or forced, then he is entitled to a humane treatment. If the victor fails in this respect, he will lose his moral authority and imperil the justness of his case.¹⁰⁸

4.6.10. The question can be raised whether this virtue - that encompasses so many aspects - can be taught, trained and embedded in the individual's soldier character. The answer is similar to the answer given in the case of other virtues. However, respect is less self-evident as a relevant virtue when compared with responsibility, military competence or comradeship. More effort has to be put in further education, 'Bildung', the moral development of soldiers.¹⁰⁹ To incorporate moral education in training could be a challenge, but not impossible; dilemma training has proven to be a useful tool.¹¹⁰ Ultimately, experience will make a soldier realize the intrinsic worth of a respectful disposition. Other military virtues of character could support the expression of the virtue of respect as well. A sense of responsibility as well as discipline and comradeship are valuable incentives to stimulate the disposition of respect in a soldier's character.¹¹¹ High quality leadership and exemplary conduct will further promote respect as a military virtue.

4.6.11. Based on the arguments in the paragraphs before, an extended preliminary definition on respect can be formulated. This definition encompasses the wider notion of respect and its different recipients. Respect can thus be defined as the right mean between an attitude of indifference if not contempt toward others and ignoring their rights and entitlements, and on the other hand, an attitude of leniency if not blind infatuation and thus losing sight of the higher interests at stake. Respect is required for the self, fellow soldiers - including subordinates and superiors - members of the opposing forces and civilians and their property, living and working in the area of operations.

Courage

4.7.1 Danger is another integral part of military practice and produces the internal goods of thrill, excitement and joy after having faced a dangerous situation. The classical military virtue that is connected with facing danger is **courage**.¹¹² It is in courage that the soldier finds the ultimate way of coping with danger in such a way that he experiences

¹⁰⁸ Sherman, N. (2005). Stoic warriors, the ancient philosophy behind the military mind. Oxford, University Press. P 151-153.

¹⁰⁹ Baarda, T. A. v., Verweij, D.E.M., Ed. (2006). Military ethics, the Dutch approach. Leiden, Koninklijke Brill N.V. P 11-20.

¹¹⁰ Ibid. P 128-144 and 345-353.

¹¹¹ Van Tongeren, P., Becker, M., Hoekstra, A., Karssing, E., Niessen, R. (2010). Deugdethiek en integriteit. Assen, van Gorcum. P 82-85

¹¹² Aristoteles (2005). Ethica Nicomachea. Budel, Damon. Par. 1115a6-1117b20.

the excitement and the joy that goes with beating the odds and survives!¹¹³ The question is whether courage can be acquired.¹¹⁴ According to Aristotle this can be done by familiarization. Therefore, training and education seem to be the key notions in shaping (military) character. Aristotle claims that the person who is afraid and runs from everything will become a coward.¹¹⁵ His description of courage is at first rather simple; it suffices to look down on what frightens a man and this will make him courageous.¹¹⁶ In book III of the *Ethica Nicomachea* Aristotle elaborates on courage. He explains that courage implies to defy fear - even of death. This means that a courageous person is not without fear, but is able to overcome this.¹¹⁷ A proper self-confidence, a noble cause and practical wisdom are important 'tools' in overcoming fear.¹¹⁸ Oltshoorn argues that it is hard to say whether a person acts out of courage or out of fear for loss of esteem by his peers (or by himself: a loss of self-esteem). He points at the importance of unit cohesion as a means to improve performance, including courage. As to the reasons why a person overcomes his fears; he argues that a concern for reputation may be a powerful incentive. Thus, as we cannot see into a person's mind, we can never be sure that a courageous act is the result of a virtuous disposition or other motives. However, he concurs with the idea that courage is also a matter of overcoming fear and that unit cohesion contributes to the willingness to accept risks.¹¹⁹ From this perspective, courage seems a disposition that can be acquired.

4.7.2. Overcoming fear and imbuing cohesion in units is an important feature of military training and exercising. Overcoming fear is trained in obstacle courses, life firing exercises, and other activities involving risks and the unexpected as well as training and exercising under harsh conditions. These activities are also aimed at creating pressure, which is a strong means in creating bonds between soldiers. Putting teamwork first and demonstrating the relative impotence of the individuals, especially in the face of strong resistance, supports bonding and imbuing cohesion. Further education may play a role as well, like a call on tradition, the 'esprit de corps' and narrative. Stories of role models, heroes, serve to get a clear picture what valour entails.¹²⁰ Tradition and narrative help to explain what courage entails and what is its practical meaning. The interconnectedness of courage with other virtues like responsibility, discipline and comradeship may further contribute in instilling these virtues.¹²¹ A sense of responsibility compels one to act. Discipline helps to continue doing what should be done and thus to overcome fear. Comradeship provides the support to live up to one's obligations and to fear the contempt if one fails to do so.¹²² Not every soldier is a hero, but this does not mean that there is no courage where there are no heroes.

¹¹³ Iersel van, F. (2002). De moed van de militair. Over moed : De deugd van grenservaring en grensoverschrijding. H. Beck & Merks, K. Budel, Damon: 211-231.

¹¹⁴ Verweij, D. E. M. (2010). Geweten onder schot. Amsterdam Boom. P 65-67.

¹¹⁵ Aristoteles (2005). Ethica Nicomachea. Budel, Damon. Par. 1104a18-26.

¹¹⁶ Ibid, par. 1104a34-1104b3.

¹¹⁷ Ibid, par. 1115b13-19

¹¹⁸ Ibid, par 1115b35-1116a9

¹¹⁹ Oltshoorn, P. (2011). Military Ethics and Virtues. Abingdon, Routledge. P 44-65.

¹²⁰ Mullaney, G. M. (2009). The unforgiving minute; a soldier's education. London, Penguin books. P 68: 'Colonel Guy LoFaro was one of the smartest history professors in the department and also one of the toughest. He knew a thing or two about courage.'

¹²¹ Becker, M. (2010). Moed. Deugdeethiek en integriteit. R. Niessen. Ed. Assen, van Gorcum: P 52-56.

¹²² Robinson, P. (2007). "Ethics training and development in the military." Parameters 37(1): 23-36. P30: 'concern for reputation plays a vital part in military life—the desire not to look bad in front of one's colleagues is a major reason why soldiers show courage in battle' see also Junger, S. (2010). War. London,

4.7.3. The idea of courageousness is often primarily associated with facing physical dangers; however, there is also moral courage. Moral courage pertains to overcome the fear of the opinion of others, rather than a physical danger. This means standing up against wrongdoings perpetrated not by the enemy but by fellow soldiers.¹²³ An outstanding example is the helicopter pilot who grounded his airframe and threatened to shoot his compatriot soldiers if they did not stop harassing and killing civilians.¹²⁴ Basically moral courage is a matter of weighing the certainty of losing self-esteem against the risk of losing the esteem by peers and others.¹²⁵ The latter risks often seem to be more important: 'Physical courage is never in short supply in a fighting army. Moral courage sometimes is'.¹²⁶ Especially in the often diffuse realities of new wars the moral dimension of courage seems to gain importance.¹²⁷ Recent breaches of moral standards - and the ensuing harm to the support of the mission - underpin the institutional need to give greater weight to moral courage as an important aspect of the virtue of courage. Courage seems true courage only when physical and moral courage goes hand in hand!¹²⁸ But even then, for a courageous act to be considered virtuous, some considerations have to be taken into account. What are the moral implications of the situation at hand and what could be the consequences in case of non-interference? Is there an adequate estimate of the dangers involved, not only for the agent but also for others? Is the ensuing conduct based on an autonomous decision and does it make sense regarding the values that are at stake?¹²⁹

4.7.4. The virtue of courage enables the soldier to overcome the dangers on the battlefield. Lacking courage, a soldier of course can try to avoid danger. He will put his personal safety first and will avoid everything that will imperil his personal wellbeing. In justification of his conduct real and imagined dangers are exaggerated and eventually his ability to act will be paralysed by fear. On the other hand, the soldier can underestimate or even ignore danger. This may be the result of ignorance or the

Fourth Estate. P 210: 'As a soldier the thing you were most scared of was failing your brothers when they needed you and compared to that dying was easy. Dying was over with. Cowardice lingered forever.'

¹²³ Walzer, M. (2004). Arguing about war. New Haven, Yale University Press. P27: 'What we require of soldiers is that they refuse the illegal or immoral orders of their immediate superior. That refusal does not constitute a denial or a rebellion against military hierarchy. It is best understood as an appeal up the chain of command over superior officer to the superiors of the superior officer. Given the structure of that chain and its purpose, any such appeal is problematic and difficult, a matter of considerable strain for the individual who undertakes it.'

¹²⁴ Toner, J. H. (2000). Morals under the gun. Lexington, University Press of Kentucky. P 123: 'Thompson (*the helicopter pilot overflying My Lai at the time of the massacre*) decided to act. He saw a group of U.S. soldiers chasing about ten Vietnamese who were fleeing to a makeshift bunker. Thompson set his helicopter down in front of the advancing Americans and gave his gunner a simple direct order. If the Americans attempted to harm the villagers he was to shoot the Americans. The group of Vietnamese was saved.'

¹²⁵ An organized form of moral courage is the Israeli organization of military veterans, established in 2004, who testify to the misconduct of Israeli forces in the Palestinian occupied territories. (2004). "Breaking the silence." Retrieved 2012, January 5 from <http://www.breakingthesilence.org.il>. See also Baarda, T. v. and Verweij, D.E.M., Ed. (2009). The moral dimensions of asymmetrical warfare. Leiden, Martinus Nijhof. Chapter 12: the phenomenon of breaking the silence in Israel by Grassani, E.

¹²⁶ Toner, J. H. (2000). Morals under the gun. Lexington, University Press of Kentucky. P 116.

¹²⁷ Oltshoorn, P. (2011). Military Ethics and Virtues. Abingdon, Routledge. P 51-53.

¹²⁸ Verweij, D. E. M. (2010). Geweten onder schot. Amsterdam Boom. P 67. See also Richardson, R., Verweij, D., Vogelaar, A., Kuipers, H., Ed. (2002). Mens en organisatie: de krijgsmacht in verandering. Alphen aan den Rijn, Haasbeek. P181-185.

¹²⁹ Bovens, M. A. P. (1990). Verantwoordelijkheid en organisatie. Zwolle, Tjeenk Willink. P 42-49.

superstitious conviction that he cannot be hurt. In his recklessness, he will take unnecessary risks and endanger not only his own life but that of his fellow soldiers as well. Courage is the right mean between cowardice and recklessness.¹³⁰ In a courageous act the soldier has taken the dangers into account and - sometimes after cool deliberation, sometimes on an impulse - decides to face these dangers and act resolutely but wisely.¹³¹ This decision is rooted in a moral conviction that one has to act. Courage is not only a matter of facing physical danger. Courage also pertains to the willingness to stand up against the wrong doings in general even in spite of possible personal repercussions. Courage has a physical as well as a moral dimension. Courage, therefore, could be preliminary defined as being the mean between an attitude of avoiding risks - both physical and moral - and cowardice and an attitude of recklessness and taking unnecessary risks for yourself and others.

Resilience

4.8.1. The conditions in the theatre of operations, the battlefield, which can be anywhere and on which action can take place at any time, produce the internal good at experiencing the thrill of the unknown and the excitement of being alive and recovering after long and exhausting action. To cope with the often harsh conditions and the pervasive uncertainty on the battlefield one needs physical and mental stamina. The satisfaction over the ability to cope with the challenges of the battlefield is enhanced by resilience. The virtue of **resilience** enables a soldier to belittle the heavy experience and optimistically face the next challenge.¹³² It's a prerequisite to overcome the adverse circumstance of which the nature as well as the duration is beyond personal control. Epictetus described this as follows: 'But as soon as a man has picked himself up and renewed his grip on himself and shown the same enthusiasm, he is allowed to compete (*again*)..'¹³³

4.8.2. An important feature of resilience is self-knowledge: knowing one's strengths and weakness.¹³⁴ Especially getting to know one's weaknesses, 'the repressed and despised parts of our personality' is essential, as these 'weaknesses and the ensuing petty acts can have consequences of immense horror and evil in the crucible of war.'¹³⁵ A soldier can be made aware of these by demanding, even harsh, physical and mental training. This awareness is a prerequisite for a proper control of weaknesses and the efforts to overcome these. This awareness is a prerequisite too to put one's strengths to a proper use. 'The primary reason you don't make sound judgments in combat is that you to often

¹³⁰ 'Bravery, fearless risking of one's own life, is always inspiring.' In: Jünger, E. (2003). *Storm of steel (In Stahlgewittern)*. London, Penguin books. P 213. See also Verweij, D. E. M. (2010). *Geweten onder schot*. Amsterdam Boom. P 54-58.

¹³¹ Holmes, R. (1985). *Acts of war*. London, Wellington house. 143-145 and 147-148.

¹³² Stanley, E. A., Jha, A.P. (2010). "Mind Fitness: improving operational effectiveness and building warrior resilience." *Fires* 75(1). P 19: 'Optimal combat readiness requires three things: mission essential knowledge and skills, physical fitness and mind fitness. All three components are crucial for equipping warriors to handle the challenges and stressors of deployment.' See also Sherman, N. (2005). *Stoic warriors: the ancient philosophy behind the military mind*. Oxford, University Press. P 34-34 and 101-130.

¹³³ Epictetus (2008). *Discourses and writings*. London, Penguin books. Par 3.215.1-5.

¹³⁴ Beddoes-Jones, F. (2011). "Having the courage to lead." *Training journal*: 5: P 23-28. See also Hinojosa, R. (2007). "Recruiting the self: the military and the making of masculinities". *Philosophy*. Gainesville, University of Florida. **PhD**: 249. P 27: 'One must first have some image of the self before one can present that image to others. When that presentation is acknowledged, insofar as the presentation is based on a valued self-image, the effect is an increase in self-esteem. If the image is rejected, self-esteem decreases.'

¹³⁵ Marlantes, K. (2011). *What it is like to go to war*. New York, Atlantic Monthly Press. P 80.

are exhausted and numbed and there is little that can be done about this, except training under extreme duress and learn how to function at such times.¹³⁶ Demanding physical and mental training as well as collective evaluation of the effects are the methods and means to develop resilience.¹³⁷ Military training provides ample opportunity to incorporate the developing of mental and physical stamina. Improving these is almost always experienced as enrichment by the soldier and is easily embedded in the military mind.¹³⁸ As a result, many individual soldiers pay great attention to their physical fitness: both as a direct goal (physical endurance) and as a means to an indirect goal (mental endurance).¹³⁹ Soldiers appreciate physical and mental fitness as a part of being a true member of the military. Resilience is perceived by most soldiers as a necessary military virtue.

4.8.3. Circumstances on the battlefield are often harsh. Laws and regulations on welfare do not always apply. Adequate housing is never sure, nor are regular meals. Rain or snow, day or night, heavy seas, rough terrain, low hanging clouds: none of these are an excuse for not conducting military operations.¹⁴⁰ The planned outcome of these is not sure either: friction will disturb the conduct of the operation in a smaller or larger amount.¹⁴¹ The virtue of resilience based on physical and mental stamina will enable the soldier to overcome these adverse conditions. A deficiency in this respect will affect morale. As a result, the soldier will neglect taking proper care of himself, his equipment and the system(s) he handles. His willingness to carry his part of the general burden will erode. Eventually, the soldier will succumb to self-pity and inertia. On the other hand, the soldier should not ignore the messages of his body. In that case he may think that sleep deprivation and physical exhaustion will not bring him down. That soldier will mock those who do take a nap when possible. Overestimation of one's possibilities will eventually result in a collapse, and that inevitable collapse will probably take place at a most inconvenient place or time, or both. Surviving on the battlefield requires that soldiers are - and remain - in a good shape. They have to be physically fit, and this physical fitness is a prerequisite for mental stamina. Physical and mental fitness shapes overall resilience, the capability to withstand physical and mental exhaustion and to 'bounce back'.¹⁴² According to Aristotle, perseverance (an aspect to the notion of

¹³⁶ Ibid, P142.

¹³⁷ Bartone, P. T. (2006). "Resilience under military operational stress: can leaders influence hardiness." *Military Psychology* 18(Supplement): 17. P145: 'Three sets of considerations lead to the proposition that hardy leaders can indeed increase hardy cognitions and behaviours in groups. These considerations concern (a) the likely underlying mechanisms of hardiness, which have to do with how experiences get interpreted and made sense of; (b) relevant theoretical positions on leader social influence, including transformational leadership and path-goal leader theory; and (c) several empirical studies that have shown indirect support for a hardy leader influence process.'

¹³⁸ Junger, S. (2010). *War*. London, Fourth Estate. P 74: '...like Monroe, who will methodically take apart a SAW while rounds are slapping the rocks all around him.'

¹³⁹ Stanley, E. A., Jha, A.P. (2010). "Mind Fitness: improving operational effectiveness and building warrior resilience." *Fires* 75(1): P 20: 'with physical exercise and repetition of certain body movements, the body becomes stronger, more efficient and better able to perform those movements with ease. A similar process can occur with the brain: with the engagement and repetition of certain mental processes, the brain becomes more efficient at those processes... Thus, there is a profound parallel between physical fitness and mind fitness.'

¹⁴⁰ Holmes, R. (1985). *Acts of war*. London, Wellington house. P 148-175.

¹⁴¹ Clausewitz, v., C (1984). *On War*. Princeton, University Press. Book 1 chapter 7.

¹⁴² 'We could sleep without having to go out into the night four hours later and without being pursued even into our dreams by the fear of a surprise attack. It made us feel reborn, on the first day of a rest spell, when we'd had a bath, cleaned our uniforms of the grime of the trenches. We exercised and drilled out on

resilience) entails resistance.¹⁴³ Resistance against succumbing to bodily pain and indulging in self-pity. This requires self-knowledge and the willingness to train physical and mental capacities. Proper resilience will add to the overall virtuousness of the soldier which will enable him to: “bear the hazards of fate harmoniously... and accept setbacks in all calm and not because he is insensible of pain, but because he is truly noble and great”.¹⁴⁴ Based on the above, resilience could be defined as the right mean between an attitude of weakness and resignation at the smallest misfortune and overestimating one’s capabilities and not taking human limits into account. Resilience has both a physical and a mental component.

Discipline

4.9.1. The rules a soldier has to adhere to are often experienced as superfluous constraints: they limit the margins within which the soldier operates. The most important rules define the legal and moral boundaries within which killing is allowed and even these can be confusing.¹⁴⁵ On the other hand, rules do create certainties and provide comfort in sometimes extreme circumstances. However, rules are not a matter of choice: one cannot pick those one likes, and disregard those one does not like. Or as Walzer puts it: ‘War is still a rule-governed activity, a world of permissions and prohibitions.’¹⁴⁶ Discipline is required to cope with rules: to accept the limitations they impose and to benefit from the security they offer.¹⁴⁷ **Discipline** is a virtue that enables a soldier to live with and to accept rules as an integral part of military practice. The military regimen is part and parcel of being a member of the armed forces which entails living close together on board of vessels, in barracks, in tented camps, airbases, etc. Generally two types of discipline are discerned: outward discipline and inner discipline.¹⁴⁸ Outward discipline is a means to show self-esteem and emphasize the special character of the military. ‘Who does not avoid a man who is dirty and smells and looks unwholesome?’¹⁴⁹ Outward discipline is also often seen as a means to achieve internal discipline, that is the acceptance of the necessity of rules and to abide by them: not out of fear of being caught trespassing, but out of the conviction that rules are there for a reason.¹⁵⁰ On the other hand, there is the opinion that acquiring outward discipline

the meadows, to return suppleness to our rusty bones and to reawaken the esprit de corps of individuals isolated over the long watches for the night.’ In Jünger, E. (2003). Storm of steel. (*In Stahlgewittern*). London, Penguin books. P 35.

¹⁴³ Aristoteles (2005). Ethica Nicomachea. Budel, Damon. Par 1149b32-36.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid, Par 1100b18-21

¹⁴⁵ Nussbaum, M. (1986). The fragility of goodness. Cambridge, University Press. P 41-47. In this section she describes the killing of Iphigenia by her father Agamemnon, the leader of the Greek army which deployed to destroy Troy. As a father this was an atrocious act, but in a different role, as leader of the army the sacrifice was justified as a means to appease the Gods.

¹⁴⁶ Walzer, M. (1977). Just and unjust wars. New York, Basic books. P 36.

¹⁴⁷ Holmes, R. (1985). Acts of war. London, Wellington house. P 332-340.

¹⁴⁸ There are more notions in use to define the difference between external and internal discipline. Shalit distinguishes formal and functional discipline [Shalit, B. (1988). The psychology of conflict and combat. New York, Praeger Publisher.] Donahue discerns discipline behaviour and attitudes [Donahue, K. S. (1993). The anatomy of discipline: a monograph. Fort Leavenworth (Kansas), United States Army Command and general Staff College.]

¹⁴⁹ Epictetus (2008). Discourses and writings. London, Penguin books. Par.4.11.18.

¹⁵⁰ Marlantes, K. (2010). Matterhorn. London, Corvus. P 148: ‘There would be no running. To reach the summit of the hill in a state of exhaustion would mean almost certain death. They walked, waiting for the enemy to open fire.’

requires inner discipline first; rules must make sense in order to assure compliance.¹⁵¹ However, discipline - outward and internal - is counted as a pre-eminently military virtue.

4.9.2. Discipline is often described as enforced obedience to an external authority. Especially in the first education and training a soldier receives; an often rigid discipline is imposed. Discipline is used as a means to promote military socialization, enhance learning and support team building. Rigorous discipline, enables the elements of body and equipment to combine faster, thus achieving a speed which conquers its adversaries by enabling using time to appropriate space.¹⁵² This collective and formal discipline aims at controlling and managing large numbers of soldiers and reducing their autonomy.¹⁵³ Although some aspects of this formal kind of discipline are still useful (e.g. in learning repetitive skills), modern wars require another kind of discipline. Modern wars require decentralization of control and a corresponding kind of discipline, which is not based on reducing autonomy.¹⁵⁴ On the contrary, this functional and individual discipline aims at achieving autonomous self discipline.¹⁵⁵ We can perhaps make a useful analytical distinction here between, on the one hand formal and collective discipline, which aims at subjection - i.e. subjection to domination - and on the other hand, functional and individual discipline, which aims at "subjectification" i.e. the constitution of subjects who are free to act, free to obey.¹⁵⁶ The most effective discipline is that which is self-imposed, which springs from the 'tribal' structure of small groups and from mutual confidence between leaders and led.¹⁵⁷ This internal discipline which compels soldiers to obey, is foremost a matter of team spirit, the sort of discipline team members are proud of. Internal discipline regulates the conduct of soldiers by way of general standards that encourage them to exercise judgement, taking into account the actual situation on the basis of local knowledge, assessed in the light of prior experience.¹⁵⁸ These characteristics allow for growth and development, whereas formal discipline is more static.¹⁵⁹ Internal discipline fits with the concept of the military as a practice as it is based on the acceptance of rules as sensible means to control the activities of the practice and the mutual trust between participants in the practice. However, this does not deny that discipline is ultimately based on compliance by many to the wishes of few. It is important to keep this willingness to cooperate, to comply and to obey, intact. This especially is a responsibility of those who lead. Leaders should be very careful not to issue orders which cannot be obeyed, as such orders could well affect

¹⁵¹ Richardson, R., Verweij, D., Vogelaar, A., Kuipers, H., Ed. (2002). Mens en organisatie: de krijgsmacht in verandering. Alphen aan den Rijn, Haasbeek. P167.

¹⁵² Drake, M. S. (2001). Problematics of military power. London, Frank Cass. P66.

¹⁵³ Osiel, M. J. (1999). Obeying orders: atrocity, military discipline and the law of war. London, Transaction Publishers. P 359.

¹⁵⁴ Janowitz, M., Little, R.W. (1969). Sociology and the military establishment. New York, Russell Sage Foundation.

¹⁵⁵ Shalit, B. (1988). The psychology of conflict and combat. New York, Praeger publishers. P 120-153.

¹⁵⁶ Osiel, M. J. (1999). Obeying orders: atrocity, military discipline and the law of war. London, Transaction Publishers. P 263.

¹⁵⁷ Holmes, R. (1985). Acts of war. London, Wellington house. P 332.

¹⁵⁸ Osiel, M. J. (1999). Obeying orders: atrocity, military discipline and the law of war. London, Transaction Publishers. P 359.

¹⁵⁹ Richardson, R., Verweij, D., Vogelaar, A., Kuipers, H., Ed. (2002). Mens en organisatie: de krijgsmacht in verandering. Alphen aan den Rijn, Haasbeek. P 166.

- if not destroy - the willingness to comply, to obey.¹⁶⁰ This is reflected in the fundamental truth that a military leader needs to lead from the front: '*les épaulettes en avant!*' A strictly managerial approach to leading units will not do: it will erode the deference necessary to his leadership, it will erode trust. Mutual trust is an important element in establishing and maintaining discipline.¹⁶¹ Savage and Gabriel articulated it thus: 'Men, of course, cannot be managed to their death.'¹⁶² However, history shows that soldiers are willing to be lead, even until death. Furthermore, discipline has other limitations as well. It has to conform to the values of civilian society, while maintaining standards that meet military necessity.¹⁶³ Discipline has many features of which obedience and trust are the most important.

4.9.3. The disposition to obey and abide by the rules is imbued by education, especially in the first phase of military socialization. Soldiers have to learn what it means to obey. They have to understand the necessity of obeying. Training, exercises and further education will enhance the development of this disposition. Group cohesion and the ensuing team spirit will further foster internal discipline. Leadership based on exemplary conduct and appropriate care will create mutual trust; a further stimulus to discipline. But there are other forces as well that compel the soldier to obey and these are the dynamics of battle: the personnel carrier that transports the soldier to the battle zone, the psychology of the primary group, modern surveillance systems that monitor the soldiers movements, enemy fire and actions that leave no time for deliberation but require immediate action, etc.¹⁶⁴

4.9.4 As I stated before, the military operates with large numbers in exceptional circumstances, which involve many uncertainties and sometimes high risks. Under these circumstances to create some kind of order, rules are indispensable. The virtue of discipline enables the soldier to abide by these rules. When discipline is insufficient, the soldier will ignore rules. He can also try to bend the rules, to look for loopholes and petty excuses.¹⁶⁵ By doing so he can bring himself and his fellow soldiers in (great) danger. But he will ignore these dangers as well, if only out of ignorance. On the other hand, the soldier can be very strict in adherence to the rules. He then often refers to the literal wording of the articles and not to the intrinsic meaning of the rule. He will do everything by the book and this attitude could also endanger himself and his fellow soldiers.¹⁶⁶ A notorious example of this 'doing everything by the book' took place on 21st of January 1897 during the battle of Isandlwana in which the British forces engaged the Zulu warriors of King Shaka. During this battle, a British NCO insisted on opening

¹⁶⁰ Sherman, N. (2011). The untold war: inside the hearts, minds and souls of our soldiers. New York, W.W. Norton & company. P24, 56-59.

¹⁶¹ Blaschke, P. H., Gramm, R., Sixt, W., Ed. (1986). De officio: zu den Herausforderungen des Offiziersberuf. Hannover, Lutherisches Verlagshaus. P 213: 'Die Disziplin und damit der Gehorsam beruhen auf einem Vertrauen zwischen Vorgesetzten und Untergebenen.'

¹⁶² Gabriel, R. A., Savage, P.L. (1978). Crisis in command: mismanagement in the army. New York, Hill and Wang.

¹⁶³ Hofstede, G. (2003). Cultures and organizations. London, Profile books. P 11-13, 18 and 225-229.

¹⁶⁴ Keegan, J. (1978). The face of battle. Harmondsworth, Penguin. P324 and Osiel, M. J. (1999). Obeying orders: atrocity, military discipline and the law of war. London, Transaction Publishers. P209,210.

¹⁶⁵ This lack of discipline could also be the result of obsolete rules that do not fit reality and therefore are ignored. In these cases the rules in themselves seem problematic and not discipline. Richardson, R., Verweij, D., Vogelaar, A., Kuipers, H., Ed. (2002). Mens en organisatie: de krijgsmacht in verandering. Alphen aan den Rijn, Haasbeek. P 166, 167.

¹⁶⁶ Dixon, N. F. (1984). On the psychology of military incompetence. London, Jonathan Cape. P 176-188.

ammunition boxes according to the time consuming regulations. He was found among the 858 other British soldiers that were killed that day. He was stabbed to death over his ample store of ammunition.¹⁶⁷ So the proper mean between ignoring and bending the rules and attaching paramount importance to them is the virtue of discipline, which could be defined as a disposition to obey orders and to adhere to the standards that are set by rules and regulations.¹⁶⁸ Proper discipline is internalized, it includes proper care for a military appearance and the willingness to promptly do what is required.¹⁶⁹ Discipline involves trust in others and being in control over oneself.¹⁷⁰ Discipline could be defined as the right mean between, on the one hand an attitude of neglect of rules and regulations by which one might endanger oneself and others and on the other hand, an attitude of strict abidance by rules and taking these literally which could frustrate the progress of the work at hand.

Practical wisdom

4.10.1. In the preceding paragraphs, I have identified seven military virtues of character, qualities that can be acquired and will enable the soldier to enjoy the internal goods that can be found in the military practice.¹⁷¹ These are: a sense of responsibility, military competence, courage, comradeship, respect, resilience and discipline. Similar notions (with the exception of courage and some additional values as well) were also identified in a survey conducted among Dutch officers and cadets. The survey aimed at establishing which values played a part in the individual soldier's moral professionalism. Moral competence - as a part of moral professionalism - is described as the capability to perceive the moral dimension in a specific situation, to come to a morally appropriate judgment and to act accordingly and lastly to accept accountability.¹⁷² And although the survey was not based on the concept of virtue ethics, the approach as well as part of the results warrants comparison. Acquiring virtues requires not only education, training and experience. Acquiring a virtuous disposition requires deliberation as well. It is also through frequent deliberation that a habit becomes a disposition that is part of the individual's mental make-up. Aristotle discerned this and defined two kinds of virtue: virtues of moral worthiness, of character and the virtues of intellect.¹⁷³ It is by using the virtue of intellect, **practical wisdom** (*phronèsis*) that we come to act in a virtuous way.¹⁷⁴ From this perspective, practical wisdom is the most

¹⁶⁷ Porch, D. (2000). *Wars of Empire*. London, Cassel & co. P 118-123.

¹⁶⁸ '... to rule by action instead of acting by rules.' In: Marshall, S.L.A. (1978) *Men against fire: the problem of battle command in future war*. Gloucester, Massachusetts, Peter Smith. P 108.

¹⁶⁹ Richardson, R., Verweij, D., Vogelaar, A., Kuipers, H., Ed. (2002). *Mens en organisatie: de krijgsmacht in verandering*. Alphen aan den Rijn, Haasbeek. P166.

¹⁷⁰ Moore, H. G., Galloway, J.L. (2008). *We are soldiers still*. New York, Harper Collins Publishers. P 165: 'Self-discipline leads to self-confidence. Disciplined use of technology creates confidence in those tools. Disciplined leaders create an foster confidence and trust in themselves by their subordinates. Team discipline leads to team confidence.'

¹⁷¹ See also Blaschke, P. H., Gramm, R., Sixt, W., Ed. (1986). *De officio: zu den Herausforderungen des Offiziersberuf*. Hannover, Lutherisches Verlagshaus. P 230-235, and Stouffer, S. A. (1949). *The American soldier: combat and its aftermath*. Princeton (New Jersey) University Press. Stouffer notices on P134-146 that appreciation of fellow combat soldiers include among others the following characteristics: tasks and duty; solidarity and comradeship; adequate performance of the job; good judgement; discipline. These findings concur with many of the virtues I identified.

¹⁷² Verweij, D. E. M. (2007). Morele professionaliteit in de militaire praktijk. *Werkzame idealen*. J. Kole, & D. de Ruyter. Ed. Assen, van Gorcum. P130.

¹⁷³ See paragraph 2.6.9. above and Aristoteles (2005). *Ethica Nicomachea*. Budel, Damon. Par 1103a3-10.

¹⁷⁴ Aristotle discerns five virtues of intellect: proficiency, scientific knowledge, philosophical knowledge, intellect as such and practical wisdom. Practical wisdom is the most important as it is a disposition to act

important virtue.¹⁷⁵ Virtuous action implies a well-considered decision which is the result of careful deliberation, discursive thinking.¹⁷⁶ So apart from these seven virtues of military character the virtue of the intellect, practical wisdom, is also required!¹⁷⁷ Aristotle even goes as far as to state that the virtue in a strict sense cannot exist without practical wisdom: '... if the subject acquires intelligence he becomes outstanding in conduct, and his disposition, instead of resembling virtue, will now be virtue in the full sense.'¹⁷⁸ It is the virtue of practical wisdom, which enables a well-considered decision on a course of action which is within our power.¹⁷⁹ In order to come to such a decision, critical analysis is indispensable as well as thinking synthetically on choosing the morally responsible mean to guide our action.¹⁸⁰ Schwartz states that practical wisdom enables us: 'to perceive the situation, to have the appropriate feelings or desires about it, to deliberate about what is appropriate in these circumstances and to act.'¹⁸¹ So apart from the virtues of character the virtue of intellect, practical wisdom, is a necessary condition in developing a virtuous disposition.¹⁸² As situations in war change constantly and deliberation on how to act is thus an important feature of the military practice it is obvious military practitioners cannot do without practical wisdom.¹⁸³

4.10.2. In elaborating on the meaning of the virtues I identified, it has become clear that the virtues of military character are closely related, interconnect in several aspects and are mutually supportive, if not reinforcing. A proper sense of responsibility and deep felt comradeship could well spark acts of courage. Discipline and respect may inspire acts of moral worthiness. Resilience and military competence enable one to discharge his allotted tasks, etc. The relationship between the different virtues strengthens their power and reduces their vulnerability to human weaknesses.¹⁸⁴ This interconnectivity plays a part in the application of the virtue of the intellect, practical wisdom, as well. This adds to the complexity of the appropriate amount of deliberation. This means taking into account the overall aim of the action, interpreting rules, reading the social context, feeling empathy for others and learning from experience.¹⁸⁵ This kind of deliberation is usually associated with command and leadership, and as such it is often appreciated as primarily a responsibility of officers. Whether this view was true in regular wars could be a matter of debate, but in new wars, soldiers of all ranks are faced with this kind of deliberation. This has to do with dispersion of forces and the complexity of new wars.¹⁸⁶

truly reasonable for the benefit of the good of men. Aristoteles (2005). Ethica Nicomachea. Budel, Damon. Par. 1139b14-17 ; 1140b4-7.

¹⁷⁵ Nussbaum, M. (1986). The fragility of goodness. Cambridge, University Press. P 52.

¹⁷⁶ Aristoteles (2005). Ethica Nicomachea. Budel, Damon. Par. 1112a15-17.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid. par. 1139a33-34: 'To succeed or not in actions, requires reason and character.'

¹⁷⁸ Aristotle (2004). The Nicomachean ethics. London, Penguin books. par. 1144b13-14.

¹⁷⁹ Aristoteles (2005). Ethica Nicomachea. Budel, Damon. Par. 1139a17-27.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid. par 1140b1-6.

¹⁸¹ Schwartz, B. and Sharpe, K. (2010). Practical wisdom. New York, Riverhead. P 4.

¹⁸² Becker, M. (2010). Verstandigheid. Deugdethiek en integriteit. R. Niessen. Assen, van Gorcum. P 52-56. See also Huntington, S. P. (1957). The soldier and the state. Cambridge (Massachusetts), Harvard University Press. P 13.

¹⁸³ Osiel, M. J. (1999). Obeying orders: atrocity, military discipline and the law of war. London, Transaction Publishers. P263-280.

¹⁸⁴ Nussbaum, M. (1986). The fragility of goodness. Cambridge, University Press. P 83.

¹⁸⁵ Schwartz, B. and Sharpe, K. (2010). Practical wisdom. New York, Riverhead. P 25-26.

¹⁸⁶ As I explained in chapter 1. See also Krulak, C. C. (1999). "The strategic corporal: leadership in the three block war." Marines Magazine 28(1): 7.

4.10.3. Although practical wisdom is not a virtue of character, it still is a virtue.¹⁸⁷ It is a disposition to come to an appropriate action; an action that is right both for the soldier himself as well as for others and that contributes to the overall goal of excelling in the military practice. The choice for a course of action requires deliberation. It requires perceiving a situation, including the moral component. A situation in which the odds are heavily against the own unit, and a hasty retreat is clearly warranted, will generally not call for courage.¹⁸⁸ A deficiency in deliberating will result in a decision which will be quick, but not necessarily good. It could be that not all factors are taken into account. Time often seems to be the most important factor, and this may well lead to stubbornness in sticking to the decision taken. A quick decision often does not allow for much reflection or taking suggestions into account criticism. On the other hand, deliberation can take too long. One wavers and vacillates and hesitates in taking a decision. When a decision is finally taken one often fails as well in displaying conviction that it is a right decision. Criticism comments on the quality of the decision and suggestions for changes are more easily accepted resulting in more delay. A preliminary definition of practical wisdom could therefore read as the right between immediate and impulsive action at the first hint of difficulties and on the other hand, a wavering conduct and inconclusive action in case of pressure or any other emergency. Practical wisdom in a military context is often displayed in leadership. Leadership involving practical wisdom entails keeping a clear head, taking full account of the situation, taking decisive action and giving strong directive guidance while leaving room for initiative and displaying strong personal commitment. The latter component of leadership aims at conveying the conviction that the chosen course of action is the best possible, both practically and morally. Display of personal commitment by leaders encourages trust and commitment by those who are to follow.

4.10.4. Practical wisdom is knowing what to do and to act accordingly. The deliberation required will generally take place in two stages. First, the situation and its relevant factors are considered. In the second stage, a decision will be reached on how to act. This decision is based on weighing what is the overall best course of action. In this appreciation, both the actual situation is taken into account as well as the overall goal of the practice and how to excel.¹⁸⁹ Practical wisdom is a moral skill that enables us to act wisely. How can we learn to be practical wise?¹⁹⁰ There is no manual on how to become wise. Basically, it is foremost a matter of experience.¹⁹¹ But not every experience adds to wisdom: some do and others don't. Getting the right experience is first of all a matter of identifying and embracing the right goal (*Telos*) of the practice. For the military, that is aspiring at being a good soldier, which means knowing what the military stands for and

¹⁸⁷ Aristoteles (2005). *Ethica Nicomachea*. Budel, Damon. Par. 1139a19-27 and 1140b12-30.

¹⁸⁸ Osiel, M. J. (1999). *Obeying orders: atrocity, military discipline and the law of war*. London, Transaction Publishers. P247-249.

¹⁸⁹ MacIntyre, A. (2003). *Whose justice? Which rationality?* Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 44-45.

¹⁹⁰ Verweij, D. E. M. (2002). Moreel fit zijn, de basis voor moreel verantwoord gedrag. *Mens en organisatie: de krijgsmacht in verandering*. R. Richardson, Verweij, D., Vogelaar, A., Kuipers, H. Alphen aan den Rijn, Haasbeek. P 102. Verweij introduces the notion of 'moral fitness' which she describes as the knowledge to act morally responsibly and the capability to act accordingly. This kind of fitness is acquired by means of developing characteristics that enable recognizing moral questions and a correct assumption of the possible solutions and to act accordingly. Maintaining the kind of fitness requires frequent training and deliberation as well as the preparedness to improve one's performance.

¹⁹¹ Ibid, P 112: 'From an Aristotelian perspective moral fitness could be described as possessing practical wisdom.'

identifying with this overall aim. From this perspective aspiring at excellence is a logical next step for a soldier. The military should then provide the prerequisites for satisfying this aspiration. If the military would try to make good soldiers by bonuses, it would corrupt military practical wisdom, as soldiers would act for the wrong reasons: incentives instead of intrinsic pleasure and satisfaction.¹⁹² Harsh discipline would not do the trick either: soldiers would act out of fear or blind obedience to rules and regulations instead out of the genuine aspiration to excel.¹⁹³ The development of practical wisdom is stimulated by providing ways and means to excel and to grow in knowledge and skills. This requires an organizational culture in which it is allowed to make mistakes. Training and exercises should provide challenges to display the knowledge and skill that are acquired and opportunities to learn more and most is learnt of mistakes made.¹⁹⁴ This kind of education ('*Bildung*') provides the best opportunities to nurture the capacity to be wise.¹⁹⁵

Non-virtues

4.11.1. The virtues of character I identified in the preceding paragraph are related to a specific practice; they pertain to military character. Why did I identify these seven military virtues and not others, or less, or perhaps more? The first question can be answered as follows. The virtues I identified are the result of a careful analysis: first, I analyzed and dissected military practice, then I identified internal goods which are closely related to the constitutive parts of the practice. Next, based on both constitutive parts and related internal goods, I identified the virtues as those acquired human qualities that enhance the experience of the internal goods in military practice. My identification of the virtues is the result of a careful analysis of this military practice and a logical elaboration of MacIntyre's theory. Still, it is not easy to establish which dispositions qualify as a virtue. Sometimes it is a matter of wording: fitness as well as perseverance are valuable properties for a soldier but on close scrutiny they refer to the same characteristics as (mental and physical) resilience. On the other hand, there are notions that are often used in relation to virtuous military conduct, which I have not listed as a military virtue. These exemptions need some explanation. I will limit my argument to the 'usual suspects': honour, loyalty, obedience, country and integrity.¹⁹⁶

4.11.2. **Honour** is an ancient notion and is often considered a virtue. However, it is a qualification that is bestowed on a person by others. It pertains to the quality of a private person as someone righteous which is averse to meanness and deceit, or of a public servant as one who has all the qualities needed for the job and who discharges his duties in a most excellent manner.¹⁹⁷ The flip side is that others can also censure. As we have seen the opinion of others is a strong incentive to behave properly. This raises questions as to the validity of qualifying honour as a virtue. Honour becomes explicit and clear only in relation to others, whereas virtues are moral dispositions in itself

¹⁹² Aristoteles (2005). *Ethica Nicomachea*. Budel, Damon. Par.1116b15-23

¹⁹³ Osiel, M. J. (1999). *Obeying orders: atrocity, military discipline and the law of war*. London, Transaction Publishers. P 359-362.

¹⁹⁴ Modern digitized and virtual training facilities provide ample opportunity for this kind of training and learning.

¹⁹⁵ Schwartz, B. and Sharpe, K. (2010). *Practical wisdom*. New York, Riverhead. P7-12.

¹⁹⁶ Oltshoorn, P. (2011). *Military Ethics and Virtues*. Abingdon, Routledge.

¹⁹⁷ Hübscher, A., Ed. (1966). *Schopenhauer, A. Der handschriftliche Nachlass, Teil III*. Der handschriftliche Nachlass, Teil I - V. Frankfurt am Main, Kramer. P 481-483.

without any external incentive.¹⁹⁸ Honour can be aspired at: a symptom of care for a positive public reputation if not vanity.¹⁹⁹ Oltshoorn concludes that: 'Honour although often ranking high on militaries' list of virtues, is in fact not a virtue at all; it is above all a reward for virtuous behaviour.'²⁰⁰ In a positive perspective an honourable person seems also to be a virtuous person. Also therefore, it is not logical to assert that honour should qualify as virtue.

4.11.3. With **loyalty**, the matter is only slightly different. This notion pertains to a person or a unit, a cause or even a principle. This notion seems to entail a priority, giving extra weight to the interest to which loyalty is acclaimed. This means that loyalty has an external cause, and we have already noticed that a proper virtue has an internal cause. Loyalty could also interfere with choosing the appropriate course of action as priorities might distort the proper view on the issues at hand.²⁰¹ Covering up unwelcome information is also a risk that is often a matter of perceived loyalty.²⁰² The question then is; loyal to whom or what: to my fellow soldiers or to the abstract rights of strangers. The meaning or content of the notion of loyalty seems problematic: how to weigh different loyalties. Loyalty should not be qualified as a virtue: it has an external cause the nature of which could be problematic. Loyalty could also hamper the flourishing of other virtues.²⁰³ Loyalty can deteriorate into rigidity, the unwillingness if not the incapacity to question where loyalty may lead us. ²⁰⁴ Thus, loyalty could interfere with the proper exercise of the virtue of the intellect as well.²⁰⁵ This does not mean that the military can do without loyalty. Loyalty has a bright side as well. It will play a role in the virtue of comradeship, in being true to one's comrades. Also in other virtues the sentiment of respecting agreements and commitments may play a role. In this sense, the practical value of loyalty is already incorporated in some virtues, and a separate status would not add much: on the contrary, it would provide a status to the idea of loyalty that could do more harm than good.

4.11.4. A similar argument applies to **obedience**, which is an integral part of the virtue of discipline as well as respect and responsibility. Thus, the idea of obedience is already incorporated in the virtues of military character I identified. A separate status is therefore superfluous and would probably confuse the issue as if obedience would not be a part of discipline. But there is another objection as well to qualify obedience as a virtue. It might result in a disproportionate concern for obeying. A critical analysis of orders given and taken - a prerequisite in the proper exercise of the virtue of intellect, practical wisdom - could be hampered. The dark side of this virtue, blind obedience,

¹⁹⁸ Oltshoorn, P. (2011). Military Ethics and Virtues. Abingdon, Routledge. P14.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid, P24-26.

²⁰⁰ Ibid, P 40.

²⁰¹ Think of the number of civilian casualties due to the use of stand-off weapons in order to reduce the risks to own troops: also matter of loyalty? (par. 4.7.5. above)

²⁰² Richardson, R., Verweij, D., Vogelaar, A., Kuipers, H., Ed. (2002). Mens en organisatie: de krijgsmacht in verandering. Alphen aan den Rijn, Haasbeek. P 238,239.

²⁰³ Coleman, S. (2009). "The problems of duty and loyalty." Journal of military ethics 8(2): 105-115. P 114 '...the demands of loyalty can never legitimately override a genuine duty'.

²⁰⁴ Sherman, N. (2011). The untold war: inside the hearts, minds and souls of our soldiers. New York, W.W. Norton & company P 74: 'Loyalty tends to breed archaic notions of honour... honour that is conspicuous, marked in easily read off stripes and medals.'

²⁰⁵ Nietzsche, W. F. (2006). Die fröhliche Wissenschaft. Berlin, Verlag De Gruyter. Par. 229: 'Trotz und Treue. – Er hält aus Trotz an einer Sache fest, die ihm durchsichtig geworden ist, – er nennt es aber "Treue".'

('Befehl ist Befehl') could emerge. So there are strong reasons not to qualify obedience as a virtue.

4.11.5. **Country** as a notion appeal to loyalty to the nation, its people and the values these represent, it stands for patriotism. In a way this notion is of some importance. Soldiers join the armed forces of their country. Only very few - in the Dutch context even less - join a foreign legion or a private company that provides military capacities. So there is some kind of adherence to the nation. In my opinion, this adherence is captured in the notion of responsibility and respect. The nation decides to have armed forces and the legitimate government - with the consent of parliament - decides for which tasks the armed forces will deploy. When joining a soldier accepts the responsibilities involved and respects the oath he takes and the values this entails. However, nowadays the armed forces of constitutional democracies are seldom (if ever) deployed to defend the continuity of the nation-state. This fact diminishes the actual motivational worth of patriotism. Furthermore, it is a well researched fact that in modern constitutional states the idea of the nation does not feature as an incentive for day to day activities. Also in war the notion of a country is proven to play only a limited role: soldiers do not fight for their country, they primarily fight for their fellow soldiers, their comrades and their leaders.²⁰⁶ Patriotism also has a 'dark side' as it could well lead to unwarranted feelings of superiority and demonizing the enemy. All in all, country does feature in military practice, but only indirectly: it is not a direct constitutive part of the practice. This fact, as well as the risk of unwanted side-effects disqualifies country as a virtue. It will be clear that I think that the virtues of character I defined, do cover all aspects of the military practice. Adding others would not contribute to the completeness of this set of virtues, on the contrary, in some aspects additional dispositions could obscure the overall idea of a set of virtues, which is by analysis related to a specific practice, its characteristics and the related standards of excellence. And there is another reason for this disqualification as well; country refers to an external cause, whereas the notion of a virtue refers to an internal disposition.

4.11.6. There is however, still another term that is often used in relation to the virtues which needs attention: **integrity**. Integrity is a recent concept and it is not exactly clear what is meant by it.²⁰⁷ A modern dictionary gives three meanings: adherence to moral principles, honesty; the quality of being unimpaired, soundness; unity, wholeness.²⁰⁸ It is obvious that the first definition is appropriate in the present context. But this definition does not give a clear picture of what is meant by it: what are the moral principles involved? Fjellstrom discerns five directions of interpretation. First, the health view of integrity. The view that integrity amounts to health is still current and includes physiological, psychological and axiological integrity. The second direction of interpretation stands in a close relation to the first, defining what is often seen as the substance of a healthy state. This refers to an intact, harmonious state, especially in a person. The third direction of interpretation is also closely connected to the first, but here the key notion is that of a person's basic or true self; a person's integrity, on this

²⁰⁶ Holmes, R. (1985). *Acts of war*. London, Wellington house. P 270-290 and Wong, L., Kolditz, T.A., Millen, R.A., Potter, T.M. (2003). *Why they fight: combat motivation in the Iraq war*. U.S Army War college. Carlisle, Strategic Studies Institute: 35.

²⁰⁷ A moral definition is absent in a 1972 edition of the concise Oxford dictionary. See also van Tongeren, P., Becker, M., Hoekstra, A., Karssing, E., Niessen, R. (2010). *Deugdeethiek en integriteit* Assen, van Gorcum. P 9-10.

²⁰⁸ (2003). Collins English dictionary. New York, Harper Collins.

interpretation, is the person's true self and the personal sphere. The fourth direction of interpretation has a legal background; it is derived from considerations of legal dues and claims in regard to the property of a person, a community, or a state. Integrity, on this view, is not an intact state of a piece of property, but the intactness of the owner's right to it. The fifth direction of interpretation identifies integrity with human dignity. The idea that each human is a being of infinite worth, regardless of his or her qualities of life and action. At the bottom this idea is the (Kantian) thought that each person as an autonomous, rational moral agent has infinite dignity and therefore should be treated with respect.²⁰⁹ Only the third interpretation could be understood as connected with the idea of an overall virtuous person, a conclusion that is supported by Bauman.²¹⁰ Also Beauchamp and Childress offer a similar opinion: 'Moral integrity means fidelity in adherence to moral norms...a coherent integration of aspects of the self... and ...the character trait of being faithful to moral values and standing up in their defence when necessary.'²¹¹ However, none of the authors identify which moral norms define the notion of integrity. In this respect, the term integrity seems a portfolio that can have any content. Van Blijswijk - in a different approach - states that integrity: 'can be thought of as individuals upholding the obligation of office by implementing public programs in accordance with laws and rules, as well as in support of the public intent or the collective trust.'²¹² He clearly refers to an outer source of integrity and not a disposition. Integrity is sometimes seen as a characteristic that can be managed.²¹³ It seems that also the Dutch Ministry of Defence shares this view.²¹⁴ Williams too states that integrity is not a virtue because it is not a disposition that yields motivations like the motivational virtues of responsibility and respect. Integrity does not enable one to act from desirable motives in desirable ways. Integrity is merely the expression of the dispositions that form a person's identity.²¹⁵ Rawls seems to accept integrity as a virtue, but argues that the virtues of integrity are: 'Yet while necessary they are not sufficient; for their definition allows for almost any content.'²¹⁶ Besides in many organizations, integrity is used as a tool to clarify what employees should not do without impairing their integrity

²⁰⁹ Fjellstrom, R. (2005). "Respect for persons, respect for integrity." Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 8: 231-242.

²¹⁰ Bauman, D. (2011). Integrity, identity and why moral exemplars do what is right. Philosophy. Saint Louis, Washington University in St Louis. **PhD**: 128. P14: 'After carefully reviewing the identity accounts offered by these philosophers, a generic identity account of integrity emerges that captures the four necessary conditions a person must meet to have integrity. The conditions are: 1) capacity to form and control one's commitments; 2) specific reasons for selecting commitments to values; 3) identification with values; and 4) coherence among commitments as well as among commitments, motivations, and actions.'

²¹¹ Beauchamp, T. L., Childress, J.F. (2001). Principles of biomedical ethics. Oxford, University Press. P35-37.

²¹² van Blijswijk, J. A. M., van Breukelen, R.C.J., Franklin, A.L., Raadschelders, J.C.N., Slump, P. (2004). "Beyond ethical codes: the management of integrity in the Netherlands tax and customs administration." Public Administration Review 64(6): 413-419.

²¹³ de Graaf, G. (2010). "A report on reporting: why peers report integrity and law violations in public organizations." Public Administration Review 70(5): 767-779. "The aim (*of this paper*) is to formulate advice on integrity management for public organizations to facilitate "good" reporting of integrity violations.

²¹⁴ The Dutch Ministry Of Defence even established a Central Organisation Integrity Defence (COID) which operates as a centre of expertise which aims at providing support in preventing and repressing breaches of integrity. <http://www.defensie.nl/cdc/personeelsondersteuning/integriteit>

²¹⁵ Williams, B. (1985). Ethics and the limit of philosophy. Harvard (Massachusetts), University Press. P. 35.

²¹⁶ Rawls, J. (2006). Een theorie van rechtvaardigheid. (*A theory of justice*) Rotterdam, Lemniscaat. § 78 (P 517)

and that of the institution as well. 'Clearly this is not what a virtue is about.'²¹⁷ So far the claim that integrity is a proper virtue seems to find little support.

4.11.7. However, one could argue that integrity has some connection with the notion of virtue as it encompasses all other virtues. MacIntyre interprets virtue in two different ways: broad and narrow.²¹⁸ The narrow approach pertains to the virtues of character related to a specific practice. I elaborated on these in the preceding paragraphs, and integrity is not included as a virtue of military practice. Therefore, there remains the broad notion of the virtues: being virtuous. A broad conception would eventually lead to the idea of a single virtue: the quality that enables one to live a good life. This is what Aristotle suggests when he speaks about a single goal in life and the virtuous way in which to achieve that, requires only one single virtue: the disposition to excel.²¹⁹ But Aristotle himself considers this not very practical as 'people can be good in one way only, but bad in many ways'.²²⁰ He therefore introduced the necessity of moral dispositions, virtues of character. The virtues determine our moral goals, and practical wisdom makes us act in such a way that we can attain this moral goal. Indeed, it does not seem very practical to found a system of morality on one virtue only. We therefore identified several virtues of military character. In this process, it already has become clear that some virtues often seem to overlap and connected, rather than being separate entities. But even apart from this interconnectivity of virtues, it would be hard to envisage how one can be virtuous in one respect and vicious in another. It is hard to imagine that a person who possesses the virtue of responsibility will be lacking in the virtue of respect. It is reasonable to imagine that a person who possesses the virtue of practical wisdom in the military practice will also be a wise participant in another practice. From this perspective, one could argue that by possessing a number of virtues that manifest themselves in different contexts, one may come close to the conception of single virtue that is being virtuous. The notion of integrity could cover this idea of a being an overall virtuous person. MacIntyre also supports this notion: '... the wholeness of human life – the virtue of integrity or constancy.'²²¹ This interpretation too comes close to the other definitions in the dictionary. It is not hard to imagine that someone who has acquired the seven virtues of military character, and therefore who has also a well-functioning virtue of intellect, practical wisdom is a virtuous person in the broad sense.²²² By his wholeness he could also be seen a person of integrity. In this approach, integrity is the result of an overall virtuous disposition. Integrity is therefore not a separate virtue in the narrow sense of that term. It is by acquiring the - narrow - virtues of character which are completed by practical wisdom, that one becomes a person of integrity, a virtuous person - in the broad sense.²²³ This approach is also supported by a more recent attempt to define integrity in terms of a virtue.²²⁴ The authors came to the conclusion

²¹⁷ Oltshoorn, P. (2011). Military Ethics and Virtues. Abingdon, Routledge. P94.

²¹⁸ MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P201-205.

²¹⁹ Aristoteles, Ethica Nicomachea. Budel, Damon. Par. 1097a23-25; 1098b28-31; 1100b34-1101a11; 1144b30-1145a2.

²²⁰ Ibid, Par. 1106b35.

²²¹ MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P203.

²²² Aristoteles, Ethica Nicomachea. Budel, Damon. Par. 1100b34-1101a14.

²²³ Oltshoorn, P. (2009). "A critique of integrity: has a commander a moral obligation to uphold his own principles?" Journal of military ethics 8(2): 90-104. P101 'Most of all, however, it is not clear what integrity has to offer that is not covered by virtues that are, in fact, always desirable.'

²²⁴ van Tongeren, P.; Becker, M.; Hoekstra, A.; Karssing, E.; Niessen, R. (2010). Deugdethiek en integriteit Assen, van Gorcum.

that integrity could be defined as a disposition to act in accordance with the cardinal virtues of temperance, prudence, courage and justice. In other words, they too consider integrity the expression of an overall virtuous disposition.

Conclusions.

4.12.1. In this chapter I identified seven virtues of military character: sense of responsibility military competence, courage, comradeship, respect - for fellow soldiers, civilians and even the enemy - resilience, and discipline. These seven virtues of military character cover all aspects of military practice, and the number needs no extending. If I would delete one of these seven virtues, I would ignore one of the constitutive parts of military practice and the internal goods that are closely related with it. I would have presented a flawed composition. A greater, or even an unlimited number of virtues would only confuse the matter and in some cases it could be hard to tell exactly what the distinction between virtues is. The same argument applies to reduce the number of virtues to one: being virtuous. The number of virtues is therefore too a matter of establishing the right mean: not too many and not too few. The virtues I identified are tangible, they accommodate the pursuit of excellence and provide clear goals - and also yardsticks - for military education and training and personal development. Their theoretical foundation facilitates critical analysis and provides an appropriate base for further reflection.

4.12.2. Based on MacIntyre's theory - and with the practice and the related internal goods as a starting point in chapter 3 - I developed in this chapter a logical and coherent picture of the appropriate military virtues of character. The acquisition of these and the virtue of practical wisdom, allow a soldier to be truly virtuous, to be a person of integrity. I thereby created a body of military professional ethics that could provide guidance on morally responsible conduct under the specific - and sometimes extreme - circumstances in which the military has to operate, while keeping within the bounds of the rule of law. Such a body of ethics sets standards, which: protect other members of society against abuse of the military monopoly on violence; define the professional as a responsible and trustworthy expert in the service of the state; delineate the moral authority for actions necessary to the military function but otherwise impermissible in moral terms.²²⁵ In chapter 6 I will compare this theoretical approach with the opinions articulated in a number of interviews with persons who participate in different practices: soldiers, people working in health care and people who work as a town council civil servant. But first - in the next chapter 5 - I will elaborate on the practical relevance of the concept of narrative in MacIntyre's theory.

²²⁵ Van Baarda, T. A. & Verweij, D.E.M., Ed. (2006). Military ethics, the Dutch approach. Leiden, Koninklijke Brill N.V. P 2-3 and 124.

Annex A to chapter 4: military practice; characteristics, internal goods and virtues²²⁶

Virtues of character

	Characteristics of military practice	Internal goods	Specific groupings ²²⁷	Virtues
1	Task	Fulfilment Achievement Satisfaction		Responsibility
2	Arms	Excitement Satisfaction Pride		Competence
3	Cooperation	Esteem Comfort Belonging	Members of the same primary group	Comradeship
			Other fellow soldiers	Respect
			Permissive, supportive civilians	
4	Enemy	Pride Satisfaction Contentment	Non-violent , opposing civilians	Respect
			Armed opposition, fighters	
5	Danger	Excitement Elation Thrill		Courage
6	Undetermined time and place	Challenge Tension Adventure		Resilience
7	Rules	Comfort Structure Stability		Discipline

Virtue of intellect

	Action			Practical wisdom
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²²⁶ This figure is an extension to the figure in Annex B to chapter 3: the two right hand columns are added.

²²⁷ This subdivision into specific groupings refers to the distinctions made in the text of chapter 4 between: soldiers who are members of the same primary group (par. 4.5); other fellow soldiers (par. 4.6.2.-4.6.5.); other non-soldiers, civilians, with either a permissive or a non-permissive attitude towards soldiers (par. 4.6.6.-4.6.7.) and non-soldiers who are members of the opposing forces, fighters (par. 4.6.8.-4.6.9.).

Chapter 5: narrative.

Introduction.

5.1.1. In the preceding chapter I argued that MacIntyre's theory provides a suitable instrument to identify and develop the required moral standards in the military. How to instil and uphold these standards will be addressed in this chapter.¹ MacIntyre rejects the possibility to secure moral agreement in our culture by rational theories only. He states three reasons: moral theories use different rational premises, and therefore it is inevitable that there is a conceptual incommensurability between rational moral theories; moral theories presuppose the existence of impersonal arguments and so underestimate the power of personal reason-giving; moral theories have a wide variety of historical origins, which adds to further incommensurability.² Of every particular theory there is a narrative to be written, and being able to understand that enquiry is inseparable from being able to identify and follow that narrative.³ Therefore, MacIntyre seeks another method and uses narratives as complementary to theory. He sees narratives as an approach to moral philosophy through which action, the unity of human life, and the pursuit of the good receives their intelligibility.⁴ His use of narrative found many followers. Knight states that: 'MacIntyre's use of the concept of narrative in *'After Virtue'* has attracted much attention. Postmodernists now commonly argue that narration plays an important part in all sorts of human reasoning but *'After Virtue'* - *the first edition was published in 1981* - was one of the first works in English to articulate this approach.⁵ Not only postmodern philosophers but also other continental and Anglo-Saxon philosophers support the idea of narratives as an important element in moral theory. However, this does not mean that the concept of narratives has not met criticisms, especially regarding its impreciseness and indeterminateness.⁶

5.1.2. According to MacIntyre, the development of the concept of a virtue and internalizing a virtue always requires a narrative. In this chapter I will elaborate on the notion of narratives. First, I will relate and explain the ideas of MacIntyre on narratives and its function in making action intelligible, creating a unity in one's life and pursuing the good. Next I will investigate in which way his ideas on narratives are incorporated in his view on virtue ethics. First, I will discuss the role of a narrative in relation to the notions of practice and virtue. Then I will focus on the relation between narrative and identity. As MacIntyre sees narrative as an important means to acquire a virtuous disposition, I will elaborate on the relation between narrative and identity. For this purpose I will discuss some authors whose opinion on this issue support MacIntyre's ideas. As I aim to apply MacIntyre's theory in a military context, I will lastly argue how narrative can be practically applied in this military context.

¹ See paragraph 1.8.2.

² MacIntyre, A. (2007). *After Virtue*. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 6-11 and 71-78.

³ MacIntyre, A. (2006). *The Tasks of Philosophy: Selected Essays, Volume 1*. Cambridge, University Press. P 143-178.

⁴ MacIntyre, A. (2007). *After Virtue*. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 210 - 218 and MacIntyre, A. (1990). *Three rival versions of moral inquiry*. Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 42.

⁵ Knight, K. (1998). *The MacIntyre Reader* Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 283. (*italics added by the author*)

⁶ For an extensive discussion of these (and other) criticisms see: MacAdam, B. M. (2011). Narrative, Truth, and Relativism in the Ethics of Alasdair MacIntyre. *School of philosophy*. Washington D.C., Catholic University of America. **PhD**: 255.

Narrative according to Alasdair MacIntyre.

5.2.1. In his book 'Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry' MacIntyre writes: 'Human action is human behaviour with a narrative: namely, a narrative of purposiveness. To explain a piece of behaviour as a human action is to be able to tell the story of how the behaviour relates to the purpose or intention of the agent.'⁷ According to MacIntyre, actions would not be intelligible without some kind of narrative.⁸ A narrative is also a prerequisite to establish an identity. In MacIntyre's understanding the self is partially defined by the roles and relationships into which an agent is born. He writes: 'The story of my life is always embedded in the story of those communities from which I derive my identity.'⁹ These different communities require different roles, which could lead to a segmented life. But such a compartmentalized understanding of human life would provide no way of evaluating the proper place that a person should accord to the goods of each segment of life. Some kind of unity is required in order to make sense of life. Therefore he writes: 'What is important is to recognize that each life is a single, if complex, narrative of a particular subject, someone whose life is a whole into which the different parts have to be integrated...'. To integrate these parts is a task; a task rarely, if ever, completed. This task is to understand those diverse goods as contributing to a single overall good, the ultimate good of this or that particular individual.'¹⁰ MacIntyre sees the necessary integration of the different goods into an overarching telos of life as a quest.¹¹ However, this kind of quest is not simple, as: '...the medieval conception of a quest is not at all that of a search for something already adequately characterized, as miners search for gold or geologists for oil.'¹² He argues that any adequate conception of the good will require the perspective not only of practices and of the unity of a human life, but also of traditions. Ultimately, a determinate conception of the good could only be given through the progress made within and between traditions, which refine and advance that conception. In this respect, traditions are seen as arguments through time. However, he acknowledges that just because someone is born into a particular tradition, and just because that tradition constitutes the person's moral starting point, does not mean that the person is constrained by the limitations of that tradition. The fact that the self has to find its moral identity in and through its membership in communities such as those of the family, the neighbourhood, the city and the tribe does not entail that the self has to accept the moral limitations of the particularity of those forms of community.¹³ In short, narrative has an important function in MacIntyre's theory, a function that permeates almost all notions he uses.

5.2.2. In the first place a narrative is required to give a prior account of certain features of social and moral life in terms of which the virtue can be defined and explained.¹⁴

⁷ MacIntyre, A. (1990). Three rival versions of moral inquiry. Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 144.

⁸ MacIntyre, A. (1988) *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press, P. 130. and MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 206 – 209.

⁹ MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 221.

¹⁰ MacIntyre, A. (2002). "Alasdair MacIntyre on Education: In Dialogue with Joseph Dunne." Journal of Philosophy of Education **36**, (1): 10.

¹¹ Czarniawaska articulates it thus: 'A life is lived with a goal, but the most important aspect of life is the formulation and re-formulation of that goal. This circular teleology is what MacIntyre calls a narrative quest... A search looks for something that already exists; a quest creates its goal rather than discovers it.' Czarniawaska, B. (2004). Narratives in social science research. London, Sage publications. P 13.

¹² MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 219.

¹³ Ibid, P 221.

¹⁴ Ibid, P 186-187.

Before one can talk of a virtue one has to have a notion of the *Telos*, which is aspired at in a *Praxis*. A practice itself is governed by rules, which are not only a matter of the present participants but also of those who preceded in the practice: 'every practice has its own history.'¹⁵ A practice does not only have a history, it also has a present, and that present is made up by the actual participants. Any individual who participates in a practice enters into a relationship with the other participants.¹⁶ This relation is defined by the purpose and standards of the practice.¹⁷ This means that this relation extends not only to the present participants but also to all who preceded in the particular practice – and who will follow.¹⁸ Narrative is required in order to convey the purpose and standards of a practice beyond the reach of the actual participants.

5.2.3. A narrative is not only used to explain and elucidate a practice, but a second function is that a narrative is used as a means to initiate and educate practitioners. A narrative supports the practitioner in developing the virtuous dispositions that fit the practice. This development will be actualized by participating in the practice. The ensuing membership of the community of practitioners will stimulate adhering by the tradition and values, of the community and thus fostering an appropriate behaviour and promote aspiring to excellence appropriate to the practice. This notion is shared by Miller.¹⁹ I will once again use the parallel of the rugby game. It would make no sense to join a rugby club without wanting to play rugby and being accepted as a player, and preferably a good one. The virtues of the good rugby player are primarily acquired and improved in playing the game. Exercise, training, discussions with fellow players, watching other games and inspiration by well known rugby players, will support acquiring the appropriate dispositions like team spirit, resilience, fair play, respect, physical prowess, technical skill, etc.²⁰ These dispositions will eventually be internalized by the participants in the practice.

5.2.3. MacIntyre then argues that: 'When someone genuinely possesses a virtue he can be expected to manifest this in very different types of situation. The unity of a virtue in someone's life is intelligible only if it can be conceived as a characteristic of a unitary life, a life that can be conceived and evaluated as a whole.'²¹ It is indeed hard to conceive that a person who is virtuous in one practice will not behave likewise in other practices. The

¹⁵ Ibid, P 194. See also MacIntyre, A. (1990). Three rival versions of moral inquiry. Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 64: 'The standards of achievement within any craft (*practice*) are justified historically. They have emerged from the criticism of their predecessors and they are justified because and insofar as they have remedied the defects and transcended the limitations of those predecessors as guides to excellent achievement within that particular craft. Every craft is informed by some conception of a finally perfected work which serves the shared telos of that craft.'

¹⁶ Ibid, P 191.

¹⁷ Ibid, P 192.

¹⁸ Ibid, P 194.

¹⁹ Miller, R. B. (1996). Casuistry and modern ethics. Chicago, University Press. P241: 'narrative ethics... emphasize the importance of personal identity, the excellences of character (the virtues), and the individual and collective stories in which those excellences find their intelligibility.'

²⁰ MacIntyre, A. (1990). Three rival versions of moral inquiry. Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P127: 'To become adept in a craft, as we noticed earlier, one has to learn how to apply two kinds of distinctions, that between what a activity or product merely seems to me good and what really is good, a distinction always applied retrospectively as part of learning from one's earlier mistakes and surpassing one's earlier limitations, and that between what is good and best for me to do here and now given the limitations of my present state of education into the craft and what is good and best as such, unqualifiedly.'

²¹ MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 204.

virtues of character pertaining to different practices - the narrow concept of the virtues - will eventually evolve in an overall virtuous attitude - the broad concept of the virtue.²² Otherwise, an individual would be internally divided, which could impede the development of an agent's unified selfhood.²³ In MacIntyre's words this means that in order to conceive unity in one's life a telos is needed, which transcends the limited goods and virtues of the practices that constitute life. If such a unity is missing, '...arbitrary will invade the moral life and we shall be unable to specify the context of certain virtues adequately.'²⁴ This means that reflection is required in order to ascertain which values and dispositions are relevant in all practices and how these can be expressed in an overall virtuous conduct.²⁵ Implicitly, MacIntyre thereby acknowledges that there is more to morality than the concepts that are part of a culture of specific communities or practices.²⁶ However, in order to conceive which values transcend practices, narrative is indispensable as narrative creates connections between different practices and thereby supports the development of transcendent values and thus a unified life and a unified identity.²⁷ MacIntyre continues by stating that in relation with selfhood and human actions, it: 'is natural to think of the self in a narrative mode.'²⁸ An often taken for granted but clearly correct conceptual insight about life is that it is not experienced as a series of unconnected episodes; it is generally conceived as a psychological continuity.²⁹ The concept of psychological continuity requires the notion of an identity, a concept of selfhood. It is natural to think of the self in a narrative mode.³⁰ A narrative is interpreted by MacIntyre as providing continuity and an intelligible account of the actions of an agent. Continuity is created in two ways: the actions of the agent - in a perspective of the past, the present and the future - and the history of the context, the settings, in which the agent acts. The history of settings provides the context in which the agent can act intelligibly.³¹ This means that his actions can be explained and accounted for.³² The narrative concept implies further that the agent is both object and subject of a story.³³ On the one hand, the agent is who he is as perceived by others in a history that runs from his birth to his death and on the other hand the agent is the subject of his own history with his own meaning and no one else's.³⁴ The narrative of the agent as object and subject are connected in the interaction with others, and this connectivity helps to

²² See par. 2.6.8. and 2.6.9. above.

²³ MacIntyre, A. (2007). *After Virtue*. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 201 - 204.

²⁴ Ibid, P 203.

²⁵ See par. 2.6.14. before.

²⁶ This reproach is articulated among others by Martha Nussbaum, see: Nussbaum, M. (2007). *Wat liefde weet (Love's knowledge)*. Amsterdam, Boom. P 205.

²⁷ MacIntyre, A. (1990). *Three rival versions of moral inquiry*. Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 128: 'But no one who engages in a craft is only a craftsperson; we come to a practice of a craft with a history qua family member, qua member of this or that local community. So the actions of someone who engages in a craft are at the point of intersection of two or more histories, two or more enacted dramatic narratives.'

²⁸ MacIntyre, A. (2007). *After Virtue*. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 206.

²⁹ Ibid, P 217.

³⁰ Ibid, P 206.

³¹ MacIntyre, A. (1990). *Three rival versions of moral inquiry*. Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 64-66.

³² MacIntyre, A. (2007). *After Virtue*. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 208-209.

³³ MacIntyre, A. (2003). *Whose justice? Which rationality?* Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 29, 291.

³⁴ MacIntyre, A. (2007). *After Virtue*. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 217. See also MacIntyre, A. (1990). *Three rival versions of moral inquiry*. Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 196,197 and Habermas, J. (1992) *Post-metaphysical thinking: philosophical essays*. Cambridge, MIT Press, P 184-186.

establish a personal identity, a character.³⁵ Narrative thus plays an important role in MacIntyre's scheme: it explains the terms of a practice and the standards of excellence involved; it provides a context, a story, in which the appropriate kind of conduct can be identified, articulated and practised, which will eventually result in the development of the relevant disposition to act in accordance with those standards, a virtue; furthermore it creates wider context in which the cohesion between virtues is clarified, which supports the development of an integrated identity, a virtuous character.

Narrative and practice.

5.3. MacIntyre argues that the Aristotelian notion of a shared overall goal (*Telos*) in life has been lost, and therefore is untenable in modern complex societies. Instead, he claims that there is: 'a particular type of practice as providing the arena in which the virtues are exhibited.'³⁶ Life is not a single practice; life is made up of numerous practices. Furthermore, he states that 'A practice involves standards of excellence and obedience to rules as well as the achievement of goods.'³⁷ It is obvious that participating in a practice and acquiring the appropriate knowledge and skills requires, first of all, communication with those who already participate in the practice and maintain the standards and purpose of the practice. Secondly, in a wider perspective, narrative can provide insight into human actions and ethical reflections pertaining to the practice and beyond.³⁸ Narrative also creates an awareness of the others besides them self.³⁹ Or as Aristotle wrote: '... a person ought to be conscious of his friend's existence, and this can be achieved by living together and conversing and exchanging ideas with him - for this would seem to be what living together means in the case of human beings; not being pastured like cattle in the same field.'⁴⁰ We need to live together with friends and share in argument and thought in order to be aware of the sort of lives we are living. Self-knowledge is for a large part based on entering into relations with others.⁴¹ A third characteristic of narrative is that it requires personal interpretation and involvement by both the narrator and the recipient of the narration.⁴² In this respect narrative is an important constituent of a practice, as a practice is never a mere set of technical skills and rules that can be acquired by merely reading a manual, an instruction.⁴³ A practitioner must get properly acquainted with the practice and gets a notion of the pleasure participating in the practice entails, the enrichment of human powers that can be achieved in the practice.⁴⁴ Or as Nussbaum elegantly articulates that a newcomer to a practice must develop: '...the keen responsiveness of intellect, imagination and feeling to the particulars of a situation.'⁴⁵ This requires a living history, an appropriate story in

³⁵ Arendt, H. (1994). *Vita Activa (The human condition)*. Amsterdam, Boom. P186.

³⁶ MacIntyre, A. (2007). *After Virtue*. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 187.

³⁷ Ibid, P 190.

³⁸ Nussbaum, M. (1986). *The fragility of goodness*. Cambridge, University Press. P 12,13, 378 and 397-421.

³⁹ Ibid, P 70.

⁴⁰ Aristotle (2004). *The Nicomachean ethics*. London, Penguin books.Par. 1170b10-13.

⁴¹ Dohmen, J. (2010). *Brief aan een middelmatige man*. Amsterdam, Ambo. P 96-98 and 107,108.

⁴² Nussbaum, M. (1986). *The fragility of goodness*. Cambridge, University Press. P 167-168.

⁴³ De Rosier, M., Mercer, S. (2007). "improving student social behaviour; the effectiveness of a storytelling-based character education programme." *Journal of research in character education* 4(2). P 134: ' Examples provided through narrative and visual images are an effective way of teaching and influencing behaviour, particularly because they provide a meaningful context within which to understand the information.'

⁴⁴ Nussbaum, M. (1986). *The fragility of goodness*. Cambridge, University Press. P 191.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

which the practice and its values are elucidated.⁴⁶ This story must be convincing; it must provide a context in which the participant recognizes himself; it must create a vision of possible achievements to be gained by excelling.⁴⁷ This story becomes tangible in interpreting and participating in the practice together with others.⁴⁸ It is hard to conceive of a practice that would attract participants without these kinds of stories. It is hard to conceive of a practice that could do without a history, a present and a future and that is not shaped in narrative. In any practice, communication is indispensable: in getting to know what the practice entails; in experiencing and sharing what it means to be a member of the community of participants; in understanding the traditions that permeates the practice; imbuing the morality of the practice and developing an aspiration to excellence.⁴⁹ Nussbaum states that Aristotelian deliberation is based on: '... a belief that the fundamental distinctions in the world of practice are human, backed by nothing more eternal or stable than human things, (*and which*) contributes to an agent's sense of ethical risk. For Aristotle, this ethical anthropocentrism is a special development of a general argument denying that our belief commitments do, or can attach themselves to objects that are altogether independent of and are more stable than human thought and language.'⁵⁰ Narrative - as an important use of language - is indispensable to make sense of our world.

Narrative and virtue.

5.4. Virtue ethics aims at developing a virtuous character which is considered a prerequisite for flourishing in life, for living a good life.⁵¹ The virtue is not a mere means to a flourishing life, but to flourish in life means living virtuously and as such, the virtue is a goal in itself. A flourishing life can be attained by anybody. Everybody can acquire a virtuous disposition and flourish in life.⁵² Participating in a practice will generally result in adopting the virtues that are inherent to the practice. A virtuous disposition means that a person is disposed to act in accordance with the standards of excellence that define a practice. A just person is disposed to act justly; a temperate person is disposed to act with temperance. The virtuous person recognizes a situation, a setting, and what is the important feature of that setting.⁵³ Sometimes, perceiving a situation results in a cataleptic, a strong mental, impression. But even then these impressions too require interpretation.⁵⁴ Narrative is an important element in this process of recognizing,

⁴⁶ Abrahamson, C. E. (1998). "Storytelling as a pedagogical tool in higher education." *Education* **118** (3): 440-441. P441: 'Stories not only explained life and preserved history, but also ensured the continuity of experiences from one generation to the next. Civilizations survived because of storytelling.'

⁴⁷ Yackley, L. E. (2006). storytelling: a key to adult learning. *Education*. Newark, University of Delaware. **PhD**: P 11: 'I observed how storytelling worked in practice. The learner became active in the process. I observed that telling stories did not just entertain the adult learner; the stories seemed to be why adults learned.... Stories are a way we accumulate information that we then integrate to understand and apply the lessons to other situations.'

⁴⁸ De Rosier, M., Mercer, S. (2007). "improving student social behaviour; the effectiveness of a storytelling-based character education programme." *Journal of research in character education* **4**(2). P133: 'Storytelling to make complex social skills, character choices, and social dilemmas more concrete and recognizable.'

⁴⁹ Ibid, P 134: '... the use of storytelling has been supported as an effective strategy for moral education.'

⁵⁰ Nussbaum, M. (1986). *The fragility of goodness*. Cambridge, University Press. P 238.

⁵¹ Aristoteles (2004). *Ethica Nicomachea*. Budel, Damon. Par. 1098b29-31.

⁵² See par. 2.6.13 above.

⁵³ Tongeren, van, P.; Becker, M.; Hoekstra, A.; Karssing, E.; Niessen, R. (2010). *Deugdethiek en integriteit*. Assen, van Gorcum. P 22-23.

⁵⁴ Nussbaum, M. (2007). *Wat liefde weet (Love's knowledge)*. Amsterdam, Boom. P 108.

interpreting and evaluating a situation. Previous experiences help an individual to select a 'frame' with which he can interpret a setting.⁵⁵ A virtuous disposition supports a person in choosing the appropriate frame. What is appropriate depends on the purpose of the impending action and the values which are at stake; it is a matter of practical wisdom. Narrative is a tool that supports 'framing' and thus interpreting situations. Narratives support the internalization of pattern recognition. Van Tongeren calls this internalizing of dispositions 'scratching'. Each time a person acts, he creates a scratch on the surface of his personality, and every time he acts in a similar way the scratch is deepened. After some time - when in a similar situation - action follows the scratch as a matter of course. The etymology of scratching, *graffito*, goes back to the Greek *graphein*, which is etymologically related to character.⁵⁶ This process is similar to the Aristotelian idea of the virtue as a developed habit. Virtue is a matter of growth: the virtuous disposition is strengthened by further practice and experience.⁵⁷ Communication, narrative - in education, training, further education (*Bildung*) and (sharing) experiences - contributes to these scratches, and thus shaping character. Storytelling is an influential instrument in education and shaping character.⁵⁸ Thus, also in connection with appropriating virtues narrative is important!

Narrative and the concept of the self.

5.5.1. The virtues developed within the context of different practices will contribute to shaping character, which cannot be seen apart from the notion of selfhood, identity.⁵⁹ An overall (different practice's transcending) identity is necessary to make sense of an otherwise compartmentalized a segmented life and to become a truly virtuous person.⁶⁰ Also with regard to the notion of identity narrative plays an important role. This notion of narrative as constituting identity is closely connected to communitarian political philosophy. The central idea in communitarianism is that an individual is thrown into an already existing community which has common social practices, cultural traditions and shared social and moral understandings. Therefore, individuals are bound up with the communities they belong to.⁶¹ However, it is not my intention to get involved in arguments regarding the plausibility of communitarianism; my aim is merely to establish whether MacIntyre's theory provides a suitable instrument to apply on military practice. The same applies to the notion of selfhood, which is a much discussed subject. It is an issue in at least the philosophy of mind, in political philosophy and in social philosophy. I will not address these theories. In the context of this thesis I will limit myself to explore the notion of narrative as a constituent for the concept of a self.

⁵⁵ The term 'Frame' is often used as a metaphor for the human capability to organize our social world in an understandable way. In 'framing' a scene we are setting the picture off from its surroundings, which helps us to establish what is important and what should be compared with what. Schwartz, B., Sharpe, K. (2010). *Practical wisdom*. New York, Riverhead. P 61-64.

⁵⁶ Tongeren, van, P.; Becker, M.; Hoekstra, A.; Karssing, E.; Niessen, R. (2010). *Deugdethiek en integriteit*. Assen, van Gorcum. P 23-24. See also Nussbaum, M. (2007). *Wat liefde weet* (*Love's knowledge*). Amsterdam, Boom. P103,104.

⁵⁷ Ibid, P 28.

⁵⁸ Finkelkraut, A. (2009). *Een intelligent hart*. (*Un cœur intelligent*) Amsterdam, Contact.

⁵⁹ Sherman, N. (1989). *The Fabric of Character: Aristotle's Theory of Virtue*. Oxford, Clarendon Press. P 57. See also Verhaeghe, P. (2012). *Identiteit*. Amsterdam, Bezige Bij. P 27-28.

⁶⁰ MacIntyre, A. (2007). *After Virtue*. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 203.

⁶¹ This approach intends to provide an alternative for political liberalism as the preponderant (western) political philosophy. A philosophy which has as its central notion the idea of the unencumbered self as prior to ends regarding justice and solidarity, the role of society and government, etc. See Kymlicka, W. (2002). *Contemporary political philosophy*. Oxford, University Press. P 209.

MacIntyre claims that narrative is a prerequisite for developing an identity. The development and shaping of an identity is not a singular and unique event. The shaping and reshaping of identity is an ongoing process during man's life. According to MacIntyre the greater part of this shaping is realized in the context of practices. Then the shaping within the practices needs to be harmonized in order to create the unity necessary to develop a stable identity. His vision allows for 'character building', a perspective on the practical applicability of this theory. The central theme of my thesis is to demonstrate the practical applicability of MacIntyre's theory. In this context I will first address the role of narrative in developing and shaping identity. Charles Taylor is one of the authors who endorse the view that a narrative is an important factor in the shaping of an identity in the wider context of the community the agent belongs to. Another author, Galen Strawson, questions the notion that narrative is a prerequisite for the development of morality as part of an identity. However his arguments are not conclusive. Thereafter I will seek support for issue, which is part of MacIntyre's theory is the notion that shaping one's identity, one's character could be a conscious process. His issue is addressed by Peter Sloterdijk who develops a powerful argument in support of this idea. Finally, John Christman is presented as he elegantly combines some of the notions, which are addressed by the previous authors.

5.5.2. In his influential and comprehensive book '*Sources of the self*' Charles Taylor gives his account of the connection between the notions of narrative, identity and the self.⁶² The interpretation of an individual is first of all, a matter of being socially embedded. This provides a language and frames of reference.⁶³ He argues that it is impossible to imagine a person that could do without frames of reference. Without any frames of reference, we would lack the horizons within which we live and give meaning to our life.⁶⁴ This moral orientation provides an answer to the question 'Who am I?' and thereby a notion of an identity. The notion of a self develops in the co-existence with others and how we - by reflection - morally position ourselves in relation to the others. This positioning of one's own self in relation with others requires a kind of orientation regarding the good which we share with others: you can only be a self amongst other selves.⁶⁵ The relation with others is for a very important part based on the use of language. It is in conversation with others that one finds one's identity, one's self. One cannot become a self on one's own.⁶⁶ It is in our orientation on a shared idea of the good, and in relation with others that we find a meaning for our life which unfolds like a story. In order to know who we are we must have a notion how we have become what we are, and where we are going.⁶⁷ Insight into one's self necessarily requires a story.⁶⁸ However, in his book Taylor more or less ignores the role of human autonomy and how this concept can be reconciled with the idea of selfhood primarily as a result of cultural framing. Neither does he address the question of how - by what means - a selfhood is developed. In other words, Taylor provides powerful arguments in favour of the notion of narrative as a constituent in selfhood but fails in explaining the process of gaining selfhood.

⁶² Taylor, C. (2007). *Bronnen van het zelf* (*Sources of the self*). Rotterdam, Lemniscaat.

⁶³ Ibid, P 233.

⁶⁴ Ibid, P 69.

⁶⁵ Ibid, P 76-79. See also Arendt, H. (1994). *Vita Activa* (*The human condition*). Amsterdam, Boom. P184,185.

⁶⁶ Taylor, C. (2010). *Een seculiere tijd* (*A secular age*). Rotterdam, Lemniscaat P 80.

⁶⁷ Ibid, P 94.

⁶⁸ Ibid, P 98.

5.5.3. The idea of human autonomy is one of the issues which Galen Strawson uses to deny the idea that narrative shapes selfhood.⁶⁹ He argues that in order to be morally responsible it is not required to have a diachronic view on oneself: the self as something that was there in the past and will be in the future. He claims that an episodic view of oneself is more appropriate: the self can have experiences without a historical context.⁷⁰ In his view, this is particularly clear with regard to deontology or consequentialism. In these theories doing the right is a matter of here and now. Only those who support virtue ethics, in which the moral character is central to ethics, will favour a diachronic view on selfhood. However, he argues that this is not logical as the notions of conscience and responsibility are more ancient than the notion of a self. They predate the sense of a self and are independent of it. 'The diachronic sense of the self can only exist in creatures - like ourselves - that have evolved in to fully fledged concept-exercising self-consciousness...'⁷¹ Self awareness or understanding the situation one finds oneself in need not involve any memory of one's past actions. However, Strawson's claims ignore the fact that we indeed have 'evolved into fully fledged concept-exercising self-consciousness' human beings, who live together in complex societies. Although individual human beings may experience episodic views regarding their lives, living together requires some shared notion of the good, a shared moral orientation. Living together requires the capacity to communicate successfully. It is hard to see how this is possible without a shared notion of a past, a present and goals that are aspired at.⁷² Strawson neither provides an answer to the question what the origin of moral experiences is and how this moral capacity is embedded in a person's self. It seems he claims it is something which is inherent to being human, maybe even genetic? Another issue Strawson does not address is that in spite of his views, man is by many considered to be a 'storytelling animal'⁷³ This 'animal' communicates with others, and in this communication he also defines his place among others in both a physical, a social and a mental capacity.

5.5.4. As to the other question which refers to what extent it is possible to actively (re)shape identity Peter Sloterdijk has recently contributed to the discussion in his book with the compelling title 'Du musst dein Leben ändern'.⁷⁴ He argues that human identity is the result of permanent self-reproduction triggered by an invisible training's programme.⁷⁵ In Sloterdijk's view, a stable and permanent identity requires at first constant training and adjustment in order to absorb new notions.⁷⁶ An important method in these processes is 'Retrivialisierung', by which he means the capability to treat new phenomena as if they do not exist; either by denying it is a new phenomenon or by denying its relevance. He assumes that stability, in principle, opposes change. He then explicitly states that this process of 'Retrivialisierung' refutes the notion of narrative as used by Alasdair MacIntyre as only a very small part of our identity is

⁶⁹ Strawson, G. (2007). "Episodic ethics." *Royal institute of philosophy supplement* 60: 84-114.

⁷⁰ Ibid, P 86.

⁷¹ Ibid, P 98.

⁷² This criticism is supported by Christman, J. (2009). *The politics of persons*. Cambridge, University Press. P 101, 102.

⁷³ MacIntyre, A. (2007). *After Virtue*. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 216.

⁷⁴ Sloterdijk, P. (2009). *Du musst dein Leben ändern*. Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp.

⁷⁵ Ibid, P 644.

⁷⁶ Ibid, P 14.

shaped by conscious changes.⁷⁷ Sloterdijk of course is right when he states that a large part of our identity is shaped by subconscious processes in which repetition is the formative power. This 'invisible training's programme' is inspired by the human drive to improve one's life; or as Sloterdijk puts it: the training imperative which exceeds the hypothetical and categorical imperative.⁷⁸ This argument is similar to the Aristotelian principle.⁷⁹ Thus, although Sloterdijk refutes narrative as a means to support the development of identity, he does accept the Aristotelian concept of character development. Also he admits to a conscious influence on character, by trainers, exemplary practitioners, acceptance of standards of excellence and discipline.⁸⁰ Furthermore does Sloterdijk accept the formative influence of participating in a practice.⁸¹ In his Aristotelian zeal, he even goes so far as to formulate a perfection imperative: aspire to excellence in such a way that the story (sic) of your achievement can serve as a model to others.⁸² People can learn in a conscious way, as is shown daily all over the world. The point is that lessons learnt - either consciously or subconsciously - can eventually become embedded in character. This is a matter of impact and exposure. Both these elements are part of the Aristotelian notion on how to acquire a virtuous disposition. First it is a matter of recognizing the relevance of achieving a standard of excellence (impact). Then it becomes a matter of education, training and experience (exposure) until acting virtuously has become a habit. A part of this process will be conscious, another part subconscious; the question is whether this matters. The conclusion is that in spite of his claim, Sloterdijk does not disqualify narrative as a formative power of identity, he does acknowledge and support an Aristotelian approach to shaping the future. This requires aspiring at standards of excellence, which demands continuous exercising; an important feature of achieving a virtuous disposition! In the end Sloterdijk supports the notion that practicing eventually changes a person.

5.5.5. In the above paragraphs I tried to find support for MacIntyre's ideas on narrative and the possibility to shape a character. More support is found in the position, of John Christman, who combines some of the notions mentioned above by Taylor and Sloterdijk.⁸³ He supports the notion that the historical self is constructed by narrative, but only in the broad sense of being diachronically comprehensible.⁸⁴ He further states that the 'self' is not a permanent stable entity. Elements of the self emerge in practical reasoning as one acts, speaks and expresses oneself. Which elements emerge, is contingent. So in his view it is not plausible to postulate a static set of values, interests, capacities and the like that make up the settled self prior to practical reasoned actions.⁸⁵ He supports his line of reasoning by citing a number of post-modern thinkers.⁸⁶ In spite of these arguments, Christman states: 'Yet, accepting all that, we can still claim that a 'self' arises out of the public, interpersonal interactions that sincere communications involves. We commit ourselves to fixed meanings even if the meanings of our internal

⁷⁷ Ibid, P 645, footnote 140.

⁷⁸ Ibid, P47-48.

⁷⁹ Rawls, J. (2006). *Een theorie van rechtvaardigheid (A theory of justice)*. Rotterdam, Lemniscaat. P 432.

⁸⁰ Sloterdijk, P. (2009). *Du musst dein Leben ändern*. Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp. P 93, 139, 221.

⁸¹ Ibid, P 305, 330-331.

⁸² Ibid, P 394-395.

⁸³ Christman, J. (2009). *The politics of persons*. Cambridge, University Press.

⁸⁴ Ibid, P 9.

⁸⁵ Ibid, P 7. The notion of thematic coherence and changing perspectives rather than a diachronical and stable identity is also supported by De Mul, J. (2002). *Cyberspace Odyssey*. Kampen, Klement. P. 194-210.

⁸⁶ Ibid, P 49-46.

reflections are rife with fluidity and ambiguity, both conscious and unconscious.⁸⁷ In this process of developing a self the human memory has an essential part as it is necessary for having a self-concept which enables us to value ourselves.⁸⁸ Autobiographic recall and its social and active components play an important role therein. The construction of a self-concept involves passive and active self-narratives - just like a memory; it is an ongoing process of socially mediated self-interpretation.⁸⁹ This requires social interaction and reflection. Identifying oneself with the ensuing interpretation requires the acceptance of the self-narrative as mine and thereby creating accountability. This notion of accountability is also articulated by Alasdair MacIntyre, who argues: 'Human beings can be held to account for that of which they are the authors; other beings cannot. To identify an occurrence as an action is in the paradigmatic instances to identify it under a type of description, which enables us to see that occurrence as flowing intelligibly from a human agent's intentions, motives, passions and purposes. It is therefore to understand an action as something for which someone is accountable, about which it is always appropriate to ask the agent for an intelligible account.'⁹⁰ Christman further argues that these self-narratives are for many people diachronic and require 'tellability' and 'thematic unity' in order that a coherent unity is created that can be recognized as one's own.⁹¹ As to the notion of autonomy, he concludes that it is true that there are certain social background conditions from which a person cannot detach himself. This requires non-alienation from basic value orientations that are part of practices and relations of a particular sort.⁹² However, this leaves room for reflection on the importance and meaning of these attachments.⁹³ In the end, Christman accepts the notion of narrative as constituent element in forming a self-concept, an identity, however not in an encompassing meaning. He does not accept narrative as a linear concept based on causality nor as a story of a quest, a development toward an overarching *telos* of life. In his view, life is more than a mere recollection of biographic facts. He claims that narrative only aims at creating a life of thematic coherence, as our lives are made up of several different and separable purposes. Thematic coherence founds emotional and moral stability, but constant re-interpretation is inevitable. This notion of re-interpretation is shared by Martha Nussbaum.⁹⁴ This approach even allows for Sloterdijk's invisible trainings programme. Furthermore, the notion of a stable identity leaves room for and even requires self-reflection.⁹⁵

5.5.6. Taking into account the arguments of the different authors, we can conclude that narrative is indeed an important factor in the development of selfhood, including moral orientation. The idea of an ongoing process of self-reflection and reinterpretation seems credible as well: characters do change, albeit slowly. The role of memory in this process cannot be refuted, and furthermore, opens the possibility of actively shaping character.

⁸⁷ Ibid, P64.

⁸⁸ Ibid, P 92.

⁸⁹ Ibid, P 96. See also Atkins, K. (2004). "Narrative identity, practical identity and ethical subjectivity." *Continental Philosophy Review* 37(4): 341-366.

⁹⁰ MacIntyre, A. (2007). *After Virtue*. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 209.

⁹¹ Ibid, P 103 and 83-84.

⁹² Ibid, P 214, 123.

⁹³ Ibid, P 131.

⁹⁴ Nussbaum, M. (2007). *Wat liefde weet (Love's knowledge)*. Amsterdam, Boom. P108 and 113.

⁹⁵ See also Nys, T. (2011). "The politics of persons: individual autonomy and socio-historical self." *European journal of philosophy* 19(3): 474-481.

This shaping is primarily a question of autonomous deliberation: which values are considered important and which not. This involves also identifying standards of excellence worth aspiring at. This perspective on evaluation is supported by the idea of thematic narrative, which aims at a conceptual unity, rather than a mere sequential notion of unity. Evaluation will take place in relation with values - what is important - rather than a sequence of events. This self-reflection supports the idea of an identity, a notion of unity in life, a unity that transcends the many practices a life is made up of. It is this kind of unity that is required to develop an overall virtuous attitude that transcends the virtues required in the different practices: that is virtuousness in the broad sense; an attitude that enables overall virtuousness. However, evaluation is also a matter of experience! Experience - and further education - gives fuel to developing of memories as well as active deliberation, the prerequisites for developing virtues of character. Exercise and training are important features in achieving excellence. Narrative is instrumental in both developing virtuous dispositions in different practices as well as shaping an unified identity as a human being. The former pertains to the narrow concept and the latter to the broad concept of the virtues. This notion is shared by Sandel who argues that if we reject the narrative account of moral agency and embrace the idea that we are free to be the author of our moral obligations, we also reject the community in which we were thrown. Such a kind of neutrality may not be possible as we cannot deliberate on moral issues without a notion of the good life.⁹⁶

Narrative and the military.

5.6.1. In paragraph 3.2. I explained that the military has all the characteristics to qualify as a **practice**. It provides rules, standards of excellence and a historical setting, the latter of which is visible and is daily experienced in details in the uniform, specific habits, as well as in the tradition of the units which are part of the military organisation. The rules are laid down in a formal military regimen supplemented by traditions. The standards of excellence apply to formal professional skills and competence as well as to live up to the informal culture of the unit. Both add to establishing and upholding an 'esprit de corps'. The function of 'esprit de corps' should not be underestimated! Being a member of a unit that has a distinctive functional role already facilitates pride in this membership. The specific ways in which the unit and its members present themselves add to this feeling of pride and self-respect. This specific 'style' is imbued by the older members of the community. Stories are an important element in this process. These stories do not only refer to 'how we do things here', but also to tradition of the unit. This tradition is for a large part based on stories; stories of battle honours, stories about remarkable members, stories of rivalries with other units and corps, stories of special feats and peculiarities, etc. Often these stories are larded with humour, which enhances the sense of 'style' that is appreciated. These stories also help to identify exemplary individuals, characters, and their conduct that can serve as models for junior soldiers. This 'esprit de corps' is often outwardly expressed by specific manners and symbols. Think of the dolphin of the submarine community, the wing of the flying family and the green, red and black berets of specific army regiments and corps. However, 'noblesse oblige' and this means that membership provides an extra incentive to live up to the expectations created by being a member of a specific unit or corps.⁹⁷ Narrative has an important role

⁹⁶ Sandel, M. J. (2010). Justice. London, Penguin books. P240-243.

⁹⁷ Hinojosa, R. (2007). "Recruiting the self: the military and the making of masculinities". Philosophy. Gainesville, University of Florida. **PhD**: 249. P 21: '... exposed to various cultural messages about appropriate social behaviour, these messages, or cultural scripts (born out of stable interpretations of

in this process; not only in the instruction, training and further education that goes with initiating someone into a practice, but also in maintaining the tradition of the unit and the specific 'esprit de corps'. All these factors add to the substance of military practice. Military practice especially cannot do without narrative, as narrative contributes to the necessary cohesion of military units.⁹⁸

5.6.2. Narrative also supports the development of the military **virtues** of character. First, on a primarily technical level by explaining why standards of excellence have to be met and how the virtues are important in order to meet these standards. Second narrative provides a vivid picture of these otherwise abstract concepts and the values involved. Abstract concepts become tangible goals that can be achieved by the appropriate course of action.⁹⁹ Furthermore, narrative triggers the imagination about what is told and supports reflection about personal ends, ways and means. Narrative also provides a context as stories often refer to settings and history, which enhance a sense of being part of a tradition.¹⁰⁰ Training, exercise and other (simulated) experiences add to the internalisation of the disposition to act in accordance with the standards of excellence.¹⁰¹ This is a matter of both maintaining self-esteem and living up to standards of fellowship.

5.6.3. However, the use of narrative is not only effective in teaching skills and standards of excellence, but also in moral education. Narrative helps in grasping the moral import of sometimes abstract lessons.¹⁰² Soldiers must understand the ideas and values that underlie the standards of excellence of the practice. Narrative also facilitates expressing the pleasure one experiences at performing well. This pleasure is a strong stimulus to aspire at further excellence.¹⁰³ The eventual aim of this moral education is to have this aspiration - as well as other dispositions - internalized. Narrative also supports the sharing of this pleasure with others and by expressing esteem. This also entails

symbols), provide the basis for forming expectations about individual social behaviours... Cultural scripts are not necessarily internalized by everyone in a culture, but they provide the basis for thinking about one's own behaviour in relation to others.'

⁹⁸ As I explained in paragraph 4.5.

⁹⁹ Nussbaum, M. (2007). *Wat liefde weet (Love's knowledge)*. Amsterdam, Boom. P125: 'To transfer these ideas properly, we seem to need a text which shows the sequence of events ... a discussion merely based on schematic examples will inevitably remain meaningless, because the richness in detail ... is lacking'

¹⁰⁰ Shuford, J. (2009). "Re-education for the 21st-century warrior." *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* 135(4): 17-19: '...education should produce leaders who can sort out from the past and present what matters from what does not, and then apply it to a particular problem or opportunity.'

¹⁰¹ Yackley, L. E. (2006). storytelling: a key to adult learning. *Education*. Newark, University of Delaware. **PhD:** P 62: 'In the military we learned about what to do if you were going into an urban setting and you had to go house to house looking for the enemy. We learned if someone didn't do the job right, we would be dead. In a simulation you actually do and learn by your mistakes before you go on into real combat situations.'

¹⁰² Abrahamson, C. E. (1998). "Storytelling as a pedagogical tool in higher education." *Education* 118(3): 440-451. P 441: 'Storytelling is an important technique in the process of learning and understanding. Individuals gain a better understanding of one another through the use of concrete examples rather than through vague abstractions and generalizations which have no relationship to life's experiences, since the sharing of experiences through the device of storytelling enables individuals to build the bridge of understanding between one another.' and P 446: 'Critical reflection of storytelling begins with the stories relating directly to course content, thus permitting a critique and inner-personal dialogue within the student's own values and life experiences.'

¹⁰³ Rawls, J. (2006). *Een theorie van rechtvaardigheid. (A theory of justice)* Rotterdam, Lemniscaat. P 432: The Aristotelian principle.

reflection on those others: what is it that guides the actions of these admirable others? Narrative brings to life also a wider opportunity for reflection on what is admirable. This is in the history of units and corps in which virtuous acts and conduct are extolled, and, which provides frames of reference as to what kind of conduct is expected. These stories often have a tangible presence in the colours and ensigns of units in which are embroidered the names of places where the units performed noteworthy deeds. The special events in which the colours are presented to the troops - mostly accompanied by much pomp and circumstance - adds to the importance of these stories: they represent a living tradition. This kind of sharing enhances the overall pleasure one experience.¹⁰⁴ Narrative also creates bonds that provide the support and stimuli to try to excel. It shapes involvement and moral sentiments of empathy. This kind of mutual involvement (*Philia*) sustains a good character.¹⁰⁵ By narrative one can explain to soldiers that they will encounter moral dilemmas and dangers and how they can cope with these.¹⁰⁶ Stories create a context which can assist soldiers in recognizing moral hazards.¹⁰⁷ Narrative can clarify the importance of deliberation required to really internalize the appropriate values and to develop a virtuous disposition. This deliberation is necessary to reflect on situations, including the critical evaluation of earlier decisions and actions and thus develop an appropriate practical wisdom.¹⁰⁸ Narrative, stories are thus a vehicle for introducing and elaborating military virtues in a tangible way. Stories are flexible: the same virtues - like courage, comradeship and professionalism - can be extolled in different stories in different ways that fit a specific subculture. This flexibility supports the introduction of a defence wide set of virtues, as it leaves ample room for specific stories that meet the characteristics of the services. The services do have a different culture, and this fact needs to be accommodated in the narrative which makes virtues intelligible for the community they are meant for.¹⁰⁹ The stories could be reminiscences of real events or even fictional literature in which a military context is present.¹¹⁰ All these stories provide opportunities for empathy and critical reflection, which support growing moral awareness.¹¹¹ This pertains not only to actual moral actions but also in digesting morally challenging experiences. In the aftermath of battle stories help to cope with the horrors that were experienced. By telling these stories, sometimes over and over, these experiences can be digested and given a place in the soldier's memory instead of being repressed. Thus narrative helps in maintaining the

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, P 433: The companion effect.

¹⁰⁵ Aristoteles (2005). *Ethica Nicomachea*. Budel, Damon. Par. 1169b18-22; 1170a2-5 and Aristotle (1995). *Politics*. Oxford, University Press. Par. 1253a7-18.

¹⁰⁶ Marlantes, K. (2011). *What it is like to go to war*. New York, Atlantic Monthly Press. P222: 'Choosing sides is the fundamental first choice that a warrior has to make... The second fundamental choice of the warrior is to be willing to use violence to protect someone against even intended or implied violence. This second fundamental choice engenders an additional choice, which is accepting the risk of death and maiming that usually results from the decision to use violence against violence... This is the warrior's dictum: 'No violence except to protect someone from violence.'

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, P 61: 'The ethical warrior must avoid getting crushed between falling in love with the power and the thrill of destruction and death dealing and falling into numbness to the horror.'

¹⁰⁸ Aristoteles (2005). *Ethica Nicomachea*. Budel, Damon. Par. 1140a22-25; 1140b7-12 and 1144b30-32.

¹⁰⁹ See annex a for a general explanation of necessary differences between services.

¹¹⁰ Bonadonna, R. R. (2008). "Doing military ethics with war literature." *Journal of military ethics* 7(3): 231-242.

¹¹¹ See Nussbaum, M. (1986). *The fragility of goodness*. Cambridge, University Press. P 41-47 and Nussbaum, M. (2007). *Wat liefde weet (Love's knowledge)*. Amsterdam, Boom. P 125-129 and Verweij, D. E. M. (2010). *Geweten onder schot*. Amsterdam Boom. P192-203.

mental health of soldiers.¹¹² Narrative thus has an important role in imbuing standards of excellence and developing and maintaining a virtuous disposition in soldiers.¹¹³

5.6.4. Military practice requires military men, soldiers. Soldiers who have imbibed the military virtues of character, intellect and practical wisdom. 'Scratching' in training, exercises, further education and experience will lead to the internalisation of these virtues. Harsh training and exercises are an indispensable means to this end. 'Some need persuasion, others need violence.'¹¹⁴ Living together on board of ships, in barracks and on bases creates a powerful condition for military socialisation and the internalisation of the appropriate dispositions. 'Parental guidance' by well qualified instructors and role models will add to the overall formative effort. Narrative supports the development of thematic unity in **identity**. The military identity is often referred to, but it still is a somewhat foggy notion: there is no standard description of the military identity. Sometimes attempts are made to develop some kind of standard, mostly for education purposes, but as policies change none of these attempts gained an enduring status.¹¹⁵ However, one of the recurring themes of identity in the military will be 'masculinity'.¹¹⁶ It is often heard: in the armed forces, you will be made a man. In the Dutch armed forces - as in many other nationalities - this is not as much a matter of gender or sexual orientation as well as of a classic notion of a typical male attitude: physical fit, mentally tough, emotionally controlled and prepared to use violence when the circumstances require so.¹¹⁷ This notion of military bearing is supported by the military virtues like resilience and discipline, supported by comradeship.¹¹⁸ Sociability is also a recurring and important theme of a military identity as the military requires cooperation and teamwork. This theme is supported by the military virtue of comradeship, respect and responsibility.¹¹⁹

¹¹² Sheeler, J. (2008). Final salute. New York, Penguin books. P 160-167.

¹¹³ Sherman, N. (1982). Aristotle's theory of moral education. Philosophy. Cambridge (Massachusetts), Harvard. **PhD**: 237.

¹¹⁴ Aristoteles (2003). Metafysica: boek I-VI. Budel, Damon. Par. 1009a17-18.

¹¹⁵ In the Netherlands in 1992 the Royal Military Academy published a manual on personality development, in which no less than 45 desired traits were identified. Nowadays the manual is no longer in use. However, a close look shows that all these traits can be seen as constitutive of the virtues of military character developed in this thesis. Koninklijke Militaire Academie (1992). Handboek persoonsvorming. Breda, Gouverneur: 52. P 5-19.

¹¹⁶ Hinojosa, R. (2007). "Recruiting the self: the military and the making of masculinities". Philosophy. Gainesville, University of Florida. **PhD**: 249. P114-139. See also Ramakers, F. Omgang met 'orde' en 'chaos' is het leervermogen van de krijgsmacht daarvoor toereikend? In Richardson, R., Verweij, D., Vogelaar, A., Kuipers, H., Ed. (2002). Mens en organisatie: de krijgsmacht in verandering. Alphen aan den Rijn, Haasbeek. P 171-173.

¹¹⁷ Hinojosa, R. (2007). "Recruiting the self: the military and the making of masculinities". Philosophy. Gainesville, University of Florida. **PhD**: P 98. 'Actively constructing the self as virtuous means fitting tales of the self within the warrior discourse such that one's actions provide evidence of virtue. Some of the men situate their current self as virtuous, but the unique quality of a discourse, as a set of ideas, allows men to also construct past and future selves as virtuous by framing these selves with the warrior discourse.' P 74: 'The warrior discourse can be understood as a highly stylized, albeit, loosely formulated construction of masculinity; a militarized masculinity.'

¹¹⁸ See also Bilgiç, R., Sümer, H.C. (2009). "Predicting military performance from specific personality measures: a validity study." International journal of selection and assessment **17**(2): 231-238.

¹¹⁹ See Sabongui, A. G. (2006). Personality and social predictors of adaptation in the military. Humanities. Montreal, Concordia University. **PhD**: 121.

5.6.5. Another recurring thematic narrative is of a moral nature. Where do I stand and which values do I cherish? These issues are also a matter of reflection, deliberation and repetitious re-interpretation. This deliberation and reflection are essential. The nature of military activities implies that a soldier is faced with dilemmas and hard questions. In order to cope with these circumstances a soldier must be willing and able to be critical: not only as to the options for action he has, but also as to his own capabilities and deficiencies. It is hard to be a good person if you are not aware of your weaknesses and deficiencies. For a soldier this is even more important as the extreme circumstances of war may well lead to extreme failures; or success for all purposes.¹²⁰ Unity in identity requires recognizing the duality inherent to being human. Unity in this respect is supported by the virtues of responsibility, respect, courage and practical wisdom. However, being virtuous is a two-way street. Having a virtuous disposition as a soldier implies often being virtuous in general. From this point of view it is hard to conceive how a soldier who has imbued the virtues of responsibility, and respect will not be a fine member of a civil sports team or a good neighbour. It is hard to conceive how a soldier who has internalized the virtues of competence and discipline will be negligent in the maintenance of his privately owned house. A resilient soldier is not apt to let his head hang by the first minor setback, whether in his military or private affairs. Being a soldier and acquiring an identity that is partly shaped by military virtues does not necessarily contradict civil values and virtues, on the contrary: military virtues and a military shaped identity support the notion of a responsible citizen. The ideal military self is well equipped for membership of the civil society and the narrative that supports it. But there is a flip side to this story as well: 'People in the field have a tendency to be rather self-congratulatory about the moral climate we associate with the profession of arms.'¹²¹ This kind of complacency could well alienate the military from the wider civil society and - which is worse - could hamper continuous attention as to the moral state of affairs within the military.¹²² Therefore, the relation between the military and the civil society also needs to be governed by a virtuous attitude: the right mean between presumptuousness and embarrassment. The right mean between, on the one hand, exaggerated pride and complacency regarding the moral standards of the military profession often resulting in disapproval of civilian standards, and on the other hand, an overestimation of civil values and standards, which could well result in a depreciation of the military profession and the values it entails.

Conclusions.

5.7. Narrative is an important feature of MacIntyre's theory. However, this does not mean that all stories have a similar impact: there is a lot of small-talk going on. Neither does it mean that all narrative related to practices, virtues and values have a positive connotation: negative comments are also a part of narrative. Even purpose narrative can be morally corrupting, as was shown in the 'Third Reich'.¹²³ However, narrative still provides the necessary context in practices, supports the development of the virtues and

¹²⁰ Marlantes, K. (2011). *What it is like to go to war*. New York, Atlantic Monthly Press. P81: 'Under ordinary circumstances the repressed and despised parts of our personalities manifest themselves as small human foibles or weaknesses in character that foster on petty acts with minor harmful consequences. In the crucible of war those same weaknesses and petty acts can lead to consequences of immense horror and evil.'

¹²¹ Toner, J. H. (2000). *Morals under the gun*. Lexington, University Press of Kentucky. P1.

¹²² Oltshoorn, P. (2011). *Military Ethics and Virtues*. Abingdon, Routledge. P 134-140.

¹²³ These notions are substantiated in: Neitzel, S., Welzer, H. (2012). *Soldaten: over vechten, doden en sterven (Soldaten, Protokolle vom Kämpfen, Töten und Sterben)*. Amsterdam, Ambo.

creates a unified identity. The first two functions can be easily understood. Stories provide practical clues on what to expect and what is appropriate to do in a specific context. Especially in a military context - that in many respects is very different from ordinary life - stories are an indispensable tool to convey the abstract ideas as well as the concrete consequences of being a member of the military. Over time - by instruction, training, exercising, education and experience, all activities involving stories - being a member the military will evolve in a typical military bearing, an attitude that cannot be limited to the barracks nor to duty hours only: this bearing becomes part of one's identity. This identity is not static; it requires constant re-interpretation, affirmation or re-orientation.¹²⁴ Thematic narrative provides a vehicle for these processes. Narrative is rightly an important feature, not only in MacIntyre's theory, but also in military practice. This does not mean that all stories that are told in a military context are relevant, although even small talk can have an educational meaning. The narrative I refer to shapes the relevant context, supports the imbuing of the military virtues eventually resulting in an overall military bearing.

¹²⁴ Taylor, C. (2010). Een seculiere tijd (*A secular age*). Rotterdam, Lemniscaat. P 569,570.

Annex A to chapter 5: the hallmarks of the services

Fire, water, air and earth.¹²⁵

Fire, earth, air and water are the primal elements (*Archè*) which - according to the pre-Socratic philosophers - constitute the living and dead world. Thales of Milete (624-546 B.C.) claimed that water was the primal element. Anaximenes (585-525 B.C.) on the other hand stated that air was the essential element, while Empedocles (492-432 B.C.) assumed all four elements were constituent of the surrounding world. In the ensuing ages these elements gained a more metaphorical meaning. This metaphorical meaning is here elaborated in a military context. It explains and clarifies the necessary differences between the services of the armed forces while all share the ability to bring to bear violence.

Fire.

The core business of the armed forces is operations. This pertains to the capability to operate under all circumstances bringing to bear the threat with or actual use of violence. This feature provides the groundwork for military values and virtues, and how to express these, the culture of the armed forces. This overall violent characteristic can be symbolized by the classic element of fire. However, the armed forces are composed of different services: the navy, the army and the air force.¹²⁶ All these services operate in one of the different classical elements: the navy has its natural element in the high seas, water; the army finds its theatre on land, and the air force has its arena in the air.¹²⁷ These different elements in which the different services operate, result in different cultures. I will elaborate on these differences: not to create a division, but to enhance insight and understanding in the necessary differences between the services. I will not use the traditional Dutch sequence in which the navy is the senior service and the air force the most junior, but for the sake of argument, the army will be treated as last.

Water.

The largest part of the planet earth is covered in water. Water is the element in which naval forces operate. The ship is the fighting system.¹²⁸ A ship is an autonomous system. The ship's company is a part of this system. Beside the operational mission, the ship's company has one common goal: staying afloat. The ship's company cannot break away from the pressure that being part of the system entails; jumping overboard is not an option. When the ship changes its course the ship's company necessarily follows suit. To change the course of the ship is the prerequisite of one man only; the ship's captain. He is the officer who is charged with a mission and then sails away. The master has absolute power over the actions of the ship and its company. The master is alone; there is no

¹²⁵ This text is based on the article by de Vries, P. H. (2000). "Vuur, aarde, lucht en water." *Carré* 23(6): 18-19, and a lecture by the author held at the Royal Military Academy in 2003 on October 25th. An abridged version was published in the UK in: (2008). *The occasional - number 54* 'Take me to your officer' officership in the army. Strategic and combat studies institute. London, Corporate document service: 82.

¹²⁶ The fourth service in the Dutch armed forces is the constabulary (Koninklijke Marechaussee) which in this context is regarded as part of the land forces.

¹²⁷ This classification needs some clarification and adjustment. The marine corps is a formal part of the Dutch navy – in some countries the marines corps is a separate service. However its main theatre of operations is clearly on land, therefore in this text they are considered a part of the land forces (and not of the army!). Some also consider armed helicopters a component of land forces, as land manoeuvre is made up of ground manoeuvre and air manoeuvre. As (armed) helicopters are one of the systems deployed in the land war they too are considered part of the land forces (and not of the army!).

¹²⁸ Ships include all men of war including submarines.

superior officer physically present. Water is a clear element. You cannot hide.¹²⁹ Mostly you can see the enemy at already a great distance, and the ship can engage the enemy at that great distance. Sometimes the enemy is not even spotted by eyesight but is it a mere dot on a radar screen. This screen is seen by only a select company in the ship's command centre. The decision to engage the enemy is made by the master only. A ship to ship action is primarily a technical affair of a platform against platform in which integrated systems of sensors, weapons and command and control capacities are brought to bear. For many on board of a man of war the use of violence is an abstract affair; the majority of the ship's company does not see, hear or feel the enemy. Another feature is that there are hardly any 'others' at sea. In most cases it is beyond a doubt who is a combatant and who is not. However, when the ship is hit by enemy fire, the ship's company returns as one man to its primary aim: staying afloat. What does this all mean regarding the naval culture? A few conclusions can be drawn. It's discipline is authoritarian with a strict division between, the master, the other officers and the other ranks. As a result respect comes natural to a sailor as does comradeship, especially by those on the same watch. Professionalism must be outstanding and it is a quality appreciated by all on board, as a ship is a complex system and every member of the company has a contribution to make to its proper functioning the common aim of it is: staying afloat. Damage control is therefore a much appreciated capability.

Air.

The planet earth is completely surrounded by air! We are nowhere without air: we have to breathe it in order to survive. Air is the element of the air forces. The aeroplane is the fighting system.¹³⁰ The aeroplane is also an autonomous system. Mostly an aeroplane is flown by one person, sometime two and for larger aircraft a crew may be necessary. The pilot is in command of the aircraft, and mostly alone. The actual use of violence is his and his responsibility only. He alone makes an estimate of the situation and decides whether to engage the enemy target or not. The consequences are also only his. His success is his' only, and his failure often results in his death. The element air is also very clear, even transparent. The pilot can see far! With his equipment, his on board electronics, he can even see further than his eyes allow him. There is no place to hide. However, the modern fighter pilot seldom actually sees his enemy: a classical dog fight has become obsolete. A modern air battle is largely a standoff affair. The air to air engagement is relatively simple: it is a matter of reading displays and pushing buttons. In the air too, there are seldom non-combatant 'others' and if a civilian plane enters an airspace under surveillance it is immediately spotted and soon afterwards identified as a civilian plane. In close air support missions, the picture is slightly different: the pilot can actually see his target. Often his view is perfunctory due to the high speed of his aircraft and consequently there is little time to get a complete picture of the situation on the ground. Nevertheless, and in spite of sometimes tight air control, it is the warplane's pilot who decides to engage the enemy, and it is the war plane's pilot who bears the risks. The pilot knows this and thus he wants to know everything there is to know about his airplane; especially what to do in case of any malfunction! These malfunctions are not necessarily the result of enemy action; they could be technical failures. But being high in the air, even a simple malfunction may will cost the pilot his life. Therefore, the pilot is the ultimate air warrior; he is the icon of the air forces. For the rest of the air

¹²⁹ Unless in a submarine of course, but even these can be detected.

¹³⁰ In some armed forces ground to air air-defence is part of the air forces. Again in this text ground to air air-defence is considered a part of the land forces (and again not necessarily of the army).

force danger is often a mere abstraction. The rest of the air forces (a large majority) can concentrate on its main task, which is providing combat ready airplanes. This activity takes place in fixed infrastructure and can best be characterized as a largely technical affair which can be optimized in a production process. Reliability is of the outmost importance: technical malfunctions must be prevented as the safe return of the airplane and its subsequent use depends on it. What does this mean for the culture of the air force? On the one hand, we have the class of 'air warriors', the pilots who run the risks, who make autonomous decisions and who want to know everything of the system they are in command of. On the other hand, we have the technical professionals who have to meet very strict standards of excellence, who have to know their job. But this is also the realm of the manager who wants to be in control of a process, who must meet targets, whose risks are managerial risks, not risks pertaining to personal survival! However, by the mere weight of numbers the managerial ethos becomes more and more the dominant feature of the air force culture. In the air force professionalism is of paramount importance, as is discipline to adhere by the technical manuals as well as a professional fellowship. A sense of responsibility supports autonomous decision making. Mutual respect is also a feature of the culture of air forces as this is the cement that creates a mutual shared culture.

Earth.

Earth is only a small part of our planet, but it is the element we live on, on which we build our houses, roads and factories and grow our crops and produce other foodstuffs and build our societies and raise our children. The earth is not very clear nor transparent. The force of nature has created mountains, hills and other elevations as well as rivers, brooks and swamps. Vegetation adds to a varying degree of visibility and accessibility. Buildings, infrastructure and other consequences of human interventions may further influence visibility and accessibility. Moreover, on land one can take cover, go into hiding. On land there is no clear concept of a typical single fighting system. Battle on land requires a large variety of systems: armoured infantry fighting vehicles, tanks, reconnaissance vehicles, artillery pieces, engineering equipment, communication and signal systems, supply vehicles, maintenance equipment, storage capabilities, medical facilities, etc. And all these separate systems have their own crew. These crews, these primary groups, these teams of soldiers are the real carriers of the fight. There are many of these teams: the infantry groups, the tank crews, the gunners manning a piece of artillery, the repair and maintenance teams, the medical transport groups, the resupply trucks, etc. All these systems and their crews operate more or less independently. This is a result of the limited visibility and accessibility on land and because of the many different functions these systems have. However, the majority of these teams operate within reach of the enemy and as a result can be faced with real danger! Because of the limited visibility on land, it is often hard to observe an approaching enemy, and an engagement is mostly well within each other's line of sight. These engagements are mostly direct fire fights, sometimes even developing in hand to hand combat. The enemy on land is seldom a mere abstraction! And then there are 'others'. Land is hardly ever empty! These others (are they combatants or not?) add to the overall unpredictable and complex nature of land warfare. The actual decision to engage the enemy thus has to be taken independently by many systems. This means that crews have the possibility to refrain from opening fire and sometimes - as in the case of non- combatant 'others'- they are even required not to fire. If, on the other hand, the concerted fire of all systems is to be brought to bear, coordination, synchronizing and orchestration are required. This is the challenge of land warfare: how to coordinate, synchronize and orchestrate the

power of all these systems, which are dispersed over a relatively wide area and which are all basically autonomous in their decision making. The challenge is how to create and maintain some kind of order in a principally unpredictable and sometimes chaotic process. This explains the preoccupation of the army with planning as a - often overestimated - tool of creating and maintaining order. The context of land warfare explains also the importance of resilience, of responsibility and discipline and sometimes courage. Professionalism and comradeship within crews and respect between teams is important, as is respect for the 'others', the civilians who are caught in the fighting, and respect in coping with the enemy. Leadership is of a different kind: it aims at creating bonds, bonds of trust that enhance cooperation in doing the job even under extreme adverse circumstances. Exemplary conduct is an important feature of the leadership that is required in land warfare. Land warfare is never simple, it is a complex affair of which the outcome is largely unpredictable!

The quintessence.

And yet there is a fifth essence: the essence that puts it all together. That quintessence is spiritual and consists of the virtues. In all these media - fire, water, air and earth - the same virtues can be displayed. All soldiers are faced with tasks to accomplish and the ensuing responsibilities. In battle, the competence of all soldiers will be stretched to the limit. In order to survive and to accomplish the allotted tasks, teamwork is indispensable with comradeship as its reward. All soldiers will meet and work with other soldiers who are entitled to respect, which is due to a fellow soldier. But soldiers will also meet others who are entitled to respect due to their being a fellow human being even if it is the enemy. In facing the enemy soldiers cannot do without courage to overcome fear and to face danger. This courage is required under all circumstances, and soldiers therefore need resilience to cope with the physically and mentally exhausting adversities of the battlefield. Discipline is the ultimate military virtue that compels soldiers to abide by their rules and standards: to face their responsibilities, to act like competent soldiers, supporting comrades, respecting fellow soldiers as well as civilians and even the enemy, to show courage when required and to display the resilience necessary to persevere.

Chapter 6: reality check.

Introduction.

6.1. The aim of my thesis is to contribute to the moral professionalism of the military of all services by identifying a set of virtues that is relevant to military practice, and that has practical value. Its applicability requires that it provide guidance for soldiers on moral reasoning and action in matters of moral concern.¹ This means it must address issues that are of practical relevance to the military and it must provide insight into the underlying features of moral evaluation that makes an action good or bad. In the preceding chapters, I developed such a practical set of military virtues. However, the practical value of such specific set of military virtues must be recognized, acknowledged and accepted by soldiers as relevant and important in military practice; that is, under actual operational conditions. In this chapter I will investigate whether the theoretical concepts I developed in the preceding chapters are indeed recognized, acknowledged and accepted by those who are active in the military practice: soldiers. This means that my research has a limited aim. I want to validate my findings hitherto. My research does not aim at a formative evaluation based on a hypothetical-deductive approach, in order to come to conclusive judgement whether my hypothesis is tenable.²

Theoretical account.

6.2.1. My investigation of the appreciation of the military virtues is primarily based on literature. The main reason is that quantitative research in the field of ethics is problematic as it is hard to ascertain the validity of data. Another difficulty lies in the aim of my research, which is to develop a set of virtues that has practical value and is applicable in the military practice; that is, in operational deployments. Furthermore, validating the set of virtues I developed, requires that the participants in the survey have been in a situation which enables them to relate to the framework I developed: they must have experienced the practice in all its constituent parts, including the benefits of cooperation, danger and the tension of an undetermined time and place. This kind of experience is in particular found in combat situations. This means that a statistical approach using an a-selective sample of the overall population of (Dutch) military personnel would not do, as a large part still lacks this kind of experience in operational deployments. Even an a-selective sample of the Dutch soldiers who participated in a military mission abroad would not do, as not all of those would have combat experience. Furthermore, whether soldiers have experienced combat is not always recorded in individual conduit files. These considerations preclude a formal large scale quantitative statistical approach. However, some appraisal of the practical value of my findings is indispensable to establish whether my thesis finds support from those soldiers who have practical operational experience in combat. These considerations lead me to conduct a limited empirical survey, using both qualitative and quantitative methods. The qualitative approach I used is partly based on methods known as 'theoretical sampling' or 'purposive sampling'.³ This means that my research is specifically aimed at soldiers with relevant operational experience and to verify whether they do, or do not support my - largely theoretical - findings. These empirical investigations are largely based on interviews: a widely accepted method in qualitative

¹ Timmons, M. (2002). Moral theory: an introduction. New York, Rowman & Littlefield. P 3-4.

² Maso, I. & Smaling, A. (1998). Kwalitatief onderzoek: praktijk en theorie. Amsterdam, Boom. P 27-28.

³ Ibid, P 74 - 75.

research.⁴ However, my approach is not purely qualitative. The interviews were conducted on the basis of a structured protocol while a purely qualitative method would be based on a series of completely open interviews, the content which would be refined based on earlier interviews. My analysis is also partly based on a quantitative approach, which is also contrary to the method of theoretical sampling. However the quantitative analysis adds to the verifiability of my findings. Therefore my approach could best be labelled 'mixed methods'⁵ The fact that I conducted all interviews myself, and made both notes and recordings added to the validity of the results.⁶ By limiting my research to soldiers with actual combat experience, I ensured that my questions pertain to subjects the respondents are familiar with; a prerequisite for a scientific relevant result.

6.2.2. The main issue of my thesis is '... how to apply virtue ethics in military practice in order to ensure that individual soldiers will uphold adequate moral standards in their actions...'. As a general aim I have specified in the research question, whether: '...the theory of virtue ethics as elaborated by Alasdair MacIntyre in his book 'After Virtue' provides a suitable instrument to identify, develop, instil and uphold the required moral standards in the military'. This infers that my practical research will have to address two issues: the theoretical means and the more practical end.⁷ The question pertaining to the means refers to the suitability of MacIntyre's theory: to what extent are the concepts and notions MacIntyre uses in his theory applicable in identifying a set of virtues that is relevant to military practice. This requires assessing whether soldiers experience military activities as a practice in which internal goods are satisfied and in which specific virtues enhance aspiring to excellence in the specific aspects of the military operational practice, resulting in a better overall performance. The question pertaining to the end refers to the outcome of the theoretical approach. Do the outlines of the virtue ethical framework I developed addresses the complexities of operational reality? To what extent are these outlines recognized, acknowledged and accepted by soldiers with proven operational experience? From this perspective, my research can be qualified as an empirical validation with a limited formative scope: the central issue is the practical applicability of a virtue-ethical approach to military morality. This means that the respondents will also take present policies into account. This implicit comparison adds to the value of the outcomes.⁸

6.2.3. I already stated that I based my practical research primarily on interviews. For these interviews, I used the method of narrative inquiry.⁹ This method enables a data-gathering process based on mutual trust and empathy resulting in detailed information, including temporal and contextual information.¹⁰ Both the method and

⁴ This method is frequently used in similar cases, see: Smaling, A., van Zuuren, F., Ed. (1992). De praktijk van kwalitatief onderzoek: voorbeelden en reflecties. Meppel, Boom. When I refer to these interviews I will insert the following footnote: Soldiers (2011). Interviews on virtue ethics with OR, NCO and officers. Amersfoort.

⁵ Smaling uses the term 'mixed methods'. See: Smaling, A. (2009). "Generaliseerbaarheid in kwalitatief onderzoek." KWALON, platform voor kwalitatief onderzoek 14(3): 5-12.

⁶ Huffcut, A., Woehr, D.J. (1999). "Further analysis of employment interview validity: a quantitative evaluation of interviewer-related structuring methods." Journal of Organizational behaviour 20(4): 549-560.

⁷ Maso, I. & Smaling, A. (1998). Kwalitatief onderzoek: praktijk en theorie. Amsterdam, Boom. P 26-28.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Czarniawaska, B. (2004). Narratives in social science research. London, Sage publications. P 42-45. See also Conle, C. (2000). "Narrative inquiry: research tool and medium for professional development." European journal of teacher education 23(1): 49-64.

¹⁰ Kohler Riessman, C. (1993). Narrative analysis. Newbury Park (California), Sage Publications. P 5.

the product are useful.¹¹ In my questions I tried to tap on the operational experience of the respondents. In these experiential stories is given voice to otherwise tacitly held personal knowledge without abandoning the particular, the contextual and the complex. This personal knowledge has a practical function, not in a technical sense, or as an instrument for previously determined outcomes, but leading back to Aristotle, as a source of deliberation, intuitive decisions daily action and moral wisdom. Narrative inquiry is particularly suited to get at such 'practical knowledge'.¹² However, in a narrative there are no single causes and no predictable effects. Instead, open-endedness pervades all data. This open-endedness is also required in order to create the opportunity to stop trading in self-evident 'truths' and social 'facts'.¹³ However, this open-endedness also has some problematic features. The first risk pertains to the autonomy of the narrators. How to ascertain the respondents is telling a 'true' story. This risk can be countered by returning to earlier stories during the interview and checking on several elements. Also similarities with stories by other respondents can add to the reliability of the respondent and his particular story. Furthermore, the inquirer - who should be knowledgeable on the subject - can appraise the authenticity of both the respondent and the story. Also the interviews I conducted focused primarily on the subjective experience of the respondents and their appreciation of what transpired. In this respect it also should be kept in mind, is that establishing the 'historical truth' of a narrative is not the first objective. It is the trustworthiness that counts.¹⁴ The promise to use only anonymous data and the assurance that the respondents would get the opportunity to screen the transcripts, added further to overcome doubts as to the autonomy of the narrators.¹⁵ A second problem may arise as a result of the inquirer not sharing a culture with the respondent. If they do not speak the same language, meaning can be lost. This risk was diminished as the respondents were all soldiers as well as the inquirer, albeit no longer on active service. Although the soldiers I interviewed were from different services and units, the language that was used proved to be very similar. These circumstances also helped to reduce the third possible risk of a lack of transparency in communication. Speaking the same 'military' language helped to reduce the gap between inquirer and the respondents and thus overcome this difficulty.¹⁶ 'Translating' the recordings of the interviews into a written transcript which were submitted to the respondents for approval provided another opportunity to verify adequate reproduction of what was said and meant.¹⁷ Another difficulty that arises from using open-end questions is that they could invite discursive stories that do not address the issues that are looked for. Using a protocol helps to prevent this kind of excursions.¹⁸ Finally, there is the disadvantage that it is more difficult to quantify and analyze the responses. However, given the relatively small number of samples, and the use of a protocol which in practice limited the average duration of the interviews to two hours - resulting in transcripts of on average 9 pages -, the advantages of open-end questions exceed the drawbacks. The protocol I developed for the interviews contained open-end and closed questions. Open-end questions, as implied in using the narrative method, give ample latitude for the

¹¹ Connelly, F. M. and Clandinin, D.J. (1990). "Stories of experience and narrative inquiry." Educational Researcher 14(5): 2-14.

¹² Conle, C. (2000). "Narrative inquiry: research tool and medium for professional development." European journal of teacher education 23(1) P 51.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Kohler Riessman, C. (1993). Narrative analysis. Newbury Park (California), Sage Publications. P 64.

¹⁵ Czarniawaska, B. (2004). Narratives in social science research. London, Sage publications. P 115.

¹⁶ Kohler Riessman, C. (1993). Narrative analysis. Newbury Park (California), Sage Publications. P 57.

¹⁷ Ibid, P 12-13 and 66-67.

¹⁸ Czarniawaska, B. (2004). Narratives in social science research. London, Sage publications. P 51-53.

respondents and decrease the influence of the interviewer's possible bias.¹⁹ Using a protocol added to the focus of the interview and the external reliability of my survey; the extent to which a repetition of the survey would produce similar results.²⁰

6.2.4. The open-end questions pertain to several notions of MacIntyre's theory and whether the respondents had any practical experience with these notions. The questions cover six issues. The first questions refer to the internal goods. These questions aim at identifying relevant internal goods and are predominantly factual: 'What were you looking for when you joined the armed forces? Did you find what you were looking for? Did you find things you hadn't been looking for? Etc.' In this way I tried to establish whether and which internal goods are related to the practice. Furthermore, these first questions conform to the requirements of setting the general scope of my interests and addressing an issue with which all respondents would be familiar.²¹ The second set of questions pertains to the operational experience, specifically to action and deliberation in problematical situations: 'What exactly did happen? What did you do? What made you do what you did? Has this occurrence changed your outlooks? Etc.' These questions aim at creating a focus on operational actions and which considerations or virtues play a role in decision making and action. The third topic aims at identifying which characteristics (virtues) are thought to be desirable. The questions are of an evaluative nature and include issues like: 'Whom do you respect or admire and what are the admirable characteristics? Whom do you detest and because of which characteristics?' The fourth set of "evaluative" questions focus on the disposition of the respondent him- or herself and which virtues are desirable in general, as well as whether it is possible to acquire these virtues. Questions include: 'What makes you a good soldier? How did you acquire these characteristics? What should we do to impart these virtues to all fellow soldiers?' The fifth part addresses 'external' values and whether these played any role in their general outlook and operational decision making. These questions aim at establishing if there are any other evaluative factors than situational circumstances that play a role in operational decision making and action: 'Are there any general values that play a part in military practice? To what extent are external goods of any importance?' The last of the open-end questions refer to the nature of the interview and whether the respondents felt free in answering and whether they wanted to add anything. Next the respondents were given a set of closed questions in which they were confronted with the list of theoretically established military virtues of character. They were asked to indicate whether they thought the virtues to be relevant or not, whether the list was complete or not and whether the virtues were only relevant under operational circumstances. They were asked to mark on a five-point scale to which extent they agreed to the description of the specific virtues. I tested the protocol in a test interview, which resulted in some marginal adjustments. The definitive protocol of the complete questionnaire is attached in annex A to this chapter.²²

6.2.5. In this survey I interviewed a total of 21 persons: 11 soldiers, 5 town civil servants and 5 workers in healthcare (doctors as well as nurses). I interviewed the civil servants and healthcare workers to compare the results with those of the soldiers

¹⁹ Maso, I. & Smaling, A. (1998). Kwalitatief onderzoek: praktijk en theorie. Amsterdam, Boom. P 50-52.

²⁰ Smaling, A., van Zuuren, F., Ed. (1992). De praktijk van kwalitatief onderzoek: voorbeelden en reflecties. Meppel, Boom. P 99.

²¹ Ibid, P 88.

²² In the interviews with civil servants and healthcare workers the 'typical' military terms were replaced by a more neutral terminology.

I interviewed and thus add to the validation my findings. As my investigation is primarily aimed at soldiers - who in a formal sense are government officials - I limited my other interviews to government or semi-government officials as well, in order to make a comparison relatively easy. Another reason was that by not including workers in commercial firms, I aimed to limit the influence of typical external goods, like earnings and status. My assumption was that health-care workers and soldiers would be more involved in their job and score their professional activities relatively high with regard to the characteristics of a practice.²³ This assumption is corroborated by Leget and Olthuis who describe medical care in terms of a virtue in which in the practice of caring for other human beings, standards of excellence are aspired at. Typical virtues of the medical practice are: caring, respect, fellowship and competence.²⁴ In the comparison I assumed that town civil servants would score relatively low regarding their job as part of a practice with the ensuing virtues. The assumption is that the average civil servant sees himself as a representative of the public authorities. Rules are an important feature of their jobs; either in developing or in maintaining these. Therefore, duty is an important concept, as is service. Both values have a primarily external source which does not correspond to the notion of virtue.

6.2.6. I did not adapt the protocol I used to accommodate specific civil virtues. In the open-end conversations, I sometimes explained what could be a civilian equivalent of the sometimes typical military terminology I used (e.g. fellowship to colleagues instead of comradeship, pluck instead of courage, etc.). Because my empirical research had a limited aim, I based the selection of the respondents primarily on qualitative criteria and some level of representativeness. The representativeness is enhanced by an appropriate variation coverage of the sample, which refers to the composition of the sample of the armed forces which reflects the composition of the overall population of the armed forces in the proportion of officers, non-commissioned officers (NCO) and other ranks (OR), as well as the services (navy, army, air force and constabulary).²⁵ As my aim is to validate which virtues are relevant in the military operational practice, all respondents had to have operational experience in a combat zone. The approach I used - which is partly inspired by theoretical or purposive sampling - requires that the respondents are knowledgeable about the subject. To make sure that the respondents had relevant experience and knowledge, I requested that the respondents were to have demonstrable operational experience in a combat zone; for example, by being distinguished for valour or wounded in action. The Netherlands Ministry of Defence called for volunteers and forwarded their names and addresses. I had no direct influence in the selection of the candidates. As to the sample of respondents of town civil servants, I approached the town clerk of my resident city and asked for a mixed (age and gender) number of volunteers whose job involved daily contact with the citizens. The town clerk forwarded the names of the volunteers, and again I had no direct influence in the selection of the candidates. The same applied to workers in health care which I secured through the cooperation of a local hospital. In all cases I specifically asked for people who had a 'hands on' job which brought them in daily contact with their clients and patients. Thus, in all three sectors, I interviewed people

²³ An assumption also articulated in: Hackett, J. (1983). The profession of arms. London, Sidgwick and Jackson. P 9 and 203

²⁴ Leget, C., Olthuis, G. (2007). Professioneel zorg verlenen: ideaal of deugd. Werkzame idealen. Kole, J., Ruyter, de, D. Ed. Assen, van Gorcum: 24-36. See also: Dwarswaard, J., Hilhorst, M. (2007). Over de idealen van de (huis)arts. Ibid, P 37-50.

²⁵ Smaling, A. (2009). "Generaliseerbaarheid in kwalitatief onderzoek." KWALON, platform voor kwalitatief onderzoek 14(3): 5-12.

who had experience in their respective 'frontline'.²⁶ With only a few exceptions the interviews were held at the place the respondents worked. The familiar and safe context enhanced the 'normality' of the situation and reduced uneasiness, which could influence the answers.²⁷ Notes were taken and every conversation was recorded. Based on the notes and the recordings, I made a transcript of every interview. These transcripts were then submitted to the respective respondent for approval. If necessary, changes were made. Only approved transcripts are used for the analysis.²⁸

6.2.7. In my analysis, I scrutinized every transcript for propositions that referred to a desire, disposition or virtue and external goods. I identified these by: words, context, internal consistency and frequency. In order to avoid personal bias, I did not take into account the extensiveness of the comments nor did I make a qualitative assessment of the intensity of responses.²⁹ Of each of those propositions, I picked the relevant entry or catchword, which I marked. Then I grouped synonyms and otherwise similar terms. Next I distributed these terms in the categories internal goods, virtues and other. Thereupon I made a cross reference to establish the number of entries made by each of the respondents in the respective categories. In this way, I established the frequency in which the terms were used by the respective respondents.³⁰ I tried to approximate the notion of intensity by dividing the total scores of the appreciation of internal goods and virtues by the number of participants who made an entry. This gives some idea about the intensity in which the topic was expressed during the interviews. I repeated my analysis on the data after some time in order to avoid intra-interviewer inconsistency.³¹

Military data and analysis.

6.3.1. My interviews and the initial analysis were initially limited to the internal goods and related virtues of military character I established, as well as related topics. This initial analysis led me to the conclusion that the virtue of intellect, practical wisdom, needed explicit mentioning as well. Quite a number of entries refer to the then implicit notion of practical wisdom. These entries pertain to decisions with a moral dimension, like: to fire a weapon or not, to continue an action or to disengage and to adhere strictly to the Rules Of Engagement (ROE's), or to allow for interpretation, etc. Therefore I made an addition to the questionnaire which I also submitted to the original respondents. In this addition, I introduced a draft of the virtue of practical wisdom and asked the same closed questions as I had done with the drafts of the virtues of military character. All who were interviewed reacted positively, after which I included the virtue of practical wisdom in the questionnaire and the ensuing further

²⁶ See annex B.

²⁷ Baarda, D. B., de Goede, M.P.M., Teunissen, J. (2005). Basisboek kwalitatief onderzoek. Groningen, Stenfert Kroese. P 177 - 181.

²⁸ Maso, I., & Smaling, A. (1998). Kwalitatief onderzoek: praktijk en theorie. Amsterdam, Boom. P 58-59.

²⁹ Krueger, R. A., Casey, M.A. (2000). Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for Applied Research. Thousand Oaks (California), Sage publications. See also Smaling, A., van Zuuren, F., Ed. (1992). De praktijk van kwalitatief onderzoek: voorbeelden en reflecties. Meppel, Boom. P 62.

³⁰ Rabiee, F. (2004). "Focus-group interview and data analysis." The proceedings of the nutrition society 63(4): 6. P 657: 'data analysis consists of a number of stages, i.e. examining, categorising and tabulating or otherwise recombining the evidence, in order to address the initial goal of a study'. See also: Schorn, A. (2000). "The "Theme-centred Interview". A Method to Decode Manifest and Latent Aspects of Subjective Realities." Forum : Qualitative Social Research 1(2), and Kohler Riessman, C. (1993). Narrative analysis. Newbury Park (California), Sage Publications. P 60-64.

³¹ Baarda, D. B., de Goede, M.P.M., Teunissen, J. (2005). Basisboek kwalitatief onderzoek. Groningen, Stenfert Kroese. P 195.

analysis. The results from this analysis are presented in the tables, charts and schedules in Annex C.

6.3.2. As to **internal goods**, in the interviews I refrained from using this abstract term.³² Individual interpretations of abstract notions could differ and thereby obscure the results. Instead, I posed open questions on what kind of specific expectations or desires the respondents wanted to satisfy by entering military practice and whether these expectations and desires proved to be relevant and to what extent they still are. This resulted in a total of 129 entries listed. The number of entries by soldiers (OR) is smaller than their share in the overall population (the Dutch armed forces): they contributed 15% of the entries compared to their 37% share of the population. The number of entries by NCO's conforms to their part in the overall strength (43% to 43%) The percentage of entries by officers exceeds their representativeness (42% to a total of 20%).³³ The approximation of intensity I computed gave a similar result: the OR scored an average intensity of 1,7 while NCO's scored 2,9 and officers 4.8. These differences could be interpreted as reflecting the strength of the intrinsic urge to join the military. If this assumption would be valid the OR seems to have a less intrinsically urge to join the military, while officers would seem to have a stronger inclination to join. However, further research is required to substantiate the validity of this deduction. In spite of these differences, all respondents answered that they had found whatever they had been looking for in joining the military. As to the number of entries for each internal good some comments can be made. The item of satisfaction, as related to the virtue of a sense of responsibility is only mentioned by one OR while all NCO's and officers made several references. The notions of adventure and challenge were addressed by 10 of the 11 respondents. Satisfaction and achievement as well as belonging and security were mentioned by 8 respondents. The internal goods of pride and appreciation and contentment and fairness were scored by 6 respondents. Excitement and thrill were mentioned by 3 respondents only, while structure as related to discipline was not mentioned by any of the respondents. Based on the percentage of the frequency of entries at each internal good, I distinguish weakly, intermediate and strongly evaluated internal goods. Weakly evaluated are structure (0%) and excitement (3%). Intermediately evaluated are pride (18%) and contentment (12%). Strongly evaluated are satisfaction (23%), belonging (21%) and adventure (23%). Adventure is also the only internal good that is mentioned by practical all respondents (minus 1). Taking a closer look at the dispersion of the entries over the respective internal goods and the number of respondents involved, we can note that the number of respondents per internal good corresponds with the overall evaluation of the respective internal goods. This seems to underpin further the distinction between weak, intermediate or strong evaluation of the different internal goods. These findings largely coincide with the intensity attached to the notions, with the exception of pride and adventure: the former has a higher score on intensity than on frequency while the latter shows the opposite. These findings are corroborated in several reports by the Dutch Ministry of Defence.³⁴

³² See annex C, table 1.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Rees Vellinga, N. van (2006). Belangstellingsonderzoek 2005-2006, Een baan als militair. Afdeling Gedragswetenschappen. Den Haag, Ministerie van Defensie. P 10 and Gelooven, R. M. W. v. (2009). Basisstudie Imago en Belangstelling. Afdeling Gedragswetenschappen. Den Haag, Ministerie van Defensie. P 31.

6.3.3. Regarding **virtues**, the representation of the entries is more in line with the overall group totals (33% to 37% for OR, 46% to 43% for NCO's and 21% to 20% for officers).³⁵ However, the intensity shows a similar dispersion as is the case with internal goods (table 1): intensity seems to rise through the ranks (OR score an average intensity of 8,2, NCO's 9,3 and officers score 10,2). The number of entries related to virtues (673), is more than five times the number of entries for internal goods (129). This seems to indicate that virtues are more easily articulated and/or stronger evaluated than internal goods (expectations and desires). This is corroborated by the fact that all virtues but one (courage) are mentioned by all respondents. Based on the distribution over the frequency of entries, I also made a distinction between weak, intermediate and a strong evaluation of the different virtues. Weakly evaluated are courage (4% of the total number of entries) and discipline (6%). Intermediate evaluated are respect (16%), comradeship (13%), resilience (12%), while strongly evaluated are responsibility (27%) and competence (22%). These findings coincide with the scores on intensity I computed. When I took again a closer look at the dispersion of the respondents, the weak evaluation of the virtues of courage is also caused by the relatively small number of respondents (8 out of 11) that made any entries. All other virtues have entries by all of the respondents.³⁶ Also the virtue of practical wisdom was mentioned by almost all (minus 1) respondent. As to the closed questions pertaining to draft virtues, some of the respondents made comments on the negative articulation (neither... nor) of the virtues and thought that an additional positive and practical description would be clearer.

6.3.4. According to MacIntyre there should be a **relation between internal goods and virtues**. He states that virtues pertain to '*an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods that are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods*.'³⁷ However, I already mentioned (in paragraph 3.4.9.) the difficulty of establishing such a specific relation. At first sight, the data as well do not warrant this relation.³⁸ The number of entries suggesting a strongly evaluated internal good like adventure is not 'translated' in a similar number of entries and strong evaluation of the virtue of resilience and a similar disconnection goes for the internal good of belonging and the virtue of comradeship. On the other hand, the virtue of competence has more entries and therefore seems to be more strongly evaluated than could be expected, as according to the number of entries the internal good of pride was only evaluated as of intermediate importance. Only in four cases the proportion to the number of entries of internal goods and virtues match: satisfaction and responsibility, both strong; contentment and respect, both intermediate; excitement and courage, both weak; structure and discipline, both weak. However, when we take a look at the intensity, I computed for the internal goods and virtues, we see a match for all relations. One could argue that there are at least some indications that there is a relationship between some internal goods and specific virtues. However, in the preceding chapter 3, I explained that one internal good could 'serve' more than one virtue, as well as that several internal goods could contribute towards the development of one particular virtue. However, hard evidence in support of a clear relationship between specific internal

³⁵ See annex C, table 2.

³⁶ These findings are corroborated by other research. See: Verweij, D. E. M. (2007). Morele professionaliteit in de militaire praktijk. *Werkzame idealen*. Kole, J., Ruyter, de, D. Ed. Assen, van Gorcum. P 129-134.

³⁷ MacIntyre, A. (2007). *After Virtue*. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 191.

³⁸ See annex C, table 3.

goods and specific virtues seems lacking. Doubts increase if we take into account that the description of internal goods is largely based on qualitative arguments. This means there is room for interpretation, which may result in obscuring some of the connections I have been looking for. The interconnectivity and the problematic nature of discerning exactly the meaning and limitations of internal goods and virtues and the ensuing room for overlap between internal goods as well as between virtues may further hamper establishing clear relations between specific internal goods and virtues. Other factors could also obscure connections. For example, the fact that the virtue of courage is mentioned in the open-end interviews a mere 26 times and only by eight of the respondents and not by the others (some of whom are decorated for valour), could be attributed to modesty. However, when we look at the total number of entries on related internal goods³⁹ in relation with the number of entries on virtues,⁴⁰ we cannot but record a general increase in the number of entries. This seems to corroborate that virtues are thought to be important for excelling in military practice and do increase the pleasure one finds in this practice. This view is substantiated by the strong support for the virtues I detected, and which I tested in a set of closed questions: all respondents thought the listed virtues relevant and thought the overall list complete and a large majority (96%) agreed on the draft descriptions. Only 4% of the respondents indicated they had no opinion on a specific description; none expressed disagreement.⁴¹ Although it is hard to establish a direct link between specific internal goods and virtues, the relevance of the virtues I developed seems substantiated by the results from the survey.

6.3.5. Another issue that is addressed in the survey pertained to the possibility to **impart virtues** on military personnel. There is considerable agreement that this is indeed possible in most instances. As one of the respondents put it: 'There are always people who cannot be taught or educated, who do not accept rules and who do not care for anyone but themselves. This kind of person does not belong in the military. Recruitment has to make sure that they don't enter. If they nevertheless do, it is up to the initial education and training to identify and dismiss these individuals as soon as possible.'⁴² As to imparting specific virtues, the overall idea is that 'skills and drills' can be taught and brought to a higher standard of excellence by training, exercising, further education and experience.⁴³ This pertains to the virtues of competence and discipline. Comradeship, resilience and respect can be imbued in (harsh) training and exercise and - of course - experience. The development of a sense of responsibility requires

³⁹ Ibid, table 1.

⁴⁰ Ibid, table 2.

⁴¹ Ibid, table 6.

⁴² Soldiers (2011). Interviews on virtue ethics with OR, NCO and officers. Amersfoort.

⁴³ In the field of education there are many theories and as a result many controversies as well. For practical reasons I will in my thesis discern five kind of educational activities. (1) Instruction, what refers to teaching basic knowledge, skills and drills. (2) Training involves physical and mental activities, mostly of a repetitive nature, in which the ability to apply what was taught is enhanced. Training aims at improving practical standards of excellence and the self-confidence of the soldier. (3) Exercises aim at applying the acquired knowledge, skills and drills in situations which simulate operational conditions, often under increasing adverse circumstances. Standards of excellence and self-confidence are further improved. (4) Further education ('*vorming*' in Dutch or '*Bildung*' in German) aims at creating awareness of the inherent importance of the subjects taught, trained and exercised. This awareness motivates soldiers to improve their attitude as a soldier and to achieve the required standards of excellence for themselves. Further education is often incorporated in training and exercises. (5) Experience refers to the participation in real life operations with all the uncertainties, pressures and dangers involved. Awareness is much enhanced by experience. See also Army, R. N. (1996). *Military doctrine*. The Hague, Army staff. P 259 & 268 (glossary).

especially further education and experience. 'You can teach a monkey how to fly an airplane if only you have enough bananas. But to appreciate a situation; that requires flexibility, responsibility, resilience!'⁴⁴ The respondents (half of them distinguished for valour!) do not give any indication on how to acquire a courageous disposition.⁴⁵ This seems to indicate that the respondents do not think that it is possible to instil the virtue of courage (in its moral meaning) in a person's character. On the other hand overcoming ones doubts and fears is a staple ingredient of military training, but then this could also be considered as a means to imbue resilience. The general responses however provide ample support for the Aristotelian idea on how to impart virtues and the role of experience therein, whether in training and exercise or in real life operations. Comments by respondents regarding the necessity of harsh physical and mental training as well as the importance of rules and exemplary conduct underpin the general outcome.⁴⁶

6.3.6. Participating in a practice requires action and virtue ethics aims at providing guidance as to **decide which action**. In the survey this issue is addressed as well. Respondents were asked to relate a difficult operational situation in which they were involved: 'It was combat actions with soldiers killed and wounded, successes, fear, shortages of ammunition, combat stress; I have seen it all that night.'⁴⁷ Then they were asked what they eventually did: 'I had trained my men, we were well prepared!, I felt enormous respect and pride in the way they performed their mission.'⁴⁸ Next they were asked how they came to do what they then did: 'You've got to make up your mind, which risks I am prepared to take. I told my second in command that if there ever was a place for an ambush; this was it. So I decided to refrain from a further advance of the vehicles and ordered a foot patrol. I joined the foot patrol, and as I passed the lead vehicle, I told the driver to back up and give us cover. The moment he started turning the Taliban opened fire... Why I stopped? I guess it was intuition, experience; I do not know exactly.'⁴⁹ In the analysis of the interviews these answers were scored whether they referred to one or more virtues.⁵⁰ The results indicate that respondents refer to practically similar virtues. The most mentioned virtue by all categories is responsibility. The virtues that are not mentioned by all, or only by a few respondents, are courage comradeship and resilience. This seems logical as these virtues refer to dispositions, qualities, that are of a personal nature and generally not the first consideration projected in a situation that requires a decision. The virtues which were mentioned most refer to personal attitudes that enable a person to make a decision under difficult circumstances: competence, discipline and respect. However, the entries do not necessarily refer to the content of the deliberation that precedes a decision. Although the number of entries on deliberation is relatively small (92), some remarks can be made. The importance of practical wisdom is especially noted by NCO's and officers, which is logical as this virtue is of importance in decision making, and that is what NCO's and officers are supposed to do when in action. They use terms like: clever, well considered, experienced, insight and when referring to actions, 'well done', and many variations on that theme. As to the virtue of discipline, the number of entries is relatively large with NCO's; which in the light of the preceding argument seems logical

⁴⁴ Soldiers (2011). Interviews on virtue ethics with OR, NCO and officers. Amersfoort.

⁴⁵ See annex C, table 4.

⁴⁶ See also: Robinson, P., De Lee, N., Carrick, D., Ed. (2008). *Ethics education in the military*. Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing Limited. P 36,127 and 166

⁴⁷ Soldiers (2011). Interviews on virtue ethics with OR, NCO and officers. Amersfoort.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ See annex C, table 5.

as well. The other virtues that are mentioned by all categories are competence - 'These drills were hammered into me!' ⁵¹- and respect - 'I had a medic with me and he was so competent; he made you feel invulnerable!' ⁵²As the issue of decision making was only a small part of the overall survey (4 out of 35 open-end questions) it is not surprising the number of entries is relatively small as well. However, the respondents give a clear indication that virtues do play a role in their decision making, especially the virtue of responsibility and practical wisdom, which involves situational deliberation.

6.3.7. The survey revealed that **external values** do not play a significant part in the soldier's mind. An individual respondent mentioned patriotism, and another spoke of his royalist sentiments: but only after some probing. ⁵³ The notion of soldiering as a job was not mentioned by any of the respondents. One of the respondents even explicitly refuted this notion when asked what he was looking for when he joined: 'Well, by no means was I looking for a job!' ⁵⁴ Some mentioned the importance of emotional stability in their family relations and attachments. All in all, there is no indication that external values are a strong part of the mental make-up of soldiers.

6.3.8. The analysis of the interviews and the transcriptions provided a substantial amount of data, and the analysis provided persuasive support for my thesis. However, from a wider perspective, it would add to the validity of my findings if these could be substantiated by other data. In addition, I also consulted another source: the **database of the Dutch Veterans Institute**. In 2007 this foundation initiated a comprehensive project in which over 1100 veterans were interviewed. The project was completed in 2011 and the data are assembled in a database in which 500 interviews are open to public scrutiny; 500 are only open for particular purposes and on approximately 150 there is an embargo in place. ⁵⁵ The project aimed at collecting stories of veterans of all kinds of background, different military branches and ranks, and of all missions the Dutch military participated in, starting with WW II. The missions included: WW II, the Indonesian war of independence, the Korean War, the guerrilla war in the former Dutch New Guinea, several peacekeeping missions - the most important were those in the Lebanon, former Yugoslavia, Eritrea and Cambodia - and the recent missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The interviews were conducted as a semi-structured conversation using a protocol of topics regarding: personal and military background; several aspects of the operational deployment, including location, job, contacts with others and special experiences; experiences on return from deployment both within the military and civil communities. The database allows queries by name, gender, subject, mission and service, as well as through a standardized thesaurus, allowing, e.g. queries by rank or unit. The database does not aim at providing statistical representative samples: for example, the public accessible sample of 500 interviews includes 90 interviews by naval veterans, 350 army, 13 former Royal Netherlands Indonesian Army, 42 air force, 20 constabulary and 4 from the (during WW II militarized) merchant navy. Furthermore, it is not possible to select interviews by veterans who participated in actual combat operations. Another issue is that the interviews aimed at collecting broad information. This means that the data from this

⁵¹ Soldiers (2011). Interviews on virtue ethics with OR, NCO and officers. Amersfoort.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Weerts, J. (2011). Interviewproject Nederlandse Veteranen, Stichting Veteraneninstituut. <http://www.veteraneninstituut.nl/projecten/interviewproject>.

project cannot be compared to the outcomes of the more limited and more specific survey I conducted for this thesis.

6.3.9. Nevertheless, some relevant information can be gathered: to what extent are the notions pertaining to the military virtues of character also mentioned by those veterans interviewed? Accessing the public part of the database gave the following results: responsibility, 85 hits; competence, 70 hits, comradeship, 137 hits; respect, 158 hits; courage, 137 hits, resilience, 45 hits; discipline, 96 hits. From these results, it seems that comradeship, courage and respect are strongly valued. Responsibility, competence and discipline seem intermediately valued, and resilience seems weakly valued. However, some nuance is appropriate. It is not always easy to establish in which context the comments were made. For example, as to the virtue of respect, I identified several grouping that are entitled to respect: fellow soldiers, civilians and even the enemy. In the hits on respect the two latter categories were seldom explicitly mentioned. Sometimes the notion of respect was used to indicate honour rather than respect. Consequently, some reservations as to the results are warranted. It was difficult - if not impossible - to establish the relevance of internal goods. One of the circumstances that have to be taken into account is that many veterans did not enter the military voluntarily: many were conscripts and had no particular desire to join the armed forces. Another circumstance pertains to the nature and structure of the interviews: they were not aimed at uncovering desires and expectations. The notions pertaining to internal goods resulted in hits, but again when looking at the context in which these notions were used, it became apparent that these were mostly used in retrospect, and in an evaluative sense rather than referring to the characteristics of the military as a practice and expectations and desires. For example, the notion of pride scored 213 hits, but pride was mostly expressed in relation to the time they spend in the military, what they did and achieved and seldom in relation to skills and other competences. Other internal goods scored only a few hits, like belonging (2 hits), structure (10 hits) and challenge (23 hits). For these reasons it was - also with these data - impossible to establish a direct relation between specific internal goods and related virtues. This seems to corroborate the earlier findings in chapter 4 and in paragraph 6.3.4., that internal goods are relevant for joining the military and finding pleasure in serving. From this perspective internal goods also contribute in articulating standards of excellence and adapting a disposition to act in accordance with these standards. However, it is hard to establish a direct link between a certain internal good and a specific virtue.

6.3.10. Furthermore, in 2012, a researcher of the Dutch Veterans Institute, drs. Major Groen, published a **book based on witness accounts** of the operations in Uruzgan, Afghanistan.⁵⁶ He interviewed 12 platoon commanders who served with each of the separate units that were deployed in the 4 years the mission lasted, as well as 9 'enablers' (an officer who served with the Regional Command South Reserve, engineers, an Apache helicopter pilot, soldiers who served with an Operational Monitor and Liaison Team, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and a Psychological Operations Support Element, a doctor and a nurse). The very personal accounts of the soldiers interviewed proved a valuable addition to the interviews I conducted. My interviews were aimed at establishing whether virtues mattered and if so, which? The interviews Groen conducted were aimed at capturing the experience of the soldiers and how they coped with the challenges of their mission.

⁵⁶ Groen, J. H. M. (2012). *Task Force Uruzgan: 'Getuigenissen van een missie'*. Den Haag, Ministerie van Defensie.

6.3.11. Although these sets of interviews were conducted with different aims, the similarities in the outcomes were remarkable. All virtues of character I defined were mentioned in the interviews; especially sense of responsibility, comradeship, and respect. Respect was used in all subdivisions I discerned: fellow soldiers, civilians and the opposing forces, the fighters. The need of competence, resilience and discipline were often mentioned as well. The importance of practical wisdom was especially mentioned by those in command. In almost every interview the importance of appropriate education, (realistic and harsh) training and exercising was stressed. Some referred to the inspiration found in the exemplary conduct of other soldiers. All mentioned the impact of their experience in a combat zone, and many expressed the probably lasting effect of their experience in their mental makeup, living attitude and priorities in life.

6.3.12. As to the result of my application of MacIntyre's theory, the provisional **conclusion** is that the outcome does support that the military practice is indeed experienced as an activity in which internal goods are satisfied. However, this must be understood as a generic connection, as I was unable to detect a conditional relation between specific internal goods and related virtues. The problematic character of this connection is twofold. In the first place, it is difficult to establish to what extent internal goods (desires) play a role in the mind of an individual respondent and his ensuing actions. The second problem is how to determine which specific internal goods are contributing to the development of a specific virtue. I was not able to establish such a direct connection. Nevertheless, the respondents positively recognized, acknowledged and accepted the virtues I identified and described. In the open-end questioning three virtues (responsibility, competence and respect) appear to be strongly evaluated and shared by all. Comradeship and resilience are well endorsed by all too. The only virtue which was mentioned relatively little is courage, but this omission could be attributed to modesty. In the closed questionnaire, a substantially stronger approval is apparent. All consider the listed virtues of military character and the virtue of practical wisdom relevant for military practice. They are positive in their appreciation of the possibility to impart virtues by education, training and experience. Regarding the practical value of my findings, they all endorse the completeness of the list I compounded: in their view no aspect is lacking and none could be missed. They further all expressed that the virtues were valid under all circumstances and not only in an operational context. This notion underpins the value of the virtues and their being embedded as a part of an individual's character. A character that - at least to some extent - can be shaped to accommodate the requirements of military practice. The fact that there was little divergence in the responses adds validity to the general outcome.

Civil Servants data and analysis.

6.4.1. As to **internal goods**, the civil servants were less explicit in identifying the internal goods they find satisfying.⁵⁷ They scored a strong evaluation - in both frequency and intensity - only with contentment as referring to the ambition to help other people.⁵⁸ This was also an internal good which was mentioned by all (minus 1) of the respondents. Satisfaction was mentioned by all of the respondents as well and scored six entries. Belonging scored a mere two entries by two respondents. Although

⁵⁷ Civil servants scored an average of 4 entries each, while soldiers scored on average 12 entries. See annex C table 1 and 7.

⁵⁸ Ibid, table 7.

the number of respondents is small, still some differences with military responses can be noted. Typical military internal goods like adventure and excitement are not appreciated by civil servants.⁵⁹ Structure and stability do not score any entry with both categories. On the other hand, do military respondents score relatively low on contentment, whereas civil servants produce a high score? Another and more remarkable difference is the importance that is attached to external goods (job security, salary, etc.) Civil servants have a pronounced and vested interest in these, while with soldiers these seem to be of secondary (or even less) importance.⁶⁰ Or, as one of the respondents stated: 'It is hard to tell what I was looking for, actually I did only look for a job.'⁶¹ This seems to indicate that civil servants do not experience their work as a practice.

6.4.2. These kinds of differences in valuing are also notable regarding **virtues**. Responsibility and competence are highly ranked, with respect and fellowship (the civilian equivalent of comradeship) on a second level; all in both frequency and intensity.⁶² Typical military virtues like courage and resilience are weakly evaluated by civil servants, while discipline scores relatively low as well. Another feature that attracts attention is the low number of entries by each individual respondent. With virtues, the military respondents score an individual average of 61 entries, while civil servants score an individual average of only 43 entries. This seems to indicate an overall weaker evaluation of virtues by civil servants than with soldiers. This is corroborated by the scores on intensity in which civil servants scored an average of 7,4 against a score of 9,1 for soldiers. These outcomes are, to some extent, mirrored by the responses regarding virtues in the closed questions of the survey.⁶³ Although the responses in the open-end questions of the survey suggest otherwise, almost all civil servants considered every draft virtue to be relevant: two respondents disqualified courage, one discipline and another resilience. More discrepancies come to light with regard to the support of the descriptions of the virtues. Only 20% of the draft descriptions attracted strong agreement by the civil servant, against 53% with the soldiers; the civil servants expressed agreement to 62% of the draft descriptions, against 42% with soldiers: a total of 82% agreement with civil servants and 95% agreement with soldiers. The civil servants did not agree with 18% of the proposed descriptions, against none of the soldiers.

6.4.3. The one on one **relation between internal goods and virtues** remains problematic. However, this is not very surprising. Civil servants show fewer specific intrinsic reasons (expectations and desires) for joining the civil service than soldiers and healthcare workers. For civil servants, external goods (a job, stability and a salary) seem to be rated as more important. Nevertheless, some relations can be discerned. The limited number of reference to the virtue of courage matches the weak evaluation of excitement as an internal good (no entries).⁶⁴ A similar (lack of) connection can be discerned with comradeship, resilience and discipline and the attractiveness of belonging, adventure respectively structure. Overall, the same criticism applies as with the relation between military internal goods and military virtues: the data provide

⁵⁹ The relative high number of entries on adventure by civil servants is caused solely by including references to a 'challenging job'.

⁶⁰ Gelooven, R. M. W. v. (2009). *Basisstudie Imago en Belangstelling*. Afdeling Gedragwetenschappen. Den Haag, Ministerie van Defensie. P 28: 'Most youngsters haven't a clue on what they are going to earn.'

⁶¹ Soldiers (2011). Interviews on virtue ethics with OR, NCO and officers. Amersfoort.

⁶² See annex C, table 8.

⁶³ Ibid, table 12.

⁶⁴ Ibid, table 9.

insufficient support for a specific connection between theoretically related internal goods and virtues.

6.4.4. Regarding the possibility **to impart a virtuous disposition**, civil servants have a different appreciation than soldiers. The entries show that competence is preponderantly a matter of formal teaching.⁶⁵ With responsibility, further education plays a relatively important role. The rest is a matter of experience: 'learning by doing'. As to **decision-making** civil servants refer most often to the need to reconcile their responsibility to uphold the rules and to treat the citizens with respect and fairness. Other virtues are hardly mentioned.⁶⁶ This seems to indicate a stronger attachment to the purposive nature of their practice, than was found with soldiers.

6.4.5. The data allow for some tentative **conclusions**. Civil servants do seem to have another orientation to their job than soldiers have. This can be inferred from the differences in the appreciation of internal goods and their interest in external goods as well as from the overall weaker evaluation of the concept of the virtues. The latter appreciation is based on: the average 50% higher number of entries by soldiers; the broader view of soldiers regarding the possibility and need to impart virtues; and the stronger role of virtues in military decision-making. The responses to the closed questions of the survey add to this impression. Nevertheless the civil servants appreciated the virtues as relevant to their professional activities.

Healthcare workers, data and analysis.

6.5.1. Although again, the number of respondents is small, still some differences and similarities with military responses can be noted. Regarding **internal goods** the healthcare workers as well as military personnel scored strong evaluations with satisfaction, pride and contentment.⁶⁷ However, these internal goods had entries by almost all healthcare workers, while only 60% of the soldiers made entries. This difference does not seem very startling; after all these desires and expectations are all closely related to the notion of care, which is an important feature of the (Para) medical practice. On the other hand, soldiers scored much higher with adventure and belonging, which is only weakly evaluated by healthcare workers. The same applies to the internal good of excitement. Albeit that challenge and stability had a relative low score on frequency, the score on intensity was higher. Excitement scored nil entries. Healthcare workers (as civil servants) had higher frequency scores than soldiers on contentment as referring to the ambition to help other people, but as to intensity, the scores were almost level.⁶⁸ This was also the only internal good which was mentioned by all the civil respondents: civil servants and healthcare workers. Several comments were made on the intrinsic gratification the job offers. Only one entry is made regarding external goods, but this comment was made in an offhand manner: 'The income is very practical.'⁶⁹

⁶⁵ Ibid, table 10.

⁶⁶ Ibid, table 11.

⁶⁷ These findings are confirmed in other research. See: C. Leget, G. Olthuis (2007). 'Professioneel zorg verlenen: ideaal of deugd' and J. Dwarswaard, M. Hilhorst (2007) 'Toch maar liever timmerman, over de idealen van de (huis)arts' in Werkzame idealen. Kole, J., de Ruyter D. Ed. Assen, van Gorcum. P 25, 38-41 and Mulder, H. (2005). "Wil je meten en beheersen, of geef je mensen de kans hun persoon met de professie te verbinden?" Christen Democratische Verkenningen Beroepszeer: waarom Nederland niet goed werkt. (Zomer 2005): 190-195.

⁶⁸ See annex C, table 7.

⁶⁹ Soldiers (2011). Interviews on virtue ethics with OR, NCO and officers. Amersfoort.

6.5.2. These differences and similarities are also notable regarding **virtues**. Typical military virtues like courage, resilience and discipline are weakly evaluated by healthcare workers. Responsibility, competence, and respect, on the other hand, are highly ranked by both soldiers and healthcare workers.⁷⁰ These virtues have entries by almost all soldiers and healthcare workers.⁷¹ The strong commitment to these virtues is also visible in the number of entries: military respondents score an average of 14 entries, while healthcare workers score an individual average of 15 entries. Comradeship is well evaluated by both groups as well: both healthcare workers and soldiers score 8 entries on average. This seems to indicate an overall strong evaluation of at least four of the seven virtues of character. Furthermore, the scores resulted in a ranking of virtues, which is the same as with soldiers, which seems to suggest some kind of consensus in appreciating the different virtues. This support is mirrored by the responses regarding virtues in the closed questions of the survey.⁷² A substantial 97% of the healthcare workers agreed to the draft descriptions of the virtues, while 3% (one entry) entered 'no opinion'. None disagreed.

6.5.3. The **relation between internal goods and virtues** seems less problematic with health care workers. Six virtues have a similar evaluation as the related internal goods. Furthermore, the absence of any reference to the virtue of courage matches the absence of any reference to the internal good of excitement.⁷³ The fact that the evaluation of six out of seven virtues matches with the evaluation of the related internal goods seems to indicate that there is a direct connection between some specific internal goods and the respondent virtues. However, this connection is not necessarily of a causal nature. It could well be that people who aspire at working in health care have more realistic expectations. Many have experience with health care: directly and personal or indirectly by friends and family. Their motivation to work in healthcare and the ensuing attitude is largely care related, and this relation could manifest itself in strong evaluation on both internal goods and virtues. The matches that were identified do not provide a convincing support for a clear cut one on one relation between specific internal goods and separate related virtues. Although, the data on frequency suggest a generic relation between some internal goods and specific virtues, this suggestion is contradicted by the scores on intensity with only two matches (one of which refers to a weak connection). There are still no convincing arguments that warrant a positive conclusion as to a specific single relation between specific internal goods and related virtues. On the other hand, do the data not contradict any such connection. Therefore, also in the case of health care workers, there are still reasons to doubt whether it is possible to identify a direct connection between specific internal goods and separate related virtues.

6.5.4. The possibility **to impart a virtuous disposition** is appreciated by health care workers primarily as a matter of further education (*'Bildung'*). There was little response as to the possibility to impart different virtues, with one exception: responsibility. All methods to impart this virtue are mentioned: instruction, further education and experience.⁷⁴ Inspiration by exemplary conduct of role models is

⁷⁰ C. Leget, G. Olthuis (2007). 'Professioneel zorg verlenen: ideaal of deugd' en J. Dwarswaard, M. Hilhorst (2007) 'Toch maar liever timmerman, over de idealen van de (huis)arts' in Werkzame idealen. Kole, J., de Ruyter, D. Ed. Assen, van Gorcum. P 24, 29-34, 42-43.

⁷¹ See annex C, tables 2 and 8.

⁷² Ibid, table 12.

⁷³ Ibid, table 9.

⁷⁴ Ibid, table 10.

mentioned as well.⁷⁵ As to **decision-making**, healthcare workers often refer to their special responsibility towards their patients. This relation requires high professional standards and respect for their patients.⁷⁶ Medical considerations, sometimes backed by a second opinion of peers, as well as respect for the vulnerability of the patient are decisive in coming to practical decisions.

6.5.5. Based on the data some preliminary **conclusions** can be drawn. In many respects, healthcare workers seem to have a similar orientation to their professional activities like soldiers have. Both disregard external goods. This can be concluded from the similarities in the appreciation of some of the internal goods and virtues. However, these similarities do not provide positive evidence that there is a direct (even causal) relation between specific internal goods and related virtues. Divergent appreciations (for example, with courage, resilience and discipline) can be readily explained by differences in the nature of both the military and healthcare practice. They both also have a positive appreciation of the possibility to impart virtues, although healthcare workers seem to take a weaker position regarding this issue and views on methods differ as well. A similar conclusion can be drawn regarding the role of virtues in decision making.

Conclusions.

6.6.1. Application of the theoretical framework on military practice results in findings that are recognized and acknowledged as relevant. Some of these findings are supported by other data.⁷⁷ This pertains to internal goods, virtues and the possibility to impart virtues as well as to what extent virtues play a role in practical decision-making. Therefore, the conclusion seems justified that the theory of MacIntyre enables the development of a virtue ethical scheme of military ethics. However, there is one element in MacIntyre's theory that seems problematic and that is the assumed connection between internal goods and virtues. There are indications that such a generic relation does exist, but I have not been able to particularize this generic relation on the level of specific internal goods and related virtues.

However, the fact that I have not been able to prove, or otherwise substantiate the existence of such specific relation, does not mean that such relation is absent, however further research is required. This further research could include the question to what extent desires can be identified and whether there is a connection between specific desires and actions. In short, how far is human behaviour 'directed' by desire, both in a generic as in a specific sense. The other question I try to answer in this chapter is to what extent do the outlines of the virtue ethical scheme I developed, address the complexities of operational reality. The interviews give a strong indication that the virtues I discerned are indeed recognized, acknowledged and accepted by soldiers with proven operational experience. The consistent and strong support further indicates that the outcomes have representative value: known as communicative

⁷⁵ J. Dwarswaard, M. Hilhorst (2007) 'Toch maar liever timmerman, over de idealen van de (huis)arts' in Werkzame idealen. Kole, J., de Ruyter, D. Ed. Assen, van Gorcum. P 40.

⁷⁶ Ibid, table 11.

⁷⁷ See: Rees Vellinga, N. van (2006). Belangstellingsonderzoek 2005-2006, Een baan als militair. Afdeling Gedragswetenschappen. Den Haag, Ministerie van Defensie. P 10 and Gelooven, R. M. W. v. (2009). Basisstudie Imago en Belangstelling. Afdeling Gedragswetenschappen. Den Haag, Ministerie van Defensie. P 31. Verweij, D. E. M. (2007). Morele professionaliteit in de militaire praktijk. P 129-134; Leget, C., Olthuis, G. (2007). Professioneel zorg verlenen: ideaal of deugd. P 24-36; Dwarswaard, J., Hilhorst, M. (2007). Over de idealen van de (huis)arts. P 37-50; . Karssing, E., Niessen, R. (2007). Geroepen om het algemeen belang te dienen: de idealen van ambtenaren. P 139-151, alle in Werkzame idealen. Kole, J., de Ruyter, D. Ed. Assen, van Gorcum.

generalizability.⁷⁸ This indication is validated by the parallel survey among civil servants and healthcare workers. The overall idea of the military as a practice is supported by the similarities with healthcare workers regarding the strong evaluation of internal goods and virtues and the absence of a primary interest in external goods (job security, salary, status, etc.) Additional support is found in the differences with civil servants whose jobs have fewer characteristics of a practice. This is especially apparent in their interest in external goods and a weaker evaluation of virtues.⁷⁹ The overall coherence seems strong: the respondents made a serious attempt to communicate their experiences related to the questions asked and in their expositions they addressed similar themes.⁸⁰

6.6.2. What at first sight seems remarkable is that a majority of civil servants and all healthcare workers found that the military virtues of character also covered the virtues - or more abstract ideals - they thought applicable to their own professional activities. None of the respondents mentioned other virtues. Especially in the case of healthcare workers this is striking as their profession has a strong ethical component, and a lot of attention is given to the ethics of care and principles of medical care.⁸¹ However, this outcome could be the effect of the closed nature of that part of the survey. On the other hand, all were explicitly asked whether the list covered all aspects of their activities. However, we should also bear in mind that virtues are related to practices, which serve as frames of reference. The notion of a virtue pertains to a disposition to act in accordance with the standards of excellence. The nature of the practice determines what kind of activities is required and how specific standards of excellence are aspired at. Practices shape the frames in which activities are put forth, and standards of excellence are aspired at. From this perspective, a specific virtue could be demonstrated in different ways depending on the practice, the frame of reference, in which the virtuous conduct is displayed.

6.6.3. As to the description of the virtues, several comments were made on the importance of a more positive articulation and practical recognisability. In the first version, the descriptions started right on with an articulation of the mean. A number of respondents found it hard to understand the correct meaning of the definition: they had to read the description several times before understanding what was meant. As my aim is to create a practical applicable set of virtues, these comments made me adjust the tentative descriptions of the virtues I articulated in chapter 4. In the adjusted version, I start with a positive description of the generic meaning of the virtue. Further minor changes were made as well. The result is listed below.

Sense of responsibility is the disposition to try to accomplish allotted tasks as well as possible. This disposition requires the right balance between on the one hand a negative attitude of shirking and scraping through and on the other hand an equally negative attitude of blind zeal and fanatically pursuing a mission when circumstances have changed. It also implies being prepared to account for one's actions.

⁷⁸ Smaling, A. (2009). "Generaliseerbaarheid in kwalitatief onderzoek." KWALON, platform voor kwalitatief onderzoek 14(3): 5-12.

⁷⁹ See annex D.

⁸⁰ Kohler Riessman, C. (1993). Narrative analysis. Newbury Park (California), Sage Publications. P 67 - 68.

⁸¹ Beauchamp, T. L., Childress, J.F. (2001). Principles of biomedical ethics. Oxford, University Press.

Competence is the disposition to acquire the knowledge and skills to serve (weapon) systems as well as the ability to perceive the effects these systems can produce. This disposition requires the right balance between, on the one hand, an attitude of thinking that a rough general knowledge will do and that this won't come to serious problems and on the other hand, an attitude of exaggerated attention for material and rules and wanting to do everything by the book and so hampering practical operations.

Comradeship is the disposition to share moral and practical support with fellow soldiers with whom one shares hardship and duress. This disposition requires a right balance between, on the one hand, a negative attitude of egotism, without any concern for others and on the other hand, an attitude of an exaggerated attention for other group members and their opinions and uncritical support of group actions.

Respect is the disposition to value people as fellow human beings. This disposition requires a right balance between, on the one hand, a negative attitude of contempt and authoritarian behaviour toward others and on the other hand, an attitude of blind infatuation and exaggerated concern for any others. Respect does not only pertain to the members of the same group but also to other soldiers; military subordinates and superiors, as well as to civilians and even the enemy is entitled to a respectful treatment when fallen into our hands.

Courage is the disposition to take personal risks in order to achieve an important goal. This disposition requires a right balance between, on the one hand, an attitude of avoiding risks and cowardice and on the other hand, an attitude of recklessness and taking unnecessary risks for yourself and others. Courage is not only displayed in taking physical risks but also in showing moral vigour.

Resilience is the disposition to persevere in the face of adverse conditions and physical exhaustion and mental distress. This disposition requires the right balance between, on the one hand, an attitude of weakness, self pity and resignation at the smallest misfortune and on the other hand, an attitude of overestimating one's capabilities and not taking human limits into account, eventually resulting in collapse. Resilience has both a physical and a mental component.

Discipline is the disposition to abide by rules and regulations. This disposition requires a right balance between, on the one hand, a negative attitude resulting in a neglect of rules by which one might endanger oneself and others and on the other hand, an attitude of strict adherence by rules and taking these literally which frustrates the progress of the work at hand.

Practical wisdom is the disposition that enables a person to perceive a situation, to deliberate on what is appropriate and to act accordingly. The virtues of character identify the need for action, the virtue of practical wisdom enables a person to determine

how to act. This disposition requires a right balance between, on the one hand, a wavering conduct and inconclusive action in case of pressure or any other emergency and on the other hand, immediate and impulsive action at the first hint of difficulties. Practical wisdom entails keeping a clear head, taking full account of the situation and taking decisive action. When displayed in leading others it also entails strong directive guidance while leaving room for initiative and displaying strong personal commitment.

6.6.4. The overall outcome of this empirical validation does provide support for my assumption that: ‘...the theory of virtue ethics as elaborated by Alasdair MacIntyre in his book ‘After Virtue’ provides a suitable instrument to identify, develop, instil and uphold the required moral standards in the military.’ The overall support for the theoretically developed concept of military virtues and the constructive comments by the respondents I interviewed resulted in the above definition of seven military virtues of character and the military virtue of intellect, practical wisdom. This support regards the possibility to identify and develop the required moral disposition and standards of excellence. This chapter concludes the first part of this thesis, which pertained to the exploration and analysis of military practice and the related internal goods and virtues. In the next chapters, I turn to the military institution without which there would not be a military practice.

Annex A to chapter 6: interview protocol

1. Particulars of the respondent

Name	
Date of birth	
Particulars	duration of service/rank/previous working experience

2. First 'broad' orientation: which desires play a part in joining?

- a. Can you recall what you were looking for when joining?
- b. Did you find what you looked for?
- c. Is there anything you looked for, but didn't find?
- d. Did you find things, you hadn't looked for?
- e. What is it precisely that you enjoy your work for?
- f. Are these thing important for you, and how come?
- g. Did your satisfaction increase or decrease while a member of..., and how come?

3. Specific orientation: did your experience lead to reconsidering your desires and values?

- a. Have you experienced any serious operational incidents?
- b. Can you tell me in your own words what happened and what you have faced?
- c. Did this experience result in a changed attitude toward the things you find important?
- d. Can you tell me which attitudes changed and why?

4. To what extent do 'values' play a part in decision making?

- a. Did you ever have to make a (morally) difficult decision?

- b. Can you tell me what happened then.

- c. Why did you find the decision difficult?

- d. Why did you eventually do what you did?

- e. Was that a conscious decision (after a rational deliberation)?

- f. What determined your decision?

- g. Did values play any role in your decision making?

5. Which 'values' do you consider important in others?

- a. Are there people with whom you work together who you admire or respect?

- b. What is this admiration or respect based on?

- c. Are there people with whom you work together who you do not admire or respect?

- d. On which grounds?

6. Which values do you consider important and can these be conveyed to others?

- a. Which characteristics make you a good member of your organization?

- b. Did you already possess these characteristics before you joined?

- c. How did you acquire these characteristics?

- d. Which characteristics should all fellow members possess?

- e. Is it possible to impart these characteristics to others?

- f. What would we have to do in order to impart these characteristics to others?

7. To what extent are wider values of the armed forces or society important?

- a. Are there any wider values that are important for you in your job?

- b. To what extent do these values play a role?

8. Conclusion

- a. Regarding the things we talked about, is there anything you want to add?

- b. Is there anything else you want to bring forward?

9. Evaluation

- a. How did you experience our conversation?

- b. Did you have ample opportunity to say whatever you wanted to say?

- c. Did you feel hampered in any way during this conversation?

10. Reality check

Below is a number of dispositions listed. Do you (strongly) agree or disagree with the description and do you consider this disposition relevant for you as a professional?

- a. **Sense of responsibility**, as the right mean between an attitude of shirking and scraping through and an attitude of blind zeal and fanatically pursuing a mission while circumstances have changed.

strong disagreement	disagreement	no opinion	agreement	strong agreement		relevant	not relevant
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- b. **Competence**, as the right mean between an attitude of thinking that a rough general knowledge will do and that this won't come to serious problems and an attitude of exaggerated attention for material and rules and wanting to do everything by the book.

strong disagreement	disagreement	no opinion	agreement	strong agreement		relevant	not relevant
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- c. **Comradeship**, as the right mean between an attitude of egotism, without any concern for others and an attitude of an exaggerated attention for group opinions and uncritical support of group actions.

strong disagreement	disagreement	no opinion	agreement	strong agreement		relevant	not relevant
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- d. **Respect**, as the right mean between an attitude of contempt and authoritarian behaviour toward others and blind infatuation and approving anything the other does. Respect does not only pertain to the members of the same group but also to subordinates, superiors and civilians in the area of operations; as well as any opponent.

strong disagreement	disagreement	no opinion	agreement	strong agreement		relevant	not relevant
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- e. **Resilience**, as the right mean between an attitude of weakness and resignation at the smallest misfortune and an attitude of overestimating one's capabilities and not taking human limits into account. Resilience has a physical and a mental component.

strong disagreement	disagreement	no opinion	agreement	strong agreement		relevant	not relevant
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- f. **Discipline**, as a mean between an attitude of neglect of rules by which one might endanger oneself and others and an attitude of strict abidance by rules and taking these literally which frustrates the progress of the work at hand.

strong disagreement	disagreement	no opinion	agreement	strong agreement		relevant	not relevant
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- g. **Courage**, as the mean between an attitude of avoiding risks and cowardice and an attitude of recklessness and taking unnecessary risks for yourself and others.

strong disagreement	disagreement	no opinion	agreement	strong agreement		relevant	not relevant
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h. Practical wisdom,⁸² as the mean between wavering conduct and inconclusive guidance in case of pressure or any other emergency and impulsive action and strong directive guidance at the first hint of difficulties. Practical wisdom entails keeping a clear head, taking full account of the situation, taking decisive action while leaving room for initiative and displaying strong personal commitment.

strong disagreement	disagreement	no opinion	agreement	strong agreement		relevant	not relevant
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Are there any dispositions missing or cover the above all aspects that are relevant under operational circumstances?

Are the above dispositions only relevant in your work or also in other circumstances and situations?

⁸² Added later.

Annex B to chapter 6: Composition of samples.

1. military sample

Strength military personnel Royal Netherlands Armed Forces by July 1st 2011⁸³

	Other Ranks		NCO		Officers		Totals by service		Totals
	(#)	(%)	(#)	(%)	(#)	(%)	(#)	(%)	(%)
Navy	3137	32%	4353	45%	2200	23%	9690	100%	20%
Army	10379	47%	7275	33%	4504	20%	22158	100%	48%
Air Force	2079	22%	4529	48%	2782	23%	9390	100%	20%
Constabulary	1142	19%	4133	68%	764	13%	6039	100%	12%
	16737	37%	20290	43%	10250	20%	47277		100%

Composition of sample military respondents in 2011

	Other Ranks		NCO		Officers		Totals by service		Totals
	(#)	(%)	(#)	(%)	(#)	(%)	(#)	(%)	(%)
Navy	1		2		0		3		23%
Army	3		1		1		5		45%
Air Force	0		1		1		2		18%
Constabulary	0		1		0		1		9%
	4	37%	5	45%	2	18%	11		100%

Operational experience military respondents 2011

- Wounded by enemy fire 3
- Wounded by friendly fire 1
- Distinguished for valour 6
- Other proven combat experience 1

2. civil samples

	Gender	Age 20-30	Age 30-40	Age 40-50	Age 50 >	Totals
Civil servants	3M/2F	-	2	2	1	5
Healthcare	1M/4F	-	1	3	1	5
Totals	10	-	3	5	2	10

⁸³ Data by the Chief Directorate Personnel Ministry of Defence in E-mail to the author of July 20th 2011.

Annex C to chapter 6: data.

1. Number of entries by **military personnel in open-end interviews**.
(other ranks = OR; non-commissioned officers = NCO; officers = Off)

Table 1: internal goods

	OR 1	OR 2	OR 3	OR 4	Int. OR	NCO 1	NCO 2	NCO 3	NCO 4	NCO 5	Int. NCO	Off 1	Off 2	Int. Off	Total	Int.
Satisfaction & achievement	1	-	-	-		2	3	2	3	5		2	12		30	4,3
Pride & appreciation	-	1	-	-		2	-	4	1	-		3	11		22	3,7
Contentment & fairness	1	-	1	4		-	-	-	-	1		2	7		16	2,7
Excitement & thrill	-	-	-	-		-	1	1	-	-		-	2		4	1,3
Belonging & security	1	-	2	3		-	-	3	1	7		5	5		27	3,4
Adventure & challenge	4	-	1	1		3	6	2	4	4		4	1		30	3
Structure & stability	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-		-	-		0	0
Total	7	1	4	8		7	10	12	9	17		16	38		129	
Intensity¹	1,8	1	1,3	2,7	1,7	2,3	3,3	2,4	2,3	4,2	2,9	3,2	6,3	4.8		
External goods	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-		-	-		0	

Frequency entries # per respondent: average (\bar{x}) = 12, Median (**M**) = 9

Frequency entries # per internal good: \bar{x} = 18, **M** = 22

Table 2: virtues

	OR 1	OR 2	OR 3	OR 4	Int. OR	NCO 1	NCO 2	NCO 3	NCO 4	NCO 5	Int. NCO	Off 1	Off 2	Int. Off	Total	Int.
Responsibility	5	13	19	16		11	18	17	23	13		30	18		183	16,6
Competence	11	9	14	19		9	18	15	11	9		21	11		147	13,4
Respect	7	10	11	11		8	10	14	5	7		13	9		105	9,5
Courage	-	1	3	3		1	3	6	-	-		6	3		26	3,3
Comradeship	12	7	6	9		5	10	13	6	6		8	4		86	7,8
Resilience	8	3	6	7		6	18	6	8	5		10	5		82	7,5
Discipline	4	3	3	2		2	13	4	3	5		4	1		44	4
Total	47	46	62	67		42	90	75	56	45		92	51		673	
Intensity	7,8	6,6	8,9	9,6	8,2	6	12,9	10,7	9,3	7,5	9,3	13,1	7,3	10,2		
Practical wisdom	-	4	2	5		2	3	4	3	7		10	18		62	

Frequency entries # per respondent: $\bar{x} = 61$, $M = 56$

Frequency entries # per virtue: $\bar{x} = 96$, $M = 86$

Table 3: evaluation of internal goods and related virtues

Internal goods	Evaluation			Virtues	Evaluation		Direction of change	
	Freq.	Int.			Freq.	Int.	Freq.	Int.
Satisfaction	S	S		Responsibility	S	S	Match →	→
Pride	M	S		Competence	S	S	Stronger ↑	→
Contentment	M	M		Respect	M	M	Match →	→
Excitement	W	W		Courage	W	W	Match →	→
Belonging	S	M		Comradeship	M	M	Weaker ↓	→
Adventure	S	M		Resilience	M	M	Weaker ↓	→
Structure	W	W		Discipline	W	W	Match →	→

Table 4: appreciation of the possibility to impart virtues

	Instr.	Train.	Edu.	Exp.	Total	remarks
Responsibility	3	5	3	4	15	
Competence	2	5	2	2	11	Serious training
Respect	-	3	3	2	8	
Courage	-	-	-	-	0	
Comradeship	1	3	1	2	7	Exemplary conduct
Resilience	2	4	-	1	7	Harsh training (physical & mental)
Discipline	3	-	2	1	6	Rules matter (ROE)
Practical wisdom	-	-	4	1	5	
Total	11	20	15	13	59	

Table 5: appreciation of the influence of virtues in operational decisions

	Decision-making			Total (11x)
	OR (4x)	NCO (5x)	Off (2x)	
Responsibility	7	19	6	32
Competence	5	7	2	14
Respect	8	4	2	14
Courage	1	1	-	2
Comradeship	-	-	-	0
Resilience	-	1	-	1
Discipline	3	6	1	10
Practical wisdom	3	9	6	18
Total	27	47	17	92

2. Number of entries by **military personnel** in **closed questionnaire**.

Table 6: entries on draft military virtues

Virtues	strongly disagree	disagree	no opinion	agree	strongly agree
Responsibility	-	-	1	5	5
Competence	-	-	-	7	4
Courage	-	-	1	5	5
Comradeship	-	-	-	5	6
Respect	-	-	-	4	7
Resilience	-	-	-	4	7
Discipline	-	-	2	4	5
Practical wisdom	-	-	-	3	8
Total	0	0	4	37	47
Completeness	-	-	-	4	7
Relevance	-	-	-	3	8

Number of entries by **civilians** in **open-end interviews**.

(civil servants = CS; health care workers = HCW)

Table 7: internal goods

	CS 1	CS 2	CS 3	CS 4	CS 5	Freq CS	Int. CS	HCW 1	HCW 2	HCW 3	HCW 4	HCW 5	Freq HCW	Int. HCW	Total
Satisfaction & achievement	1	1	2	1	1	6	1,2	-	3	4	4	3	14	3,5	20
Pride & appreciation	-	-	-	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	3	6	13	2,6	15
Contentment & fairness	-	1	4	3	2	10	2,5	2	6	1	3	1	13	2,6	23
Excitement & thrill	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	0
Belonging & security	-	-	-	1	1	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	2
Adventure & challenge	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	-	-	5	2	-	7	3,5	7
Structure & stability	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	-	-	5	2	-	7	3,5	7
Total	1	2	6	6	5	20		4	10	11	12	10	47		67
Intensity	1	1	3	1,5	1,3		1,6	2	3,3	2,2	4	3,3		3	
External goods	2	3	3	2	2	12		-	-	-	-	1	1		13

Table 8: virtues

	CS 1	CS 2	CS 3	CS 4	CS 5	Freq. CS	Int. CS	HCW 1	HCW 2	HCW 3	HCW 4	HCW 5	Freq. HCW	Int. HCW	Total
Responsibility	14	12	9	17	25	77	15,4	19	14	22	13	13	81	16,2	158
Competence	8	11	5	14	15	53	10,6	13	10	15	21	13	72	14,4	125
Respect	10	6	6	11	7	40	8	8	10	16	22	16	72	14,4	112
Courage	-	1	-	-	2	3	1,5	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	3
Comradeship	4	6	5	3	8	26	5,2	13	2	12	8	3	38	7,6	64
Resilience	-	-	1	4	2	7	2,3	3	4	8	7	5	27	5,4	34
Discipline	2	4	3	2	2	13	2,6	3	3	1	4	-	11	2,8	24
Total	38	40	29	51	61	219		59	43	74	75	50	301		520
Intensity	7,6	6,7	4,8	8,5	8,7		7,4	9,8	7,2	12,3	12,5	10		10,4	
Practical wisdom	1	-	-	-	3	4		1	2	6	-	-	9		13

CS entries # per respondent: $\bar{x} = 44, M = 40$

HCW entries # per respondent: $\bar{x} = 60, M = 59$

CS entries # per virtue: $\bar{x} = 31, M = 26$

HCW entries # per virtue: $\bar{x} = 43, M = 38$

Table 9 A: evaluation of internal goods and related virtues by civil servants

Internal goods	Evaluation		Virtues	Evaluation			Direction of change	
	Freq.	Int.		Freq.	Int.		Freq.	Int.
Satisfaction	S	S		Responsibility	S	S	Match →	Match →
Pride	M	M		Competence	S	S	Stronger ↑	Stronger ↑
Contentment	S	S		Respect	M	M	Weaker ↓	Weaker ↓
Excitement	W	W		Courage	W	W	Match →	Match →
Belonging	M	M		Comradeship	M	M	Match →	Match →
Adventure	W	W		Resilience	W	W	Match →	Match →
Structure	W	W		Discipline	W	W	Match →	Match →

Table 9 B: evaluation of internal goods and related virtues by health care workers

Internal goods	Evaluation		Virtues	Evaluation			Direction of change	
	Freq.	Int.		Freq.	Int.		Freq.	Int.
Satisfaction	S	S		Responsibility	S	S	Match →	Match →
Pride	S	M		Competence	S	S	Match →	Stronger ↑
Contentment	S	M		Respect	S	S	Match →	Stronger ↑
Excitement	W	W		Courage	W	W	Match →	Match →
Belonging	W	W		Comradeship	M	M	Stronger ↑	Stronger ↑
Adventure	M	S		Resilience	M	M	Match →	Weaker ↓
Structure	W	S		Discipline	W	W	Match →	Weaker ↓

Table 10: appreciation of the possibility to impart virtues

	Instr.		Train.		Edu.		Exp.		Total			remarks
	CS	HC W	CS	HC W	CS	HC W	CS	HC W	CS	HC W	Total	
Responsibility	-	1	1	-	9	4	-	1	10	6	16	
Competence	8	2	2	-	-	-	2	-	12	2	14	Example
Respect	-	1	-	-	1	1	1	-	2	1	3	
Courage	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	0	
Comradeship	-	1	-	-	2	1	1	-	3	1	4	
Resilience	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	0	1	
Discipline	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	0	
Practical wisdom	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0	1	1	
Total	8	5	3	0	1 3	6	4	2	28	11	39	

Table 11: appreciation of the influence of virtues in operational decisions⁸⁴

	Decision-making		Total	Remarks
	CS	HCW		
Responsibility	9	4	13	
Competence	1	10	11	
Respect	4	10	14	
Courage	-	-	0	
Comradeship	1	3	4	
Resilience	0	5	5	
Discipline	2	1	3	
Practical wisdom	-	4	4	
Total	17	37	54	

⁸⁴ 'Practical decisions' in civilian terms

Table 12: entries on draft military virtues


Virtues	Strongly disagree			Disagree			No opinion			Agree			Strongly agree		
	CS	HCW	Total	CS	HCW	Total	CS	HCW	Total	CS	HCW	Total	CS	HCW	Total
Responsibility	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	0	3	3	6	2	2	4
Competence	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	0	3	2	5	2	3	5
Respect	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	0	3	2	5	2	3	5
Courage	-	-	-	2	-	2	-	-	0	3	4	7	-	1	1
Comradeship	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	1	1	4	3	7	1	1	2
Resilience	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	1	2	2	4	1	3	4
Discipline	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	0	4	3	7	-	3	3
Practical wisdom	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	1	3	3	6	-	1	1
Total	0	0	0	5	0	5	2	1	3	25	22	47	8	17	25
Completeness	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	4	5	9	-	-	-
Relevance	-	-	-	2	-	2	-	-	-	3	5	8	-	-	-

Annex D to chapter 6: positioning of respective activities

Activity A: preponderant characteristics of a practice

Activity B: characteristics a balance of both practice and poièsis

Activity C: preponderant characteristics of poièsis



Chapter 7: military institution.

Introduction

7.1. In the preceding chapters I elaborated on military practice: its characteristics, internal goods, virtues and the role of narrative in this context. I concluded my discussion so far with a 'reality-check'. This check supported the validity of my findings so far. This means that I have addressed the first and most important part of my hypothesis by which I aim to answer the central question, that the theory of virtue ethics as elaborated by Alasdair MacIntyre in his book 'After Virtue' provides a suitable instrument to identify, develop, instil and uphold the required moral standards for the military.¹ However, in his theory MacIntyre also addresses the role of institutional structures and the relation of these with the practice as such. Therefore, in this chapter I will also address the issue of the military institution and its relation with its practice. I will first explain the position of Alasdair MacIntyre regarding institutions and the related notions he introduces. From this perspective I will then have a look at the way this relationship is shaped in the Dutch military context. I will investigate to what extent the institutional interests correspond to the needs of the practice. In this context I will also investigate the present policy on morality of the Dutch MOD as embodied in the code of conduct. After all, a code of conduct communicates what an organisation thinks important.² I will compare the present code with the framework of military virtues I developed in the preceding chapters. In order to add weight to this comparison, I will also compare this code with those of some other constitutional democracies; the US, the UK, the FRG and France and establish similarities and differences. I will conclude this chapter by arguing whether a virtue ethical approach to military ethics should be preferred.

Practice and institutions

7.2.1. MacIntyre argues that practices cannot survive for any length of time unless sustained by institutions.³ Without proper and consistent organization of the internal conditions and characteristics of a practice, it will not develop into a specific and as such recognizable activity. A practice will not be able to manifest itself as such, without the proper and consistent organization of the internal circumstances which provides conditions and rules and an authority to uphold the regulations under which the practice is realized. **Institutions** are the organisations which facilitate the practice by providing the conditions, means and context for its continuous existence. They provide the organizational structures and procedural frameworks by codifying rules and setting standards. Often practices are organisationally supported by more than one institution. Referring again to the example of rugby as a practice it is true that one can play rugby with a few friends on a stretch of turf that happens to be available. However, if one wants to play regularly in a regular team and on a regular playing field, it is obvious that a rugby club is required. The rugby club provides continuity and the appropriate context for the game. It organizes teams and matches, appoints referees, and provides a pitch and training facilities. A rugby club is in its turn a member of the national rugby league. The league organises a competition between clubs, provides education and training for rugby referees and coaches, as well as club officials, etc. The league in its turn is a

¹ MacIntyre, A. (2007). *After Virtue*. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co.

² Olthoorn, P. (2011). *Military Ethics and Virtues*. Abingdon, Routledge. P 86.

³ MacIntyre, A. (2007). *After Virtue*. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 194, 195.

member of the international rugby board that organises international competitions and tournaments and provides internationally uniform rules and standards.

7.2.2. It is in the context of the institutions that the **external goods** of a practice can be acquired.⁴ These external goods are not acquired by participating in a practice, but by means of a practice. The practice serves as an instrument to acquire these external goods. The institution that supports the practice is the place where these external goods are made available. The institutions provide organisation and structure, which implies positions for officials, jobs. Within the framework of institutions positions and the ensuing status are acquired; power is wielded and money is earned: the prototypical external goods.⁵ From this perspective, the institution serves as a means to other ends, whereas the practice is an end in itself.⁶ In his later works, MacIntyre introduces some gradation compared with this earlier approach. He articulates the distinction between internal goods (acquired through participating in the practice) and external goods (acquired by means of the practice) also as respectively goods of excellence and goods of effectiveness.⁷ He explains that the relation between these two types of goods is a complicated one. He states that the acquisition of both internal goods (of excellence) and external goods (of effectiveness) require sometimes the same kind of qualities; for example, a sense of responsibility, competence and respect. But he then states that it is also clear that the content of these qualities will differ depending on the context and perspective.⁸ In the practice, these qualities are self imposed and excellence is primarily a matter of merit and desert. A person not meeting the standards of excellence will primarily wrong himself. After all, he knows very well what is expected and nevertheless, fails in doing so, which may affect his self-esteem. In the institution these qualities, to a certain extent, could be necessary as well, but excellence is primarily a matter of tangible results and institutional targets met. A person not meeting these standards could not only wrong himself but also those who depend on him, as well as the institution he serves. According to MacIntyre internal and external goods are not mutually exclusive: some excellence is required to be truly effective and on the other hand, the yields of effectiveness often are a stimulus to improve excellence.

7.2.3. However, institutions can also have a more substantial role than merely sustaining the practice. This criticism is articulated by Miller and pertains to MacIntyre's view of a practice as an autotelic, self-contained phenomenon.⁹ According to Miller this is a too limited a view on the concept of a practice. In his view, practices are not pursued only for the sake of acquiring internal goods, some of them serve social ends beyond themselves.¹⁰ These **purposive practices** also can - and should - be reviewed from the perspective of the end(s) they are meant to serve. Is a virtue something autotelic, a goal

⁴ Ibid, P 190.

⁵ Ibid, P 194. See also: Verbrugge, A. (2005). Geschonden beroepseer. Beroepszeer; waarom Nederland niet werkt. M. Jansen. Amsterdam, Boom. **Zomer 2005**: 108-123.

⁶ Tongeren van, P. (2003). Deugdelijk leven. Amsterdam, Sun. P 20,21.

⁷ MacIntyre, A. (2003). Whose justice? Which rationality? Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 32-46.

⁸ Ibid, P 32.

⁹ Miller, D. (1994). Virtues, practices and justice. After MacIntyre. Horton, J and Mendus, S. (ed.) Cambridge, Polity Press: 245-264 and Miller, D. (1999). Principles of social justice. Cambridge (Massachusetts), Harvard University Press. P 111-130.

¹⁰ Miller, D. (1999). Principles of social justice. Cambridge (Massachusetts), Harvard University Press. P 117.

in itself, or could it also contribute to a higher goal? The concept of a purposive practice allows for a wider evaluation of the virtues involved.¹¹ The standards of excellence are not only a matter of the participants in the practice, but are also a matter of achieving the wider purpose of the practice in an excellent way. For example, the practice of medicine is not practiced solely to help patients and find better cures, but also to increase public health! The realization and safeguarding of public health is not a matter of medical expertise only, but requires organization and therefore institutions. This means that a critical assessment of the standards of excellence can be made both from within the practice as from the perspective of the social ends served by the practice. As a consequence of Miller's criticism, institutions often have a more substantial role than just sustaining a practice. Institutions can also embody the purpose of a practice: institutions do not only provide means to sustain a practice, but also provide direction and guidance in achieving and serving a wider (moral) goal. This means providing rules and regulations and standards of excellence that are not only relevant to the excellence in the practice but also to social ends that are served by the practice.

7.2.4. In my opinion, the criticism by Miller cannot be ignored: there are just too many examples of his kind of purposive practices. Some obvious examples are teaching and the public education system, medical care and the public health organization, etc. Especially with a view on the military practice, there is no doubt that a purposive perspective is indispensable. Without a social purpose a public institution, and (legal) rules and regulations, some aspects of the military practice - killing other soldiers - would come to nothing more than wanton killing: murder. However, the criticism of Miller does not imply that the complete concept of MacIntyre is invalid. The idea of internal goods and their function as to establish what kind of virtues are relevant, is not refuted by Miller's criticism. Nevertheless, Miller's argument is convincing that there are more influences relevant as to establishing which virtues are important, than just those which facilitate the acquirement of the internal goods of the practice. Some practices do seem to have a double character. In this thesis, I will therefore use the concept of a purposive practice in addition to the framework developed by MacIntyre, and as such it will provide an extra and necessary perspective of evaluation. In order to provide a clear picture of the relation between the practice and the military institution, the question that needs to be answered is, which moral directions figure in the case of the military as a purposive institution?

7.2.5. Institutions also play a role within the community and are a part of the fabric of society, and thus they are often part of the moral tradition of a community as well. As such the institutions also officiate as a kind of linking pin between the practice and the wider fabric of society and its moral traditions. Also from this perspective the influence of the institutions on the morality of the practice cannot be ignored and has to be taken into account. This is evident in practical moral reasoning - as part of a practice - which is often, at least partly, based on institutional and social values. Also from this perspective the institution is more than just an organizational backbone to support a practice.

Military institutions and purpose

7.3.1. Military practice is no exception to the rule that it needs an institution to provide an adequate structure, to set standards of excellence and safeguard continuity. However, there is also another, more pressing necessity for military institutions: a navy, army, air

¹¹ Ibid, P 120.

force and a constabulary. These institutions create vehicles for the legitimate use of violence. Without legitimate military institutions and the legal and moral rules and regulations that are part and parcel of these institutions, military practice would be little more than banditry.

7.3.2. Also it will be clear that the **military is a purposive practice**: it has a wider goal than merely providing a vehicle for individuals to participate in military activities.¹² This purpose, the social end, of the military in the Netherlands is embedded in the constitution.¹³ The (international) commitment of the armed forces is also subject to the (international) rule of law that is embedded in both the constitution and the international treaties to which the Dutch government is a signatory. The most important of these international legal agreements are the UN Charter, the NATO treaty and the treaties and protocols of the Geneva Convention. These treaties constitute the most important parts of the legal body of the 'jus ad bellum' which stipulates when it is legitimate to go to war.¹⁴ The most important tenets can be summarized as follows: an armed conflict is legal if taking up arms is a matter of self-defence or as the inevitable means of last resort when all other ways to solve the conflict have failed; the aim of a war must be just as well and revenge can never be a motive to go to war; war can only be decided on by the legal government of a nation-state.¹⁵

7.3.3. The generic purpose of the Dutch armed forces is elaborated into actual political goals. These political goals, the practical political purposes, are articulated in the year 2000 Defence White paper.¹⁶ In this White Paper, three main tasks are discerned. In a concise version these are: (1) defence and protection of the national territory and interests, (2) promotion of the international rule of law and (3) support of civil authorities. This practical purpose and tasks clearly refer to the operational nature of the ensuing military activities: to defend, protect, promote and assist.¹⁷ This approach is

¹² Huntington, S. P. (1957). *The soldier and the state*. Cambridge (Massachusetts), Harvard University Press. P 2, 9-10, 57-58, 65.

¹³ *Grondwet van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden*. Den Haag, Kluwer, (2002) art. 97: 'ten behoeve van de verdediging van en ter bescherming van de belangen van het Koninkrijk, alsmede ten behoeve van de handhaving en bevordering van de internationale rechtsorde is er een krijgsmacht.' (In translation that is: *For the defence of the realm and to protect the interests of the Kingdom as well as to maintain and promote the international rule of law, there will be an armed force.*)

¹⁴ For a summary of the main aspect of the tradition of 'jus ad bellum' and its problematic aspects see: Koninklijke Landmacht. (1996). *Army Doctrine Publication I Military Doctrine*. Den Haag, Landmachtstaf. P 28-30; Norman, R. (1995). *Ethics, Killing and War*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. P 117-121; Achterhuis, H. (2008). *Met alle geweld*. Rotterdam, Lemniscaat. P 505-535 and Walzer, M. (1977). *Just and unjust wars*. New York, Basic books. P 152-153.

¹⁵ The role of the nation-state in this respect has diminished and is largely taken over by the international community, notably the U.N. The tenets of 'jus ad bellum' tradition have not changed though. For a more elaborate account see: Ducheine, P. A. L. (2008). *Krijgsmacht, Geweldgebruik & terreurbestrijding*. Nijmegen, Wolf Legal Publishers.

¹⁶ *Kamerstukken II 1999-2000, 26 800 X, nr. 46*. Den Haag, Staatsdrukkerij, (2000) P 41: 'De hoofdtaken van de krijgsmacht zijn: beschermen van de integriteit van het eigen en bondgenootschappelijke grondgebied, bevorderen van de internationale rechtsorde en stabiliteit, ondersteunen van civiele autoriteiten bij rechtshandhaving, rampenbestrijding en humanitaire hulp, zowel nationaal als internationaal.' (In translation that is: *The main tasks of the armed forces are: protecting the integrity of the own territory and that of allies, promoting of the international rule of law and stability, supporting civil authorities in maintaining law and order, disaster relief and providing humanitarian aid, both nationally and internationally.*)

¹⁷ The emphasis on these operational activities is in support of my operational perspective on military practice.

also noticeable in the recent policy of NATO: 'The lessons learnt from NATO operations, in particular, in Afghanistan and the Western Balkans, make it clear that a comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is necessary for effective crisis management.'¹⁸ In the international colloquial this comprehensive approach is often referred to by the acronym 3D, which stands for defence, diplomacy, and development. The profile for higher educated officers of the Dutch armed forces (colonel and higher ranks) is based on this approach as well. In this inter-service profile, three roles are discerned: warrior, manager and diplomat.¹⁹ This development reflects the present three different main tasks of the armed forces, which imply more divergent roles than only to fight the nation's wars.²⁰

7.3.4. However, as noted in the preceding paragraph, modern soldiers are confronted with diverging tasks, which - on the practical level - may require different roles and frames of reference. These differences could be of such proportion that for all practical purposes one could claim to discern separate practices. Recently, the issue of soldier's different roles was studied in depth, which resulted in some remarkable conclusions.²¹ Broesder studied role identities of Dutch soldiers in both 'peace keeper' and 'warrior' missions and how their respective role affected their work-related attitudes. Her first finding was that these roles can be measured as independent constructs: in short, there are measurable differences. She also found out that - in spite of these differences - Dutch soldiers identified with both roles simultaneously and that a preference for one role is not related to a preference for the other role. This means that - at least in the Dutch context - preparing for one role does not disqualify the soldier for deployment in another role. Role strain develops only when allotted tasks are not in line with the role identity of the mission. This could mean that general training could be focussed on a 'warrior' identity without impairing the ability to adapt to a 'peace keeper' identity. The relevant frame of reference must be clear! This means that an operational focus in training and education and aspiring at the related technically and tactically more complex standards of excellence for 'warriors' do not impair the soldier's ability to adopt other roles. However, it does not seem wise to focus exclusively on a 'warrior' ethos in all aspects of military training. This could hamper the necessary conversion to other roles. From this perspective especially a virtue like the above-described respect, which encompasses not only fellow soldiers but civilians and opposing fighters as well seems appropriate. Another conclusion that can be drawn is that mission specific training seems to gain in importance as a means to limit the risks of role strain and increases relevant competence. However, in spite of the differences Broesder identified, there are no indications that different roles imply different practices, on the contrary. On the whole, it seems clear that the purposive perspective adds an extra dimension to military practice and its virtues: on the institutional level which provides a wider frame of reference and on the practical level depending on the role in which the military is deployed.

¹⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Active Engagement, Modern Defence. Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon, 19 November 2010.

¹⁹ Commandant der Strijdkrachten, (2007). *Profiel hoger opgeleide krijgsmacht officier*. Ministerie van Defensie. Den Haag.

²⁰ See also Oltshoorn, P. (2011). Military Ethics and Virtues. Abingdon, Routledge. P 6-7.

²¹ Broesder, W. A. (2011). *Soldiers wielding Swords and Ploughshares*. Psychology. Leuven, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. **PhD**: 114.

7.3.5. However, whatever the role of the military, the legitimate deployment of the armed forces requires full political control. The armed forces are by tradition an instrument of force in the hands of the legitimate political government to defend the sovereignty of the nation (and its allies). In order to serve its purpose the military must be trustworthy in the discharge of its duty, it must be credible in equipment and training and reliable as to its abidance to the law and the directives issued by the legal government. This also requires that those who are members of the military organization subordinate themselves to this legal and political control unconditionally and willingly. As a formal confirmation of the special status of the military as an instrument of state violence and to assure that the military will dutifully execute its special task, all Dutch soldiers are required to take an oath.²² In this oath, they swear allegiance to the king, abidance to the law and subordination to the military regimen.²³ Allegiance to the king is not a personal allegiance, but allegiance to the king as the formal head of the democratically chosen and legitimate government. Abidance to the law means that the military will abide to the laws of the realm and the laws and regulations of 'jus in bello': this formula speaks largely for itself. Subordination to military discipline means that the soldiers will respect their legal superiors and obey their orders faithfully, as well as adhere to the other rules and regulations of the military regimen. The oath is sworn in front of a unit while holding on to the ensign of the regiment and after the oath is sworn, the national anthem is played. These circumstances make taking the oath more than an abstract speech act; instead, it is a personal commitment of the soldier in question to his fellow soldiers who are present and beyond. However, taking an oath and the ensuing duty to abide by the rule of law and the tenets of the democratic constitution does not mean that the soldier is a mere passive instrument of state. Albeit a soldier surrenders a number of rights, he still left with some important civil rights. It is possible that individual soldiers do not agree with the political goals and/or the means used to achieve those - otherwise even legal - goals. Also it is possible that soldiers are not satisfied with the organization, equipment and standards of training, or moral practices within the military. In these cases, they are faced with a moral dilemma.²⁴ They can escape only in one way, which is to resign from the military organization. The most proper way to do so would be after a formal protest against the policy or practices they do not agree with. That would provide ample opportunity for public debate about the development that is protested.²⁵ Otherwise a soldier has to fulfil his duty. The preceding argument refers to a situation in which the soldier reacts on a moral issue ex-ante. In the case of an ex-post moral issue, in which the soldier is confronted with immoral actions, the soldier is bound by the rule of law not to participate in illegal actions and should report these wrongdoings to his superiors.

²² (1982) (laatstelijk herzien op 12 juli 2012). Algemeen Militair Ambtenaren Reglement (AMAR). Ministerie van Defensie. Den Haag. Artikel 126.

²³ The formal text of the Dutch military oath is: 'Ik zweer/beloof trouw aan de koningin, gehoorzaamheid aan de wetten en onderwerping aan de krijgstucht. Zo waarlijk helpe mij God almachtig/Dat beloof ik.' (In translation that is: *I swear/promise allegiance to the Queen, abidance by the laws and subordination to military discipline. So help me God almighty/ So I promise.*) For those who have religious objections to swearing an oath invoking the help of the almighty an alternative text is available in which they make a solemn promise.

²⁴ Sherman, N. (2011). *The untold war: inside the hearts, minds and souls of our soldiers*. New York, W.W. Norton & company. P 22 and 41-48.

²⁵ However, there is a limit to this right. If the soldier - for example - does not protest the participation of the armed forces (of which he is a member) in an international conflict, he cannot refuse to be deployed. If he does and persists in his refusal he will be brought to trial and sentenced after which he will be discharged dishonourably. See also Walzer, M. (1977). *Just and unjust wars*. New York, Basic books. P 75.

7.3.6. The idea of political primacy - and the duties and rights this entails - must be an integral part of the mental 'make up' of the military mind. In the Dutch context, this means that the notion of the democratic constitutional state and the values embedded in it, must be an integral part of the shared military moral standard.²⁶ First of all, this entails bearing the responsibility inherent to the public office the soldier holds. Secondly, this involves paying respect to the law and his political and military superiors. The third implied moral standard is to maintain the discipline required to assure the effective and efficient operations of the military. Thus, the internally based military virtues responsibility, respect and discipline also have an external, institutional source, albeit that the latter has a different focus: effectiveness rather than excellence.²⁷ The importance of a wider social and institutional frame of reference cannot be underestimated. This is illustrated in the frames of reference of German soldiers during WW II. In the 'Third Reich', a shared frame of reference was created in which the basic inequality of different groups of human beings and even dehumanizing certain groups, were accepted as normal. From this perspective wanton killing of those who were labelled as sub-human was not considered immoral by - at least a substantial part of - the German soldiers.²⁸ Although constitutional democratic states are based upon the notions of freedom and equality and their armies are educated in this spirit, still some similar effects can be identified in many other armed conflicts.²⁹ This underpins the importance of the military virtue of respect, actively supported by a democratic frame of reference.

7.3.7. The central values in this democratic frame of reference are freedom and equality.³⁰ In the Dutch context, the value of cooperativeness and solidarity could be added. According to Rawls, equality entails that all men have equal political rights. Freedom entails amongst other's freedom of conscience and freedom of speech. However, these rights also require that citizens display an appropriate sense of tolerance.³¹ However, these values are broadly formulated and can be interpreted in different ways. Van Baarda and Van Iersel argue that 'peace' is the fundamental value for the armed forces as the armed forces are an instrument of the state to protect the peace and peace allows the flourishing of freedom and equality. According to them, the ensuing specific values for the armed forces should be justice (as a prerequisite for

²⁶ Huntington, S. P. (1957). The soldier and the state. Cambridge (Massachusetts), Harvard University Press. P 10.

²⁷ MacIntyre, A. (2003). Whose justice? Which rationality? Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 35-41.

²⁸ Neitzel, S., Welzer, H. (2012). Soldaten: over vechten, doden en sterven (*Soldaten, Protokolle vom Kämpfen, Töten und Sterben*). Amsterdam, Ambo. P 16-31, 63-77, 375-402. See also: Goldhagen, D. J. (1996). Hitler's willing executioners: ordinary Germans and the holocaust. London, Abacus. P 391-406.

²⁹ In the Dutch colonial war of 1946-1947 the Indonesian nationalist resistance fighters were derisively called 'peloppers'. The American soldier deployed to Vietnam in the seventies talked about 'gooks' when referring to their enemies of the Viet Cong and the north Vietnamese army. These derisive terms played a part in creating a context in which the enemy was often seen as sub-human and sometimes treated accordingly.

³⁰ Christman, J. (2002). Social and political philosophy. New York, Routledge. P 94-95.

³¹ Rawls, J. (2006). Een theorie van rechtvaardigheid. (*A theory of justice*) Rotterdam, Lemniscaat. P 223 - 238.

peace) and security (as a result of peace).³² Their approach aims at describing the outlines of an institutional 'body of ethics'. These organisational ethics encompass security, human rights, communicative competences, international law, accountability, moral awareness and civil values: all very abstract principles largely based on a deontological approach. It is hard to match these generic abstract principles to specific military virtues. However, there is also an approach to purposive values, which is based upon the virtues. Starting from the same broad democratic principles of freedom and equality, Galston argues that responsible citizenship requires four kinds of civic virtues. These are: **general civic virtues** like courage, law-abidingness and loyalty; **social civic virtues** like independence and open-mindedness; **economic civic virtues** like work ethics and saving; **political civic virtues** like respecting the rights of others and the willingness to engage in the political discourse while displaying 'public reasonableness'.³³ These civic virtues do give the military virtues also a wider purposive connotation. From this perspective, responsibility does not only pertain to military tasks to fulfil, but also to uphold the political rights of freedom and equality. Competence is also a matter of civic work ethics; of a positive attitude towards the job to be done and demonstrating diligence in its performance. Comradeship could find its civil equivalent in solidarity. Respect for the rights of others gets a wider scope which adds to the importance of this military virtue and the same goes for the virtue of courage. Resilience could be interpreted as a special kind of work-ethics; to continue on the face of set-backs and ill luck. Discipline too gets a wider perspective based on the general civic virtue of law-abidingness. Also the military virtue of intellect, practical wisdom, has a civic parallel in independence and open-mindedness. Thus, the purposive character of military praxis could be expressed by interpreting the military virtues as aggravations of civic virtues; an approach which adds further weight to the importance of the military virtues.

Military institutions and external goods

7.4.1. The military institution as such also provides **external goods** that can be aspired at. From this perspective, the military institution serves as a means to other ends. In generic terms, these ends include money, power and status or any combination of those three.³⁴ To acquire these, the employees must meet institutional standards, and these standards are not necessarily similar to the standards of excellence that are set and upheld in military practice. The first tangible institutional external good mentioned, is money. By participating in military practice - and therefore joining the armed forces - military personnel is entitled to a salary, but hardly any other financial benefits. The standard for paying soldiers is similar to those of other civil servants and entails no serious extension as the times of plunder as a substantive addition to their pay is long gone. On the other hand, when deployed abroad soldiers do get extra allowances, and these can be quite substantive. These allowances sometimes provide an incentive to volunteer for extra tours of duty abroad. However, this incentive becomes effective only once a soldier has experienced gaining an allowance. The surveys I consulted showed no proof that allowances, etc. are separate external goods for which young people desire to

³² Baarda, T. A., van, Iersel, A.H.M., van (2002). Militaire ethiek, morele dilemma's van militairen in theorie en praktijk. Budel, Damon. P203-242.

³³ Galston, W. (1991). Liberal purposes: goods, virtues and duties in the liberal state. Cambridge, University Press. P 221-227.

³⁴ MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 190, 194 and MacIntyre, A. (2003). Whose justice? Which rationality? Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 32-39.

join the military. So money is hardly to be counted as a particular relevant external good provided by the military institution. Sometimes the opposite is the case.³⁵

7.4.2. Status is another generic institutional external good. In the Netherlands status is primarily a matter of money, excellence and tradition. However, as I explained in the preceding paragraph money is hardly a source of military status. Nor seems tradition a source of external goods: the Netherlands have no living military tradition like, for example, the United Kingdom or France.³⁶ Some traditional status could be derived from the connection of the armed forces with the monarchy, but this kind of status hardly seems appealing for the larger part of the Dutch military. So excellence seems the only serious means to acquire status. This kind of status can be expressed in admiration, honours, public praise, etc. The question is how to earn these. Recent deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan and the fine stories about the excellent performance of the Dutch troops there, as well as the price paid in soldiers killed and wounded, have greatly contributed to the increasing status of the Dutch armed forces: national as well as internationally.³⁷ On the national level, this increased appreciation for armed forces and the excellent way in which they fulfil their duties. This increasing appreciation is also visible in the changed attitude towards the veterans of passed conflicts. The status of the veterans of the armed forces has substantially improved, as a result of both assertive actions by the veterans themselves and an increasing awareness of political responsibility. This improved status and recognition is visible in the presence of high standing politicians and other officials at veteran's commemorations, the introduction of an official 'veterans day', the founding (and funding) of the independent Veterans Institute, the proposed enactment of a 'Veterans Law' and the introduction of material benefits for veterans.³⁸ Nonetheless, it seems doubtful whether soldiers join the military in order to gain a share in this institutional status: status-related desires hardly figure in the surveys on reasons for joining the armed forces.

7.4.3. The last of the generic external goods is power. As stated in paragraph 7.3.2., the institutional power of the military is primarily based on the credibility of the armed forces as the state instrument of war. This means that the armed forces must be well manned, well equipped and well trained. This is basically a matter of adequate budget. The amount of social power that the armed forces actually have, could be ascertained by measuring the military budget in relation to other sectors that are financed by the state. The budget of the Dutch armed forces is modest (a mere 1.2% of the national product, and further reductions are not be excluded). The modest budget reflects the modest nature of the public power which could be acquired by participating in military practice.

³⁵ Hastings, M., Ed. (1987). The Oxford book of military anecdotes. Oxford, University Press. P 174: "Not a soldier moved (*during the siege of Savannah in 1779*). Much mortified colonel Dillon began to upbraid them for cowardice. A sergeant-major stepped forward; 'Had you not sir' he protested, 'held out a sum of money as a temptation your grenadiers would one and all have presented themselves '". See also paragraph 6.3.7.

³⁶ Klinkert, W. (2008) Van Waterloo tot Uruzgan, de militaire identiteit van Nederland. Amsterdam, Vossiuspers, Universiteit van Amsterdam.

³⁷ In 2006 Elsevier magazine proclaimed the Dutch soldiers in Uruzgan (Afghanistan) to be the man of the year. (Vrijzen, E. (2006). Militairen Uruzgan Nederlander van het jaar. Elsevier magazine. Amsterdam, Elsevier. 61: 5.)

³⁸ (2012). Handelingen Eerste Kamer: het voorstel van wet tot vaststelling van regels omtrent de bijzondere zorgplicht voor veteranen (Veteranenwet) Eerste Kamer, December 19, 2011. Den Haag. A comprehensive survey of activities and developments regarding Dutch veterans can be found in the year reports of the Veterans Institute. (<http://www.veteraneninstituut.nl/over-het-vi>)

Within the Dutch context, this fact does not constitute any problem: it is a well-accepted fact of Dutch reality. Therefore, it seems justified to assume that sharing in the limited institutional power of the Dutch armed forces is not considered an attractive external good for most soldiers.

7.4.4. However, although institutional external goods seem weakly appreciated, on the personal level the appreciation of money, status and power may be different. An obvious candidate to qualify as an external good for the individual members of the armed forces - and related to money - is the relative job-security.³⁹ As a soldier is a servant of the state, he is also entitled to the benefits that go with such a position. These benefits include job security, a guaranteed and steady income, medical care, adequate insurances and regulated working hours and holidays.⁴⁰ Among the benefits are also opportunities for further education. However, to be eligible for special courses, further education and specific postings that require specific education and training, it often does not suffice to be merely a good soldier. Often formal and civilian qualifications are required. However, the military is a closed system which has to educate its own personnel and therefore, soldiers are stimulated and assisted in meeting these formal qualifications and get better education. From a wider perspective, the armed forces provide ample opportunity for further educations and personal development of all who serve. Further education also provides opportunities for promotion and the higher salary and status that go with it. Educational opportunities do qualify as a relevant external good for almost all who join the armed forces.

7.4.5. With the other external goods, power and status, a similar argument could be entered into. Although it is problematic to derive power and status from the - relative weak - institutional position of the Dutch armed forces in society, the individual soldier also can acquire these external goods within the military organization. From the individual perspective power and status can also be acquired by the position a soldier holds within the institution. This can be a matter of expertise or rank. Informal status and power are a matter of personality and special knowledge and/or skills. Formal status and power go with rank, and rank requires education and mostly ambition as well. On an institutional level, some individual qualities, which are of little or no importance in the operational practice, are highly valued in the higher echelons and the Ministry of Defence. This pertains to qualities like: having a good hand at writing and a good and expressive style; having a good eye for the political implications of actions, plans and policies; being a good negotiator in interdepartmental or commercial consultations and having a scarce and expert knowledge in a relatively small but (politically) interesting field, etc. Another difference that requires special capabilities and talents on an institutional level is that there are more stakeholders than those committed solely to the best of the military practice. Beside military interests, there are also political and economic interests at stake. This can result in decisions which - from an operational perspective of the practice - are at most second-best and sometimes not even that. Sometimes decisions which affect military capabilities are taken nevertheless,

³⁹ Rees Vellinga, N. v. (2006). Belangstellingsonderzoek 2005-2006, Een baan als militair. Afdeling Gedragswetenschappen. Den Haag, Ministerie van Defensie: 22. An average of 5 % of those who consider joining is interested in salary and 6% is interested in educational opportunities (P10)

⁴⁰ If these benefits cannot be met - e.g. during deployment - adequate compensation is provided.

in order to serve the interests of other stakeholders.⁴¹ This sometimes requires soldiers in institutional jobs to act against the (actual or perceived) needs of the practice. To be a good 'player' at the institutional level 'game' requires flexibility and a strong and primarily personal ambition. However, successful institutional 'players' do gain status and power, and it is plausible that these gains qualify as external goods. Although the armed forces provide little or no opportunities to gain money, power and status at the institutional level, the armed forces do provide access to these external goods on an individual level.

7.4.6. The question then is to what extent soldiers all having the same opportunities to access these external goods. Some benefits like a salary, job security and educational opportunities come for all who join the armed forces. To increase these, is primarily a matter of personal capacities and ambition. At the individual level, the external goods of power and status mostly come with advanced positions within the military institution. Reaching those positions is a matter of both time and individual capacity and ambition, as the military has a closed personnel system. This means that soldiers of all ranks enter at junior level and are educated and trained for their primary jobs.⁴² Based on their educational credentials when they join, capabilities, diligence, further educational accomplishments and personal ambition they are advanced through the ranks: private soldiers can become non-commissioned officers and even get a commission. However, the majority of military personnel will stay in the category in which they entered the military. This fact, as well as the capacity of the organization and the reality that the military requires physical and mental capabilities that are not easily met when older, results in a relatively high turnover of personnel in the lower ranks. The average Dutch soldier serves for a term of 7 years; NCO's serve an average of 17 years, while officers - who often have a lifetime employment, which could run to a maximum of 40 years - remain in service for on average 24 years.⁴³ This means that the external goods of individual (formal) status and power are primarily accessible for senior employees: officers and to a lesser extent, NCO's.

7.4.7. Still there remains one issue that needs to be addressed, and that is the attractiveness of violence as such and the power one experiences in using violence. The question is whether this attraction is an internal good which finds its satisfaction in the activity that constitutes the practice. According to Achterhuis this kind of violence could be labelled as: a matter of the animal spirit of human beings; the fight for recognition amongst other human beings; and violence as the result of a 'them' and 'us' dichotomy.⁴⁴ Hooligans probably fit these qualifications. The other possibility is that wearing a uniform and carrying arms add to a sense of power in the agent's mind, a mental state, which as an end could be achieved by means of being a member of the armed forces.

⁴¹ For example in procuring military equipment it is often required that Dutch industries are involved in the manufacturing, even when this is more expensive and sometimes even when Dutch industries seem to lack the appropriate know-how and technical skills. The first happened with the procurement of the Leopard tank (1979-1980), the latter practice was manifest in the procurement of the YPR armoured infantry fighting vehicles (1977-1989) and the Fennek armoured reconnaissance vehicles (2006-2008).

⁴² Rare exceptions are made for civil specialists with relevant credits, like lawyers, accountants, general practitioners and such.

⁴³ Information to the author by the department of plans and policy of the Chief Directorate Personnel (afdeling BO/HDP) of the Dutch MOD in an E-mail correspondence of may 22, 2012.

⁴⁴ Achterhuis, H. (2008). *Met alle geweld*. Rotterdam, Lemniscaat. P 43-54. See also Taylor, C. (2010). *Een seculiere tijd (A secular age)* Rotterdam, Lemniscaat. P 855-860.

From this perspective, this sense of power would qualify as an external good.⁴⁵ The related manifestations of violence could be described as: a rational means to an appropriate end and morally justified violence, as the result of a tension between morality and politics.⁴⁶ In the surveys on the motivation of soldiers to join the military, I did not find any reference to the attractiveness of using violence; neither as an internal good, satisfying a desire nor as an external good in which joining the military serves as a means to legitimately indulge in violence.⁴⁷ This does not come as a surprise as admitting to such a personal fascination of violence is not only highly political incorrect, but it would almost certainly result in disqualifying the candidate as constituting a liability in the legitimate and proportionate use of violence. For the same reasons, the inhibitions to openly admit to this kind of fascination will probably remain in place once a candidate has joined the armed forces as a soldier. Therefore, as there is no direct evidence to qualify an inherent attraction to violence as an internal good, I will - for practical reasons - label the satisfaction felt in carrying arms as a part of the generic external good of power. This kind of external good is accessible for all soldiers, but especially for those who actually wield their arms, and this is a preponderant junior level activity.

Military practice and institution

7.5.1. As I mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, MacIntyre discerns the practice and the institution. The practice is seen as autotelic activities: the enjoyment is found in the activity itself. The achievement gained through the practice is defined by standards of excellence inherent to the practice, a view which is supplemented with the notion of 'purposive practices' in which the standards of excellence are also founded in the wider purpose of practices. Practices need institutions to provide organization and continuity. The institution allows for acquiring benefits, external goods, which are beyond the immediate activities that define the practice. The institution is a means to gain these other goods. This description runs parallel to the concepts of *praxis* versus *poiesis* which I introduced in chapter 2 and elaborated in chapter 3. Soeters uses the term 'Janus' culture to articulate the different perspectives of the practice (*praxis*) and the institution (*poiesis*) within the military.⁴⁸ This perspective sheds a new light on the figure in annex A to chapter 3. From this perspective, this figure could also be read as to what extent activities are dominated by, on the one hand, the internal goods and the virtues of the practice, the goods of excellence and/or, on the other hand, the external goods and the wider purpose related to the practice as pursued by the institution, the goods of effectiveness. The figure also provides the possibility to visualize whether there is a close relation between the purpose and ideology of the institution on the one hand, and

⁴⁵ The sense of power that I referred to, is basically a matter of a specific mental state that comes with being a member of the armed forces, wearing a uniform and carrying arms. This sense of power should not be mistaken for the actual power an individual possesses which is based on formal or informal authority and which enables him to get things done by others.

⁴⁶ Achterhuis, H. (2008). Met alle geweld. Rotterdam, Lemniscaat. P 43-54.

⁴⁷ Gelooven, R. M. W. v. (2009). Basisstudie Imago en Belangstelling. Afdeling Gedragwetenschappen. Den Haag, Ministerie van Defensie; van Rees Vellinga, N (2006). Belangstellingsonderzoek 2005-2006; Een baan als militair. Afdeling Gedragwetenschappen. Den Haag, Ministerie van Defensie; Tuinier, A. (2005). Stand van zaken belangstelling voor een baan als BBT-er bij de Koninklijke Landmacht. Afdeling Gedragwetenschappen. Den Haag, Ministerie van Defensie.

⁴⁸ Richardson, R., Verweij, D., Vogelaar, A., Kuipers, H., Ed. (2002). Mens en organisatie: de krijgsmacht in verandering. Alphen aan den Rijn, Haasbeek. P43-52.

the virtues and values of the practice on the other hand, or whether such a relationship (the gap between the wedges) is more distant.⁴⁹

7.5.2. When investigating the nature of the relation between the military practice and the military, we must first take into account the context in which the Dutch military fulfils its purpose: Dutch society. The wider moral tradition of Dutch society as well as the relation to the practices is addressed in the next chapter. In this paragraph I will limit my investigation to the military practice and institution as compared with civil purposive practices and the related public and semi-public institutions. Over the last decade, these institutions were faced with a trend to reduce the size of the administration and to limit the amount of government involvement and control and to promote the establishment of independent agencies.⁵⁰ This development was part of a bigger effort which aimed at improving the effectiveness and efficiency of public and semi-public organisations while reducing costs. However, it seems that after the initial success and enthusiasm over the benefits from this development, also feelings of discomfort have grown. These feeling were for a large part based on the - real or perceived - negative side-effects of the imposed changes.⁵¹ This pertains, for example, to public education, in which the practitioners, the teachers, are feeling underestimated and overruled by the institutional managers who are primarily focussed on reducing costs and increasing control, often under the supervision - if not with the endorsement - of the ministry of education.⁵² The perceived negligence of the educational standards of excellence is criticised, as well as the problematic nature of a primarily managerial ethos in education.⁵³ These criticisms even lead to the foundation of an association for the improvement of education in the Netherlands.⁵⁴ Also in the public health sector there is widespread discontent over the rules and regulation imposed on medical practice by the

⁴⁹ See Annex A to this chapter.

⁵⁰ Kickert, W. J. M., Bestebreuer, A., Hoekstra, A., In't Veld, R.j., Verhey, A.J.M. (1998). Aansturing van verzelfstandigde overheidsdiensten. Alphen aan den Rijn, Samson.

⁵¹ Verhaeghe, P. (2012). Identiteit. Amsterdam, Bezige Bij. Sambeek, van, N., Tonkens, E., Broer, C. (2011). "Sluipend kwaliteitsverlies in de gezondheidszorg: professionals over de gevolgen van marktwerking." Beleid en Maatschappij 38(1): 47-64. Beer, de, P. "Hoezo zijn er te veel publieke diensten?" Socialisme en democratie 67(7/8): 142-149. Graaf, de, Th.; Hoeven, van der, D. A.; Langeberg, P.J. (1985). Omtrent Parlement, opstellen over parlement en democratisch bestuur. Amsterdam, Veen. Waarden, v., F. (2012). Was Privatisering van het Publieke Domein wel in het Publieke Belang? Een kritische beschouwing over het Nederlandse privatiseringsbeleid van de afgelopen decennia. Utrecht, Utrecht University College: 63. Geschreven i.o.v. de Parlementaire Onderzoekscommissie 'Privatisering en Verzelfstandiging van Overheidsdiensten', Eerste Kamer der Staten-Generaal. See also: Klamer, A. (2013). It's the society, stupid. Meer. Thieme, M. Ed. Utrecht, Jan van Arkel: 108-127.

⁵² A critical article states that authorities require a lot from schools But when it comes to action these authorities are absent. Instead of assisting schools they launch new demands and plans. Sikkes, R. (2012). "Waarom het steeds mis gaat bij roc's: zeven vragen." Het onderwijs blad 11(14 November). P17-19. The association for public education (Vereniging van openbare en algemeen toegankelijke scholen) published an article in which it argues that in spite of all kind of plans, measures and directives the quality of Dutch education did not increase, while it improved in the surrounding countries. Boogaard, van der, M. (2012). "Onderwijskwaliteit al jaren in 'watertrappelstand' ". Retrieved January 27, 2013 from: <http://www.vosabb.nl/onderwijskwaliteit-al-jaren-in-watertrappelstand/>.

⁵³ Ibid, also the managerial ethos is criticized: managers have given professional education a bad name. Beuningen, van, T. (2010). Competentievericht onderwijs is zondebok. De Volkskrant. Amsterdam.

⁵⁴ In 2006 an association was founded which aims at improving the standards of education in the Netherlands (de Vereniging Beter Onderwijs Nederland: BON) The association has approximately 4000 members - which for a large part are educational professionals - and even more sympathizers. BON plays an important role in the public debate on education. (2012). "Beter Onderwijs Nederland." Retrieved December 27, 2012, from <http://www.beteronderwijsnederland.nl/over-bon>.

ministry of public health and the insurance companies; all to the underestimating and detriment of medical competence and necessity. Protests are raised by general practitioners, medical specialists and other employees active in medical care over developments, which show an increasing focus on costs and infringement on medical expertise and autonomy.⁵⁵ Recently also judges protested the infringement on the quality of the administration of justice by the emphasis on effectiveness and efficiency rather than excellence. More than 500 of the approximately 2500 judges in the Netherlands signed a manifesto to protest this development.⁵⁶ They claimed that their judicial work is hampered by an emphasis on quantity rather than quality.⁵⁷ This feeling of discomfort is added by recent publications on fraud and self-enrichment by high-ranking managers in charge of administering this kind of institutions.⁵⁸ It is hard to define the causes of these kinds of derailments, but apparently, there is widening gap between practice and institution - *praxis* and *poiesis* - within certain, mainly public and semi-public, sectors of Dutch institutional fabric. These developments seem to be the result of an increased focus on institutional instrumentality and the ensuing institutional values and norms rather than the virtues of the practice. The paradox is that in order to enhance effectiveness and efficiency often more bureaucracy is introduced, which in addition often obstructs rather than facilitates the activities of the practitioners.⁵⁹ In short, institutions do provide continuity and organisational support for practices, and they can add a wider purpose - including a wider moral perspective - to practices. However, institutions can also create restrictions for practices and affect the internal directedness of practices and the ensuing standards of excellence, eventually undermining the pleasure the practitioners find in their activities.

7.5.3. The growth of institutional bureaucracy also took place within the Dutch MOD; a growth that finds its origin in wider financial and social developments, which seemingly contributes to a diminished operational focus. In 1994 a number of larger military units

⁵⁵ Both general practitioners and medical specialist as well as others active in medical care, frequently protest developments which focus on costs and infringe on medical autonomy. See: "vereniging Nederlands Huisartsen Genootschap." Retrieved December 27, 2012 from <http://nhg.artsennet.nl/Home.htm>; "Orde Medisch Specialisten." Retrieved December 27, 2012, from <http://www.orde.nl/over-oms/nieuws/>; "Werknemers in de zorg." Retrieved December 27, 2012, from <http://www.werknemersindezorg.nl/>. Especially the latter organisation is very active and critically follows the developments regarding medical care.

⁵⁶ Haenen, M. (2012). Meer dan 500 rechters ondertekenen pamflet; we hebben het te druk. NRC. Rotterdam.

⁵⁷ (2012). "Manifest". Retrieved December 27, 2012, from <http://www.rechtspraak.nl/Actualiteiten/Nieuws/Documents/Manifest.pdf>.

⁵⁸ The college for applied sciences 'In Holland' dropped admission standards to recruit more pupils and dropped examination standards to improve the output. The college thus succeeded in presenting a high effectiveness and based on this fraud received more government subsidies. Rengers, M. (2011). Tentamenfraude op grote schaal bij In Holland. De Volkskrant. Amsterdam. Managers of other big educational institutes (Amarantis, Boor) were caught in open fraud and self-enrichment. de Pous, I. (2011). Zelfverrijking bij top scholereus Amarantis. De Volkskrant. Amsterdam, and Rengers, M. (2012). Behalve fraude ook zelfverrijking bij Rotterdamse scholenkoepel BOOR. De Volkskrant. Amsterdam. Also in the medical sector there are numerous reports on mismanagement, frauds and self-enrichment. See: A.N.P. (2012). Zorgdirectrice cel in voor miljoenenfraude. De Volkskrant. Amsterdam. Redactie (2012). Onnodige dure technologie in ziekenhuizen door marktwerving. De Volkskrant. Amsterdam. A.N.P. (2012). Ziekenhuizen doen valse declaraties. De Volkskrant. Amsterdam.

⁵⁹ van den Brink, G., Jansen, T., Pessers, D., Ed. (2005). Beroepszeer: waarom Nederland niet werkt. Amsterdam, Boom. See also: Verbrugge, A. (2004). Tijd van onbehagen. Amsterdam, Sun; Dohmen, J. (2010). Brief aan een middelmatige man. Amsterdam, Ambo; Simon, C. (2011). En toen wisten we alles: een pleidooi voor oppervlakkigheid. Amsterdam, Ambo.

were also designated as 'profit centres' and these were to close management agreement with their superior level.⁶⁰ These contracts specified the products the units were to deliver and the means they were allocated in order to be able to meet their end to the contract. However, in the end the means provided, including budgets, were largely virtual, which means that the limits that they were supposed to set were virtual as well and as a result the expected efficiency gains did not materialize.⁶¹ Therefore, in 2003 a new kind of governance was introduced in the armed forces. This method aimed at a separation of policy and implementation and introducing a customer-supplier relationship between operational commands and service centres. The changes were meant to create result-orientated processes, which would produce efficiency incentives and a reduction of bureaucracy. Although the need for strict financial control was readily accepted, the civilian method which was introduced resulted in a number of unforeseen bureaucratic side effects and a substantial administrative workload. This was substantiated in an evaluation report which was released in 2007.⁶² The report commented on faltering relations between the MOD concern staff and the operational commands, the absence of a clear link between defence planning (with a horizon of 9 years) and budgetary planning (with a horizon of 4 years), an excess of detailed input instead of control based on output and a gap between the 'reality' at the level of the MOD and 'reality' on the operational work floor. Bureaucracy did not decrease: the report mentions 310 conferences in which over 500 participants are involved for every fiscal year. In 2013 yet another report was published.⁶³ This report - written by a consultant of the Ministry of Home Affairs - again comments on a lack of vision, little coherence and lengthy processes involving many consultations and a large amount of red tape. The recommendations include the need for a decisive intervention based on a clear vision in order to create a coherent governance and a substantive reduction of bureaucracy. A side effect was the introduction of a managerial vocabulary which seemed to suggest that a managerial approach was appropriate for the military, even for junior soldiers in primarily operational matters.⁶⁴ A similar development was noticed in the UK: 'No balanced assessment of the Ministry of Defence in the first decade of this millennium should ignore the slurry of management-speak that washes across the decks from time to time, and the many officials who have come to regard defence as the might a commercial organisation with the receivers in it.'⁶⁵ Much earlier - in the 'Vietnam era' - a civilian managerial approach was introduced in the US military under the secretary of defence Mr. McNamara. One of the results was that professional soldiers - especially officers - became entrepreneurs of their own career rather than leaders of men, which eventually resulted in a moral corruption of the practice.⁶⁶ In the Dutch armed forces the consequences were a lot less dramatic, but in some regards the armed forces were seen as just another government agency and as a result primarily civilian oriented legislation

⁶⁰ Reitsma, R. (1994). Beleidsvoornemens 1994 en 1995. Ministerie van Defensie. Den Haag, Koninklijke Landmacht.

⁶¹ Heijnsdijk, J. (1999). "Resultaat Verantwoordelijke Eenheden: papier of werkelijkheid." *Militaire Spectator* **169**(9) P 494-500.

⁶² Kreemers, H. P. M., Homstra, E. (2007). Tussen machten en tegenkrachten: Rapport bestuurlijke evaluatie Defensie. Den Haag, Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties.: 25.

⁶³ Paul, H. en van der Steenhoven, K. (2013). Quicksan bestuurlijke processen Defensie. Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties. Den Haag, BZK.

⁶⁴ de Vries, P. H. (2002). "Vaktaal." *Militaire Spectator* **171**(7/8). P 400.

⁶⁵ Holmes, R. (2011). *Soldiers*. London, Harpers Press. P 24.

⁶⁶ Gabriel, R. A., Savage, P.L. (1978). *Crisis in command: mismanagement in the army*. New York, Hill and Wang.

was introduced. For example, the use of the classical mess tins was forbidden because of the possible health risks. As a result a huge amount of plastic disposables is used every year, which produces a just as big a threat to the environment.⁶⁷ Civilian norms on first aid and further medical treatment were introduced, with substantial consequences for the military medical system which is primarily geared for emergencies in very adverse conditions. Labour regulations were introduced limiting the number of hours a soldier can be employed on a job, the physical effort he is allowed to perform without appropriate supportive machinery, etc. Many of these developments are at best not well understood and at worst resented by those who consider the military primarily an operational organisation which has to fulfil its tasks no matter the circumstances.

7.5.4. The tension between a primarily operational focus and the primacy of institutional interests can also be found within the military population. This is because the armed forces use a closed personnel system. This implies that not all soldiers are at all times engaged at the sharp end of the military organisation, in the operational practice. Due to the inherent internal and upward mobility soldiers - especially officers and NCO's - are also engaged in institutional activities, mostly in training facilities and the higher staffs and at the level of the MOD. The operational focus of their daily activities there is replaced by a primarily institutional involvement. Regular transfers from operational postings to staff positions and vice versa may assist these officers and NCO's to keep in touch with their operational background, but this is not given for everyone. In the end, it is not to be avoided that during the course of their career, a number of senior officers and NCO's do get more or less alienated from the operational practice in which they started as junior leaders.⁶⁸ In these cases, the distinction between an operational focus and the ensuing goods of excellence and an institutional focus and the implied goods of effectiveness can grow into a gap.⁶⁹ This gap refers to a situation in which the interests of the praxis and the related goods of excellence are - in perception or effectively and whether deliberately or inadvertently - subordinated to the interests of the institution and its related goods of effectiveness.

7.5.5. Taking into account the developments described before I now take to the question how practice and the Dutch military institution relate to each other. Goods of excellence are those benefits which are found in participating in a practice and to do so in an excellent way. The aspiration to excel in those activities that are enjoyed comes natural to man.⁷⁰ The aspiration to excel pertains both to the here and now and to meet the standards which are the result of: 'the history of successive attempts to transcend the limitations of the best achievements in a particular area.'⁷¹ These historical standards as well the efforts that preceded the accomplishments are part of the

⁶⁷ Ironically the armed forces' policy intentions for 2001 announced the establishment of an environmental agency with 79 pax. Seijkens, A. H. M. (2000). *Beleidsvoornemens 2001*. M. v. Defensie. Den Haag, Koninklijke Landmacht: 67.

⁶⁸ Holmes, R. (2011). *Soldiers*. London, Harpers Press. P 24: '... some military officers, especially those 'Whitehall Warriors' on a second or third tour of duty, become so wise in 'the ways of the building' that they sometimes forget that men and women in uniform are much more than 'line serials' on a spreadsheet.'

⁶⁹ See annex A.

⁷⁰ Rawls, J. (2006). *Een theorie van rechtvaardigheid (A theory of justice)*. Rotterdam, Lemniscaat. P 432. See also MacIntyre, A. (2003). *Whose justice? Which rationality?* Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 31.

⁷¹ *Whose justice? Which rationality?* Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 30, 31.

narrative that - together with other characteristics - define the practice. Over time, a body of maxims will develop, which characterizes the practice and the standards of excellence involved. However, how to apply these maxims is a matter of experience, practical wisdom, a capacity which cannot be specified by further rules. To acquire both the skills and the disposition to excel in a practice and to act in accordance with the maxims of a practice is a matter of apprenticeship. It is hard to conceive that everything the apprentice has to learn could be reduced to rules and regulations: the instruments of institutions. On the other hand, Institutions provide external goods or goods of effectiveness, which to some extent can also be acquired by participating in the practice.⁷² In that case, it is the result that counts, and not only the pleasure and satisfaction one finds in merely participating in the practice. Sometimes difference between the goods of excellence and goods of effectiveness seems blurred. This, for example, is evident in professional sports, in which excellence is required to gain financial benefits and status that come with good results: winning the game. Winning is not only to the benefits of the practitioner but also in the interests of the institution. The question is whether it would be possible to promote excellence and thus winning by means of institutional external goods?

7.5.6. Although excellence can result in winning these are not the same. Excellence can result in winning and winning can lead to a reward in internal goods (satisfaction and pride) and external goods (honour, status, power, and even material benefits). However, these external rewards can also be objects of desire in themselves, independently from a desire for achieving excellence. To achieve these external rewards often requires the same kind of qualities that are required to achieve internal rewards. However, there are differences as well. When striving for excellence the practitioner imposes restraints on himself. The agent who wants to achieve excellence in accordance with the standards of excellence of the practice will do so in adherence to the appropriate maxims and not by foul play. Nevertheless, if he does play foul, the agent will be aware of that: otherwise, it would be an unintentional failure to abide by the standards of excellence. However, by wilfully ignoring the standards of excellence of the practice, he will primarily wrong himself rather than anybody else; at least, his self-esteem will be affected. Therefore his behaviour is primarily judged by himself. This does not mean that he will not repeat his offences: the external goods, the stakes, may be too high. In that case, the benefits to be gained will overrule the embarrassment over an offence against the standards of excellence. However, if the agent is caught in the act of intentionally ignoring the standards of excellence and duping his opponent in order to win, the culprit will meet with contempt and derision. The agent who plays foul in pursuing the institutional goods of effectiveness (winning) deceives others rather than himself. Therefore, in this case, his conduct is primarily judged by others. In order to come to such a judgement the others refer to constraints that are expressed in formulas to define justice: rules. Rules that are either complied to or broken. In this context, compliance is not primarily a matter of virtue, but could well be the result of habit or fear of punishment. The difference between these approaches is best exemplified with the virtue of courage. A soldier cannot excel in war without the willingness to face danger, to run risks. This disposition to be willing to face danger and even to risk one's life, this virtue of courage, is judged after the action; by the soldier himself and his fellow soldiers. For his courage, he is rewarded with honour. When it comes to awarding a decoration for valour, rules

⁷² Ibid, P31-33.

are applied whether all the requirements are met. However, there are no rules which prescribe courage. The institution cannot lay out rules that spell out under which conditions supererogative action is required. To do so would destroy the notion of courage and would corrupt the conduct of soldiers. Similar arguments can be applied to the other virtues.

7.5.7. However, the display of desirable dispositions - like courage - could perhaps be stimulated; for example, by promising rewards in honours, promotion, other (material) benefits, etc. A relatively innocent example of such an incentive was the distribution of 'a tot of rum' in the British armed forces before a pending battle. A little less innocent is the intentional hunt for decorations.⁷³ Money was also used as an incentive, albeit the tempting was not always successful.⁷⁴ Promotion as an incentive is also used, but for obvious reasons, both the patron as well as the beneficiary mostly keeps silent about the arrangement. When incentives are part of an official scheme, rules are needed to ensure that the official incentives are used properly. This raises the familiar question on how to capture in words when and for what reasons incentives are distributed. But there is another argument that pleads against incentives. Instead of acting in accordance with his aspiration to excellence, the agent who is primarily motivated by incentives will act in a way that gets him the most benefits. His actions are based on a utilitarian computing rather than the result of aspiring at excellence in accordance with the virtues of character of the practice and made tangible by practical wisdom.⁷⁵ The agent's frame of reference becomes economic rather than moral.⁷⁶ Therefore, the application of benefits to stimulate to promote adequate behaviour has some serious drawbacks.

7.5.8. From the above emerges a picture in which the institutional interests seem best served by embracing the standards of excellence used in the practice and accepting that these are promoted by adhering to maxims rather than trying to promote excellence by institutional rules or incentives; or as Schwartz puts it: 'by sticks and carrots.'⁷⁷ Of course this does not mean that the institution can do without rules. Rules will remain a necessary instrument to regulate behaviour. Also they are sometimes used as an alibi to show the willingness and energy of institutions to address abuses and effectiveness is considered to be less important if not cynically irrelevant. However, the application of rules should be limited to those spheres in which their utility is obvious and effectiveness measurable. These spheres are, for example: judicious, rules of engagement, safety proceedings, technical manuals and regulations, the organisational economy, etc. On the other hand, in the sphere of moral reasoning actions should be governed by the virtues, rather than rules or incentives. The realization of a policy based on virtue ethics requires personnel that is educated and trained in developing the required dispositions. This will take time and a substantive effort and what is more, it will take trust! Trust in the eventual results, trust in the capabilities of soldiers and of those who lead them. However, soldiers mentally equipped along these lines will

⁷³ Holmes, R. (1985). *Acts of war*. London, Wellington house. P 358: 'Hunting for decorations is a menace. A fellow officer was determined to get a bar to his MC. He became a very dangerous bore and caused many unnecessary casualties...'

⁷⁴ Hastings, M., Ed. (1987). *The Oxford book of military anecdotes*. Oxford, University Press. P 174: A sergeant-major stepped forward; 'Had you not sir held out a sum of money as a temptation your grenadiers would one and all have presented themselves.'

⁷⁵ Schwartz, B., Sharpe, K. (2010). *Practical wisdom*. New York, Riverhead. P 9-11

⁷⁶ Ibid, P 191.

⁷⁷ Ibid, P 4.

maintain and display their virtuous disposition in a wide variety of circumstances, also while pursuing the results the institution expects them to achieve. In this way the goods of excellence and the good of effectiveness could coincide to the benefit of both the practice and the institution. In the meantime, many nations try to achieve that goal of morally responsible soldiers by issuing a code of conduct. The Dutch armed forces also established and promulgated a code of conduct. The question then is to what extent a code of conduct achieves what it aims at: creating morally responsible soldiers. Only after this question has been answered, a comparison can be made whether a virtue-ethical approach promises a better result.

Code of conduct

7.6.1. In 2006, a number of incidents involving improper behaviour by members of the armed forces were published in several newspapers and TV programs. The media coverage suggested that such misdemeanours were rife in the armed forces. The ensuing political debate made the government decide to take action. In the best of Dutch traditions, a committee was founded (de commissie Staal) to advise the Minister of Defence on a policy on how to put an end to these kinds of incidents. In September 2006, the committee produced its report with a large number of recommendations.⁷⁸ These recommendations included the need for explicit norms, and integrity was to be secured at all organizational levels, and a special and professional staff department was to be realized in order to provide a tangible foundation for a serious implementation of the recommendations. The deputy commander of the armed forces was appointed to chair the workgroup that would develop proposals on how to implement the recommendations of the Staal committee.

7.6.2. The workgroup first made an inventory of existing codes both in the military as well as in a number of large Dutch (international) companies. Based on this inventory the workgroup developed a tentative first concept. This concept was evaluated by approximately 1000 employees of the Ministry of Defence.⁷⁹ This evaluation resulted in a second more substantial proposal. This proposal was also evaluated, and the feedback on this second proposal led to a definite proposal in March 2007. This proposal for a **Code of Conduct** for the Dutch armed forces was discussed at the highest levels within the Ministry of Defence, accepted by the minister, presented to parliament and implemented.⁸⁰

7.6.3. The aforementioned development seems adequate but there is room for serious criticisms.⁸¹ Codes do not influence behavior because as those to whom it is addressed and who need it the most, will not adhere to it anyway, and the rest of the good people in the profession will not need it because they already know what they ought to do. From

⁷⁸ Ministerie van Defensie. (2006) Ongewenst gedrag binnen de krijgsmacht- rapportage over onderzoek naar vormen en incidentie van en verklarende factoren voor ongewenst gedrag binnen de Nederlandse krijgsmacht. Den Haag: Staatsdrukkerij.

⁷⁹ Vader is highly critical about the way the findings were used in the further development of the code. Vader, P. C. M. (2011). Naar een gedragen gedragscode voor Defensie: advies voor een 'best-practice' methode. Den Haag, Nederlandse Defensie Academie. P 32, 38.

⁸⁰ (2007). Brief aan de voorzitters van de Eerste en Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, Tweede rapportage implementatie commissie Staal, Ministerie van Defensie. Den Haag.

⁸¹ These normative judgments are strictly my own and can be in no way attributed to mr. van der Vlugt: he informed me about the factual proceedings and did not in any way cast a critical light on the result. My comments are the result of a critical analysis and personal experience in the Dutch Ministry of Defence.

this perspective, codes could undermine the responsibilities of employees and could be interpreted as accusatory, threatening, and demeaning. Moreover, codes are often viewed as mere window-dressing providing superficial and distracting answers to the question of how to promote ethical behavior in corporate life.⁸² Evaluations show a wide variety in the appreciation of codes: from counterproductive, little impact and not very effective to much needed, very effective and successful.⁸³ The general criticism is that codes as such, being a set of formal prescriptive rules, do not automatically lead to tangible results. On the other hand, codes do increase moral awareness and provide a starting point for the further development of this awareness.⁸⁴ Codes of conduct aim at creating an explicit yardstick for the conduct of the members of an organization and aim at assisting the members in (mutually) evaluating and improving their conduct. Also these codes are a tool for changing the conduct of those members who do not (yet) adhere to general or specific rules. However, a code as such will not necessarily result in establishing (organizational) appropriate conduct and changing (inappropriate and unwanted) conduct unbecoming. In order to be effective in directing moral conduct Birnbacher identified several criteria.⁸⁵ First of all, rules and regulations should take into account that people are fallible in their capacity to translate abstract rules and regulations in specific conduct. Rules should be articulated in such a way that meets the situations in which agents have to act.⁸⁶ In the second place, rules should be articulated in such a way that provides a sense of continuity regarding already existent moral convictions. Rules must appeal to already familiar moral concepts.⁸⁷ And last the rules should not be over exacting nor under taxing. In order to be effective, rules must provide a feasible challenge.⁸⁸ The more ambitious the objectives of business codes, the less likely business codes will be considered to be effective.⁸⁹ However, even if the rules meet these criteria, there will still be non-abiders that know perfectly well what is expected of them, and still they just do not do it. There has to be an additional effort to reach these non-abiding members of the organization and convince them to change their attitude and behaviour.⁹⁰ The need for such additional measures was also recommended in the report by the Staal committee.

7.6.4. As one of the consequences of the Staal report, in 2010 a special integrity desk was established: 'Centrale Organisatie Integriteit Defensie' (COID) which is to monitor the policies on improving the integrity of the members of the armed forces and when necessary to propose improvements. Furthermore, COID is to advice and support line-management, to conduct risk-assessments and to investigate (serious) integrity

⁸² Kaptein, M., Schwartz, M.S. (2008). "The effectiveness of business codes; a critical examination of existing studies and development of an integrated research model." *Journal of business ethics* 77(2): 111-127. See also Pelletier, K. L., Bligh, M.C. (2006). "Rebounding from corruption: perceptions of ethics program effectiveness in a public sector organization." *Journal of Business Ethics* 67(4): 359-374.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Verweij, D. E. M., Hofhuis, K., Soeters, J. (2007). "Moral Judgment in the armed forces." *Journal of military ethics* 6(1): 19-40.

⁸⁵ Birnbacher, D. (1999). "Ethics and social science: which kind of cooperation?" *Ethical theory and moral practice*, 2(4): 319-336.

⁸⁶ Ibid, P 324, 325.

⁸⁷ Ibid, P 325.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Kaptein, M., Schwartz, M.S. (2008). "The effectiveness of business codes; a critical examination of existing studies and development of an integrated research model." *Journal of business ethics* 77(2): 111-127.

⁹⁰ Brien, A. (1998) 'Professional Ethics and the Culture of Trust', in: *Journal of Business Ethics* 17: 392

breeches. In addition, a regulation regarding complaints on misdemeanours was issued.⁹¹ A network of some 650 'local confidential agents' within the units was developed and a reporting system was established in order to monitor developments. COID reports every year on trends and developments.⁹² In short, several institutional efforts are undertaken to improve and maintain the moral consciousness of Dutch soldiers. The question is whether these efforts are successful.

7.6.5. Although the reporting system does not yet cover all incidents, the reports do show a decline in the number of contacts with confidential agents and complaints.⁹³ This refers to both institutional breaches and social integrity.⁹⁴ The issues which are most frequently reported pertain to aspects of social integrity and in particular intimidation and badgering. The accused are mostly NCO's and civil employees of the Ministry of Defence.⁹⁵ Nevertheless, in a practical sense, it seems that integrity is improving. It is hard to draw a conclusion as to the causes of this improvement, but it seems that the increased attention for morally appropriate behaviour pays off. However, the role of the code of conduct in achieving this result seems limited. In 2007, a survey was conducted regarding the introduction of the code of conduct. It showed that almost two third of the Defence population were to some extent familiar with the code. However, a mere 50% of the soldiers and civil employees appreciated the code as a useful instrument. A change in this attitude was primarily brought about by the efforts of the direct superiors.⁹⁶ In 2009, a second survey was conducted. This time 75% of the participants acknowledged being familiar with the code; a substantial increase compared with the 2007 survey. However, the thematic knowledge of the issues addressed in the code had declined. Still, a majority of the soldiers appreciated the code as relevant; also an increase in support! Even then, still 60% do not perceive any change in the overall conduct of soldiers and civil employees of the MOD.⁹⁷ Another researcher concluded that the code does not contribute effectively in preventing unbecoming behaviour. He advocates a code that uses an ethical approach more in line with the frames of reference of those for whom the code is meant: soldiers.⁹⁸ This opinion is shared by the head of COID, who stated that reports showed that it is found difficult to broach the issues addressed in the code of conduct. This seems to be due to the relatively abstract nature of the code and - partly

⁹¹ (2012). Klachtenregeling gedragingen Defensiepersoneel. Ministerie van Defensie. Den Haag.

⁹² COID (2010). Jaarverslag meldingen ongewenst gedrag 2009. Den Haag, Ministerie van Defensie; COID (2011). Jaarrapportage COID 2010. Den Haag, Ministerie van Defensie; COID (2012). Jaarrapportage integriteit Defensie 2011. Den Haag, Ministerie van Defensie.

⁹³ In 2008 there were 928 references to confidential agents, in 2009 this number decreased to 896 in 2009 and then dropped to 629 in 2010, with a further decline in 2011 to 539 references in 2011. However, not every reference leads to a complaint on unbecoming behaviour: on average a little under 50% of the references results in a request for assistance. Another point is that not all incidents are reported or are reported in other (judicial or medical) channels.

⁹⁴ Institutional breaches refer to harming the materiel interests of the armed forces, social integrity refers to conduct unbecoming towards other members of the services.

⁹⁵ The fact that NCO's figure prominently in the scores on intimidation and badgering does not seem surprising. After all it is their job to transform the civilians who join the military into soldiers. This necessarily involves sometimes harsh training to which not all submit willingly. The coercion which is then applied could easily be interpreted as intimidating.

⁹⁶ van Rees Vellinga, N. (2007). Onderzoek naar introductie voorlopige Gedragscode Defensie. Den Haag, Ministerie van Defensie.

⁹⁷ Vos, A. J. V. M., Klaassen, A.L., van Thiel, L. (2009). Gedragscode Defensie: draagvlakmeting. Den Haag, Ministerie van Defensie.

⁹⁸ Vader, P. C. M. (2011). Naar een gedragen gedragscode voor Defensie: advies voor een 'best-practice' methode. Den Haag, Nederlandse Defensie Academie.

consequently - the lack of a clear link with what soldiers do. As a result he attributed to the code an only limited practical impact.⁹⁹ It could well be that the limited impact of the code is also due to the fact that it addresses only a part of the issues which soldiers consider relevant.¹⁰⁰ Altogether, it seems that the improvements on integrity are mainly because of the efforts of officers and NCO's: the leaders of soldiers. The code of conduct in its present form seems to have an only limited value and lacks a practical connection with the soldier's day-to-day activities, especially operational activities.¹⁰¹

7.6.6. This lack of a practical connection with what soldiers do, becomes obvious when we take the proceedings of the workgroup which developed the present code into account. The working party used a highly instrumental approach. Primarily, it was felt, there was a need for practicable tools to address manifest problems. The consequent want of a more conceptual approach also explains the strange mixture of deontological, duty-ethical, utilitarian and consequentialist elements of the code of conduct.¹⁰² Paragraph 1 and 4 stress the importance of autonomy and equality and these notions are an important feature of deontological normative ethical theories. In paragraph 2 the issue of subordination of private interests to general utility is stressed: a utilitarian concept. In paragraph 3 and 5 the need for safety and effectiveness is elaborated: an appeal to consequentialism. The instrumental and institutional character of the code of conduct becomes clear further when it is realized that it could easily be transferred to any kind of organization. It provides only general norms and has no direct connection to the military; it could as well be a corporate code. Generally a professional code of conduct is based on the practice it refers to: it establishes what is valuable in a practice and what the specific responsibilities are of the (autonomous) professionals who engage in this practice. The present code lacks such a foundation. Furthermore those tenets in the code that are of a military nature, aim primarily at the conduct in peacetime. This probably is because the code aims at addressing all employees of the MOD, both military and civilian. Apparently, for this reason operational considerations are almost completely lacking. This is even stranger, as it is the very special operational conditions in which the military has to perform its task that create the need for a specific kind of morally appropriate conduct. All in all the code refers to goods of effectiveness, rather than goods of excellence. Consequently, it is not surprising that the present code has no clear relation with military practice and its standards of excellence and morals.¹⁰³ Obvious notions like courage, comradeship, and resilience as traditional features of proper military conduct are not mentioned. On the contrary, values pertaining to safe working-conditions that are included in the present code are easily understood as contradicting with the military tradition of accepting risks. Mileham observes a similar partition in the UK, which he defines as the difference between military institutional ethics and operational ethics. The former deals with: 'The need for military persons to accept the spirit beyond legislation and regulation of such matters as anti-discrimination norms, equal opportunities, health and safety and employment laws, as well as

⁹⁹ de Vries, P. H. (2012). Interview H-COID. Amersfoort.

¹⁰⁰ Musschenga, B. (2004). "Empirische ethiek: contextsensitiviteit of contextualiteit." *Ethische perspectieven* 14(1): 27- 41. P 27, 28.

¹⁰¹ This is substantiated by: Vader, P. C. M. (2011). *Naar een gedragen gedragscode voor Defensie: advies voor een 'best-practice' methode*. Den Haag, Nederlandse Defensie Academie. P 35-37.

¹⁰² See Annex A.

¹⁰³ de Vries, P. H. (2008). Interview with mr. J.M. van der Vlugt, secretary to the Staal committee. The Hague. In this interview mr. van der Vlugt mentioned the fact that several civilian firms expressed an interest in the code as an example for their own codes which were being developed.

adherence to criminal law, particularly on such matters as drug and alcohol misuse.' The latter includes virtues like discipline, respect for others, courage and commitment.¹⁰⁴

7.6.7. Altogether the Dutch MOD succeeded in implementing a system for improving the overall moral awareness of its personnel, both military and civilian. The MOD also succeeded in articulating a code of conduct valid for all the services. However, this code lacks a comprehensive theoretical framework and as a result, it shows a remarkable patchwork of theoretical influences and practical considerations. The code misses intrinsic coherence. Another limitation of the present code is that it provides a very general and relatively abstract framework and does not address the primarily operational nature of the armed forces and the ensuing need for a shared moral standard that fits with traditional military values. Also references to any military virtues are entirely missing. It appears to be difficult to make the present abstract and generic code palpable in practical activities. It seems there still is room for considerable improvement.

International comparison

7.7.1. However, there are more nations that have developed and issued military codes of conduct. It is worthwhile to compare these with the Dutch code as this comparison could add an extra dimension to the assessment of the present Dutch code. In order to enhance the relevance of the comparison, the sample involves only those constitutional democracies, which sustain close cooperation with the Dutch military: France, the Federate Republic Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. France and Germany have issued a generic, defence wide code, while the UK and the US use different codes for the services. The complete results are presented in Annex C to this chapter. The main results are discussed in the next paragraphs.

7.7.2. In the military codes of conduct of the four nations investigated a total of 18 different concepts were used, which resulted in a wide variety of combinations. Only two concepts are shared by all nations: competence and respect! Furthermore, there is wide international support (3 out of 4 nations) for three concepts: courage, loyalty and discipline. Four more are also supported (by 2 out of 4 nations): commitment, comradeship, honour, and integrity. The remaining 9 other concepts were used by only one nation. When we compare this outcome with the official Dutch military code of conduct, only the concepts of professional competence, integrity and respect are acknowledged in the international average. The remaining concepts of responsibility, team spirit, and safety find little or no international support.

7.7.3. Another issue that attracts attention is that all nations have a code that encompasses both references to the practice as well as to institutional interests of the military. However, in spite of this, in the majority of the texts the overall terminology is clearly inspired by virtue ethics and also the elaborations often clearly aim at the virtues.¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, all other international codes refer explicitly to the operational practice in which soldiers are active: a context the Dutch code lacks. In interpreting the different codes one must bear in mind that the concepts which are used by the different nations can be attributed a more extensive meaning - which may even include concepts

¹⁰⁴ Mileham, P. (2009). "Moral dynamics and military operations." *Defence and security analysis* 25(1): 81-88.

¹⁰⁵ Oltshoorn, P. (2011). *Military Ethics and Virtues*. Abingdon, Routledge. P 3-4, 6-7 and 134-136.

which are not mentioned otherwise. Responsibility is often related to the need to be physical fit and an accomplished expert; integrity is often interpreted as responsibility; while loyalty is often connected with comradeship. When compared with the military virtues I identified in this thesis the concurrence with internationally accepted concepts seems better. Of the seven virtues I identified, four find strong international support: competence, respect, courage, and discipline. Comradeship is also widely supported, while only two, responsibility and resilience, seem weakly supported. However, as I stated before the internationally used concepts in some respects are interpreted in a wider and sometimes even a different way¹⁰⁶. When these differences are taken into account, the overall support of the virtue-ethical framework is stronger than the arithmetical average shows. Al in all, the similarities between the alternative virtue-ethical framework and other international codes predominate, which could have practical value in a better common consent in international military cooperation.

7.7.3. In the context of an international comparison the question is justified to what extent the interpretation of concepts is influenced by cultural bias. In his book, Hofstede provides the means to get some insight in the possible answers to this question.¹⁰⁷ He distinguishes four dimensions by which differences between national cultures can be measured. These are: power distance (PDI) relating to social inequality, including the relationship with authority; individualism (IDV) referring to the relationship - loose or tight - between the individual and the wider communities; concepts of masculinity (MAS) as the social implication of being born as a boy or a girl; uncertainty avoidance (UAI) pertaining to ways of dealing with uncertainty, including the control of aggression and the expression of emotion.¹⁰⁸ As to the first index of **power distance** the scores of the 50 nations included in the survey range from 104 (Malaysia) to 11 (Austria). France has a score of 68, while the USA, the Netherlands, the UK and the FRG have scores between 40 and 35: relatively close together and relatively low on the scale of PDI. The main feature of a low score is the generic notion of equality between man and the legitimacy of power.¹⁰⁹ The next index on **individualism** runs from a high score of 91 (USA), 89 (UK), 80 (the Netherlands), 71 (France) and 67 (FRG) to a low of 6 (Guatemala). All the countries of comparison score relatively high on individualism.¹¹⁰ The main features of the IND index pertain to self-reliance, identity as based in the individual, self-respect and tasks prevailing over relationships.¹¹¹ The third index on **masculinity** shows a different picture. The scores run from a high score of 95 (Japan) to a low of 5 (Sweden). The UK and the FRG both score 66 while the USA scores 62: all fairly close together. Then comes France with a score of 43, while the Netherlands score a mere 14. The MAS index features masculinity by assertiveness, ambition and toughness and sympathy for the strong. The opposite refers to modesty, relations, care, and sympathy for the weak.¹¹² The last index on **uncertainty avoidance** shows less diverging scores. In the scores - which run from a high of 112 (Greece) to a low of 8 (Singapore) - only France scores relatively high (86). The other nations involved score relatively low: the FRG (65), the Netherlands (53), the USA (46) and the UK (35). The relevant notions of a low UAI score

¹⁰⁶ As I explained in Annex C.

¹⁰⁷ Hofstede, G. (2003). *Cultures and organizations*. London, Profile books.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, P 13,14.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, P 26, 37, 43.

¹¹⁰ Ibid, P 53.

¹¹¹ Ibid, P 67.

¹¹² Ibid, P 84, 96.

include the acceptance of uncertainty and differences as well as a low need for rules combined with internationalism and a believe in human rights.¹¹³ This (very concise) excerpt shows that the nations involved in this comparison have largely similar cultural outlooks. This means also that the frames of reference from which the respective codes of conduct are derived include similar values. These facts give extra credence to the relevance of the outcomes of the international comparison. This observation adds weight to the conclusion in the preceding paragraph that the virtue-ethical framework I developed could contribute to the international common consent, which in its turn could improve international military cooperation.

Conclusions

7.8.1. There can be no doubt that the military encompasses both a practice and an institution. Furthermore, it is clear that the military is a purposive practice; to defend the interests of the Dutch constitutional state. This means that the values which are embedded in the Dutch constitution should be part of the standards upheld by the practice. This obligation is captured in the oath all Dutch soldiers take on entering the institution of the armed forces. The institution provides - beside continuity and stability for the practice - the means to acquire external goods: money, status and power. At the institutional level, these external goods provide little attractiveness. However, at the individual level, these external goods provide interesting incentives, including: job security, educational development and opportunities for promotion resulting in an increase in salary and internal power and status. In a number of practices, including the military, there is an increasing emphasis on the institutional goods of effectiveness, which results in introducing regulations and norms alien to the practice and its standards of excellence. In the military this development can - at least partly - be explained by the fact that the armed forces have a closed personnel system, with the result that senior members are generally less in touch with the practice and more involved in institutional issues and the ensuing goods of effectiveness.

7.8.2. In order to safeguard standards of excellence and to prevent a possible slipping of moral standards in the armed forces a code of conduct was introduced in the Dutch armed forces. However, this code was inspired primarily by institutional values rather than virtues pertaining to the practice. The operational context, which determines the nature of the practice, is mentioned only implicitly. And although it appears that the overall integrity of the personnel of the MOD has improved, the impact of the code of conduct is appreciated as limited. It seems that the code has little appeal and fails to convey practical relevance. An international comparison shows little support for the official Dutch official code as well. A framework of ethics based on military virtues of character and practical wisdom could overcome at least a number of the deficiencies I identified. It would create a tangible link with the (operational) reality soldiers experience while serving. As a result, it would be easier to incorporate the code in education, training and exercise, which could increase the internal support for the code as well. As the alternative framework is based on virtues, which are founded on an internal disposition to act in accordance with the standards of excellence, the overall technical and moral quality of the soldiers - and as a result the armed forces in general - could increase. The survey among civil servant indicated that they also consider the military virtues relevant to their professional activities. Furthermore, it would be relatively easy to create a similar tangible link between the military virtues and

¹¹³ Ibid, 113, 125.

corresponding civic virtues, which would enhance an appropriate wider frame of reference for both civil employees of the MOD and members of the armed forces. Furthermore, it would be relatively easy to create a similar tangible link between the military virtues and corresponding civic virtues, which would enhance an appropriate wider frame of reference. From this perspective, a virtuous soldier would probably be a virtuous citizen as well. A code based on virtues would also find more international support. However, imbuing these dispositions requires time and the realization of a policy geared to that purpose. But also such a body of military virtues must have support in the wider Dutch society. MacIntyre argues that any adequate conception of the good will requires the perspective not only of practices and of the unity of a human life, but also of traditions. Tradition constitutes the person's moral starting point.¹¹⁴ This issue is the subject of the next chapter.


¹¹⁴ MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 219 – 221.

Annex A to chapter 7: job characteristics.

Activity A: preponderant characteristics of a practice

Activity B: characteristics a balance of both practice and poèsis

Activity C: preponderant characteristics of poièsis



Category X: junior soldiers preponderantly active in operational activities (praxis)

Category Y: senior soldiers (mostly NCO's and officers) preponderantly active in institutional staff activities (poiesis)

Feature Z: the gap between praxis with a primarily operational focus and poièsis with a primarily institutional focus

Annex B to chapter 7: Dutch military code of conduct.

Abridged English version of the Dutch military code of conduct

1. I am part of a professional organization.

I maintain my professional knowledge and skills, technically as well as socially, on the acquired level. Therefore can I perform my tasks well, even under adverse circumstances.

2. I am a member of a team with a common job.

I am working together with my colleagues and I am also responsible for them and the team. I confront others with their conduct and I accept that others confront me with mine.

3. I am aware of my responsibility.

I do not harm the interests of the defence department and I will be exemplary in my attitude, demeanour and conduct. I will use defence equipment in a responsible way and will use these carefully and legitimately.

4. I am a person of integrity and I treat everybody with respect.

I do not accept unwanted behaviour like discrimination, (sexual) intimidation and harassment. I will abide by the law and regulations and will not abuse my power nor position.

5. I will look after safe working conditions.

I feel responsible for the safety of others and myself. This pertains to all kinds of safety, like operational security, information security, and safe working conditions. I do not use drugs. Alcohol may never impair my performance.

Complete Dutch version of the military code of conduct

Defensie staat voor vrede en veiligheid, in eigen land en daarbuiten. Wij leveren een bijdrage aan stabiliteit en vrijheid in de wereld en dienen daarmee de samenleving. Defensie is snel en flexibel inzetbaar en kan overal ter wereld optreden, ook onder de zwaarste omstandigheden. In nauwe samenwerking met anderen en gesterkt door een rotsvast vertrouwen in elkaar. Defensie wil een betrouwbare werkgever zijn. Defensiepersoneel is goed opgeleid en getraind, uitgerust met modern materieel. De militair kan indien nodig verantwoordwoord omgaan met geweld. In het uiterste geval met gevaar voor eigen leven. Dat is Defensie.

Deze kernboodschap is voor het personeel vertaald in een defensiebrede gedragscode die uitgaat van de eigen verantwoordelijkheid en staat voor professioneel gedrag, fatsoenlijke omgangsvormen en goede samenwerking. De code is een onderlinge afspraak en is gebaseerd op vijf pijlers:

1. Ik maak deel uit van een professionele organisatie.

Ik houd mijn kennis en vaardigheden, zowel vakinhoudelijk als sociaal, op het vereiste peil. Daardoor kan ik, ook onder moeilijke omstandigheden, mijn taken goed uitvoeren.

Toelichting: Wij vinden het normaal dat we in ons dagelijks werk voldoende verantwoordelijkheden en bevoegdheden krijgen. Wij willen dat ook. Wij zijn immers volwassen en professioneel met ons werk bezig. Onze verantwoordelijkheden gaan verder dan onze directe taken. Defensie schept de randvoorwaarden voor een professionele, veilige en plezierige werk- en leefomgeving. Maar we zijn zelf verantwoordelijk voor het op peil houden van onze kennis, vaardigheden en fysieke conditie. We houden rekening met de mensen om ons heen en zijn steeds bereid rekenschap te geven over gemaakte keuzes. We nemen de regels in acht zonder ons erachter te verschuilen.

2. Ik ben lid van een team met een gemeenschappelijke taak.

Ik werk samen met collega's en ben mede verantwoordelijk voor hen en het team. Ik spreek anderen aan op hun gedrag en accepteer dat anderen mij op mijn gedrag aanspreken.

Toelichting: Wij maken deel uit van een team met één taak of doelstelling, gebaseerd op wederzijds vertrouwen. Dat betekent dat we geregeld onze eigen belangen ondergeschikt maken aan de belangen van het team. Binnen het team hebben we allemaal een eigen taak. Toch zijn we niet alleen verantwoordelijk voor ons eigen gedrag, we dragen medeverantwoordelijkheid voor wat de anderen in ons team doen. Het beste resultaat behalen we alleen als we elkaar scherp houden en als we elkaar durven coachen en durven aanspreken op de kwaliteit van het werk en op ons gedrag. Leidinggevend in onze organisatie hebben een bijzondere verantwoordelijkheid. Zij geven te allen tijde het goede voorbeeld. Zij durven de leiding ook daadwerkelijk te nemen. Tegelijkertijd geven zij teamleden ruimte voor inbreng.

3. Ik ben mij bewust van mijn verantwoordelijkheid.

Ik schaad de belangen van Defensie niet en geef in houding, voorkomen en gedrag het goede voorbeeld. Ik ga verantwoord om met defensiemiddelen en gebruik deze zorgvuldig en rechtmatig.

Toelichting: Wij staan voor vrede en veiligheid en dat brengt specifieke verantwoordelijkheden met zich mee. Negatieve gedragingen van de individuele defensiemedewerker hebben, meer nog dan bij andere organisaties, een negatieve uitstraling op de overige medewerkers en op de Defensie als geheel. Wij realiseren ons dat we voor de buitenwereld 24 uur per dag, 7 dagen per week defensiemedewerker zijn. Wij gaan verantwoord om met gemeenschapsgeld.

4. Ik ben integer en behandel iedereen met respect.

Ik accepteer geen ongewenst gedrag zoals discriminatie, (seksuele) intimidatie en pesten, niet ten aanzien van mijzelf of anderen. Ik houd mij aan de geldende wetten en regels en misbruik mijn macht of positie niet.

Toelichting: Wij zijn eerlijk, oprecht, betrouwbaar en zorgvuldig. We maken deel uit van een organisatie die veiligheid creëert. We accepteren dat we daarbij fysiek gevaar kunnen lopen. Dat kan alleen vanuit een sociaal veilige werkomgeving. We versterken het team door ons te realiseren dat we niet allemaal hetzelfde zijn maar wel gelijkwaardig. We behandelen anderen met respect zoals wij ook met respect behandeld willen worden.

5. Ik zorg voor een veilige werkomgeving.

Ik voel mij verantwoordelijk voor de veiligheid van anderen en mijzelf. Dit geldt voor alle vormen van veiligheid, zoals operationele veiligheid, informatieveiligheid en veilige arbeidsomstandigheden. Ik laat mij niet in met drugs. Alcohol mag nooit invloed hebben op mijn functioneren.

Toelichting: We werken met wapens en met zwaar materieel. We oefenen bij nacht en ontij. We treden bij ernstoperaties klok rond op onder fysiek en mentaal zware omstandigheden. We kunnen dat alleen maar succesvol doen als we oog hebben voor de veiligheid van anderen en onszelf. Daarin passen geen drugs. Gebruik en bezit van of handel in drugs zijn dan ook verboden. Ook alcohol kan onze veiligheid in gevaar brengen. Het gebruik van alcohol tijdens operaties, oefeningen en dienst uitoefening is daarom niet toegestaan tenzij na uitdrukkelijke toestemming van de bevoegd commandant.

Annex C to chapter 7: international comparison of military codes of conduct

	Armed forces	Navy	Army	Air force
France ¹¹⁵	Competence Discipline Honour Obedience Resilience Respect Responsibility			
Germany ¹¹⁶	Comradeship Competence Courage Democracy Discipline Loyalty Moral judgment Respect			
United kingdom ¹¹⁷		Commitment Courage Discipline Integrity Loyalty Respect ¹¹⁸	Commitment Competence Comradeship Courage Discipline Integrity Loyalty Respect ¹¹⁹	Commitment Competence Courage Discipline Honesty Integrity Justice Loyalty Pride Respect Responsibility ¹²⁰
United states		Commitment Competence Courage Honour Integrity Loyalty Respect Responsibility ¹²¹	Courage Duty Honour Integrity Loyalty Respect Selfless service ¹²²	Commitment Decisiveness Energy Loyalty Integrity Selflessness ¹²³

¹¹⁵ (2005). Décret n° 2005-796 du 15 juillet 2005 relatif à la discipline générale militaire. Le Président de la République. Paris.

¹¹⁶ (2009). Lebenskundlicher Unterricht. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. Bonn. (2008). Innere Führung. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. Bonn.

¹¹⁷ The UK also has a Civil Service Code which applies also to civil servants in the UK MOD. Its core values are: integrity, honesty, objectivity and impartiality. (2010). Civil Service Code. Civil Service Commission. London.

¹¹⁸ (2007). Naval service core values. Head Quarters Royal Navy. Portsmouth.

¹¹⁹ (2008). Values and Standards of the British Army. Head Quarters Land Forces. Andover.

¹²⁰ (2007). Ethos, Core Values and Standards of the Royal Air Force. Head Quarters Royal Air Force. Gloucester.

Analysis

For the sake of clarity, the notions are listed in an alphabetical order, although in some national documents there is a clear ordering and sometimes subordination of concepts. The first thing that can be noted is that not every nation has succeeded in establishing a joint code of conduct. In this sample, the UK and the US still maintain separate codes for the respective services, although many similarities can be noted. In the international comparison, the UK and US notions will be counted for one each as the notion in question is noted by at least two of the three services of the country in question. This leads to the following chart

	France	Germany	United Kingdom	United States	Total
Commitment			+	+	2
Competence	+	+	+	+	4
Comradeship		+	+		2
Courage		+	+	+	3
Decisiveness				+	1
Democracy		+			1
Discipline	+	+	+		3
Energy				+	1
Fairness					1
Honour	+			+	2
Integrity			+	+	2
Justice			+		1
Loyalty		+	+	+	3
Moral judgment		+			1
Obedience	+				1
Respect	+	+	+	+	4
Responsibility	+				1
Resilience			+		1

The first thing that attracts attention is that there are only two notions which are shared by all nations: competence and respect! There is wide international support (3 out of 4 nations) for three notions: courage, loyalty, and discipline. Four more are also supported (by 2 out of 4 nations): commitment, comradeship, honour, and integrity. The other 9 notions find only little international support. This low rate of international conformity is not surprising when we take the different codes into accounts. The German approach emphasizes the idea of the soldier as a citizen in uniform who is to defend the ensuing values of the democracy. France emphasizes the role of the soldier as a servant of the state, albeit a special kind of servant. The US pictures the soldier as a paragon of the citizen fulfilling his duty to the nation. The approach by the UK services is steeped in their respective traditions. These different approaches lead to different kind of codes. In one aspect all codes are similar: they all include both institutional values as well as values and virtues directly related to military practice.

¹²¹ (2008). Core Values Charter. Department of the Navy. Washington

¹²² (2010). Army: profession of arms. Center for the army professional and ethic. Fort Leavenworth.

¹²³ (1985). To the men and women of the Air Force. Department of the Air Force. Washington.

However, when we make this comparison, we must bear in mind that the notions that are used in the different national codes are part of a national culture and are therefore interpreted in different ways.¹²⁴ For example, commitment (in the UK army) and loyalty are often used in reference to being loyal to your fellow soldiers and the team the soldier is a part of. Integrity is often used in terms of accomplishing those things that a soldier is responsible for. Responsibility is a number of times used in explaining the duty a soldier as to be fit and competent. However, I refrained from any interpretation and merely present the notions as used in the different codes. But even then, the chart gives some idea of the differences and similarities between the different national military codes of conduct.

When we look at the Dutch official military code of conduct, we can conclude that of the six notions only two are also acknowledged in the international average; professional competence and respect. Integrity too is internationally supported, albeit to a lesser extent; whereas responsibility, team spirit and safety find little or no international support.

When we compare the alternative framework of military virtues as identified in this thesis a more positive comparison emerges. Of the seven virtues, four find strong international support: competence, respect, courage, and discipline. Comradeship is also widely supported, while only two, responsibility and resilience, are weakly supported. However, also in this respect one must bear in mind that the concepts used sometimes have different meanings.

¹²⁴ Hofstede, G. (2003). Cultures and organizations. London, Profile books. P 3-19.

Chapter 8: moral tradition and the military

Introduction

8.1. In his theory, MacIntyre discerns three layers in the logical development from the concept of the virtues. These layers are: first a background account of the practice; second an account of the narrative order of a single human life and third an account of what constitutes a moral tradition. Each later stage presupposes the earlier, but not vice versa.¹ However, he acknowledges that eventually each layer is both modified and reinterpreted in the light of the other layers.² In the preceding chapters, I addressed the concept of the virtues, practice and narrative and how to interpret and apply these notions in a military context. In order to provide a complete answer to my research question to what extent MacIntyre's theory provides a suitable instrument to identify, develop, instil and uphold the required moral standards in the military, I will address in this chapter the third layer which in Alasdair MacIntyre's theory pertains to the moral tradition and how this relates to the military practice and its virtues. I will first focus on Alasdair MacIntyre's position regarding tradition. From this perspective, I will then have a look at the way this relationship is shaped in the Dutch context. I will analyze to what extent this tradition relates to military virtues and practice. I will refer to the virtues of military practice and verify whether these virtues are reflected in Dutch moral tradition. After that, I will investigate the formal relationship between the military as an institution and wider civil society and how it is shaped; which kind of contract is used.

Moral traditions according to Alasdair MacIntyre

8.2.1 MacIntyre argues that: 'the past is never something to be discarded, but that the present is intelligible only as a commentary upon and response to the past in which the past, if necessary and if possible, is corrected and transcended, yet corrected and transcended in a way that leaves the present open to being in turn corrected and transcended by some yet more adequate point of view.'³ This past is substantiated in the present in the form of tradition. MacIntyre defines a moral tradition as: '... a historically extended socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition.'⁴ Thus, in his view tradition is something completely different from the general idea in which tradition is seen as an in time coagulated set of opinions and rules. Living traditions do make progress, but in an evolutionary, cumulative way, rather than in a process of complete overthrow of a set of ideas and the introduction of a complete new set. Even if radical new ideas emerge it is hard to envisage how these can be developed without earlier ideas, even if these new ideas aim at overthrowing present notions. MacIntyre states that a tradition ...'will have some contingent historical starting point'⁵. From that contingent starting point it will develop further. He discerns three stages in this development. In the first phase, a set of beliefs, texts and authorities is established and adopted as relevant, if not more. Eventually, the tradition provides its adherents with an attitude which allows them to encounter radically different and incompatible positions, which are part of other moral traditions. However, these encounters and arguments that ensue may well affect the

¹ MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 186-187.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid, P 146.

⁴ Ibid, P 222.

⁵ MacIntyre, A. (1990). Three rival versions of moral inquiry. Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 116.

beliefs and authority which are part of their own tradition. As a result - in the second phase - the established truths of the own tradition are questioned, and inadequacies of various types are identified. In the third phase, the response to the inadequacies identified results in reformulations, re-evaluations and new formulations designed to remedy the inadequacies and to overcome limitations.⁶ This renewed tradition stays in place until new criticisms come forward. A tradition - in MacIntyre's view - is a socially embodied argument extended through time.⁷

8.2.2. In moral traditions the argument centres characteristically on the question how to sustain and improve a practice and the goods involved: '... the pursuit of which gives a tradition its point and purpose.'⁸ Living traditions involve practices in which the tenets of the tradition are embodied; and the standards of excellence of a practice find their anchorage in the virtues. The extent to which the virtues relevant to the practice are exercised, determines whether a tradition remains living or gets corrupted.⁹ A lack of virtues like responsibility, respect and courage corrupts both the practice as well as the institution, which derives their existence from the traditions of which they are the temporary embodiment.¹⁰ Living traditions on the other hand, are not-yet-completed narratives that continue and confront their future and adapt themselves to changing circumstances and needs of the practitioners.¹¹ Within the practices that are part of these living traditions the relevant standards of excellence are aspired at; the maxims of which are articulated in the virtues. In short, in MacIntyre's view a tradition always involves practices of which virtues are an integral part.

8.2.3. MacIntyre's view on traditions as not-yet-completed narratives corresponds with his conviction that narrative is an essential part in constructing human life, and this narrative does not start from nothing. The narrative of one's life cannot be seen without the social setting and the constraints and opportunities this involves.¹² We are 'thrown' into a community with its own peculiarities and its own history and its own idea of the good which is to be pursued. This context, this past, in which we start and live our lives, constitutes also a moral starting point.¹³ MacIntyre articulates this pointedly: 'Without those moral peculiarities to begin from, there would never be anywhere to begin...'¹⁴

8.2.4. The last issue which MacIntyre addresses is language. Every tradition is embodied in some particular set of utterances and actions, and is therefore part of a unique culture with its own language.¹⁵ Some of the notions about the language used in a specific cultural tradition are not translatable because the concept has a specific meaning even to the extent that there is no equivalent in another language. To understand these alien concepts requires submerging in that specific tradition rather

⁶ MacIntyre, A. (2003). Whose justice? Which rationality? Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 326-327, 350 - 355. See also MacIntyre, A. (1990). Three rival versions of moral inquiry. Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 116.

⁷ MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P222.

⁸ *ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid*, P 222, 223.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, P 223.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid*, P 215.

¹³ *Ibid*, P 220.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, P 221.

¹⁵ MacIntyre, A. (2003). Whose justice? Which rationality? Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 371.

than in a dictionary.¹⁶ This means that there are certain limits in understanding specific traditions in all its aspects. This is at odds with the intuition of modern cosmopolitanism that all cultural phenomena can be translated into the language in which the adherents of modernity speak to each other.¹⁷ However, in some aspects incommensurability of languages also implies that one should be very careful to transfer the language from one tradition into another. It would be unwise to assume that the language of the western economic tradition would be adequate to introduce and explain the benefits from the law of demand and supply in - for example - an Asian non-profit organisation geared to the proliferation of women rights.

8.2.5. MacIntyre's concept of a tradition as a dynamic scheme sounds plausible.¹⁸ The notion of progress as a sometimes discontinuous and abrupt process is accepted by many and found its way in many theories, like: shifting attractor patterns; mutual causality; dialectical change; flux and transformation metaphor; etc.¹⁹ Also the observation that some practices flourish and others wither does not seem controversial, as is the idea that this process is in a large part the result of vigorous support by the practitioners or the lack of it. However, it is hard to pronounce a verdict on the flourishing or corruption of a tradition during the process. Often these evaluations are formulated after the event. Furthermore, the idea that we need some kind of prior orientation before we can argue about moral issues has the support of many as well. Taylor uses the very apt metaphor of a moral map. The way we use a map to orient ourselves in a physical surroundings is similar to how we orient ourselves in a moral sense. In order to orient ourselves on a map - either physical or moral - we have to know where we are both, in reality, as well as on the map. When we aim to travel, we need some kind of orientation: the map and a compass provide this orientation. The map provides information on our location and the wider surroundings; the compass provides a way to establish the general direction where we want to travel.²⁰ In short, MacIntyre's notions do not seem to divert from generally accepted arguments. A number of these issues were addressed in preceding chapters of this thesis as well. The only issue that may need some elaboration pertains to language and its limitations in conveying meaning between different traditions.

Language

8.3.1. At first sight, it is difficult to see how language could constitute a barrier (or a bridge) between the wider Dutch society and its national military. After all, the members of these entities are all Dutch. Although this is a correct observation, it is not complete. All Dutch soldiers are also Dutch citizens, but not every Dutch citizen is (or has been) a soldier. Therefore, reciprocal understanding is not a matter of course, even if they use the same terminology. However, the terminology often differs. This is for a large part due to the widely used military jargon, for a large part made up of abbreviations.²¹ However, these difficulties can be overcome by refraining from the use

¹⁶ Ibid, P372.

¹⁷ Ibid, P 327, 328.

¹⁸ See also: van Tongeren, P. (2012). *Leven is een kunst*. Zoetermeer, Klement. P 79-80, 140.

¹⁹ Morgan, G. (2006). *Images of organizations*. London, Sage publications ltd. P 241 - 290.

²⁰ Taylor, C. (2007). *Bronnen van het zelf*. (*Sources of the self*) Rotterdam, Lemniscaat. P 86-88.

²¹ An interesting example of the misunderstanding as a result of jargon is found in Millar, S. (2003). The language of war. *The Guardian*. London, Guardian Newspapers Limited.

of jargon. The real difficulties arise from the use of similar notions by both citizens and soldier but with a different meaning for each of the groups; a kind of homonyms.

8.3.2. I do not aim at presenting a comprehensive analysis based on a theory in the field of philosophy of language, but a short sidestep into semantics could illuminate my point. Frege uses the terminology of sense ('Sinn') and reference ('Bedeutung').²² He argued that expressions have two semantic aspects: a sense and a reference. The former notion pertains to the mode of presentation, the concepts used as an expression. The latter notion is the object or situation in reality, which is referred to.²³ This approach enables to understand where misunderstandings occur. For example, both citizens and soldiers use in their common language the word comradeship. This word expresses a kind of intimate relationship between fellow human beings: this is the sense of the word that is shared by both citizens and soldiers. The reference, however, is radically different for citizens and soldiers. For most of the citizens, comradeship is a kind of synonym of friendship in general with a generic positive connotation, and that is it. For soldiers, on the other hand, comradeship pertains to a very special and strong bond shaped under duress, hardship and even danger. The value that is attached to this concept differs substantially: for the citizen, the term is more or less an abstraction and for the soldier, the term refers to a very real experience. The same argument can be used for concepts like resilience, discipline and courage. Misunderstanding occurs less if the concepts have a more similar reference, like with responsibility, competence and respect.

8.3.3. The question is then, how to overcome these difficulties and prevent misunderstandings? In this context, MacIntyre identifies two problems. First, it is possible that the some key notions of a community are strongly incompatible with those of another community.²⁴ For the military this does not seem to be the case. As the military is a purposive practice which serves the ends of the wider community, it is hard to imagine that in a democratic constitutional state, the key notions of the military do not reflect those of the wider community. The second problem MacIntyre identifies is the 'translation' of concepts. He argues that in order to maintain the identity of a practice, it is important to accept that certain notions are indeed, to some extent, untranslatable.²⁵ For example, a military unit is responsible for achieving a designated result. From this perspective, some think that a military unit is comparable with a store which is part of a large commercial chain. The question is whether both can be denoted as 'profit centres'.²⁶ However, this does not mean that one should not try to explain the different content of a similar notion, but at the same time, it should be accepted that a different emotional connotation remains. This requires not only a lot of explanation, but also good will, if not empathy, by both communities involved. To support and sustain this kind of differences and their acceptance requires a special kind of relation between

²² Carnap uses the similar notions of intension and extension. He asserts that two sentences have the same *extension* if they are equivalent, i.e., if they are both true or both false regarding the subject they refer to. On the other hand, two sentences have the same *intension* if they are logically equivalent, i.e., their equivalence is due to the semantic rules of the language. Thus a citizen and a soldier talking about comradeship may have the same intension, but their extension differs. Carnap, R. (1988). Meaning and necessity: a study in semantics and modal logic. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

²³ Textor, M., Ed. (2011). Frege on sense and reference. Routledge philosophy guidebooks. Cambridge, Routledge. P 149-154.

²⁴ MacIntyre, A. (2003). Whose justice? Which rationality? Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 379.

²⁵ Ibid, P 379-388.

²⁶ Which is what happened in the 1994 MOD policy paper in which large units were defined as 'Resultaat Verantwoordelijke Eenheden' which means profit centre.

the nation and its citizens and the practices and those who participate in these practices. Especially in the case of the military practice and its soldiers, this special relationship is important, as the military's purpose is to protect the nation. Therefore, this special relationship should be reflected in the formal bonds between the military and the nation it serves.

Interpreting Dutch moral tradition.

8.4.1. However, a question still remains that needs to be answered, and that is, how to analyse and describe the relationship between the military virtues, the military practice and (Dutch) moral tradition. In MacIntyre's view virtues, practice and moral tradition are intertwined and influence each other in an iterative process. In order to provide a complete answer to my research question I cannot ignore the issue of moral tradition, in particular, Dutch moral tradition. On the other hand, there are some serious difficulties in addressing this issue. First of all, Dutch moral tradition is a complex subject on which already many books have been written. Because of this complexity, other problems arise as well. The subject can be approached from many different angles and perspectives, which makes it very hard to provide a complete picture. Furthermore, the subject is sensitive to ideological bias, which adds to the difficulty - if not the impossibility - of providing a complete and - for everybody - satisfactory picture. In short, how to approach this charged issue?

8.4.2. MacIntyre states that the concept of a virtue can only be understood from a historical multilayered perspective. These layers are practice, narrative and moral tradition. I will continue my argument by following MacIntyre's argument that each later stage presupposes the earlier, but not vice versa.²⁷ I already addressed the relationship between the virtues and the practice and between the virtues and narrative. In the next paragraphs I will investigate the relationship between the virtues and the moral tradition. After analyzing the tenets of Dutch moral tradition, I will refer to the virtues of military character. In this reference, I will approach the nature of this relationship starting from the virtues and not vice versa. This means that I will refer to the virtues of military practice and verify whether these virtues are reflected in Dutch moral tradition.

8.4.3. As the 'contingent starting point' of my investigation I will use the Dutch war of independence against the feudal Spanish oppressors (1568 - 1648): the genesis of the present Dutch state. At the end of this war, the internationally accepted independent Dutch Republic was founded. Independence and liberty and equality are long standing values in Dutch moral tradition.²⁸ Religious freedom was one of the main issues over which the eighty-year war was fought. Not surprisingly religious tolerance and pluralism are a historical characteristic of Dutch moral tradition.²⁹ In the Dutch golden age, religious tolerance and mercantile developments found a match that was beneficiary to both.³⁰ Especially the tenets of Calvinism - then the majority creed in the Netherlands - played an important part in this development.³¹ In this age, the dichotomy of the

²⁷ MacIntyre, A. (2007). *After Virtue*. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 186 - 187.

²⁸ Pleij, H. (2010). *Cultuurgeschiedenis van Nederland*. *NRC Academie*. Rotterdam, NRC. CD1 hoofdstuk 1 en 2.

²⁹ von der Dunk, H. W. (1992). *Sprekend over identiteit en geschiedenis*. Amsterdam, Prometheus. P 54-55. See also, Huijsen, C. (2013). *Nederland en Oranje, 'rebels with a cause'*. *De Volkskrant*. Amsterdam

³⁰ Schama, S. (1987). *The embarrassment of richness*. London, Fontana Press.

³¹ Weber, M. (2002). *The protestant ethic and the 'spirit' of capitalism*. London, Penguin books. P106-109 and 112-116

minister and the merchant was introduced, which still permeates present Dutch society. Based on the teachings of Calvin, the Dutch also tried to shape their worldly affairs in accordance with the covenant with God. They sought to create an enduring society based on voluntarism, consent and the equality of men before their creator.³²

8.4.4. The geographical situation of the Netherlands at the mouth of a large delta had its implications as well. Firstly, being situated in a large delta, lead to the development of a large number of 'independent' administrative entities: towns, counties, provinces, polders, etc. In these circumstances, governing was primarily a matter of consulting, negotiating and compromise.³³ The Dutch state and its culture is to a large extent based on the history of decentralized organisation.³⁴ Dutch communities are largely independent: they can establish their own rates for communal taxation, the mayor is responsible for law and order, and the community council decides on the organisation of the public space.³⁵ Second, being situated in a river delta implies a constant struggle against water; either from the sea or from the rivers. This struggle requires cooperation and mutual assistance, as an individual would be powerless against the watery forces of nature.³⁶ The necessity of cooperation furthermore contributed to instil the traits of flexibility and compromise in the Dutch character.³⁷ In the third place, the Netherlands have always been a mercantile nation. Due to its position in a large delta between large Anglo-Saxon, French and German powers, the Netherlands became a perfect trading partner and transit post.³⁸ Its mercantile interest combined with its smallness also required political flexibility and a liberal attitude toward others. These liberal standards made the Netherlands also a haven for all those who were religiously or politically prosecuted elsewhere, and both the Dutch Republic as its citizens benefitted from the influx of (mostly well-educated) foreigners.³⁹ Over time, religious tolerance was extended to political tolerance, which found its confirmation in the 1848 revision of the constitution and in consequence, the step by step introduction of general franchise, which was achieved in 1917.

8.4.5. From this description of the formative period of Dutch moral tradition emerges a picture of several values, traits and dispositions that seems to dominate early Dutch moral tradition. These dominant notions are: independence, liberty and equality, flexibility, tolerance and pluralism, striving for cooperation based on consulting, consent and compromise. The question is whether these originally dominant notions are still a part of modern Dutch moral tradition.

³² Allen, B. (2005). Tocqueville, covenant and the democratic revolution. Lanham, Lexington books. P 14-19.

³³ Wessels, M. (1998). De Nederlandse traditie van vrijheid. Assen, Van Gorcum. P 9-14.

³⁴ Ibid, P 47 - 61. See also: Dooren, v., R. (2000). Traditie en transformatie: politiek en staatsinrichting in Nederland. Amsterdam, Instituut voor publiek en politiek. P13-19; and Pleij, H. (2010). Cultuurgeschiedenis van Nederland. NRC Academie. Rotterdam, NRC. CD3 hoofdstuk 9.

³⁵ (1992). Gemeentewet. BWBR0005416. Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties. Den Haag, Ministerie van Justitie.

³⁶ Pleij, H. (2010). Cultuurgeschiedenis van Nederland. NRC Academie. Rotterdam, NRC. CD2 hoofdstuk 5.

³⁷ de Nijs, T., Beukers, E., Ed. (2003). Geschiedenis van Holland, deel III a: van 1795 tot 2000. Hilversum, Verloren. P156-161.

³⁸ Wessels, M. (1998). De Nederlandse traditie van vrijheid. Assen, Van Gorcum. P 93-101.

³⁹ Schama, S. (1987). The embarrassment of richness. London, Fontana Press. P 590 - 596. See also: Wessels, M. (1998). De Nederlandse traditie van vrijheid. Assen, Van Gorcum. P 80-84.

8.4.6. In order to answer this question, I will again refer to Hofstede and his analysis of national cultures.⁴⁰ Hofstede uses four different dimensions in interpreting national cultures. This is the degree of inequality within a society measured on a scale on low or high-power distance, the degree of individualism within a society measured on a scale between collectivism and individualism, the role of gender measured on a scale between masculinity and femininity and last the tolerance of ambiguity measured on a scale of high or low uncertainty avoidance. Hofstede investigated 53 nations, including the Netherlands. His analysis refers to differences among the institutions like, family, school and the community and differences in organisations, the workplace and in relation to the state.⁴¹ It turned out that mostly the analysis of both institutions and organisations produced similar results. Hofstede presents a large-scale investigation and powerful analysis of a highly complex subject. A concise description of his results regarding the four different dimensions of culture is inserted in the following paragraphs (8.4.7. - 8.4.10.).

8.4.7. Power distance is defined as the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions expect and accept that power is distributed unequally. On the scale of power distance, the Netherlands are on the 40th place of the 53 nations investigated, which indicates a low power distance. This means that people see and treat each other as equals regardless of differences in power, status and wealth. It implies also a consultative style of decision-making. Hierarchy in organisations is seen as to pertain to inequality of roles established for convenience; hierarchy is not a matter of class or birth. Decentralisation is popular. The use of power should be legitimate and the use of violence in politics is rare.⁴²

8.4.8. Individualism - as opposed to collectivism - pertains to societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is free to make his or her own choices and is expected to look after him- or herself. On the individualism index, the Netherlands occupies the 5th place, which indicates a high score on individualism. This means that identity is understood to be based in the individual. People speak their mind and expect to be treated as individuals; one is expected to have a private opinion. Tasks prevail over relationships. Individual responsibility is expected, and self-actualisation by every individual is seen as an ultimate goal.⁴³

8.4.9. Differences in gender refer to the extent in which gender roles are clearly distinct. In masculine societies these roles are clearly distinct with typical role attributions, while in feminine societies, gender roles are less distinct and even overlapping. In the masculinity index, the Netherlands is 51st out of 53 nations, which indicates a feminine society in which the gender differences are small. This implies that everybody is supposed to be modest. It means also an emphasis on equality, a strong willingness to cooperate, striving for consensus while violence is rejected as a means to solve conflicts. The latter is also visible in

⁴⁰ Hofstede, G. (2003). Cultures and organizations. London, Profile books.

⁴¹ Hofstede's distinction between institutions and organizations could be compared with and seems more or less similar to MacIntyre's distinction between practices and institutions.

⁴² Hofstede, G. (2003). Cultures and organizations. London, Profile books. P 26-43.

⁴³ Ibid, P 53-67.

state policy in which a large proportion of the state budget is spent on development and international assistance and a relatively small part on defence and armament.⁴⁴

8.4.10. The last dimension pertains to tolerance for ambiguity; to what extent do the members of a society feel threatened by uncertainties or unknown situations. With this index, the Netherlands has the 35th position out of 53 nations. This position indicates a relative high tolerance which means that uncertainty is accepted as a fact of life. People feel comfortable in ambiguous situations and unfamiliar risks. Tolerance is expected and there should be no more rules than strictly necessary. Esteem by others and a sense of belonging are important factors in the motivation of agents. Some of these characteristics are also found in policies, which focus on internationalism and a belief in human rights.⁴⁵

8.4.11. The overall picture that emerges on the tradition of Dutch society includes the following conclusions and observations. First, it seems that the modern ideal of equality and the related notions of tolerance and room for self-realisation are very much in line with early Dutch tradition. The same applies for the willingness to cooperate, the notion that task prevails over relationship, a consultative style of decision-making and striving for consensus and compromise. It seems justified to conclude that Dutch moral tradition has remained relatively stable, albeit its manifestation in day-to-day life will have changed since the founding days of the Dutch state. According to MacIntyre, the moral tradition should reflect the virtues of the practices which constitute that tradition. This means that the virtues of military character should also fit with this tradition.

Moral tradition and military virtues

8.5.1. MacIntyre states that the concept of a virtue: 'always requires for its application the acceptance for some prior account of certain features of social and moral life in terms of which to have to be defined and explained.'⁴⁶ The description of Dutch moral tradition, in the preceding paragraph 8.4., provides such a prior account of features of social and moral terms. In paragraph 7.3., I argued that the military as a purposive practice should embrace the moral standards of the constitutional democracy which it serves. The above description of the main features of Dutch moral tradition is in line with the concept of responsible citizenship that Galston introduces.⁴⁷ Galston argues that responsible citizenship requires civic virtues.⁴⁸ In the same paragraph 7.3., I argue that military virtues could be seen as a particular expression of civic virtues. As the tenets of Dutch moral tradition do not run counter to the concept of responsible citizenship, the conclusion is warranted that the concept of military virtues is indeed supported by the acceptance of certain features of social and moral life. This means that from the perspective of Dutch moral tradition, there are no restraints on the application of those military virtues which I discerned in chapter 4: sense of responsibility, competence, comradeship, respect, courage, resilience and discipline. According to MacIntyre this also means also that the exercise of the military virtues sustains the wider moral tradition which in turn provides the necessary historical background which

⁴⁴ Ibid, P 84-96.

⁴⁵ Ibid, P 113-134.

⁴⁶ MacIntyre, A. (2007). *After Virtue*. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 186.

⁴⁷ Galston, W. (1991). *Liberal purposes: goods, virtues and duties in the liberal state*. Cambridge, University Press. P 221-227.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

makes the practice and the life of those involved intelligible.⁴⁹ It is worthwhile to investigate to what extent tradition and the concept of military practice in which the military virtues are displayed are indeed mutually supportive.

Moral tradition and the military, an institutional perspective

8.6.1. In this paragraph I will address the relationship between the practice and moral tradition. As I explained in chapter 7, military practice is a purposive practice which cannot exist without an institution that provides legitimacy and continuity to the practice. From this perspective, the military is necessarily also - and for many primarily - an institutional entity. The moral tradition as a 'historically extended, socially embodied argument, precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition' is embodied in society, which is made up of practices and institutions.⁵⁰ Of these institutions, the state is the most encompassing. The state plays an important role in maintaining and supporting moral tradition by establishing and promulgating rules and regulations regarding the goods and values that constitute the tradition. Therefore, I will address the issue of the relationship between moral tradition and the military from these institutional perspectives. To what extent are the state and the military 'essential constituents' of each other?⁵¹

8.6.2. In the Dutch context, the relation between the people, the government and the armed forces during the last two centuries has mostly been somewhat problematic. As a small nation - which depends on trade and commerce as its primary means of existence - war and armed conflict were seen as a political liability rather than an asset. From the founding of the Dutch kingdom in 1813, the foreign policy aimed at avoiding getting involved in international conflict. The Netherlands succeeded in staying neutral in many European conflicts, including WW I. This prolonged period of peace resulted in a 'non-military' attitude.⁵² The system of conscription added to the overall lack of popular support for its armed forces. Nevertheless, sometimes serious efforts were undertaken to improve on the Dutch defensive effort, but these seldom achieved their goals. The general attitude was one of disinterest in the armed forces and parsimony in military spending. It was a shock when in 1940, the Netherlands policy of neutrality failed and the Dutch territory was attacked and occupied by the military forces of the German Third Reich. The Dutch army was defeated after a campaign that lasted only one week. In 1942, the Dutch colony of Indonesia was attacked and occupied by the Japanese, which got the Netherlands involved in the war in the Pacific as well.

8.6.2. Immediately after the war, the armed forces enjoyed a short-term on popularity. However, after some time, this popularity faded. The Dutch had other things on their minds: rebuilding their severely damaged country. And albeit the political alliance with NATO and Europe lead to an initial increase in the defence budget, the relation between the nation and the armed forces remained a distant one. Van Doorn argues that the Dutch armed forces are a respected institution and its aim - defence against aggression - is well respected too. However, the consequence that violence could be used is rejected.

⁴⁹ MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 222 - 223

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid, P 187.

⁵² Klinkert, W. (2008). Van Waterloo tot Uruzgan: de militaire identiteit van Nederland. Amsterdam, Vossiuspers, Universiteit van Amsterdam. P 1.

⁵³ In Dutch tradition, violence is not a means to solve problems.⁵⁴ Thus the military and war are disconnected. The armed forces are transformed into an abstract entity en thus made - partly- invisible. Van Doorn makes the comparison with the appreciation of marriage and sex in the Victorian era. Marriage then was a social accepted and appreciated institution, but the issue of sex was under a taboo. Van Doorn observes a similar - troubled - relation between the armed forces and violence.⁵⁵ The distance between the armed forces and the nation increased in the wake of the effort of conscripts to ameliorate their national service, and the political support their efforts had. In the course of the post-war developments, political support for a conscript army dwindled further and in 1997, conscription was formally suspended, effectively cutting the only practical bond between the Dutch population and its armed forces. The Dutch military became an all-volunteer force. However, the record of the first units of the new all-professional army was seriously blemished by the events in Srebrenica and its aftermath, adding to the already low esteem of the armed forces.

8.6.3. The deployment of Dutch troops to Iraq and afterwards to Afghanistan and their performance there, including the losses they suffered, lead to a serious re-orientation in Dutch society. The respect and esteem for the members of the armed forces increased considerably.⁵⁶ However, this did not mean that the Dutch came to love their armed services. The Dutch self-image, which was established over a long history, remained; based on tolerance, freedom and right over might; leaving little room for military elements.⁵⁷ In spite of recent operational deployments, the Dutch in general still lacks awareness of the implications of the use of force and misses knowledge of military action; they have no idea of the dynamics of international military operations.⁵⁸ In parliament too, this perfunctory expertise and alienation of the armed forces is demonstrated. Domestic political considerations seem more important than the inherent purpose of the armed forces. But not only in parliament, in the media as well, repeatedly vehement discussions took place whether the mission in Uruzgan was a fighting mission or a development mission; a distinction which was completely meaningless for many of the soldiers who were deployed in Uruzgan.⁵⁹ A similar debate took place in 2011 in relation to the subsequent deployment of a police-training mission to Kunduz.⁶⁰

8.6.4. This seemingly lack of awareness of the dynamics of the use of military force and the wanting knowledge of military affairs in almost all branches of Dutch society, could put serious pressure on the relationship between the military and the nation. After all, this relationship also has a moral dimension which aims nurturing bonds of trust in an

⁵³ Doorn, van, J. A., Hendrix, W.J. (1970). Ontsporing van geweld. Rotterdam, Universitaire Pers. P 185-186.

⁵⁴ Hofstede, G. (2003). Cultures and organizations. London, Profile books. P 43, 96 and 103.

⁵⁵ Doorn, van, J. A., Hendrix, W.J. (1970). Ontsporing van geweld. Rotterdam, Universitaire Pers.

⁵⁶ 'The armed forces are trusted by 71% of the population.' (2011). Handelingen Tweede kamer, betreffende het Wetsvoorstel Vaststelling van de begrotingsstaten van het Ministerie van Defensie (X) voor het jaar 2012 M. v. Defensie. Den Haag.

⁵⁷ Klinkert, W. (2008). Van Waterloo tot Uruzgan: de militaire identiteit van Nederland. Amsterdam, Vossiuspers Universiteit van Amsterdam. P 1.

⁵⁸ Ibid, P 2.

⁵⁹ Groen, J. H. M. (2012). Task Force Uruzgan: 'Getuigenissen van een missie'. Den Haag, Ministerie van Defensie.

⁶⁰ (2011). Bestrijding internationaal terrorisme. Brief van de minister van. Defensie, van Buitenlandse Zaken, en van Veiligheid en Justitie. Den Haag.

affectionate reciprocity that exists within this special heterogeneity.⁶¹ The budget cuts decided on in parliament in 2011 and the consequent plans for the dismissal of approximately 5000 soldiers is a recent example in which 'affectionate reciprocity' seems to be wanting. Especially the way in which so many soldiers were dismissed, fuelled a feeling of being deserted.⁶² The soldier's uncomfortable feelings seem to grow not from any reluctance to accept reducing the cost of the military, thus contributing to a nation-wide effort to cope with the effects of the international financial crisis, but rather a perceived lack of interest in which political expediency rather than analysis and careful consideration determined the outcome of the debate. This kind of suspicion - whether it is based on facts or fiction - undermines the relationship between the nation and the military. It seems that both the political leadership as well as the departmental military advisors are not fully aware of the vulnerability of this relationship.⁶³

8.6.5. The conclusion seems warranted that the institutional relation between the Dutch nation and its military is rather weak in several aspects. First, the relation is hampered by a general 'non military' attitude as the result of an enduring peace. This attitude feeds on a strong historical tradition of deliberation and debate in seeking consensus and an aversion to authoritarian arrangements - such as the armed forces - and the use of violence to settle disputes. From this general feeling of embarrassment follows a second difficulty which impedes an adult relationship and that is the general lack of knowledge of the military and its capacities as well as the complexities involved in committing these capacities. The suspension of conscription put an end to the system in which the male part of the population at least gained some perfunctory knowledge of military affairs. From these two circumstances follows a third distinctive feature of the relationship between the Dutch nation and its military, which pertains to the questioning of the overall utility and necessity of the armed forces. Not that the soldiers are not respected, but the relevance of the armed forces as such cannot count on much support. This is the result of a traditional aversion of violence as a means to solve conflicts. This lack of support is mirrored in the public and political debate. It seems that these views are largely based on an instrumental and institutional appreciation of the military as an expensive ornament of the state. A feature of this debate is that the notion of the military as a practice receives only little attention, if at all. This reflects the generally widening gap between praxis and poesis in many branches of Dutch society, as described in paragraph 7.5.3. In these branches, there is a growing emphasis on goods of effectiveness rather than goods of excellence, and in this development, the military is no exception. This means also that the virtues of these practices are under some pressure. According to MacIntyre, living traditions involve practices in which the tenets of the tradition are embodied; and the standards of excellence of a practice find their anchorage in the virtues. The extent to which the virtues relevant to the practice are exercised, determines whether a tradition remains living or gets corrupted.⁶⁴ A lack of virtues corrupts both the practice as well as the institution, which derives their existence from the traditions of which they are the temporary embodiment.⁶⁵

⁶¹ Kincaid, J. (2005). "Tocqueville, covenant and the democratic revolution." *Publius* **36** (4): 599-600. P 600.

⁶² (2011). *Handelingen Tweede kamer, betreffende het Wetsvoorstel Vaststelling van de begrotingsstaten van het Ministerie van Defensie (X) voor het jaar 2012 M. v. Defensie*. Den Haag.

⁶³ This issue was addressed in a periodical of the Netherlands officers association: de Vries, P. H. (2000). 'Sprookje'. *Carré*, **23**: 6-9. A translation is provided in Annex A of this chapter.

⁶⁴ MacIntyre, A. (2007). *After Virtue*. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 222, 223.

⁶⁵ *Ibid*, P 223.

Moral tradition and the military, an obligatory perspective

8.7.1. In chapter 7 I elaborated on the political relation between the nation and the military. The question then is how this generic relation is shaped within the context of a democratic constitutional state. In which way are mutual obligations of the nation and the military shaped? An obvious candidate is the contract, which the soldier signs on entering the armed forces. However, there are many kinds of contracts. O’Gorman discerns seven contract theories: reliance and restitution theory; will theory; consent theory; bargain theory; efficiency theory; substantive fairness theory and the multi value theory.⁶⁶ The reliance and restitution theory is based upon the notion that the promisee’s reliance on the promisor’s promise should be protected. If the party, who made the promise, fails in fulfilling the obligations made under the promise, the party duped by this failure can claim retribution. The main question is then, how to ascertain the promise was not (completely) fulfilled and to what extent the responsible party is liable. The other issue is that this approach is hardly two sided. The will theory is based on the assumption that the parties freely assume - in a so-called ‘meeting of the minds’ - the reciprocal obligations set in the contract. Given the inequality of the parties involved in a contract between the state and a soldier, this theory does not seem appropriate. The consent theory postulates that the contractual obligation is based on the consent to transfer an entitlement. This consent is considered a manifestation of an intention to alienate rights. This theory seems more appropriate because that is what happens when a citizen signs on as a soldier. By his signature, he does alienate some of his rights, like the right to strike, to choose his own doctor, etc. The boundaries of protected domains are clearly discerned. However, there still is the matter of the inequality of the contracting parties. The bargain theory emphasizes the process in which the agreement is reached. If the process is correct, the obligations of the contract are too. However, adhering to a correct process may enhance the force of the contract, but does not in any way define the nature of the contract. The efficiency theory focuses on how to achieve the best deal. It is based on a utilitarian approach and this theory, therefore allows for bargaining. This approach does not seem appropriate to settle the arrangement between the state and its soldiers as the contract partners face substantial inequalities, which may be reflected in the result as well. The substantive fairness theory assumes that it is possible to ascertain the fairness of a contract between parties. However, this theory does not address the question on what criteria the fairness of a deal should be established. This is left to experts and ultimately, the rule of law. Apart from introducing an expert opinion, this theory does not add much to the other theories. The final theory - the multi value theory - does not try to base contracts on a single starting point, but allows for a synthesis. In this theory, the freedom of contract is tempered by legal and traditional rules and regulations. However, the question is how to enforce these legal rules and regulations as laws are neither self-enforcing nor self-interpreting.⁶⁷ Nevertheless, this theory allows for diminishing the inequality between the state and the soldier, and creates clearer boundaries as to the reciprocal obligations, including alienation of rights. Nevertheless, even in this approach it is unclear how to embed in a contract that a soldier is liable with his life. Besides, these theories do not explain the

⁶⁶ O’Gorman, D. P. (2012). "Contract theory and some realism about employee covenant." S.M.U. Law Review **65**(2): 145 - 201.

⁶⁷ Lomasky, L. E. (2011). "Contract, covenant and constitution." Social philosophy and policy **28**(1): 50-71. P 57.

nature of the bond between the soldier and the state over time. It seems that classical contract theories fail in this respect. Another approach is needed.

8.7.2. A starting point for this other approach could be found in history when there were soldiers and states, but not yet the present formal contracts. The covenant could be characterized as the pre-contractual ground of our modern contracts.⁶⁸ Especially in the Netherlands and its predominantly Calvinist culture, covenantal thinking was strongly developed.⁶⁹ A covenant signifies a partnership in which persons or groups regarded as moral equals voluntarily consent to unite for common purposes.⁷⁰ This purpose can be limited or comprehensive. Furthermore, by entering into a covenant the partners do not surrender their fundamental rights of identity.⁷¹ The difference between a contract and a covenant is that parties can disengage from a contract when it is no longer in their interest to continue with it; however, a covenant binds them even - perhaps especially - in difficult times. The reason is that a covenant is predicated not only on interest, but rather on loyalty and fidelity.⁷² A covenant is maintained by an internalized sense of identity, kinship, loyalty, obligation, duty, responsibility, and reciprocity. A covenant - the instrument of man as a social animal - gives rise to institutions, like: families, communities, traditions, and voluntary associations. It is the basis of civil society. A social contract, on the other hand - the instrument of man as a political animal - gives rise to the instrumentalities of the state: governments, parties, and the mediated resolution of conflict. It is the basis of political society.⁷³ The most important dimension of a covenant, in contrast to a contract, is a moral imperative to uphold the covenant by going beyond the letter of the law in order to observe the spirit of the law. After all, as stated before, laws are neither self-enforcing nor self-interpreting. This moral dimension is crucial not only for sustaining the covenant but also for nurturing bonds of affectionate reciprocity that exists within covenantal heterogeneity.⁷⁴ A covenant depends upon parties willing to respect the rights of others. This obligation of one partner toward another must be reciprocal.⁷⁵ We know that communities fail without bonds of fellowship and the obligations that flow from fellow feeling. Neither the free market nor the liberal- democratic state can survive without internalized constraints that prevent us from doing certain things, which may be in our advantage to do. These are moral relationships. They are covenantal rather than contractual. The covenant belongs to a different narrative, one primarily told by our traditions. In short, founding, upholding and strengthening a covenant, a civil bond, means also maintaining and strengthening the narrative of our social life in terms of

⁶⁸ Kuntz, P. G. (1997). "John O'Neill, the Canadian Burkean, and his dialectic of covenant and contract." *Philosophy of the social sciences* 27(1): 96-101. P 97.

⁶⁹ Schama, S. (1987). *The embarrassment of richness*. London, Fontana Press. P 94.

⁷⁰ Allen, B. (2005). *Tocqueville, covenant and the democratic revolution*. Lanham, Lexington books. P14-19, 32.

⁷¹ Kincaid, J. (2005). "Tocqueville, covenant and the democratic revolution." *Publius* 36(4): 599-600. P 600.

⁷² Sacks, J. (1996). "Social contract or social covenant." *Policy Review* 78(4): 54-58. P 55.

⁷³ Ibid, P 58.

⁷⁴ Kincaid, J. (2005). "Tocqueville, covenant and the democratic revolution." *Publius* 36(4): 599-600. P 600.

⁷⁵ Kuntz, P. G. (1997). "John O'Neill, the Canadian Burkean, and his dialectic of covenant and contract." *Philosophy of the social sciences* 27(1): 96-101. P 100.

mutuality, the mutuality that precedes identity.⁷⁶ A covenant is conceived not just as enabling relationships with individuals, but also as communal.⁷⁷

8.7.3. The soldier is a proto-servant of the community, the state which he serves. Hackett states: 'Living in a group demands some subordination of the interest of self to the interests of the group. The military contract stands out here as almost unique. It demands the total and almost unconditional subordination of the interests of the individual if the interest of the group should require it. This can lead to the surrender of life itself. If not infrequently does.'⁷⁸ The essence of the relation between the soldier and the state is of a twofold nature. On the one hand is the soldier licensed to use violence and if necessary to kill, albeit within the constraints of legitimate orders. This license is prohibited to all other servants of the state.⁷⁹ On the other hand, soldiers have an unlimited liability in giving their lives in doing so.⁸⁰ The former element - the legitimacy of the use of violence - is to a large extent defined by law: the *Jus ad Bellum* and the *Jus in Bello*. The latter element - the liability of soldiers - can be defined by law to only a very limited extent; for example, in the case of cowardice in the face of the enemy, treason or defection to the enemy. Therefore, the element of unlimited liability, which binds the soldier to kill or be killed for a purpose in which he may have no personal interest whatever, is primarily a matter of a covenant.⁸¹ A covenant binds the community and the individuals over time and implies a strong moral obligation even in difficult times and in the face of danger. The covenant appeals to loyalty and fidelity. However, a covenant implies reciprocity and therefore, in exchange for surrendering various rights (by swearing an oath), soldiers who serve the community may expect fair treatment as human beings.⁸² Sir John Hackett articulated this as follows: 'The essential basis of military life is the ordered application of force under an unlimited liability. It is this unlimited liability, which sets the man who embraces this life somewhat apart. He will be, (or should be) always a citizen. So long as he serves he will never be a citizen.'⁸³ As a citizen the soldier shows allegiance to the state; he pays his taxes and abides by the state's rule of law. In return, he reaps the benefits of the state, including protection from harm. However, as a soldier he is expected to put himself in harm's way for the sake of the community, but what does the soldier get in return? Some say it is dismally little: 'soldiers have across the army's history, been subjected to treatment that has fallen far

⁷⁶ Sacks, J. (1996). "Social contract or social covenant." *Policy Review* 78(4): 54-58. P 58. See also chapter 5.

⁷⁷ Lomasky, L. E. (2011). "Contract, covenant and constitution." *Social philosophy and policy* 28(1): 50-71. P 59.

⁷⁸ Hackett, J. (1983). *The profession of arms*. London, Sidgwick and Jackson. P 139.

⁷⁹ Even the police has no such license. They are only allowed to use potentially lethal violence in case of serious danger or self defence. (1994). Ambtsinstructie voor de politie, Koninklijke marechaussee en andere opsporingsambtenaren. *Stafafdeling Wetgeving Publiekrecht, nr. 433019/94/6, nr. EA 94/U1149*. Den Haag, Ministerie van Justitie. Hoofdstuk 1 artikel 7.

⁸⁰ No other servant of the state is faced with such an unlimited liability, not even the police. These liabilities include death, physical as well as mental injury, capture, disruption of domestic arrangements, etc.

⁸¹ Holmes, R. (2011). *Soldiers*. London, Harpers Press. P 497.

⁸² Mileham, P. (2010). "Unlimited liability and the military covenant." *Journal of Military Ethics* 9(1): 23-40. P 24.

⁸³ Hackett, J. (1983). *The profession of arms*. London, Sidgwick and Jackson. P 202. Von Clausewitz described this relationship in terms of a trinity. The people from which entity the soldier comes forward, the government which entity represents the people and the army in which entity the soldiers serve the nation. Clausewitz, von, C (1984). *On War*. Howard, M., Paret, P. Ed. Princeton, University Press. P 89.

short of that to which they have been reasonably entitled, and is not enough to maintain that this all happened in a distant land where things were done differently. We have done it in recent memory and, given half a change, would still do it again.⁸⁴

8.7.4. In discussing this issue, Mileham introduces the terminology of a 'fiduciary relationship'. This kind of relationship is built on trust and confidence.⁸⁵ This kind of relationship permeates the military practice. 'Military leadership and the imperatives of teamwork require a willing and continuous display of trust, confidence and loyalty.'⁸⁶ The ensuing display of good faith enhances moral good-sense, self-discipline, respect and restraint, which cannot be achieved by military regiment and the rule of law. The same kind of relation exists (or should exist) between the soldier and the state. The soldier must be confident that the risks he is exposed to are worthwhile and within the legitimate power of the state. He must also be able to trust the state to do everything in its power to provide the appropriate means, personnel, organization and training to allow the soldier a fair chance (perhaps even more than that) to achieve victory and survive. And in the case, the soldier does not return or returns seriously injured, the soldier must be confident that the nation will not abandon him nor his family. To a soldier the whole military organisation and society could be viewed as an upturned pyramid, with him at the bottom; but like a man dangling beneath a parachute, everything above him is actually supported.⁸⁷

8.7.5. However, in modern terms, the responsibilities of the state are primarily of a political nature. This political responsibility requires, first of all a political strategy with a clearly articulated end, a political goal. Next a clear view of the way to achieve that goal, a policy is needed. Lastly there have to be available the appropriate means necessary to realize the required ways, a budget. However, in keeping its end of the covenant it is essential that the state realizes that it has a wider responsibility than merely a political one. As a partner in a covenant the state is expected to act in good faith as well. The covenant must be honoured in order to preserve the reciprocal fiduciary relationship between the soldier and the state. Preserving this relationship is not only a matter of material means but is also in showing respect (and sometimes gratitude) for the sacrifices soldiers (are willing to) make. If this relationship is thrown out of balance, if the fiduciary relationship is damaged it can result in serious consequences; both in terms of the covenant as the mutual relation in Clausewitz's trinity: people, state and army.⁸⁸

⁸⁴ Holmes, R. (2011). Soldiers. London, Harpers Press. P 24. Also in Dutch history there are poignant examples of maltreatment of Dutch soldiers. The former POW's of the Royal Netherlands Indian Army did not receive their pay over the period they were interned in Japanese POW camps during WW II. It was only in 2001 the Dutch government made a 'gesture' and paid each former POW a compensation of € 1822. More recently it took the Dutch government 7 years to formally exonerate the soldiers of Dutchbat 3 of any responsibility in the 1995 massacre of Bosnian fighters by the Serbian Army.

⁸⁵ Mileham, P. (2010). "Unlimited liability and the military covenant." Journal of Military Ethics 9(1): 23-40. P 28.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Schlaefli, R. (1992). Emergency Sahib: Of Queen's, Sikhs and Dagger Division London, R.J. Leach military publishers. P 29.

⁸⁸ Clausewitz, von, C (1984). On War. Howard, M., Paret, P. Ed. Princeton, University Press. P 89.

Living morality, practices and virtues.

8.8.1. The aim of my thesis is to establish whether MacIntyre's theory provides a suitable instrument to identify, develop, instil and uphold the required moral standards in the military. However, MacIntyre in his theory argues that the virtues are closely connected to the practices, the narrative order of human life and moral tradition. As I have investigated all constitutive elements of his theory, it is now time to see whether application of his theory creates a coherent and logical story which underpins the validity of his theory. As I elaborated on in paragraph 8.4., Dutch moral tradition has several characteristics, which are firmly embedded in its culture. These are first the notions of equality of man, that all men are entitled to respect and the ensuing aptitude to strive for consensus rather than conflict. Freedom is a second important element of Dutch traditions and is expressed in an attitude of tolerance and the overall willingness to compromise. In the third place there is widely held consensus on the need for solidarity and the notion of cooperation as an effective means to achieve common and otherwise unattainable goals. In MacIntyre's idiom this indicates that Dutch moral tradition seems to be alive.

8.8.2. However, according to MacIntyre, the liveliness of moral traditions is expressed through the exercise of the virtues that are relevant to the practices that constitute society. In paragraph 7.5., I elaborated on the growing gap between praxis and poesis, between the practice and the institution, between goods of excellence and goods of effectiveness. Institutional instrumentalism seems to gain importance at the cost of the interests of the practice. At the same time, it becomes increasingly obvious that an instrumental approach has its limits: 'stick and carrot' are not particularly suited to promote effectiveness let alone excellence. Furthermore, the institutional approach also seems to deny the special relationship, a covenant, based on mutual duty and trust that are required. Some kind of discomfort is noticeable: how to maintain standards of moral excellence in an institutional and instrumental environment. Moreover, how to make sense of a shared idea on the morally good in a complex situation?

8.8.3. When we look at the Aristotelian telos of mankind - being a virtuous citizen of the Greek polis - it is obvious that such a general overarching telos is an illusion in the present complex nation state: there are just too many differences within the people, their ethnical backgrounds their religious and political convictions, their prosperity, lifestyle, etc. However, this does not mean that the underlying idea of Aristotle has also lost its relevance, which is that man aspires at giving full scope to one's natural gifts. This human flourishing entails aspiring at meeting the standards of excellence that are relevant to the practice(s) one participates in. This kind of flourishing is not only beneficial to the practice and the practitioner but also to his fellow practitioners, the community of which he is a part and the wider society as well. The question is how to mobilize these forces to the benefit of society and to avoid that a lack of virtues will corrupt both the practices as well as the institutions which derive their existence from the traditions of which they are the temporary embodiment.⁸⁹

8.8.4. This kind of revival cannot be organized top-down. This would require a common consent over transcendental 'truths'. Given the already mentioned complexity of society, that would amount to cry for the moon. This kind of revival can only be achieved in a

⁸⁹ MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 222, 223.

bottom-up process. This means that practices should reclaim their standards of excellence and their priority over, or at least their being at par with, the institutional goods of effectiveness. This would result in greater involvement in the practices and the ensuing goods of excellence: at first at a small scale, but possibly ever widening and eventually this could encompass the social fabric of society as a whole. Thus, universalising of virtues could be achieved without recurring to transcendent ideas.⁹⁰ Of course this process requires time, thus immediate results cannot be expected. However, it is tempting to speculate that if this process could start in the sporting and other clubs and in education, and we would be able to hold on to this approach for a sustained period, much could be achieved!⁹¹ All in all, the conclusion seems warranted that the application of MacIntyre's theory on some aspects of Dutch society creates a coherent and logical story, which underpins the validity of his theory.

A living military practice

8.9.1. A number of the conclusions articulated in the preceding paragraphs are based on a specific interpretation of some social developments and how to cope with these. However, the argument is relevant, in answering the question whether MacIntyre's theory provides a suitable instrument to identify, develop, instil and uphold the required moral standards in the military. By accepting the perspective in which the military is primarily seen as a practice rather than an institution, would help in recognizing and addressing some of the problems I identified in the preceding chapters. First of all, it would be beneficial to military further (moral) education. The relevance of the seven virtues of military character is easily explained as they follow logically from the characteristics of military practice and contribute to satisfy the internal goods for the sake of which the armed forces are joined. The necessity of the virtue of intellect, practical wisdom, is from a military point of view obvious as well. It is required to make often tough decisions in difficult and complex situations. All of these virtues, combined in a framework of virtues, can be made part and parcel of military education, training and exercise. As these virtues are directly related to military practice, they will be readily accepted as relevant. Narrative can play an important role in developing and instilling these virtues in the character of soldiers. As I explained identity is for a large part based on stories, which create the unity of a single life. Narrative will also be an

⁹⁰ Gabriels, R. (2000). "Simsalbibambasaladusaladim." *Krisis - tijdschrift voor actuele filosofie* 20(1): 89-107.

⁹¹ Support for this assumption can be found in the efforts in the field of sport to try and halt further coarsening of behaviour on and around the pitches. Already in 2002 the Royal Netherlands Field Hockey League (KNHB) started a campaign to improve sportsmanship and to promote mutual respect. The campaign proved a success as the number of incidents decreased and the atmosphere on and off the playing grounds improved. The campaign is continued. See: (2010). Samen voor sportiviteit en respect. Actieplan sportiviteit & respect van de Koninklijke Nederlandse Hockey Bond. Nieuwegein, KNHB. Because of its success, in 2009 this initiative was followed up by a national campaign in which the government (Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport) and 11 other sports leagues participated. In 2012 a report was published on the results. See: Lucassen, J., Kalmthout, van, J., Steenbergen, J., Werff, van der, H., Smits, F., Jong, de, M. (2012). Je gaat het pas zien als je het door hebt...: conclusies en slotbeschouwing van de monitor voor sportiviteit en respect 2009 - 2012. Nieuwegein, Arko sports media: 73. The authors concluded that measurable progress was achieved but stressed the importance of a sustained campaign. They also mentioned a moral paradox which complicates the efforts: increased action for improvements generates an increased attention for the issue and also an increased critical perception which results in the paradox that although the number of incidents decreases, the public image does not improve. This paradox underpins the need for a sustained effort.

important instrument in explaining and assisting in creating an 'esprit de corps' which adds to identity as well as cohesion. Cohesion is an important asset as it greatly contributes to effectiveness of military units. Tradition is important in upholding the required moral standards. The wider moral tradition provides the background in which the virtues are embedded. Military tradition and 'esprit de corps' could serve as means to clarify and these moral standards in a military context. Thus, tradition could contribute in upholding these required moral standards.

8.9.2. Replacing - or adapting - the present code of conduct by the proposed framework of virtues would solve several other problems as well. It would create a theoretical unified framework in contrast to the present code, which rests on several ethical theories. It would also solve the problem of how to convey the content of the present code: the content of the proposed framework of virtues is closely related to operational military practice and the usefulness of the standards of excellence expressed within the framework is all part of an obvious military truth. The framework would not hamper military effectiveness, on the contrary! The framework provides guidance, both practical as well as moral, while leaving room for practical solutions required in the often complex situations that are characteristic of military practice. The framework meets the criteria as articulated by Birnbacher.⁹² Furthermore, the framework provides a closer link with regard to the international practice of military codes.

8.9.3. Furthermore, applying the framework in moral education aims at building character. This military character that is aimed at, is the same for all soldiers of all services thus creating a common consent on what is appropriate. Once these characteristics are instilled in the identity of the soldier successfully, it will be hard to discard these. This could well enhance the overall moral awareness and reduce the number of reports and incidents as presently monitored by COID. Furthermore, this also means that those soldiers (especially senior NCO's and officers) who - in the course of their career - are posted to institutional positions, bring their moral dispositions, their virtues and values along. These personal characteristics will play their part in the way these soldiers will fulfil their - at the higher levels primarily institutional - job. Institutional instrumentality could be met with personal involvement. Operational relevance and practicality will probably play a more important role, rather than mere instrumental considerations and political expediency. This could add to the quality of decision-making at the higher level staffs. It would contribute to diminish the gap between military praxis and institutional poesis. However, it must be recognized that instilling virtues, building character, is a complex affair and requires a long-lasting effort. It is not something which can be achieved in a six-month basis training. In basis training a foundation can be laid, which creates the prerequisites for successful further education. Instilling and upholding the virtues requires attention throughout the entire term of service of all soldiers. Not an opportunity should be lost to dwell on the practical relevance of the virtues and the connected standards of excellence. This requires that military leaders at all levels are educated and trained in recognizing opportunities for contributing to the building of military character. Furthermore they must be equipped with the knowledge, skills and the will to make the best use of these opportunities. Only

⁹² Birnbacher, D. (1999). "Ethics and social science: which kind of cooperation?" Ethical theory and moral practice, 2(4): 319 - 336.

a consistent and continuous effort will produce the required results. This would require a strong conviction, a clear policy and a lot of energy.

8.9.4. Another consequence could be that by positioning the military as a practice rather than an instrument could foster a different attitude toward the military. Positioning the military as a practice provides opportunities to emphasize the importance and value of inherent involvement typical of a practice. Openly aspiring at the standards of excellence of the practice and displaying the relevant virtues could well add to a better understanding and appreciation of the military. Emphasizing the utility of the military, on the contrary, would at the best lead to an appreciation of the instrumental value of the military, which is vulnerable for the demands of (political) expediency. By positioning the military as a practice also the idea of the covenant - based on mutual duty and trust - will be accepted more readily. Communication would be based more on empathy and diminish the communicative problems of using 'different languages'. Such a development will enhance the reciprocal esteem of the parties to the covenant and strengthen the fiduciary nature of the bond between the partners. Duty and trust will be evenly met. The nation trusts the soldier to do their duty, which includes their complete liability. The soldier trusts the nation that they will do theirs, which includes legitimate deployment, adequate equipment and training and appropriate care for themselves if wounded and for their relatives if the soldier is killed.

8.9.5. Not every citizen is a soldier, but every soldier is also a citizen. This simple fact has also a further consequence. A citizen brings his prior moral education with him, when he joins the armed forces as a soldier. Serving in the military for a number of years will change a soldier physically and mentally: a number of his moral outlooks will change. Some of the disposition inherent to a virtue will stay with him. As the virtues are related to standards of excellence, a soldier will probably develop an increased awareness of the importance of excellence. As soldiers are also citizens and they will bring their moral outlooks with them in their activities in society; whether they are still on active duty or have left the military. As I explained in paragraph 7.3.6., military virtues also have civil relevance, and some military virtues actually coincide with civic virtues. This pertains especially to responsibility, competence and respect as well as comradeship. The link between the military virtues of resilience, courage and discipline and their civic counterparts might be less obvious, but these also have civilian relevance. However, within the military soldiers are stimulated to aspire at achieving the appropriate standards of excellence. In many civilian practices, on the contrary, this kind of aspiration is not often displayed openly. In some respects therefore, civilians with a background as soldiers often seem to play an important role in improving other practices.⁹³ In this sense the soldier's active notion of the virtues adds to the quality of other more civilian practices. They thereby contribute also to keep the wider moral traditions alive.

Conclusion

8.10.1. In this final conceptual chapter, I addressed the final constituent element of MacIntyre's theory: the relation between the wider moral tradition of society and the practices and the virtues that constitute society. According to MacIntyre, a moral

⁹³ This observation is partly speculative as data on military personnel active in civilian practices are not available. On the other hand as a sports official I very often met fellow soldiers acting as officials in sports and other clubs, thus contributing to the fabric of society.

tradition is an extended argument through time about the very goods that are part of the tradition. This tradition - when it is to be kept alive - should maintain a fruitful relation with the practices, and the virtues involved. A living moral tradition goes through a continuous process that has three phases. In the first phase the tenets of tradition are established and accepted. From this acceptance grows the second phase in which the tradition is criticized. The third phase accommodates the criticisms, and the tradition is re-formulated. If the reciprocal relation between the tradition and its practices and virtues loses its impetus, the tradition will change and practices and virtues could whither away and eventually die.

8.10.2. When MacIntyre's theory is applied in the Dutch context, I concluded that Dutch moral tradition is alive and also with regard to the military. The main tenets of wider Dutch moral tradition - freedom and equality as well as solidarity and tolerance - are reflected in the military virtues. However, the perspective from the moral tradition allows for some other observations. The emphasis on the military as an institution, an instrument, rather than a practice could cause some problems. It could affect the necessarily reciprocal relationship between the nation and the armed forces and between the soldier and the state. The latter is based on a covenant in which the soldier accepts total liability in exchange for the trust in the nation that it will fulfil its duty towards the soldier and his relatives. This covenant is a fiduciary relation, based on mutual trust.

8.10.3. Putting more emphasis on the military as a practice rather than a mere instrument could improve mutual understanding and prevent a possible erosion of the covenant. It would enable to give ample room for military virtues related to the practice, rather than an institutional code. Military virtues embedded in the soldier's character could provide a more stable moral guidance and could add to the prevention of derailments. The effects of a military character could also better be represented in institutional decision making, which could also result in a more balanced policy that reflects the covenant. The realisation that the relationship between the nation and its soldiers is based on a covenant could improve the relationship between the two, based on empathy and accepting that language has its limitations. Finally, yet importantly, the virtuous soldier is also a citizen and from that perspective the soldier's role in keeping the moral traditions alive, extends well beyond the military practice. However, these changes will not be created by itself, they will need a continuous effort based on a clear policy.

Annex A to chapter 8: 'A fairytale'⁹⁴

Once upon a time there was a director of city affairs (prince) in a large city (a prosperous country far away). He was a successful director! He was young (and beautiful) and managed city affairs well. He was sure to become a mayor (king) some day. This was not only the opinion of the other directors and the members of the city council, the director himself thought so too. For that reason, he worked hard and took great care to avoid mistakes. One of the city services over which the director had supervision was the Fire brigade. The director of city affairs had a good working relationship with the commandant of the fire department. The commandant in his turn thought the director is a capable manager and a nice fellow.

One day the commandant was asked to report to the director. After they had a cup of coffee and exchanged gossip, the director told the commandant the city had a budgetary problem, and the question was how to find a solution for this financial deficit. However, he developed a wonderful scheme to solve the financial problem without hurting the citizens. What if the fire department would focus on the prevention of fires breaking out? In the long run, he then would be able to implement budget cuts and trim the size of the fire department without endangering the interests of the citizens! On the contrary, in the end, the city would be a safer place to live in!

The commandant thought it was, in principle, a good idea and promised to look into it. And so the fire department became the leading agency in initiating and implementing a serious fire-prevention-plan. The program was received with great enthusiasm. Especially the elder fire-fighters were strongly motivated to participate: they knew all too well what havoc and tragedy fires could bring. And due to the effective prevention programme, the number of fires declined. As a result, the director and the commandant agreed to a reduction on the number of fire-stations and as a result the strength of the fire department could be reduced by an impressive 50%. Everybody was happy. The mayor was happy, the director was happy, the commandant was happy and even most of the fire-fighters (at least those who could stay on the force) were happy.

In the mean time, the prevention programme continued and with great success! The number of fires declined further. At one time, there were even young fire-fighters that had never fought a real fire. When more veterans retired even the number of wild stories of terrible fires and how they had fought these, diminished. That did not mean that the fire-fighters did nothing, on the contrary. They were active in the prevention programme, they trained and exercised, and they polished their fire-engines. The commandant was well pleased with his men; his hose-men as he called them affectionately.

Then, one day the commandant was once again invited by the director of city affairs. The director asked whether the strength of the fire department could be reduced further. The commandant protested vehemently: the risks for the citizens would be too high! The director nodded thoughtfully. 'I see your point,' he said. 'But how am I going to explain this to the town council? When there are no fires, the people do not see fire-engines racing through the streets. Then politicians start asking questions. They haven't a clue

⁹⁴ This annex contains a translated and edited version of an earlier publication by: de Vries, P. H. (2000). "Sprookje." *Carré* 23(5): 6-9.

what instant availability means in terms of capabilities.' The director fell silent. The commandant understood the nature of the problem and did not speak either. But suddenly the director jumped up from his chair and cried: 'Eureka!' The commandant - lacking a classical education - looked bewildered. The director noticed the bewilderment and said: 'That means I've got it.' He continued: 'Your men must turn out more often! We must invest in civil support! We will get more visibility and fewer difficult questions!' The commandant immediately grasped what the director meant, and he felt much relieved. He promised the director to take prompt action and left in a hurry.

Soon after the citizens saw fire-engines racing through the streets, sometimes even with their loud horns at full blast. Not that there was a fire somewhere but to deliver civil support: they drained cellars, they assisted in fixing Christmas decorations throughout the city, and they helped the elderly to move and saved kittens from trees. The citizens were proud of their fire department and no questions were asked in the town council. Also the fire-fighters were proud: at last they were able to show what they were capable of. And they wanted to do things even better! The training programme with ladder-engines was intensified and fire-fighters with a fear of heights were sent to therapy. In the newspapers there were glowing stories about the excellent cooperation between the fire department and the society for the prevention of cruelty to animals, the town transport services, the homes for the elderly, etc. Everybody seemed happy. However, the idea of fire and the dangers involved slowly disappeared into the background and from the collective memory.

Then, one day the commandant went to visit the director. The director was very happy to see the commandant. The commandant explained the reason for his visit. It had been coming for some time, but now his fire-engines really needed replacement. They were not used as often as they used to be, but nevertheless, they were now at the end of their life. It was very expensive to keep them running and by investing in new engines, they could reduce the running costs. The director was dismayed. He thought it not fair to ask for new fire-engines. They were silent. The director said sullenly: 'Fire-engines, you never use them anyway. Why not ask for ladder-engines?' The commandant said nothing. Then the director started speaking; 'OK, I see your point. But this is not the moment to ask for extra budget. My suggestion is that you take half of your fire-engines out of service and use these to keep the other half running. I know it is not what you want, but it is the best I can offer.' The commandant looked surprised and disappointed and started to protest, but the director cut him short: 'It really is the best at this moment. Maybe some time later on we will be able to create a real solution. But now I have got to go as I have an appointment with the mayor.' and the director left the room. The commandant left as well and did as the director had suggested.

Some time later the commandant again went to see the director to ask for serious investments. The director seemed irritated. 'Tell me,' he said, 'what was the last time we had a serious fire in this city?' The commandant thought hard and long, but he could not come up with the appropriate date. 'You see!' the director said, 'Fires are obsolete and so are fire-engines. We will skip these altogether. We will make an arrangement with our neighbour cities to come to our support in case of an emergency. I will see to that. However, I do recognize the need for investments, so I will take care you can buy another ladder-engines. Those you use at least. Sorry, but I have got to go.' And off was the director. Therefore the commandant put the remaining fire-engines out of service

and bought a new ladder-engine, and as new material was scarce, there was a lot of commotion about in which station this brand new engine was to be posted.

Then, one day, a fire broke out. Due to the prevention programme in which every building was fitted with a fire-detection system which was connected to the central operations centre, the fire was spotted immediately, and the fire stations reacted promptly. In no less than three minutes, several engines were at the location of the fire, a small industrial zone at the outskirts of the city. Unfortunately, they were all ladder-engines. The fire could not be stopped and spread. Finally, the only remaining fire-engine arrived, but nobody knew exactly how to operate the machine. However, thanks for the efforts of some old hands they were able to get water pressure on the sprayer. But then what? Nobody knew what to do. Surely they had been trained, but that was long ago, and they missed proficiency. Fortunately, the commandant arrived in person and took command. 'Come on hosiers keep the adjacent premises soaked!' After some explanation the other fire-fighters understood what was expected, but they had only one engine, with two sprays, insufficient to fight the conflagration and they could not prevent the fire from spreading further to a residential building. Suddenly someone cried out: 'There are people on the top floor!' And indeed, on the balcony of the top floor a mother was visible with two small children, who clung to her skirt and cried for help. Now the ladder-engines came pat to the purpose. After a few seconds the first was deployed. But nothing happened. One after the other fire-fighter refused to go up. Not that they were afraid of the height; they all had therapy and extensive experience from getting kittens out of trees. It was the fire that prevented their action. They knew you could get terribly burned by fire. However, they intuitively sensed that something was amiss, so they discussed the situation: 'Look here, we are not trained for this kind of dangerous work.' said one. 'And not paid either!' said another. 'I do not even know those people.' said a third, 'How can I be expected to run serious risks for people I do not even know!' Another said: 'We have only one fire-engine. This is useless.' And no matter what the commandant did; he implored, he begged, he even ordered! No fire-fighter mounted the ladder.

That night a large part of the city was reduced to ashes and hundreds of citizens perished. The director of city affairs was not there to share in the sorrow; he had been promoted to mayor of another city a few weeks before the disaster struck. Some time after the disaster, the commandant was promoted too; he became a director in the international organisation on the prevention of fires. However, in a few years the city is rebuilt and one of the first buildings that was completed was a fire-station with brand new fire-engines. And after a while the citizens forgot what happened and lived happily ever after.

The moral of the story

The fairytale carries morals at different levels. The first concerns the extent in which the covenant is honoured. Fire-fighters are willing to run serious risks for the benefit of society as a whole: risks that cannot be computed in terms of contracts and salary. In this context, mutual trust is the core of the bond between the town and its citizens and those who protect them. The citizens should be able to trust their protectors that they will do their duty when required, even at great liability. In return, the protectors should be able to trust their citizens and the institutions they build to provide the appropriate means with which they have to operate and the appropriate context in which they are

deployed. Failure to maintain the covenant can have serious consequences. Short-term political expediency can seriously undermine the mutual trust on which the covenant rests. Especially when this expediency concerns capabilities that requires long-term investments in both material and personnel.

The second point is that we must keep a sharp focus on the ultimate purpose of capabilities. Short-term benefits often are to the detriment of long-term effectiveness. In this fairytale, the purpose of the fire department, which is fire-fighting, was ultimately lost. Not that the fire-department cannot rescue kittens from trees, but it is not their core-business! An appropriate focus on its primary purpose gives direction to the organisation of the capabilities required to fulfil that purpose: in structure, in procedures, in equipment and in its culture. Of course the capabilities can be deployed for other purposes as well, but this must not lead to a reversal of priorities.

A third issue is that a clear purpose; creates a clear focus for selecting of personnel and the further process of education, training and exercising. The importance of this issue cannot be overestimated: the men and women in an organisation are the key to its overall effectiveness. Furthermore, a clear purpose provides direction to the institution and creates the prerequisites for the flourishing of the practices involved. This means a culture in which aspiration for excellence is accepted, if not stimulated. In such case the goods of excellence and the goods of effectiveness are mutually stimulating resulting in better effectiveness and better performances.

Chapter 9: general discussion and conclusions

Introduction

9.1. MacIntyre in his book 'After Virtue' uses the concept of a quest: 'The unity of human life is the unity of a narrative quest... The only criteria for success or failure in human life as a whole are the criteria of success or failure in a narrated or to be narrated quest.'¹ He discerns two key features of a quest. The first is that there must be, at least some, determinate conception of a final telos: an ultimate goal. But secondly a quest is not a search for something already adequately characterized. He states: 'It is in the course of the quest and only through encountering and coping with the various particular harms, dangers, temptations and distractions which provide any quest with its episodes and incidents that the goal of the quest is finally to be understood.'² The conception of this thesis can also be defined as a quest, as: 'A quest is always an education both as to the character of that which is sought and in self-knowledge.'³

Motivation and justification

9.2.1. I started this thesis by arguing that 'new' wars require more moral strengths from soldiers than 'old' wars did. First of all the challenges to morality have grown and changed. The 'new' wars are fought mostly on the level of small units which means that junior soldier (OR, NCO's and officers) have to bear the brunt of moral decision-making. Furthermore, these small units operate in relative isolation, as generally speaking there is only a limited number of troops in an extended area of operations. Often there is no direct support from the higher echelons available, both material as well as moral. The unpredictability of armed confrontations and the variety in intensity adds to the pressure on small units and their soldiers. Also the moral complexity of 'new' wars has increased: the opposing fighters are mostly in civilian attire which makes it hard to distinguish them from peaceable civilians and they can also ignore the rule of international rule of law. In short, in 'new' wars soldiers face far more morally complex situations than in 'old' wars.

9.2.2. At the same time the soldier's moral conduct has become more important. Nowadays democratic constitutional states are not involved in an armed struggle in which the survival, the continuous existence, of the nation state is in jeopardy. When these states get involved in an armed conflict it is mostly by contributing to an international intervention in order to restore the international rule of law. As 'defenders' of the rule of law it is of paramount importance that their forces adhere to this rule. Otherwise they would lose their moral high ground. Any breach of these rules would seriously damage the image of the intervening forces and could impede their public and international political support. And when such a breach occurs it would be very hard to organize a cover-up, because of the wide spread 'open source' media coverage of any armed intervention. Therefore the modern democratic constitutional state has a vested interest in deploying morally responsible soldiers; not only from a political perspective, but also to avoid compromising their mental health.⁴ The question is how to create morally responsible soldiers.

¹ MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P219.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ This motive has two perspectives. It is a matter of concern and care for the soldiers as well as a case of self-interest to avoid disablement and claims for incurred personal injuries like PTSS, etc.

9.2.3. My assumption is that an approach based on virtue ethics would be best suited to enhance the morality of soldiers. My first argument is that the notion of virtue ethics is closely connected to the concept of a practice. It is in the practice that the relevant virtues are acquired and demonstrated. This means that the virtues are attainable for all participants, which in military practice means for all soldiers: private soldiers, non-commissioned officers and officers. Furthermore, it is possible to develop virtues which are suited to the requirements of practices, the military practice included. These virtues can be further developed and maintained by education, training and emulating exemplary fellow humans. However, it is important to realize that embedding virtues in character is not a simple matter. It requires a consistent and enduring effort by skilled instructors and leaders, backed by a strong policy. Furthermore, this policy must be based on a thorough investigation on the appropriate ways and means required to achieve the policy's end. Eventually the virtues are embedded in a soldier's character, and thereby are relatively stable moral dispositions; an important asset in complex situations in which rules are difficult to apply. Embedded virtues are an important advantage given the burden resting on small units which often operate in isolation. Being virtuous also implies that the virtuous aspire to achieve the standards of excellence of the practice. From this perspective virtue ethics is particularly suited to military practice, as excellence in handling the implements of war, abiding by the rules and close cooperation between soldiers and the resulting cohesion within units are essential parts of the military practice. This also means that being virtuous contributes to the overall effectiveness of military activities. Participating in a practice together with others, fuels cohesion, which is another asset of effective military operations. Lastly, virtue ethics allows for a multiple interpretation of moral experience. Not only reason, but also the other capabilities of the individuals involved are taken into account: which options are feasible, which options are within the agent's grasp? Situational elements are also considered a part of the moral equation. This feature is especially relevant in a practice in which the unexpected seems to be the norm. These arguments provide strong indications that virtue ethics is indeed especially suitable to develop, impose, support and maintain a military framework of ethics. The next question was how to proceed.

Research question and outline

9.3.1. I aimed at developing a practical framework of military ethics using the theory of virtue ethics as elaborated by Alasdair MacIntyre in his book 'After Virtue'. My hypothesis was that this theory would provide a suitable instrument to identify, develop, instil and uphold the required moral standards in the military.⁵ My central aim was to develop a framework that could serve as the outline of a policy on how to apply virtue ethics in military practice in order to ensure that individual soldiers will uphold adequate moral standards in their actions in 'new' wars. My secondary aim was to contribute to the body of theory on virtue-ethics and its practical application. My third aim was to assist the Royal Netherlands Armed Forces - in which I served for 35 years - in upholding the moral character of their military personnel. It was for this reason that the Dutch armed forces were my primary frame of reference. These are well suited for my research as the Netherlands are a traditional democratic constitutional state which frequently deploys its armed forces in international expeditionary operations.

⁵ MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co.

9.3.2. MacIntyre's theory promises a clear understanding of a specific practice and the related virtues. It also explains the role of institutional structures in supporting practices. The theory further relates the role of narrative in imbuing virtues and provides arguments to maintain a close link between the practices and their virtues and the wider morality. My overall aim was to come forward with a framework that provides tangible means to address practical issues in military ethics. In order to ascertain the applicability of my framework, I interviewed a number of veteran soldiers who had proven operational experience; as it is in operations that the real nature of the military practice is found. In order to validate my findings I also interviewed members of two other professions: one with clear characteristics of a practice (medical care) and one with a less apparent resemblance to a practice (municipal civil servants). In order to provide a further yardstick on military morality, I not only investigated the Dutch policy but also those of other democratic constitutional states with which the Netherlands maintains close ties and cooperates militarily: France, the German Federal Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States. Finally, I investigated to what extent a specific framework of military ethics could be part of the wider moral traditions of Dutch society.

9.3.3. I started my research with elaborating on virtue ethics and how the concepts used in this theory could be interpreted. From this wider perspective I then looked into MacIntyre's theory and the concepts he uses. From this analysis sprung one conclusion which pertained to the concept of a practice. MacIntyre claims that a practice is autotelic and serves only the activities which are constituent of the practice and the related standards of excellence and none other. I found convincing arguments that some practices have a wider purpose. In his theory MacIntyre also claims a direct relationship between practices, the reasons why practices are attractive and the appropriate virtues. I therefore made an analysis of these concepts in the military context. Next, I investigated MacIntyre's use of the concept of narrative and its relevance in imbuing virtues. These investigations resulted in specific 'translations' of these concepts in a (Dutch) military context. Next, I conducted the interviews in order to validate my findings. I found that the framework I developed could count on considerable support. Also, the international comparison provides a positive view as to the relevance of my framework.

9.3.4. In the second part of my thesis I focussed on the role of the institution, the armed forces, and their relation to society in general and the nation's wider moral traditions. I conclude that there are no discrepancies between the morality of the ethical framework I proposed and wider Dutch moral tradition; even in the face of the non-military attitude of the larger part of the Dutch public. However I did argue that there is a potential risk which pertains to the quality of the relations between the military practice and the military institution, the armed forces. This reflects a wider development in Dutch society in which institutions claim an increasingly bigger role in shaping practices. As a result the institutional goods of effectiveness seem to infringe on the goods of excellence of the practices. My conclusion is that practices need to (re) claim their role and their goods of excellence in order to maintain the virtuous character of their practices. If they fail in this respect, they will eventually lose their virtues which will mean the loss of their characteristics as a practice as well. In the end there will only be institutional instrumentality to the detriment of the quality of practices and of society as a whole.

Main findings

9.4.1. MacIntyre defines a **practice** as: *'any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, an partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved are systematically extended.'* Looking at the first part I concluded that military activities are conducted within an institutional setting that is part of the larger state institution. As such the military is socially established. Military activities are complex because of the many aspects that are involved in the activity: mission, men, material, time, space and doctrine. Coherence is required in order to produce the overall aspired to result. Because of the complexity of the activities, cooperation between the members of the military is a *'conditio sine qua non'*. From these perspectives, military activities do qualify as a practice. I proceeded by analyzing the practice and identifying the constitutive elements of military practice: task, arms, cooperation, enemies, danger and an undetermined time and place as well as rules that govern the practice.

9.4.2. I also found convincing arguments that practices are not necessarily autotelic; some serve a purpose beyond merely participating in the activities of the practice. These **purposive practices** also serve wider goals. Healthcare is not only a practice in which practitioners aim at achieving standards of excellence in helping their patients; the practice also serves the wider goal of ensuring public health. Similar relations can be found in education, justice, the police and of course the military. Without such a wider purpose military activities would be mere banditry.

9.4.3. Next, I looked at the second part of the definition and undertook a first attempt to identify which **internal goods** are inherent to the military practice: the reasons why people want to join the military. The goods I identified are based on the constitutive elements - the defining characteristics - of military practice and the expectations of those who join the military. These are: satisfaction in accomplishing tasks, pride in wearing an uniform and bearing arms, a feeling of belonging as a result of close cooperation in a primary group, contentment in overcoming the enemy, excitement and thrill in facing danger, the challenge and adventure of strange places, the structure and stability provided by clear rules. Almost always there is a combination of some internal goods that appeal to those who want to join the military. However, MacIntyre's assumption of a direct relation between some internal goods and specific virtues could not be corroborated. I did not find conclusive evidence of a one on one relation between a specific characteristic of military practice and a particular internal good; these connections are more complex.

9.4.4. In my further analysis of the last part of MacIntyre's definition I identified seven **virtues** of military character. These are: sense of responsibility, military competence, courage, comradeship, respect - for fellow soldiers, civilians and even the enemy - resilience, and discipline. These virtues of military character are a prerequisite to establish what needs to be done. How to achieve what needs to be done is a matter of deliberation which requires the virtue of intellect: practical wisdom. These seven virtues of military character and the virtue of practical wisdom cover all aspects of military practice, and their number needs no extending. If I would delete one of these seven virtues, I would ignore one of the constitutive parts of military practice and possibly the

internal goods that are closely related with it. The number of virtues is also a matter of establishing the right mean: not too many and not too few. The virtues I identified are tangible; they accommodate the pursuit of excellence and provide clear goals - and also yardsticks - for military education and training and personal development. The acquisition of these, allow a soldier to be truly virtuous. I thereby created a body of military professional ethics that could provide guidance on morally responsible conduct under the specific - and sometimes extreme - circumstances in which the military has to operate, while keeping within the bounds of the rule of law.

9.4.5. **Narrative** is an important feature of MacIntyre's theory. It provides the necessary context in practices, supports the development of the virtues and creates a unified identity. The first two functions can be easily understood. Stories provide practical clues on what to expect and what is appropriate to do in a specific context. Especially in a military context - which in many respects is very different from ordinary life - stories are an indispensable tool to convey the abstract ideas as well as the concrete consequences of being a member of the military. Over time - by instruction, training, exercising, education and experience, all activities involving stories - being a member the military will evolve in a typical military bearing, an attitude that cannot be limited to the barracks nor to duty hours only: this bearing becomes part of one's identity. Narrative shapes the relevant context, supports the imbuing of the military virtues, eventually resulting in an overall military bearing. Narrative also creates flexibility for interpretations which suit specific 'tribes' within the military: services, corps, regiments, units etc.

9.4.6. The **reality check** I conducted showed wide support for my findings which were recognized and acknowledged as relevant. The conclusion seems justified that the theory of MacIntyre enables the development of a virtue ethical framework of military ethics. However, there was one element in MacIntyre's theory that seemed problematic and that was the assumed connection between internal goods and virtues. There were indications that such a generic relationship does exist, but I have not been able to particularize this generic relationship on the level of specific internal goods and related virtues. On all the other subjects the interviews gave a strong indication that the virtues I discerned were indeed recognized, acknowledged and accepted by soldiers with proven operational experience. The consistent and strong support further indicated that the outcomes have representative value. This indication was validated by the parallel survey among civil servants and healthcare workers. The overall idea of the military as a practice was supported by the similarities with healthcare workers regarding the strong evaluation of internal goods and virtues and the absence of a primary interest in external goods (job security, salary, status, etc.). Municipal civil servants on the other hand did mention and appreciate these external goods. Nevertheless civil servants acknowledged the virtues I discerned as relevant for their professional activities. This seems to foreclose the necessity to insert 'typical' civil concepts in a moral guideline for the MOD.

9.4.7. The overall outcome of my practical survey did provide support for my assumption that: '...the theory of virtue ethics as elaborated by Alasdair MacIntyre in his book 'After Virtue' provides a suitable instrument to identify, develop, instil and uphold the required moral standards in the military.' The description of the **military virtues** I identified are listed below.

Responsibility



Investigating a cache of Improvised Explosive Devices, vicinity Tarin Kowt (Uruzgan, Afghanistan) 2008, August 12. Photo: Audiovisuele Dienst Defensie.

Sense of responsibility is the disposition to try to accomplish allotted tasks as well as possible. This disposition requires the right balance between on the one hand a negative attitude of shirking and scraping through and on the other hand an equally negative attitude of blind zeal and fanatically pursuing a mission when circumstances have changed. It also implies being prepared to account for one's actions.

Competence



F 16 pilot on a training mission. 2011, July 19. Foto Audiovisuele Dienst Defensie.

Competence is the disposition to acquire the knowledge and skills to serve (weapon) systems as well as the ability to perceive the effects these systems can produce. This disposition requires the right balance between, on the one hand, an attitude of thinking that a rough general knowledge will do and that this won't come to serious problems and on the other hand, an attitude of exaggerated attention for material and rules and wanting to do everything by the book and so hampering practical operations.

Comradeship



Reconnaissance crew in front of their vehicle. Operation Bagchi Baaz, vicinity Mazar , (Uruzgan, Afghanistan) 2010, June 16. Photo: Audiovisuele Dienst Defensie.

Comradeship is the disposition to share moral and practical support with fellow soldiers with whom one shares hardship and duress. This disposition requires a right balance between, on the one hand, a negative attitude of egotism, without any concern for others and on the other hand, an attitude of an exaggerate attention for other group members and their opinions and uncritical support of group actions.

Respect



Paying respect to other soldiers: a last salute in a ramp ceremony.
Kamp Holland (Uruzgan, Afghanistan)
2009 September 9.
Photo: Mark Leijsen.



Communicating respectfully with civilians.
Vicinity Chora (Uruzgan, Afghanistan)
2007, April 17.
Photo: Audiovisuele Dienst Defensie.



Suspected enemy fighters behind bars treated with respect.
As Samawah (Iraq)
2004, September 12.
Photo: Ruud de Mol, Koninklijke Marine.

Respect is the disposition to value people as fellow human beings. This disposition requires a right balance between, on the one hand, a negative attitude of contempt and authoritarian behaviour toward others and on the other hand, an attitude of blind infatuation and exaggerated concern for any others. Respect does not only pertain to the members of the same group but also to other soldiers; military subordinates and superiors, as well as to civilians and even the enemy is entitled to a respectful treatment when fallen into our hands.

Courage



Major Royal Netherlands Air Force, J.N. Mulder is awarded the Military order of William by her Majesty Queen Juliana in The Hague, 1948. Photo: Nederlands Instituut voor Militaire Historie.

Courage is the disposition to take personal risks in order to achieve an important goal. This disposition requires a right balance between, on the one hand, an attitude of avoiding risks and cowardice and on the other hand, an attitude of recklessness and taking unnecessary risks for yourself and others. Courage is not only displayed in taking physical risks but also in showing moral vigour.

Resilience



Dutch Marine of the Netherlands UN Detachment during an operation in the Korean War (1953-1956). Photo: Nederlands Instituut voor Militaire Historie.

Resilience is the disposition to persevere in the face of adverse conditions and physical exhaustion and mental distress. This disposition requires the right balance between, on the one hand, an attitude of weakness, self pity and resignation at the smallest misfortune and on the other hand, an attitude of overestimating ones capabilities and not taking human limits into account, eventually resulting in collapse. Resilience has both a physical and a mental component.

Discipline



Commissioning of Royal Netherlands Navy's submarine HMS K 17, 1933, December 19.
Photo: +.

Discipline is the disposition to abide by rules and regulations. This disposition requires a right balance between, on the one hand, a negative attitude resulting in a neglect of rules by which one might endanger oneself and others and on the other hand, an attitude of strict adherence by rules and taking these literally which frustrates the progress of the work at hand.

Practical wisdom



Leadership of the Kings company, 11 Guards Battalion Grenadiers & Rifles deliberating in the vicinity of Kandahar (Afghanistan), 2006 January 6. Photo: Audiovisuele Dienst Defensie.

Practical wisdom is the disposition that enables a person to perceive a situation, to deliberate on what is appropriate and to act accordingly. The virtues of character identify the need for action, the virtue of practical wisdom enables a person to determine how to act. This disposition requires a right balance between, on the one hand, a wavering conduct and inconclusive action in case of pressure or any other emergency and on the other hand, immediate and impulsive action at the first hint of difficulties. Practical wisdom entails keeping a clear head, taking full account of the situation and taking decisive action. When displayed in leading others it also entails strong directive guidance while leaving room for initiative and displaying strong personal commitment.

9.4.8. When compared with the virtue-ethical framework I developed, the present Dutch **code of conduct** has some problematic features. First of all the framework has a coherent theoretical foundation which the present (rather eclectic) code lacks. In the second place the framework addresses issues relevant of military operational practice, while the present code primarily addresses institutional values. It is precisely the lack of operational relevance that impedes conveying the practical essence of the code. The present code is rule-based, and rules invite circumvention and this eventually erodes the code and could affect the moral standards of the soldiers. A framework which aims at character building will create a more stable disposition to adhere not only to the rules as such, but also to the spirit of the rules and the values embedded in those rules. Furthermore a code based on the virtue-ethical framework will be better comparable with other international codes which could contribute to improving international military cooperation. Introducing civil concepts in a code in order to address the civilian employees of the MOD seems to be superfluous.

9.4.9. After investigating the military as a purposive practice, I next directed my attention at the military as an **institution**. The military is a purposive practice; to defend the interests of the Dutch constitutional state. This means that the values which are embedded in the Dutch constitution should be part of the standards upheld by the practice. This obligation is captured in the oath all Dutch soldiers take on entering the institution of the armed forces. The institution provides - beside continuity and stability for the practice - also the means to acquire external goods: money, status and power. At the institutional level these external goods provide little attractiveness. However, at the individual level these external goods do provide interesting incentives, including: job security, educational development and opportunities for promotion, resulting in an increase in salary and internal power and status.

Some argue that these external goods gain in importance due to the increasing appreciation of material benefits as a prerequisite for individual flourishing.

9.4.10. The institutional **emphasis on goods of effectiveness**, rather than goods of excellence - in the military as well as in other sectors - results in introducing regulations and norms to secure the institutional goods of effectiveness, but which often are alien to the practice and its standards of excellence. In order to prevent a possible slipping of standards, including moral, a code of conduct was introduced in the Dutch armed forces. Consequently this code was inspired primarily by institutional values rather than virtues pertaining to the practice. And although it appears that the overall integrity of the personnel of the armed forces has improved, the code has little appeal and fails to convey practical relevance.

9.4.11. The relationship between the military practice and the institution of the armed forces could also be perceived from the perspective of **praxis and poiesis**. These concepts provide a tool, an angle of refraction, to look at military reality. In the praxis the soldier is the pivot while in poiesis it is the institution. Practices cannot survive without institutional support. However, a balance is required. Without the appropriate institutional support the practice would have difficulties in sustaining continuity and providing the means necessary for the activities of the practice as well as developing its standards of excellence. On the other hand, too much institutional interference with its ensuing emphasis on goods of effectiveness could encumber the practice and its goods of excellence. In the Netherlands there is widespread feeling that in certain sectors

institutional interests seem to prevail over those of the practice. These sectors include - among others - medical care and education, but also in the military this development is noticeable. It is particularly manifest in the code of conduct which reflects institutional interests rather than practical virtues. It can also be detected in the instrumental approach of the military in a wider context. The military seems to be seen as a mere instrument of state, comparable with the service of internal revenue, public transport, healthcare and the like. However, the virtue ethical approach of the military practice can also have a positive influence on the performance of the institution that supports the practice, the armed forces. A virtue-ethical framework could provide the armed forces with a unified and coherent code with obvious relevance to the practice. It could contribute to achieving higher standards of excellence which would also improve the operational effectiveness of the armed forces. As the armed forces have a closed personnel system, eventually the virtues would play a role in the governance of the armed forces as well. This could prevent a further widening of the gap between military practice and institutional poiesis; perhaps even contribute to diminishing this fissure.

9.4.12. The last element of MacIntyre's theory pertains to **moral tradition**. He argues that 'the past is never something to be discarded, but that the present is intelligible only as a commentary upon and response to the past...' In this moral traditions the argument centres characteristically in part around the question how to sustain and improve a practice and the goods involved. Living traditions involve practices in which the tenets of the tradition are embodied; and the standards of excellence of a practice find their anchorage in the virtues. I conclude that the gist of Dutch moral tradition has remained remarkably stable. The characteristics of this living Dutch moral tradition are: freedom and equality; political and religious tolerance; cooperativeness and solidarity; both internal and in its international orientation. I did not find any contradiction between the military virtues and this wider Dutch moral tradition; on the contrary the military virtues of character reflect the tenets of wider moral tradition, albeit in a specific manner.

9.4.13. Another feature of Dutch moral tradition is its non-military character. This is a long-standing fact and it is not feasible to want to change this characteristic of tradition, which has such an enduring and deeply rooted origin. A side effect of this tradition is a generic lack of knowledge of the military. This pertains to the capacities of the military and what these can achieve, to the complexities involved in the deployment of the military and bringing to bear its ultimately lethal power, and to the nature of the bond between the nation and its military in which the soldiers might have to face a complete liability for their actions: being killed in action. However, this does not mean that it would be unattainable for the military to improve on the **relationship between the military and wider society**. This could be achieved if the military were to reclaim their status as a practice, rather than an institutional instrument of state. This would first of all affect the internal culture: goods of excellence would be reinstated as at least at par with goods of effectiveness. Such a change would not go unnoticed by the wider public and this could create a different and more positive attitude towards the military. It would be relatively easy to emphasize the 'obvious' link between civic virtues and the corresponding military virtues and vice versa. This link would enhance an appropriate wider frame of reference for soldiers and for citizens it could promote a better understanding of the military. The virtuous soldier would probably be a virtuous citizen as well. If the military would be able to emphasise its virtuous character and its

aspiration at excellence, the public perception could improve as well. Consequently it could revive the awareness of the bond between the nation and the military. It is even possible that the military would provide a model for other practices suffering from too much institutional infringement. Also the role of the virtuous soldier in the wider society - in clubs, sports, schools, etc. - could be emphasised in order to show that a virtuous military has wider social benefits as well. Such a development would take time to produce tangible results, but what is a decade compared to the enduring tradition in which the Dutch nation and its military stands.

9.4.14. Then there remained only one issue and that pertains to the relation between the nation-state and its military: how to shape that bond? This relationship is under pressure from both an institutional as an obligatory perspective. The institutional perspective underestimates the nature of the military as a practice which hampers communication and mutual understanding. The obligatory perspective shows a lack of understanding of the bond between the nation and the military. This bond is peculiar as soldiers who join the armed forces accept an unlimited liability. I concluded that this kind of bond cannot be captured in a modern contract, but is primarily a matter of a **covenant**. A covenant binds the community and the individuals over time and implies a strong moral obligation even in difficult times and in the face of danger. A covenant is a 'fiduciary relationship' which rests on mutual trust and confidence. To maintain a covenant the parties must stay aware of the obligations a covenant entails. In the Dutch case the present awareness of the covenant and its consequences seems weak. This could be the result of the 'non-military' nature of the Dutch nation, a general lack of knowledge of the military and the consequences of military action as well as the increasing emphasis on the goods of effectiveness based on a primarily institutional and instrumental approach of the military.

Conclusions

9.5.1. The **ethical framework based on military virtues of character and the virtue of intellect, practical wisdom**, addresses military operational practice. This feature, the practical value the framework of military virtues, is indeed recognized, acknowledged and accepted by soldiers as relevant and important in military practice. This conclusion is based on the interviews I conducted and the ensuing comparison with other professional activities, the research of other sources and an international comparison. Many of those whom I interviewed supported the idea that virtues can be developed by (further) education, training, exercising, living up to exemplary professionals, role models, and of course experience. This pertains to all soldiers: private soldiers non-commissioned officers and officers. Narrative provides an important element in imbuing these virtues. Narrative creates a shared frame of reference and provides the necessary links to wider society. However, narrative while contributing to a common consent on what is important, leaves room for specific interpretations that fit the requirements of specific services, corps and regiments. The virtue-ethical framework I developed could create a tangible link with the (operational) reality and thus it would be easier to incorporate the tenets of the framework in education, training and exercise.

9.5.2. As the framework based on virtues is founded on internal dispositions to act in accordance with the standards of excellence, the overall technical and moral quality of the soldiers - and as a result the quality and the effectiveness the armed forces in general - could increase. The virtues embedded in the military character promote that virtuous

soldiers will act in accordance with the rules. When the complexity of a situation refutes the strict application of rules, the virtuous soldier will act in accordance with the overall spirit of the rules that apply. However building a military character will require a strong and continuous effort in the field of education and training, based on the exertions of a vigorous leadership backed by a clear policy.

9.5.3. My findings largely confirmed my hypothesis that MacIntyre's theory indeed provides a suitable instrument to identify, develop, instil and uphold the required moral standards in the military. Some of my findings gave reasons to adjust some elements of MacIntyre's theory (e.g. in the case of internal goods), but these adaptations did not disavow his theory. Based on his theory I developed a framework of military ethics that found support by those experienced soldiers I interviewed and also by other sources and by international comparison. At the same time I found that applying the framework in the Dutch armed forces would contribute to overcoming some of the shortcomings in the present Dutch policy on morality.

Theoretical implications

9.6. In this thesis I did not only elaborate on the theory of virtue ethics in general and its specific interpretation by Alasdair MacIntyre but I also reflected on other theories and not only philosophical theories. Van Tongeren uses the term hermeneutical ethics, which aims at using a variety of theories, traditions and concepts in ethical reflection.⁶ Hermeneutical enquiry tries to enhance understanding of the whole by investigating the constitutive parts and vice versa. From a hermeneutical point of view reflecting on morally appropriate behaviour is not only a matter of theory, but is also an affair of character and behaviour influenced by situational circumstances, moral intuitions and the culture and the nature of men. All should be taken into account in order to interpret facts and to come to a more complete picture of a specific situation or concept. Empirical ethics has a similar aim. Empirical ethics seeks to enhance the context sensitivity of moral rules and regulations, thus enhancing the practical value of these rules and their applicability. This approach aims at achieving this goal by describing and analyzing the cultural and organisational aspects of practices and institutions and their context, including the procedures and processes and the relations between those involved in the practice and the institution. Thus it wants to establish the relevant aspects in judging the practical applicability of moral rules and regulations.⁷ Thus this approach does not focus only on normative theory and its broad principles which should govern human conduct. Empirical ethics takes seriously how people, active in specific practices and institutions think and act, how they shape their standards by which they act and what their convictions are. Empirical ethics explicitly takes on the responsibility to provide tangible means to provide practical guidance on morally appropriate conduct. This requires not only philosophy but also the use of other social sciences as well as empirical research.⁸ This thesis could provide an example on what can be achieved by an approach based on hermeneutical enquiry and empirical philosophy.

⁶ Tongeren, v., P. (2012). *Leven is een kunst*. Zoetermeer, Klement. P 62-64, 75, 221-224.

⁷ Musschenga, B. (2004). "Empirische ethiek: contextsensitiviteit of contextualiteit." *Ethische perspectieven* 14(1): 27- 41. P 27 – 28.

⁸ Ibid, P 39.

Practical implications

9.7.1. As to the practical implications I already made some observations. The method I developed could serve as a frame of reference and used as a tool to investigate other practices and which standards of excellence would be appropriate. Furthermore the notions of praxis and poiesis could help in clarifying the relation between a practice and the institution by which it is supported. As to the military, I am convinced that application of the framework of military virtues of character and the virtue of practical wisdom could lead to several improvements pertaining to the military practice and its supporting institution. Ideally the Dutch MOD would adopt the scheme I developed, as a groundwork for its moral policy, in which case the following consequences or practical implications could occur.

- The virtues are the central feature of the MOD's moral policy. They are closely related to the constituent elements of military practice and the internal goods for which young people join the armed forces. These circumstances enhance their relevance and improve acceptance by the soldiers.
- The virtue-ethical policy aims at all ranks and categories and will be instilled by education, training, exercises and experience. Narrative and role models play an important part in this process of building a military character.
- The virtue-ethical policy is flexible in its application and will be easily adopted throughout the Dutch armed forces. The virtues will remain the same while the context may differ. This makes the framework of virtues perfectly suited to be introduced defence wide. It will create a common consent while leaving room for differences. Each service, corps or regiment can insert their own narrative, their own traditions, to elaborate on the importance of the virtues.
- Because of the inherent flexibility in applying the virtue ethical framework it is also valid for the civilian employees of the MOD. The close link with military practice will promote awareness of this feature in a civil job in the MOD.
- The virtuous person, soldiers and civil employees of the MOD, will demonstrate a more stable moral outlook than those who merely abide by rules. The sometimes very demanding circumstances in which especially soldiers have to perform their tasks, requires men of character. Also in more favourable circumstances the virtuous person will act in a morally appropriate way.
- The virtue-ethical policy will enhance effectiveness by promoting cohesion and setting appropriate standards of excellence.
- The framework of virtues will improve international military understanding and cooperation.
- The virtuous soldier and also the virtuous civil employee posted on a primarily institutional job will still keep in mind the requirements of the practice.
- The virtuous soldier and civil employee will also be a virtuous citizen. Thus they will contribute to the social fabric of wider society and promote the reputation of the armed forces.
- Emphasising the nature of the military as primarily a practice will enhance the status of the military and facilitate communication on military affairs.
- Positioning of the military as a practice will revive the relevance of the covenant between the military and the people whom it serves.
- The framework of virtues could act as an example for other sectors in which goods of effectiveness of the institution infringe on the standards of excellence of the practice.

9.7.2. However, to what extent this idealistic picture will be (partially) realised is a matter of policy. The leadership at the MOD will have to decide whether they will give the virtues a chance. Even then, it will require substantive research on the methods and means that could be used in building military character and establishing which prerequisites are required to achieve that goal. Nevertheless, in my opinion implementation will not incur substantial cost. Introducing the concept of virtue-ethics would be largely a matter of rearranging the focus and efforts of military education and training. However, it will take serious effort over a substantial time before it will produce tangible effects. In my opinion it would be well worth the effort.

Epilogue

9.8. 'Assuming then, that we have given (in outline) a sufficient account of happiness and the several virtues, and also of friendship and pleasure, may we regard our undertaking as now completed? Or is the correct view (as we have been saying) in the case of conduct, the end consists not in gaining theoretical knowledge of the several point at issue, but rather putting our knowledge into practice? In that case it is not enough to know about goodness; we must endeavour to possess and use it, or adopt any other means to become good ourselves.'⁹

⁹ Aristotle (2004). The Nicomachean ethics. London, Penguin books. Par. 1179a33-1179b4

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Curriculum Vitae

The author was born in Batavia, the capital of the then Dutch colony Indonesia in 1948 on December 2. In 1952 the family returned to the Netherlands. In 1968 he finished his secondary school and was admitted to the Royal Military Academy. In 1972 Peer de Vries was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the cavalry Regiment Huzaren van Boreel. After finishing his staff college in 1980 he was selected for the Dutch War College (Hogere Krijgsschool) which he completed successfully in 1982. He commanded 103 armoured reconnaissance battalion from 1989 to 1991. After a three year posting as chief of staff of the 1 Armoured Division '7 December' he spent 9 months in the former republic of Yugoslavia as chief operations of the European Community Monitor Mission. After his return in 1997, he was appointed as chief editor of the revision of the Dutch army doctrine. After a short period as head of education at the Senior Defence College (Instituut Defensie Leergangen) he was promoted to brigadier general in 2000 and appointed as deputy director plans and policy of the Dutch Army Staff. General de Vries left the army in December 2003.

After his retirement he remained active in military education as the organizer of the yearly operational seminar for senior officers. In 2009 he organized his last seminar. In 2003 - while still on active duty - brigadier general de Vries enrolled in Utrecht University as a student in philosophy. He achieved his bachelor degree in 2007 and a degree as master in applied ethics in 2009.

In 2010 he wrote a historical novel about a lieutenant in a cavalry regiment in 1813 - 1815. This novel was published at the occasion of the 200 year jubilee of the regiment Huzaren van Boreel in 2013.

Peer de Vries is married with Anneke and lives in Amersfoort. They have two grown up sons and a foster daughter.

The good:

Rear –admiral Karel Willem Frederik Marie Doorman (1889 - 1942) was in command of the Allied Naval Combined Striking Force which fought the Japanese fleet in the Java sea in 1942 on February 27th. The allied fleet was ill prepared and had been at sea for a substantial time. Although lacking intelligence the Japanese fleet was attacked when spotted; Doorman courageously leading the attack. The Japanese fleet was not much larger, but better trained and equipped and the allied fleet was annihilated. The allies lost approximately 1000 sailors, the Japanese fleet a mere ten. Rear-admiral Doorman choose to go down with his ship. Posthumously he was awarded the Military order of William for valour.

The bad:

Raymond Pierre Paul Westerling (1919 - 1987) joined the Royal Netherlands Indian Army (K.N.I.L.) after the war. In 1946 he commanded the special forces corps. In response to the Indonesian bid for independence he unleashed a vicious counterterrorist campaign at first on the Island of Sumatra and in 1947 in southern Celebes. In the course of this campaign approximately 5000 civilians were killed, many by Westerling's own hand. Being a member of the K.N.I.L., which was disbanded after the Indonesian war of liberation, he was never brought to justice. He died in Amsterdam at the age of 70.

The virtuous:

Siebre Erik Hazelhoff Roelfzema (1917 - 2007) was a resistance fighter in the Dutch underground in the first stage of WW II. He escaped to England where in 1942 he was trained as a fighter pilot. As a member of the 139th RAF squadron he flew 72 Pathfinder missions over Germany. He also participated in a number of secret missions in the German occupied Netherlands. He accompanied Queen Wilhelmina on her return to the liberated Netherlands. He was awarded the Military order of William for valour and the British Distinguished Flying Cross. After the war he emigrated to the United States where he died at the age of 90.